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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the relationship between.historical 
structure, human experience and social consciousness in the constitution 
of ethnicity. The area of study is the Jharkhand region of the state of 
Bihar in Northern India.
The development of an ethnic consciousness among the adivasis 
(original inhabitants) of Jharkhand is an integral part of the history of 
British colonialism and of the modem Indian nation-state. This history 
explains the incorporation of the adivasis into the dominant order and the 
diverse modes of indigenous resistance to it. Only through such a 
historical analysis can we understand the present salience of ethnicity 
and the dialectics of cultural struggle in the Jharkhand region.
In recent times, the changing modes of Jharkhand's collective 
identity have resulted in two projects: one is termed the reformist 
movement in this thesis and the other the grass-roots movement. The 
former has formulated issues purely in ethnic terms, concentrating on 
the demand for a separate state and promoting cultural revivalism. In 
contrast, the grass-roots movement was far more concerned with issues 
of class inequalities, ownership and distribution of resources, and the 
concentration of power in the hands of the state. To attain its objectives 
this movement sought a regional/class alliance and defined Jharkhandi 
identity by fusing class and ethnicity. The core of this thesis examines 
these changing dimensions of ethnicity and the ways that different social 
sectors seek to formulate the problem.
In locating the objectification of ethnicity within a historical 
framework, the thesis discusses basic issues concerning class, culture, 
social classification, modes of resistance and the forging of collective 
identities among subordinate groups, thus seeking to bridge the 
theoretical gap between social anthropology and social history, in the 
hope of contributing towards an interdisciplinary social analysis.
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INTRODUCTION 
ETHNICITY: METAPHORS, REALITIES, 
DISCOURSES.
There exists a scholastic and academic historico-political 
outlook which sees as real and worthwhile only such 
movements of revolt that are one hundred per cent 
conscious.... But reality produces a wealth of the most 
bizarre combinations. It is up to the theoretician to unravel 
these in order to discover fresh proof of his theory, to 
'translate' into theoretical language the elements of historical 
life....
Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks.
l.-Facing the Problem: the Ethnic Riddle.
My initial entry into the field of ethnic studies resulted from 
my study of agrarian movements among indigenous peasantries. When 
I first went to India in 1980 to do research on ethnicity with reference to 
the adivasis (1), I was searching for essences: the Jharkhand Movement, 
"pure" identities and no less "pure" collective memories. In the course of 
time, I developed defences against the mirage of essences: an uneasiness 
about the "ethnic view" of things; a realization that there was a high 
degree of mystification surrounding the concept of ethnicity and that 
ethnicity was never fully explained or was taken as a self-explanatory 
variable in most socio-anthropological approaches to the phenomenon.
I was to discover that there was no such thing as the 
Jharkhand Movement. Instead there were at least two main political 
formulations expressed in the formal as well as in the informal political 
domains, both having ethnic referents. These two formulations, one 
reformist and the other a grass-roots expression, are discussed in this 
thesis. It became apparent that ethnicity had not been translated in
(1) Adivasi (from Sanskr. adi-vasi ~ original inhabitant), labelled 
"tribal" in India. The use of the term adivasi is not without problems 
(see N. Sengupta 1984; 1986), The term indigenous is used in this 
thesis in its original sense (from Lat. indigena and Late Latin indigenus: 
one of the original inhabitants of a place; native; vernacular (Oxford 
Latin Dictionary 1982: 883). I add to the semantics of the term the 
civilizational dimension which refers to the long historical duration of 
specific socio-cultural_styles. The terms subaltern or subordinate 
sectorsfclasses  are used to refer to small peasants, subsistence 
agriculturalists, rural landless labourers, marginal workers, and 
generally those in the lowest economic echelons of society.
Jharkhand into a single discourse (2). Collective memory appeared as an 
anchor as well as a vast field that could give life to new formulations. 
Collective identities did not exist in pure forms but were forged with 
many interwoven elements that changed in the course of time. In the 
political terrain, reality indeed proved to have produced "a wealth of the 
most bizarre combinations" (Gramsci 1973: 200). Not surprisingly, the 
different uses of ethnicity, in the political arena have created confusions 
in the understanding of ethnic-based movements. In my view, this 
confusion arises from an uncritical evaluation of movements of varied 
contents and social bases, and from a rather general inability to 
comprehend the different ways in which protest can be expressed.
Furthermore, it is absolutely essential to locate the problem 
of ethnicity as a historical problem. It was precisely at the moment of 
colonial conquest that the indigenous and ethnic problematiques emerged 
in the non-Western world as social phenomena with specific 
characteristics (Stavenhagen 1985: 3-14). These problematiques are in 
origin aspects of the colonial expansion in which racism and the 
fostering of ethnic differences formed part of the strategy for 
domination. This in turn resulted in complex structures of social 
relationships in which racial, ethnic and class differences interacted to 
maintain patterns of inequality. The case of Jharkhand's adivasis is 
inscribed in India's colonial history, and marked by the process of 
"Nation-building" developed after independence.
Faced with the highly complex problem of ethnicity, I was 
tempted at first to take an already tested path out of the maze: class 
reductionism, thus eliminating from the picture the mercurial ethnic 
dimension. To this end, I thought of writing an essay on "The End of 
Ethnicity". I later abandoned this idea after observing the events of the 
present decade, when "ethnic issues" overflowed the frontiers of 
established Nation-States and emerged as one of the foci of international 
politics. It also happened that I moved for a few years to Australia, 
where ethnicity was omnipresent. There everybody was catalogued as
(2) Discourse: all kinds of language, including but also extending 
beyond what is actually written or said, in relation to a social, economic, 
political and cultural con-text (cum texto). Discourses are socially and 
historically conditioned, are purposive and addressed to an interlocutor. 
A discourse is not a series of texts but takes place in the ambit of 
interdiscourses. Discursive practices are those non verbal discourses 
such as the plastic arts, gestures, etc.. Apolitical act can be a discursive 
practice, generally structured as performance. A text is a discourse's 
verbal or non-verbal manifestation; it is the material moment of the 
discourse.
one or other type of "ethnic", everybody except the cataloguers, the 
dominant Anglo-Celtic group. Taxonomies were elaborated, finally 
acquiring credentials as the catalogued people's "true identities". 
Stereotypes of Otherness emerged, enabling the reformulation of 
prejudices and racism in new ethnic garb. In that context, those who 
had been catalogued often accepted their condition of being invented 
"ethnics" and the inequalities that went with it. Ethnicity became in this 
case a device to explain Otherness and inequality at one and the same 
time (3).
Another stay in India in 1984 gave me a different insight into 
the role played by non-class identities (Devalle 1985b), At the same 
time, the Latin American context, which has been my usual base, 
provided yet other elements for the understanding of the phenomenon. I 
finally obtained a varied canvas of ethnic representations. In the Latin 
American situation, the indigenous and the peasant problematiques 
usually went together; both ethnic and class dimensions were 
acknowledged (4). In the Australian case, class was definitively 
subsumed under the primacy of ethnicity, which was an element in the 
practice of State social control. In India, different movements where 
non-class identities played a part were variously mystified as 
"separatisms", "religious" or "caste" conflicts. The implicit class 
dimension was ignored in the definition of these movements. 
Nevertheless, this dimension was made explicit when concrete realities 
were closely observed. Faced with this varied collage, I postponed my 
literary execution of ethnicity. Nonetheless, I hope in future to 
demonstrate that the concept of ethnicity is yet another reformulation of 
an ethnocentric construction of The Other.
The problem of the multiplicity of ethnic discourses is 
studied in this thesis through the situation of the adivasis in Bihar's 
Jharkhand region in India. Attention is given to the correlation between 
ethnic ascription and class situation, the processes of legitimation of 
ethnic differences, and the historical, political and cultural dimensions of 
ethnicity.
In approaching ethnic phenomena, I would like to pose a, 
series of theoretical proposals as an alternative to the perspectives
(3) The Australian situation is explored in Devalle 1984 and 1988a and
b.
(4) Except in southern South America where, through conquest and 
genocide, a vast indigenous ethnic desert was created.
current in the field. These proposals will be tested while examining the 
case under study (5).
2.- A Theoretical Proposal. Ethnicity: the Faces and 
the Masks (6).
Cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors have often 
given political movements a source of solidarity and a basis for 
mobilization at one moment of their development. In this context, 
ethnicity serves as a dependent variable in the social formations of the 
"Third World", and not as a product of vaguely defined "primordial 
sentiments" (C /. Geertz 1963: 105-157). Ethnicity should be seen as a 
historical phenomenon, subordinated to existing class and centre- 
periphery contradictions, and as an element operating in cultural 
dialectics (C/. Abdel-Malek 1981 with Saul 1979).
There has never been a single discourse of ethnicity. 
Rather, there has been a plurality of discourses. By looking at the ways 
in which ethnicity has been articulated in the ideological discourses of 
antagonistic classes and of the State, and at the realities of uneven 
development, two salient faces of the phenomenon are differentiated:
(1) Ethnicity can serve as an element of support for the 
hegemony of the dominant classes and of the State. In this case ethnic 
strategies confirm the State, its policies and the statu quo of class 
domination (as in populist nationalist discourses). The reformist project 
for Jharkhand discussed in Chapter V and the ideological uses of the 
tribal construct (7) by the Indian State, fall into this category..
(5) The theoretical proposals suggested below attempt to attain, as any 
theoretical formulation does, a certain level of universal applicability. In 
the present case, this level is limited to non-Western societies, given the 
commonalities in their history which have conditioned the structuring of 
ethnic relationships.
(6) I presented to discussion aspects of this theoretical proposal, applied 
to cases in India and in the Pacific, at the ANZAAS Conference 
(Canberra, 1984), the UNU Symposium on Minorities and Socio­
economic Development (Suva, 1986), and the V ALAADA International 
Congress (Buenos Aires, 1987).
(7) A construct is either: (1) a theoretical concept to which is given the 
qualities of a concrete object; or (2) the objectification of an inductive 
experience with the aim of contrasting it with reality. In this thesis, the 
first of these definitions applies.
(2) Ethnicity can also be a counter-hegemonic force in the 
instances where ethnic ascription and economic and political 
subordination correlate (as in the cases of indigenous peasantries in 
Latin America and India, African workers in South Africa, 
"marginalized" workers in the Pacific, etc.). The grass-roots 
movement's project for Jharkhand is a case in point (see Chapter VI).
In the first case, the recognition and fostering of different 
identities by the ruling sectors and by an alienated indigenous elite (8) 
with similar interests, have been used to justify and structure unequal 
social and economic relationships.
In the second case, ethnicity may contribute to develop an 
awareness of the contradictions existing in the society at large as they are 
experienced by the social sectors concerned. Thus, the most visible part 
of the iceberg: ethnicity as a metaphor for opposition, becomes 
"subversive" in the eyes of the State and the ruling classes, especially 
when it is articulated into ideological formulations and a social practice 
that stimulates the conception of a radically different future.
Diversity becomes particularly "subversive" in the realm of 
culture, where the resilience of indigenous styles demonstrates the limits 
of the hegemonic forces (R. Williams 1978:108-114). For instance, in a 
number of multiethnic societies, the languages of indigenous inhabitants 
and ethnic minorities are marginalized or their existence is denied, while 
the language of those in power is imposed as the official one. In such a 
situation, indigenous cultures, vernacular languages and diverse modes 
of knowledge have been debased by the power-holders as "folklore", 
"dialects" and [little or popular] "tradition". In the Indian case, the 
anthropologist G.S. Ghurye recommended the eradication of adivasi 
languages (1963: 186,187,189). Why this attitude towards language? 
The answer resides in the great potential language has for practical 
political purposes and for maintaining a people's identity. Language is a 
people's particular code, a field where collective identity and the 
perception of reality are constantly reformulated, hence a terrain difficult 
to conquer by those external to it (see Pasolini 1982: 180, 187, on 
Italian languages).
(8) Jharkhand's indigenous elite is characterized as such in two senses: 
in terms of its exercise of the functions of power and knowledge, and in 
class terms, as a petty bourgeoisie. Politically, it is a subaltern elite.
In the political practice of the subaltern sectors, the 
revitalization of fundamental elements of a specific socio-cultural style 
gives ethnic-based grass-roots movements a potential beyond mere 
political tactics and strategy. The efforts at reconquering their own 
history, at re-inventing it if badly destroyed on the basis of whatever 
collective memory has kept, should be seen in this light. This 
reconquered history is opposed to official history, which is never 
sympathetic to the subaltern sectors.
Looking at the problem in this way, the role played by ethnic 
identity and consciousness in everyday life in general and in the political 
field in particular suggests a series of theoretical concerns:
(1) At the level of the historical processes, it is important to 
clarify under what conditions cultural differences are stressed and 
become one of the bases for political action.
(2) At the political level, the process of formation of an 
ethnic consciousness needs to be decoded and its role in impairing or 
favouring the formation of a class consciousness needs to be 
considered.
(3) At the level of the wider social system, patterns of 
domination translated into "inter-ethnic" relations and the ways in which 
ethnic and class differences are structured should be disclosed.
These interconnected levels will be examined in this thesis in 
the Indian context and in Jharkhand in particular (9).
3.- A Mythological Hydra? The Problem Re-stated.
The different faces of ethnicity have to be distinguished. On 
the one hand, there is the theoretical construct created by social theorists 
to catalogue phenomena and social groups, and the elements this 
construct contributes to the ideological discourses of the ruling classes to 
justify and implement especial policies and practices. On the other, we
(9) The application of analytical categories such as class to a situation 
like Jharkhand's poses a series of problems given that we are looking at, 
first, phenomena in evolution and, second, a "situation of convergence" 
(peasants, ex-peasants, workers, etc. combined with a diversity of 
ethnic and regional ascriptions).
encounter ethnicity as it is actually lived, as a dynamic process with a 
specific present, entailing a particular mode of social experience.
Taking into account these two aspects, ethnicity appears as a 
dependent variable whose dynamics are subordinated to the diverse 
ideological and practical needs and interests of the hegemonic as well as 
of the subordinate sectors.
Etlmicity not being an ahistorical subject - as it is usually 
portrayed in liberal sociological writings - it should be conceived as a 
process evolving through time. Time provides the necessary ground on 
which ethnic styles are maintained (re-created) and collective identities 
formulated. The time dimension (not linear but social time) either gives 
these styles and identities substance (as in the case of collective identities 
practiced in everyday life) or legitimation (as in the case of "imagined 
communities" [B. Anderson 1983] and "invented traditions") (10). 
The evolution of the @tre historique of a society - that synthesis 
expressed in a global ethnic or national style (Abdel-Malek 1981: 151- 
159) - is not removed from the objective reality of social contradictions, 
class formation and class conflicts. Although it is a constant point of 
reference, this etre historique, this "style" will be differently lived and 
expressed by the different classes and class sectors.
Being firmly grounded in the concrete history of a particular 
social reality, an ethnic style cannot be understood as the inimitable and 
intangible "essence" of a given people, or as a fixed sociological 
idealized type (seen by Abdel-Malek [1963] as deriving from the West's 
"hegemonism of possessing minorities"; also Said 1978: Ch. 1), 
Consequently, processes of renaissance and collective self-assertion are 
not accidental "happenings" in an ideal "existential communitas" guided 
by an spontaneous urge for brotherhood (C /. V. Turner 1969:119 ff.).
Ethnic styles are expressed in quotidian life in codes of 
communication, culture, modes of social reproduction and consumption, 
the reference to a common past and usually to a territory. At the same 
time, formulations of what the community is or should be emerge,
(10) Hobsbawn defines "invented traditions" as:
A set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules 
and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate certain 
values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically 
implies continuity with the past...It includes both 'traditions' actually 
invented, constructed and formally instituted and those emerging in a 
less traceable manner within, a brief and dateable period,...(Hobsbawn 
and Ranger 1983: 1).
making use of traditions, modes of thought and acting ascribed to a 
certain ethnic style. We thus observe the "invention,, and legitimation of 
communities and their conversion into constructs.
Benedict Anderson, when examining the phenomena of 
nation and nationalism, defines nation as
an imagined community...[that], regardless of 
the actual inequality and exploitation that may 
prevail [in it]...is always conceived as a deep 
horizontal comradeship....
(1983: 15-16).
Anderson's definition broadly corresponds to Hobsbawn's 
"pseudo-community" category (1983:10), This definition can be applied 
to state-ist conceptions of the nation, in which the Nation-State is 
portrayed as an all-embracing interclass collectivity, a supercommunity 
with no internal contradictions. Often, and particularly in the ex-colonial 
societies of the "Third World", it is this key construct that regional and 
ethno-national movements challenge with their alternative projects.
Anderson's proposal, on the other hand, is not adequate to 
understand those aspects of collective identity that are not imagined but 
have been built up in the course of time: the constant elements that 
provide the basis for the formulation of collective identity as it is lived. 
While interpreting ethnic styles, care must be taken not to perceive their 
manifestations as simply a world of symbols, or as expressions of an 
idealist "mentality" without reference to socioeconomic factors. Neither 
can all communities be considered to be constructs of the imagination in 
which all the points of reference for their sustenance are invented. 
Constructs of communitites and the traditions that legitimate them can be 
defined within temporal and ideological limits. Beyond these constructs 
there is a concrete world in movement, with reference to which - 
through a process of reinterpretation - constructs are built. This process 
is not unidirectional. While constructs have the curious property of 
elevating themselves to the rank of the real - becoming the realities they 
allege to describe - they are also liable to be questioned, usually in the 
political domain. This dialectic does not preclude, however, the 
emergence of new constructs. The question is: when and among whom 
do constructs arise and what needs and conditions do they respond to?
It is particularly in times of "high density" (the unfolding of 
deep social transformations, threats of destruction of existing socio­
cultural patterns) that the collective imagination is activated and new 
formulations of communities arise. In the case under discussion, an 
"imagined community" overrides the picture: a state-ist conception of the 
Indian Nation. Regional and ethnic-based movements do challenge this 
construct.
The colonial creation of administrative units on the basis of 
the arbitrary delimitation of territories and the spacial reorganization of 
peoples, was bequeathed to the new ruling sectors after independence. 
These in turn rephrased this creation as the abode of "the Nation". Thus, 
the independent State, although the project of a few, has come to act as 
the true and sole interpreter of the Nation(s) it seeks to embrace. 
Ultimately, in the state-ist conception of the Nation, State and Nation 
become one, an "imagined community" that ignores the various nations/ 
identities/ histories it may include.
To maintain this conception of the Nation-State it is 
necessary constantly to stress the existence of only one possible cultural 
model, one history, one language, one social project. At the -most, 
diversity can be "tolerated" by the State but not fully accepted. In this 
effort to impose a constructed national unity, two apparently 
contradictory strategies have been followed. On the one hand, cultural 
plurality is underplayed in the name of "national integration", On the 
other, differences based on "racial", ethnic or cultural grounds are 
reinforced to cover the contradictions arising out of domination, class 
relations and conflicts, the real nature of social struggles, and to 
maintain specific modes of exploitation. In India this strategy is seen in 
the coexistence of the ideology of the Indian unity, and the practice of 
preferential policies (C/. Weiner et ah: 1981).
In such a context, cultural diversity is preserved as a 
museum exhibit ("exoticism", "culture for tourists"), isolated from 
social reality and thus innocuous. Moreover, the State appropriates for 
itself the expressions of culture of the subordinate sectors and attempts 
to integrate these expressions in a modified form into its discourse of 
national unity. The State has constantly to find ways of incorporating 
alternative projects and initiatives that may challenge its dominance (R. 
Williams 1978: 108-114) with the aim of defusing their oppositional 
potential and subsuming all possible antagonisms under a unitary
umbrella. This effort at incorporation is always limited and selective, 
and does not touch a wide spectrum of social experience, alternative 
perceptions of social relationships and the material world as well as the 
dynamics of political consciousness. It is in these areas that the 
subordinate indigenous communities build up zones of resistance in 
order to develop a strategy for survival and political action (Devalle 
1985a).
By means of populist nationalist ideologies based on 
imagining the community of the "nation", the elites attempt to attain 
monopoly control over the social project. Cultural revivalism provides 
legitimating support for these ideologies in the shape of "invented 
traditions". Parts of the history and elements of the indigenous cultures 
are selected and re-structured into a "tradition" that the elites use in the 
political discourses to call for a broad "national" ("regional", "ethnic") 
solidarity. The culture and history of the different populations 
composing the Nation-State are censored; ethnicity is codified and made 
immutable in response to the needs of the codifiers acting as self-styled 
"true" spokesmen of their societies. These invented traditions are 
concerned with establishing a legitimating continuity with the past, not 
with understanding historical discontinuities and the evolution of social 
contradictions. These new versions of identities and traditions refer to 
models of ideal and, at the same time, imperfect brotherhoods which 
may not necessarily coincide with the perceptions, aims and realities at a 
grass-roots level.
4.- The Case.
The modes in which ethnicity and ethnic discourses are 
formulated in India are discussed in this thesis with reference to 
Jharkhand's adivasis in the state of Bihar (11).
Greater Jharkhand is an area rich in mineral and forest 
resources (refer to Maps 5 and 6), containing India's largest adivasi 
population (ten million persons registered as Scheduled Tribes) (Map 4). 
This thesis focuses on the Jharkhand area of Bihar (Mapa 1 and 2)
(11) Jharkhand is conceived in its wider expression as a cultural region 
extending over Chdtanagpur and Santal Parganas in Bihar, parts of West 
Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.
where almost half of the state's population (42%) is registered as 
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes.
The different Jharkhand communities share common basic 
traits (related languages, culture and aspects of social organization) as 
well as historical experiences and a long history of migration into the 
area. This population is not divided into clear-cut units (Chapter H). In 
the seventies, these characteristics provided one of the bases for the 
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha's (Jharkhand Liberation Front [JMM]) 
definition of the Jharkhandis as "producers, irrespective of caste, tribe 
or religion, within the same geographical boundary [Jharkhand]" 
(Chapter VI).
Jharkhand's adivasis are basically peasants: 89% of them 
live by agriculture. Forests (29.2% of the land area in Jharkhand) 
supplement the agrarian economy. The depressed economic situation in 
rural Jharkhand has often forced peasants to migrate within Bihar and to 
other states to work in agricultural and non-agricultural jobs for 
subsistence wages.
The expansion of industries in Bihar since the fifties and the 
development of the commercial exploitation of the forests have 
accelerated a process of land alienation and limited alternative sources of 
subsistence, undermining the adivasi peasant economy which was 
already marked by bonded labour and chronic indebtedness. An unequal 
labour market has developed in Bihar's industrial sector in which adivasi 
poor and landless peasants are integrated as unskilled workers. To this 
economic picture one should add the effects on this population of 
mechanisms to maximize the uses of ethnic differences in the process of 
domination: discrimination, social degradation, deculturation, and the 
distortion of cultural traits (Chapter HI).
Attention has been given in this study to points of "density" 
in time: the moments when movements, changes and contradictions in 
the past and present history of Jharkhand's adivasis became acute. The 
nineteenth century and the seventies and eighties of the present century 
are considered times of "high density". Jharkhand has been the setting 
of a sustained agrarian-based tradition of protest with ethnic overtones 
since the end of the eigtheenth century. In present-day Jharkhand, this 
tradition continues not only in political movements but also in an 
everyday culture o f resistance, the counterpart of a culture o f 
oppression, now a pervading feature in Bihar (Chapter VII).
In the fifties, the Jharkhand Party inaugurated a reformist 
line that is still operative, mostly among the urban educated adivasis. 
This line has generally phrased the Jharkhand question in ethnic terms. 
It concentrates on the demand for a separate state and cultural revivalism 
and does not present an explicit agrarian program. The reformist 
position in fact confirms the State by promoting the idea of a 
paternalistic State and by not acknowledging the class dimension of the 
Jharkhand situation (Chapter V).
By contrast, the movement the early JMM began to lead in 
the Santal belt in 1972 aimed at the recovery of alienated lands. Together 
with the forest movement in Singhbhum, it formed part of an alternative 
project for Jharkhand (refer to Map 11). Although the JMM movement 
also supported the demand for a separate state, it concentrated on 
producing economic changes in the rural areas and forged alliances 
within the local peasantry beyond ethnic demarcations and a peasant- 
worker alliance. The movement attained a regional/class base, and 
Jharkhandi identity was defined on new terms (Chapter VI);
The changing faces of Jharkhand's collective identity have 
been translated in the last decade and a half basically into these two 
alternative projects. These projects can be seen as two polar 
interpretations of the Jharkhand situation: the view of the urban petty- 
bourgeoisie and the view of the peasantry. The first is the case of the 
reformist project which appears as "closed" in terms of formulation, 
implementation and future development. Through it the indigenous elite 
seeks to monitor the participation of the subaltern sectors of their 
communities. The grass-roots movement, on the other hand, acted in the 
mid-seventies as a bridge between social sectors through the 
establishment of a peasant-worker alliance. This movement was 
characterized by its "openness" in terms of participation and of its effort 
to link ethnic and class issues.
The differences in Jharkhand's political movements seems 
based not on differences in their ethnic composition but on their different 
class basis. Ethnicity alone does not appear to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the nature of the Jharkhand movements. Ethnicity is 
present in the political discourses of both the reformists and the early 
JMM, but crystallised into two different projects.
5.- Organization of the Thesis.
a.- The data.
The discussion of the situation in Jharkhand is based on data 
collected during field-work in India in 1980, 1981 and 1984, on archival 
documents consulted in England and India, statistical materials consulted 
in India and in Australia (A.N.U.), contemporary reports, documents 
and newspapers, and interviews. Discussions with specialists and 
colleagues in different parts of the world, in the frame of international 
congresses, working groups and informal talks helped greatly to refine 
the analysis.
Additional research on ethnic phenomena in a variety of 
social contexts also proved valuable in the elaboration of theoretical 
proposals for the study of the subject and the development of a 
comparative perspective. I have put forward some of the proposals I 
advance in this thesis in my publications on ethnicity as it occurs in the 
non-Western world. Discussions on the ethnic question and indigenous 
movements held with people belonging to various ethno-national groups 
have also helped in the comprehension of the problem.
b.- Structure.
This thesis consists of four main parts and a conclusion. The 
First Part, "The Terrain of Ideas", deals with the theoretical problems 
which the analysis of ethnicity and culture present. Chapter I, "The 
Conceptualization of Ethnicity", contains a critical review of approaches 
to the problem in general and with reference to India.
The Second Part of this thesis, "Realities", gives a 
background of the area and its people. Chapter II presents an 
ethnohistorical account of Jharkhand and examines the tribal construct in 
India. Chapter III on "The Poverty of Development in Jharkhand" 
discusses the socioeconomic forces at work in the region and the modes 
of insertion of the adivasis in Jharkhand's social formation, and reveals 
the structuration of ethnic and class differences.
The Third P art, "The Political Terrain", centers on the role 
of the ethnic factor in adivasi political movements. Anticolonial 
movements among the Santals, the Mundas and other groups are 
analyzed in Chapter IV by using the concept tradition o f protest (12), 
This tradition continues in later movements. The two main Jharkhand 
projects of recent times are discussed in Chapters V ("The Reformists; A 
Captive Project?") and VI ("The Grass-roots Movement; The Extension 
of the Possible"). The aim is to show the diversity of ethnic discourses 
in Jharkhand.
"The Dialectics of Cultural Struggle" is the theme of the 
Fourth Part where the concepts culture o f oppression and culture o f 
resistance (13) are introduced and discussed. These concepts are applied 
in Chapter VII to the analysis of the role of culture in the process of 
dominance and subordination as it presently affects Jharkhand's 
adivasis.
The analysis of the Jharkhand case seeks to illuminate the 
historical, social and political aspects underlying ethnic phenomena by 
following the propositions stated in section 2, p. 19-23. The results of 
this investigation are condensed in the concluding section.
In following the path outlined above, the argument moves 
from the universal level of theory to the particular level where the 
problem under study, ethnicity, is examined through an specific case. 
The discussion also moves from the identification of the most visible 
aspects of the phenomenon (ethnicity as a language for political 
expression; overt actions and movements), to other aspects not so 
visible (class expressed in cultural terms; quotidian resistance). Stress is 
put on ethnicity as a process (the sociology of ethnicity), not on the 
description of fixed ethnic forms (ethno-graphia). The theoretical 
proposals and the discussion of the Jharkhand case seek to raise relevant 
points regarding the nature and contents of ethnic phenomena.
6.- Field-work.
(12) I first used this concept in Devalle 1977 to examine peasant protest 
in India in the nineteenth century. It was the central issue of the position 
paper for the seminar "Peasantry and National Integration" (Aguero, 
Devalle, Tanaka 1981) at the XXX International Congress on Human 
Sciences in Asia and North Africa (Mexico, 1976).
(13) Ideas on this subject were earlier developed in Devalle 1985a: 32- 
57.
The study of white men...was a separate science called
sociology: anthropology was for the rest....
C. Alvares, Homo Faber.
Anthropological theses often include a section on 
"experiences in the field". Such sections are usually labelled 
"methodology" when in fact they discuss field-work incidents and not 
methodological questions. In these cases, issues discussed may include 
the story of the anthropologist's first encounter with the "object", 
illnesses that haunted him or her in the field (the theme of the alien, 
hostile context) and his or her success in "possessing the object" 
(translated into a vocabulary such as "my tribe", "my village" and even 
"my family") (for similar comments, see Copans 1974: 124; Pratt 1986: 
26-50).
After this, the researcher promptly disappears from the text, 
the relationship between observer-observed never made explicit 
(contrary to Maquet's [1964] wishes). More than relating to the need to 
assert the anthropologist's authority (before the academic audience), as 
I. Lewis sees it (1986: 1-21. Cf. Crapanzano 1986: 53), this approach 
to field-work seems to refer to a particular conception of the subject 
studied as The Other (alien, therefore dangerous, difficult to understand, 
an "object" to be "possessed", that is, conquered), and to the mode in 
which the "I" (observer) /  "they" (observed) opposition is formulated. 
Field-work rules were originally set from an ethnocentric perspective by 
which the "I" and the "they" were neatly separated, thus maintaining the 
researcher's "position of advantage" (phrased as "objectivity"). This 
correlation reproduces the opposition between "First" and "Third" 
Worlds, the last being the realm in which the "First World" has 
developed much of its field-work.
Anthropology seems to be passing through one of its 
cyclical crises. This is, however, a very different crisis to that 
experienced in the late sixties as an expression of a prise de concience 
after Algeria, Viet Nam and May 1968. The present crisis refers 
precisely to the unsolved issue of the observer-"object" situation and has 
produced two different results. On the one hand, some young scholars 
(who were maybe too young in the sixties to appreciate the debate of that 
moment) have started to publish confessional "field diaries", formerly 
the privilege of the more renowed anthropologists (like Malinowski 
1967), On the other^ hand, the present crisis has also led to the
development of reflexive anthropology and to a critical examination of 
the field-work situation and ethnography (see contributions in Clifford 
and Marcus [eds.] 1986) (14).
I hope I will not dissapoint the readers if I admit that I never 
fell ill in the field, did not adopt a family or a village and least of all a 
"tribe", and cannot speak of personally experienced "culture shock". 
Many of the situations encountered during field-work were in fact 
familiar to me from my own background. There were, however, 
practical problems and difficult situations to overcome. The particular 
political juncture in India in the eighties and the situation of violence in 
Bihar that the culture o f oppression entails, did present obstacles for my 
field-work. First, I did not have permission to leave "urban areas". 
Second, parts of the research were conducted under curfew situations. 
Third, in Chotanagpur, academics in a position of power created 
obstacles for my research. For instance, I was warned: "You will not be 
able to do anything unless you join me". My activities were constantly, 
monitored. Every day I was asked where I had been or what I planned 
to do, who my contacts were, and was also asigned a "tail" (15). 
Fourth, the subject I was interested in was sensitive: arranging and 
holding interviews became at times complicated; when these were 
conducted in English, some words were consciously avoided by those 
interviewed and the interviewer had to follow suit. Given the situation, 
interviews were not tape-recorded; sometimes notes were taken after the 
interview was concluded, since writing during the interview made some 
people uncomfortable (16),
(14) This critical re-evaluation is not so much a new development in the 
discipline but a derivation of a debate initiated twenty years ago (from 
Gough 1968 to Asad 1975b, Leclerc 1972 and Copans 1974). Copans 
went far beyond the ideological critique of the late sixties and the present 
methodological critique.
(15) Fortunately, I had to respond only to Jawaharlal Nehru University 
(New Delhi) and the Centre for Social Sciences Research (Calcutta), to 
which I was affiliated at the invitation of the University Grants 
Commission as part of a bilateral governmental agreement.
(16) There is a further element to be reckoned with in the "translation of 
cultures" when it becomes a written text. This thesis is written in a 
language other than the native tongue of the writer. Given that language 
is an expression of cultural experiences, in this thesis the translation of 
the researcher’s perceptions of reality across "languages/worlds" did 
sometimes cripple the original flow of thought-expression (see Galeano 
1984: 32), for instance, when using concepts stemming from 
philosophical traditions, which did not take root in the Anglo-Saxon 
world.
Both in 1981 and 19841 had to leave the field when India 
was passing through troubled times. The seventies and eighties have 
been tense years in India in social and political terms. The Emergency 
established a sharp watershed in the realm of political practice. It was 
in the eighties that field-work was conducted. At an immediate level 
one could perceive what may be called the "general atmosphere". After 
rationalizing this perception, and considering the durability of the 
situation, one can risk the expression "the sense of an epoch". This 
epoch started in the seventies and, given the forces at work in the 
subcontinent at present (Devalle 1985b), appears set to continue into the 
immediate future.
The analysis of a situation such as that of contemporary 
Bihar heavily depends on the social sector that is taken as the main focus 
and on where we place ourselves thematically, theoretically and 
ideologically (the ideological, which others may phrase as a moral 
stance, is unavoidable here). The focus of the present research is on the 
subaltern sectors. This gives a specific angle to the perception, 
understanding and analysis of the phenomena under study.
The researcher's life experience in non-Western societies, 
and his/her social and ideological situation have direct relevance for 
his/her perception of a "Third World" society and to the selection and 
analysis of data. In this thesis there is an implicit answer to Maquet's 
request for the researcher's clear-cut self-definition vis-d-vis the subject 
of study: the researcher only ocassionally appears explicitely in the text 
but is always there because, as E. Said says:
No production of knowledge in the human sciences can 
ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement as a 
human subject in his own circumstances....(1979: 11).
FIRST PART
THE TERRAIN OF IDEAS
The theoretical and methodological problems presented by the analysis 
of ethnicity are discussed in this Part of the thesis (Chapter I),
Diverse approaches to ethnicity are evaluated and key issues, such as the 
legitimation of ethnic differences by scientific "texts" and the 
construction of social categories, are examined.
CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ETHNICITY.
In the last two decades ethnicity has emerged as a key concept in 
the writings of numerous social scientists. Societal developments which 
once may have been explained by economic, political and social factors 
are increasingly viewed as manifestations of ethnicity. A host of social 
phenomena around the world is seen to represent the ever growing 
repertoire of ethnicity (for instance, in Cohen 1974: ix, xix-xxi) to the 
extent that today we see an entire "industry" devoted to the service of 
this concept: academic journals, university departments, television 
channels and government departments in some countries. Some "settler" 
societies have even adopted it as part of their political culture (like the 
State ideology of multiculturalism in Australia. De Lepervanche 1980).
Ethnic phenomena (1) in central as well as in peripheral social 
formations have been approached from theoretical perspectives within 
the liberal socio-anthropological tradition. These perspectives have 
translated into the culturalist-assimilationist approach, the culture of 
poverty theory, reconstructive ethnography, and the theory of the plural 
society and other pluralist models. Of late, ethnicity has also been 
approached from the Marxist perspective. A civilizational approach has 
also developed. It is in these two related approaches to ethnicity - 
Marxist and civilizational - where new insights and theoretical 
discussions on the subject have recently arisen.
In this chapter, I refer first to the emergence of a discourse on 
ethnic differences accompanying European expansion and to the 
implications of projects for national integration. I then examine the tribal 
construct, and go on to review the ways in which ethnicity has been 
approached in the social science
(1) The terms "race relations" and "ethnic relations" are sometimes 
mentioned together when discussing theoretical approaches which use 
them. The position that focusses on the political dimension of these 
phenomena uses the word "nationalism" and its derivatives (Cf. Connor 
1972 with Naim 1975).
1.- European Expansion and the Invention of a Discourse
Myth deprives the object of which it speaks of all history....
Roland Barthes, Mythologies.
Ethnic differences were structured in the non-Westem World in 
modern times under specific historical circumstances: colonial 
expansion, the persistence of residual colonial forms of control, the 
development of neocolonial structures for the exploitation of people, 
land, strategic geographical positions and natural resources, and the 
processes of State formation. In this context, legitimating ideologies 
phrased in racial or ethnic terms have been formulated to maintain 
political domination and unequal socioeconomic relations.
At the same time, science contributed justifying arguments to this 
process. The sociological constructs of "race relations" and "ethnicity" 
were applied to specific situations from perspectives that subordinated 
the nature of the existing socioeconomic structures and class relations to 
the primacy of the racial or ethnic factors. Inequality was paraphrased as 
difference (racial or/and cultural). Scientific "texts" have not only 
resulted in a mode of knowing reality, but often ended up acquiring 
credentials as the actual realities they attempted to describe.
The ethnic and the indigenous problematiques emerged as 
specific historical and social phenomena the moment conquest took 
place. The constructs of "tribe" and of "race" as a social category 
became elements through which Europe reconstructed - intellectually as 
well as in administrative practice - part of the reality of the societies that 
came under its dominance. The categories "tribe", "caste" and "religion" 
performed this role in colonial India.
"Racial", "ethnic" and "tribal" stereotypes were forged, 
conflating a variety of modes of production, forms of social organization 
and cultures, ignoring the complexities, dynamism, history and 
civilizational patterns of the societies thus catalogued. In the end,
taxonomies acquired the power of truth (2). In sum, these societies were 
rendered a-historical.
The indigenous societies' socio-cultural diversity was given new 
meanings. Existing differences were enhanced to preclude any unified 
action of the colonized people. A new opposition expressed in racial 
and/or cultural terms came into being, i.e. the one between the 
superordinated European group and the people under their domination.
While the constructed categories were ideal models, the ideology 
derived from this perception was and is very concrete and functional 
(Mafeje 1971; Wolpe 1972:454) in supporting and reproducing patterns 
of power relationships and in justifying the expansion of cultural 
hegemony. As with the Orientalists' Orient (Abdel-Malek 1963; Said
1979), I believe we also have comparable discourses on the rest of the 
"Third World". The mode in .which the West constructed and re­
constructed the non-Western world profoundly marked the way in 
which ethnic and indigenous issues were posed and addressed. Thus 
various discourses arose: the Pacific-Paradise, "tribalist" Africa, passive 
and "unprogressive" Indian America. Parallel to the evolution of these 
discourses, anticolonial movements and efforts at ethno-national 
assertion developed in the subordinate societies.
In multiethnic modern Nation-States, the State formulates a 
project for "national integration" with the help of intellectuals and 
administrators and little or no participation by the people to be 
"integrated". In this context, State policies generally run along the lines 
of paternalism, assimilation or planned aggression (from genocide to 
acculturation as ethnocide). In the best of cases, these policies aim at an 
asymmetrical integration. In agrarian-based societies (like India, or more 
massively, in Latin America), where sectors of the peasantry have 
clearly defined ethnic contents, integration has come to mean the unequal 
incorporation of these sectors into the prevailing economic system as 
peasants or as a reserve labour force. This is the case of the adivasi 
peasantry in Jharkhand.
The State is informed by social theories that provide specific 
objects on which to exert particular social policies. Intellectual constructs 
of socio-cultural identities function in this way. In India, the official
(2) The categories Criminal Tribes and Criminal Castes in India up to the 
fifties are cases in point.
category Scheduled or Backward Tribes artificially determines a 
"special" sector with "special" problems (phrased as weakness and 
backwardness), deserving a special treatment. In consequence, the 
objective situation of the catalogued populations is ignored, and the 
structure of inequality is validated by attributing its causes to deficiencies 
assumed to be inherent in these subordinate sectors. Furthermore, in 
using cataloguing systems and special policies State paternalism 
obstructs the forging of alliances across ethnic demarcations.
The de-historization and deculturation (3) of subordinate peoples 
and the imposition of constructed identities have helped in the process of 
economic and political domination. Subordinate ethnic groups have 
opposed these processes by means of re-affirming their threatened 
historical and cultural specificity and by forging alternative social 
projects. Ethnic consciousness may then serve as a strategic axis for 
solidarity and for political action at one moment in the development of 
ethno-national movements.
The question of the acknowledgement of the internal 
contradictions present in the society at large as well as in the ethnic 
group/community itself, beyond ethnic demarcations, should also be 
highlighted. In this respect, the discontinuities in the processes of 
decolonization and "nation building" call for a consideration of those 
internal contradictions. For instance, by ignoring these contradictions, 
the indigenous elites are able to use ethnic identity and alliances in the 
containment of the process of decolonization (Fitzpatrick 1980: 198- 
199) or to monopolize the project of the independent State in ex-colonial 
societies. The examination of the role of an adivasi elite in Jharkhand 
provides an opportunity to look into these questions (Chapter V). On 
the other hand, the existence of a consciousness of historical 
permanence (4) and the maintenance of social, cultural and semantic 
fields and endogenous forms of organization provide grounds where 
counter-hegemonic practices can emerge directed against the conditions
(3) Deculturation refers to processes usually concealed under the labels 
of modernization, Westernization and acculturation, entailing the 
obliteration or distortion of a society's culture, promoting its 
replacement by the culture of the dominator (see Ribeiro 1968).
(4) Following A. Abdel-Malek's notion of depth of the historical field 
when discussing the time dimension as a "component part of the patterns 
of social maintenance" though historical evolution since:
Culture and thought...express the sum total of social maintenance, the 
global depth reality, the achievements, the balance sheet as well as the 
prospective potentials of a given society.... (1981: 171. Italics in the 
original).
created by colonialism, neocolonialism, or by the attempted all- 
pervading control of the modern State. These elements are present in 
Jharkhand, as shown in Chapters VI and VBI.
2.- The construction of the "object*'..
The Orient and Orientals [are considered by Orientalism] 
as an "object" of study, stamped with...a constitutive 
otherness of an essentialist character...,
Anouar Abdel-Malek, L'Orientalisme en Crise.
Tribe has been the most salient category used in the study of 
adivasi societies. The way in which it has been conceptualized in the 
field of anthropology in general and in India in particular, calls for some 
comment (5).
Generally, anthropologists defined tribe as a type of society 
characterized by political autonomy, a subsistence economy and 
territoriality. This resulted in the construction of a fixed idealized type, 
and in a perception that divorced "tribal" societies from the historical 
processes that affected them, most notably the colonial situation in 
which "tribal studies" initially developed.
The vagueness of the category "tribe", its uses, its derogatory 
implications and its lack of correspondence with reality, has made 
anthropologists increasingly dissatisfied with it (6). A thorough critique 
of the category and its uses in the intellectual construction of reality 
developed in the field of African studies. The tribal construct has been 
traced to the colonial administrations and the social theories that 
informed them (Southall 1970: 33 ff.; Argyle 1969: 51 ff.). When the 
state of the social sciences was evaluated in the seventies, the role social 
theories played in the colonial context and the ideology of "tribalism" 
attracted further criticisms (Mafeje 1971; Essiem-Udom 1975:243; Asad 
1975 b; Onoge 1977).
(5) "Tribe" is used with two meanings: as a type of society, and as a 
stage in social evolution (Godelier 1974:198-222). The latter aspect was 
dropped from the definition until M. Sahlins (1968) and other 
neoevolutionists redefined "tribe" with its former dual meaning. This 
version of "tribe" appears to underlie many of the Indian 
anthropologists' view of adivasi societies.
(6) In the early sixties Aidan Southall stressed the need to take into 
account "colonial rule, and industrialization or participation in the 
exchange economy" (1961: 2). Also Gulliver 1969: 7.
Notwithstanding the doubts regarding the category "tribe", 
anthropologists continued to use it. Two factors seem to account for its 
persistence. First, the continuation of microstudies which ignore the 
societal macrolevel, historical processes and structural transformations 
(Copans 1974: 74-80). Second, there has been a confusion between 
idealized types and reality. The category "tribe" was constructed out of 
ideas about what societies were thought to have been in the precolonial 
past. This construct was in turn projected into the colonial situation and 
mechanically applied to societies which were already incorporated in a 
capitalist economy and in the world market (Mafeje 1971).
Hardly any of the so-called tribes can be defined by their political 
autonomy, isolation and subsistence economy. A reality that included a 
new articulation of modes of production, new division of labour and 
system of power inaugurated with colonial rule and, afterwards, the 
structural changes that took place in the modem States,bring to question 
the validity of this idealized type.
The roots of the so-called "tribal problem" have often been 
sought in the socioeconomic characteristics of the "tribes" themselves, 
as a "problem" stemming from their past (Mair 1936: 264) (7). This 
perspective excluded from anlysis the contradictions that arise from 
colonialism and, later, from the operation of political and economic 
forces in the independent States, and the nature of the process of class 
formation (Onoge 1977: 40). Moreover, the construction of a "tribal 
problem" on these premises served to create a spurious social sector, 
"the tribes", whose arbitrarily defined peculiarities greatly helped, as in 
India, to set this sector aside from the rest of the society for policy 
purposes.
The most serious consequence of this kind of anthropological 
perception of indigenous peoples has possibly been the construction of a 
still persisting derogatory image of these societies. It suffices to see the 
currency in academic parlance of terms like "primitive", "simple", 
"backward", and the "underdeveloped" of later vintage. This image 
reflects prejudices that have been put to scientific use. It is an image not 
only advanced by the central societies (now under the guise of 
developmentism), but also by sectors of intellectuals and planners in the
(7) The term tribalism alludes to this "problem" in Africa. In India it is 
called particularism, although the word tribalism has also been used (as 
in “Roy Burman 1968;.,N.K. Bose 1964: 7 ff., who equates it with 
nationalism, and D. P. Sinha 1972).
non-Western world (Mafeje's "converts", 1971: 253). Thus we find in 
multiethnic States a variety of assimilative, integrative and indigenist 
policies, instances of ethnocide and even genocide, all justified in the 
name of "progress" (8).
a.- From tribe to ethnicity.
In the seventies a noticeable shift in terminology occurred. A 
vast range of phenomena formerly subsumed under tribal, racial, 
cultural, linguistic and religious differences, became increasingly 
identified with the term ethnicity despite some initial reluctance. For 
instance, Gulliver considered the term "ethnic group" a euphemism 
(1969; 2). Recently, de Lepervanche has made a similar point, although 
on different grounds (9).
The shift in terminology did not necessarily entail a deep 
transformation in theoretical approach. Sometimes, this shift was 
justified solely on the basis of the researcher’s preference (as in Southall 
1970: 47), given the disfavour "tribe" and "race" had incurred due to 
their association with the colonial project and racist ideologies. The less 
evocative and deceivingly neutral term ethnicity provided an appropriate 
substitute and a basic element to reformulate discourses legitimating 
social inequality (as in Glazer and Moynihan 1976:11-12).
While the term ethnic, is old, ethnicity is relatively new (10). 
Rather delayed, the shift to the ethnic terminology was practically 
imposed on the researchers by the changes that had taken place in the 
international scene after World War II: the end of the colonial order and 
the emergence of the "Third World" (anthropology's former "object 
societies") in international politics. These events brought with them a 
realization that the previous context of anthropological research and the 
position of advantage Western researchers had enjoyed until then had to
(8) The case of the Amazon indigenous population in the years of 
Brazil's "economic miracle" is a clear example (Davis and Mathews 
1976; Ramos and Taylor 1979; Aspelin and Coelho dos Santos 1981).
(9) She considers the change in terminology and perspective part of "a 
series of ideological transformations in the recreation of hegemony" 
(1980: 25).
(10) Possibly first used by David Riessman in 1953 (Glazer and 
Moynihan 1976: 1).
be relinquished (11). Despite the fact that this awareness resulted in a 
shift from fixed categories to processes in anthropological analysis, the 
term "ethnic group" is still regarded with suspicion. For instance, 
S.Silverman, while commenting on the New Ethnicists, remarks:
If once we were worried that "ethnic group" had an ambiguous 
meaning, now it is defined as something that is ambiguous.... (1976: 
626. Italics in the original).
b*- The tribal construct in India.
A tribe is a tribe ....
An Indian anthropologist
Tautology creates a dead, a motionless world....
Roland Barthes, Mythologies.
According to the Indian 1981 Census of India, the population 
officially called Scheduled Tribes numbered 51,628,638 persons 
(7.53% of the total population), distributed in 427 communities, and 
divided into six major linguistic groups (12).
The British colonial government in India used the category tribe 
as an element of classification for administrative purposes, and as such it 
has continued to be used in independent India. In India, "tribe" is clearly 
a colonial category in origin and in content. It has been reformulated in 
the context of the Hindu model of caste-ideology, a context observable 
in the conceptualization of adivasi "backwardness" and in the 
alternatives espoused for social mobility (Gautam 1978: 22). Thus, 
"tribes" only exist in relation to the "mainstream" complex (N. Sengupta 
1986).
(11) Maquet 1964; Copans 1974; Asad 1975.1 discussed this issue in 
Devalle 1983.
(12) Austro-Asiatic, Mon-Khmer, Munda, Tibeto-Burman, Dravidian 
and Aryan. Bilingualism was reported in 15.75 % of the adivasi 
population (Schemerhorn 1978: 72-73).
In India, the category "tribe" has not developed as a conceptual 
category, independent from administrative practice, possibly because 
anthropology there has tended to be applied anthropology. Defining 
"the tribes" is the task of government officials (Indian Constitution: Art. 
342). The official selection of criteria to define the Scheduled Tribes is 
questionable for its lack of correspondence with reality and its 
ethnocentric bias (13). These criteria were so unsatisfactory that A. R. 
Desai (1961) considered they could only apply to 20% of the adivasi 
population, while K.S. Mathur dismissed the classification as "a typical 
case of fiction-creation by Government officers" (1972: 460) (14). 
Furthermore, the whole exercise has resulted in the legitimation of 
derogatory stereotypes..
From the studies of British colonial administrators like E. T. 
Dalton (1872) and H. Risley (1891), to the pioneer works of S. C. Roy 
(1912, 1915) and V. Elwin (1942 and many monographs), as well as 
the bulk of contemporary writings on the adivasis, the term "tribe" has 
remained vague, not adequately conceptualized and consequently, of 
weak methodological value (see Pathy et al. 1976:401-406; Pathy 1982: 
23-48). Indian "tribalist" anthropologists comfortably accepted as tribes 
those people registered as such in the official list. Thus, "a tribe is a 
tribe which is included in the list of scheduled tribes" (Sahay 1969, cit. 
by Pathy et al. ibid:. 402). There also seems to be a lack of awareness 
about the colonial connotation of the vocabulary used to address adivasi 
history, as with "revolt" and "uprising" to name their anticolonial 
movements (Moser 1978:123-124).
Most Indian "tribal studies" have remained synchronic and 
descriptive, ignoring the economic and political transformations that 
affected the populations studied. "Tribes" were seen as homogeneous 
units, forming an undifferentiated bloc (although set in a hierarchy of 
"more" and "less primitive groups"), marked by "backwardness". While 
the anthropological view of "tribes" in India may have abandoned the 
stereotype of isolated groups and moved to observe social interaction 
(K. S. Singh 1982: 1318), the point of reference - to define "tribe" and 
social mobility patterns - continues to be the dominant Hindu model.
(13) The traits selected included: isolation, racial characteristics, the use 
of "tribal dialects", "animism", "primitive" economic activities, eating 
habits (non-vegetarian), dress ("naked or semi-naked"), nomadism, 
propensity to drink and to dance (1952 Report on the Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes. Commission).
(14) See also Dube 1960:11; Roy Burman 1960:17; Bailey 1961: 10.
A persistent assumption has been that "tribes" have a shallow 
conception of history. Their history then easily becomes "mythology", a 
trait that is accompanied by an "over-all tradition-orientation" (Dube 
1960: 11-12):' "Tradition-orientation" has often been equated with 
"backwardness in the scale of civilization". On these grounds and from a 
particular (Western and alien) conception of "progress" (15), the 
adivasis1 sense of history and their culture are declared to be retrograde, 
a "negation of progress", a perpetuation of backwardness (16), In this 
way, backwardness becomes a trait inherent to these societies. At the 
same time, endogenous innovations and change are never mentioned.
Indian anthropological literature seldom introduces the term 
ethnicity with reference to the adivasis, and when it does, it is often in 
an ambiguous way (Surajit Sinha’s "tribes" as "certain ethnic groups" 
[1965: 57-83; 1974]; Dube’s "tribal ethnicity" [1977: 1-5]). On the 
whole, however, Indian anthropologists have remained faithful to the 
old category of tribe. This measured shift in emphasis seems to derive 
from an acknowledgement of emerging ethno-regional movements, not 
from an analytical exercise (K. S. Singh 1977), In this context, B. K. 
Roy Burman preferred the notions of national identity and nation 
society, qualifying adivasi political expressions ("processes of identity 
expansion") as "infra" and "protonationalisms" (1983 b: 1174).
Lastly, adivasi societies have been defined in terms of a constrast 
with non-adivasi society (usually understood as Hindu society) and set 
at one end of several variously defined a-historical continua: the 
tradition-modemity paradigm (leading to G. S. Ghurye's conception
[1969] of adivasis as "backward Hindus"); the tribe-caste continuum 
(basis for assimilationist models like Srinivas'[1966] sanskritization 
model (17)), and the developmentalist traditional-modern continuum for 
administrative use (V. K. Mathur 1967: 11-25). M. K. Gautam (1978 
a: 20) has already called for a perspective independent from the Hindu
(15)Following fallacious dichotomies like those of the "tradition- 
modernity" and the "dual society" models (See Gunder Frank 1966; 
Stavenhagen 1981:2-6; Leclerc 1972, among others).
(16) For B. K. Roy Burman:
Empirical data from the different parts of the world shows that when an 
underdeveloped people develop separatist tendencies, they tend to vest 
symbolical value to some or other aspects of their backwardness and try 
to perpetuate the same...They are overtaken by the social malady of 
stagnancy and ultimate decay....(I960: 19. Italics added).
(17) However, Srinivas was aware that sanskritization meant only 
positional and not structural changes (ibid.: 7, 30 ff.).
caste model, and N. Sengupta (1986) provides an excellent discussion 
of the "tribe-mainstream" dichotomy.
One last mode of defining the adivasis on the basis of a 
continuum  has been to place them in relation to a "peasant pole", 
"tribals" and peasants conceived as "two idealized evolutionary levels of 
socio-cultural integration" (S. Sinha 1982: 3) (18). It is the conception 
of some adivasis as peasants and not the shortcomings inherent in these 
continua that has aroused opposition. This fact derives from the way the 
category "peasant" has been defined (for instance, Roy Burman 1983: 
1173). The neat compartmentalization of "three types of communities: 
tribal, caste and peasant" in Mathur and Agrawal (1974), and 
Vidyarthi's (1967a) "three dimensions of Indian society: primitive, 
peasant and industrial", should be noted in this context. On the other 
hand, K. S. Singh (1982), considers that in many of the "tribal areas" a 
peasantization trend started at the end of the eighteenth century, while 
B.B. Mandal concludes that the agricultural "tribes" in Bihar can be 
considered to be peasants (1975: 355-362; Betehle 1974). In the present 
study, when addressing specific sectors of the adivasi population as 
peasants, T. Shanin's definition will be followed (19). This, however, 
is not the end of the problem. The fact that adivasis exist in the frame of 
a class society and that their relationships with it cannot avoid the 
operation of class forces, are issues that, with few exceptions (Pathy 
1982; N. Sengupta 1980, 1986), have not yet been subjected to 
analysis.
3,- A deluge of scientific "texts".
One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth 
century, the hegemonism of possessing minorities...[is] 
accompanied by eurocentrism in the area of human and 
social sciences, and more particularly in those in direct 
relationship with non-European peoples....
Anouar Abdel-Malek, L'Orientalisme en Crise.
(18) Earlier expressed as "tribal-caste/peasant continua" (S. Sinha 
1965). See also F. G. Bailey's application of the tribe-caste continuum 
(1961: 13 ff.).
(19) "The peasantry consists of small agricultural producers who, with 
the help of simple equipment and the labour of their families, produce 
mainly for their own consumption and for the fulfilment of obligations 
to the holders of political and economic power." (Shanin 1972: 204).
In the last two decades, the ways in which "race relations" and 
ethnicity were studied became a matter of serious concern among some 
social scientists. A critical appraisal of current approaches began, 
leading to the analysis of case studies beyond the limitations of 
established anthropological, psychological and historical perspectives. 
This appraisal was first encapsulated in the critique of an isolated 
discipline - "anthropology - moving by the mid-seventies to the 
evaluation of positivist theories in general, including economics and the 
political sciences, inheritors of anthropology's former "objects": the 
"new" States (Mafeje 1976).
Ethnic studies in the liberal Anglo-Saxon tradition do not usually 
take into account theoretical developments produced outside this 
tradition, particularly by "Third World" scholars (20). Therefore, for 
many the last word on ethnicity has been pronounced by F. Barth
(1970). Considered the last watershed, it has originated the expression 
"B.B, and A.B." (before and after Barth), in which the "A.B." seems to 
be final. However, the self-named New Ethnicists have lately been 
added (See Hinton’s critique, 1981: 14-19).
Two important aspects of ethnicity have been largerly absent 
from the liberal tradition's concern. First, the historical conditions under 
which ethnicity emerges as a major element in social organization, 
solidarity and conflict. Second, that of ethnicity as lived bv the people 
themselves, as an expression of civilizational alternatives, its potential 
role and strategic value in the process of decolonization and in the 
development of a social consciousness among subordinate social 
sectors.
Various and changing realities were reduced to fixed types 
(ethnic groups, tribes, interest groups), ultimately becaming 
autonomous subjects abstracted from the global social reality, which 
provided the basis for fundamentally a-historical studies (Asad 1975b: 
29; Saul 1979: 365-366).
Furthermore, maintaining the position of advantage of the 
observer and his/her illusion of objectivity, studies on ethnicity have
(20) A general situation in the social sciences not exclusive to the field of 
ethnic studies. See S. Bhattacharya's remarks in relation to history 
(1982: 3) andDenoon (1985:119). In anthropology, French Africanists 
have developed a critical reapprisal of the situation (Copans 1974). See 
also Abdel-Malek’s remarks in his critique of Orientalism (1963: 109- 
142).
usually been conducted on the basis of the outsider's perspective. 
Intellectual conceptions of socio-cultural identities have thus been put 
forward as the actual identities of the societies studied, mostly on the 
basis of visible cultural and/or behavioural elements. Some indigenous 
intellectuals are now precisely denouncing these constructs of identity 
and their uses (Langton 1981: 16; Documentos...l979). This is not to 
say that any further inquiry should stop after noting the ethnic groups' 
self-perceptions. The determinants of these self-perceptions are factors 
that should be explained in context (see Wolpe's remarks, 1971), an 
aspect that is considered in this thesis.
A critique of current socio-anthropological approaches to the 
study of ethnicity and a search for new perspectives started to develop 
both in the Marxist tradition in the central societies and among non- 
Western intellectuals concerned about the processes of decolonization 
and "nation building". Despite the critique and the limitations of the 
process of decolonization in the social sciences themselves, some 
Western academics are finding it hard to stop playing "the role of 
unchallenged interpreters and translators...of cultures" (Owusu 1978. 
Also Onoge 1979: 54).
The study of the relations into which the "Third World" was 
drawn by the West, marked from their inception by the colonial 
experience, was approached by anthropology with the concepts "racial 
difference" and "cultural contact". Ethnicity, of later use, came 
generally to be restricted to the perception and uses of cultural 
differences among either the indigenous peoples themselves or recent 
newcomers in the central societies, those swelling the waves of the 
international migratory labour force.
Once the social field was thus divided and conceptualized, race 
and ethnicity emerged as conceptual tools divorced from the social 
totalities of which they were integral parts, masking the realities of the 
colonial past, the current international forces at work, the presence of 
neocolonialism and dependence, and the nature of the modern State. 
"Racial" and ethnic relations were conceived of as developing in 
situations of hypothetical social balance, favourable to gradual and non- 
conflictive processes of change called "modernization" and 
"Westernization" (21). Conflicts inherent in relations established by
(21) "Third World" societies have been depicted as passive recipients of 
externally induced changes. Thus the illusion, in Selboume's words,
force, and resistance to domination were rarely considered in their full 
social dimension. This aspect, however, was treated in the Marxist 
tradition (starting with Balandier 1955).
For the general state of the studies in this field of inquiry, H. 
Wolpe has already suggested a corrective:
What is needed is, on the one hand, a description of the 
' ideology and the political practices of the ethnic, racial and 
national groups and, on the other, an analysis of how they 
relate to the mode of production and social formation in 
which they are located....
(1971: 238).
What follows is a discussion of the ways ethnicity has been 
approached. However, the vast number of studies on the subject has 
not yet produced a school of thought in the sociological sense. Of late, 
we find in the influential Anglo-Saxon tradition variants of the same 
basic approach, mostly under the influence of F. Barth and/or C. 
Geertz, translated into pluralist models. These influences are generally 
absent from Indian anthropology which has remained linked to earlier 
approaches.
a.- The cultural-assimilationist__approa_ch.
The approach that centers on cultural aspects belongs to the old 
ethnographic tradition developed along with the West's colonial 
expansion. Considerable effort was devoted to the systematic study of 
the cultural aspects of subordinate societies in the colonies, the "ethnics" 
of the moment. Knowledge of the cultural field provided the foundations 
for assimilationist policies and what was often called "cultural 
transformation" (in fact a process of deculturation). Assimilation and 
deculturation ultimately aimed at the establishment of an all-embracing 
hegemony.
Political, economic and cultural confrontations were concealed 
under the "cultural contact" disguise. Functionalism described 
colonialism as "culture clash", "culture contact" and "acculturation". 
With the introduction of the concept "social change", colonialism was
that "the Indians - or the Africans, or the Latin Americans, or the Arabs - 
are (variously) congenitally inert, lacking in "political will', "fatalistic', 
or passive" (1979: 36).
further reduced to just one aspect of this general change. Social change 
was perceived as a natural and uniform process with "modernization" as 
its final goal. Neither the colonial system nor the implications of 
acculturation were critically examined (22).
The assumptions that guided acculturation studies until the fifties 
were reformulated after the breakdown of the colonial order to fit new 
sociopolitical realities and be applied to situations of inequality in which 
racial, ethnic, minority or national groups were involved.
The inevitability of the assimilation process of all subordinate 
"minorities" to conform to the dominant models, values, world view and 
economic-political orientations has been the implicit assumption 
underlying the theories of acculturation and modernization. These 
theories have failed to see that "resistance to change" was really based 
on the people's realization that "progress in the abstract meant 
domination in the concrete" (Naim 1975:10).
Changes in emphasis in the assimilationist perspective, still 
dominant in the United States, can be exemplified with the works of 
Glazer and Moynihan, where they make assumed deficiencies in 
different ethnic groups responsible for social inequality (23). The focus 
on assimilation-acculturation is particularly noticeable among social 
scientists engaged in "welfare-relevant research" and among applied 
anthropologists working as government advisors, a common feature in 
India.
b.- Culture of poverty theory.
(22) In a review of functionalist anthropological approaches to Africa,
O. Onoge remarks:
By far the most disastrous consequence of the functionalist Africanists 
was their general amnesia over the objective social situation in which 
Africans were at the time implicated. I refer of course to the colonial 
situation...The unit of study always remained the "tribe"...The very 
contradiction of life in a colony...[should have received] 
primacy....(1977: 36-37. Italics in the original).
(23) See the first and second edition of Beyond the Melting Pot (1963, 
1970), and Ethnicity. Theory and Experience (1976). In Ethnicity..., it 
is said:
Men are not equal; neither are ethnic groups...As to the origins of this 
inequality...it arises from differential success in achieving social 
norms...Individuals and.„ethnic groups have different levels of success 
in attaining the desired condition..,.(1976:11,12,17. Italics added).
The notion of cultural deprivation derived from Oscar Lewis' 
works (1970) and his "culture of poverty" theory, has also been used to 
equate "racial" or ethnic differences to negative social, cultural and 
psychological traits. These traits are seen as the cause of the problems 
the subordinate sectors suffer. A fallacious notion of "poverty" is 
constructed, as a condition inherent in some social sectors, ignoring the 
historico-economic basis of this condition (24).
Although the culture of poverty theory as such was not applied 
to the study of the adivasis in India, explanations on similar lines have 
been offered to characterize their "backwardness".
(24) Even more dangerous than the culture of poverty's negative 
equations are the racist analyses based on the "race-civilization" 
equation, used as the background ideology for special legislation 
addressed to sectors catalogued according to racial indexes, for instance, 
Australian Aborigines (comments in Tazt 1982:15-16).
c.- Reconstructive ethnography.
Substantial research has been conducted in the shape of 
reconstructive ethnography ("salvage anthropology"). From this 
perspective, indigenous cultures are seen as broken residues of past 
traditions that have to be rescued as if they were museum specimens. A 
perception of culture as social and historically conditioned is absent. 
Indigenous cultures are supposed to have succumbed under the impact 
of "civilization" and been reduced to the category of "traditional 
remains". These cultures are seen as static, and their living carriers often 
"without a culture" (as this is considered to belong to the past), or with a 
"lesser" form of culture. "Salvage anthropology" has been one of the 
constants of field-work in the ethnographic tradition.
d.- Theory of_the plural society and related models.
The theories of the plural society give "race" and ethnicity the 
key roles in the dynamics of modern society (Kuper and M.G. Smith 
1969; Kuper 1974), Although pluralist theorists acknowledge a possible 
correlation between economic differences and ethnic ascription, they fall 
back on models based on the assumption of social equilibrium, such as 
that followed by the modernization school (25). The theory of the plural 
society avoids the problem of the structuring of society into classes. 
The central idea of a society divided vertically into ethnic or racial blocs, 
complementary to and interdependent of each other, is one characteristic 
of F. Barth's still very influential model (1970) (26).
Interest converges on interaction in terms of expected or rejected 
forms of behaviour, and on the interdependence of social sectors defined 
by their ethnic ascription. The dynamics of the social and historical 
processes that encompass ethnic phenomena are not explored. This
(25) Pluralist models received a new impetus even after the idea of the 
"melting pot", prominent in the United States, did not produce the 
expected result of an harmonious blending of people of different origins 
into the dominant culture. The "melting pot" ideology is echoed in 
Australia's "multiculturalism".
(26) Barth considers each ethnic category "an organizational vessel that 
may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio­
cultural systems", and consequently stresses the "ethnic boundaries that 
define the group" (Ibid.: 14-15),
approach stresses adaptation to an established social order and not the 
possibility of structural changes (27).
Present ethnic group theory considers ethnicity a "new social 
category" (Glazer and Moynihan 1976: 3), the only one that can be 
observed and even measured. This can be stated because only the 
visible cultural traits and behavioral aspects of ethnic phenomena are 
considered. On this basis, ethnic categories were defined as devices 
forged by ethnic groups to organize social interaction (28). In this line, 
J. C. Mitchell (1974: 14, 23) was able to determine patterns of "social 
distance" between ethnic groups in which this distance is quantifiable 
while the reasons why this distance exists is not explained. The picture 
of a "cognitive framework of ethnicity" is said to predict behaviour. 
Only the assumption of social equilibrium and an a-historical perspective
(29) can support this kind of prediction. The ideological proposition for 
the existence of an ultimate social order allows social relationships to be 
placed in terms of balance or as transactions among equals, leading to 
adaptation (30).
In some works within this perspective, ethnicity is perceived as a 
political phenomenon. Politics, however, are reduced to the attainment 
of power. Ethnic groups are seen as "interest groups" (a vague 
theoretical category), and the emphasis is put on manipulation (A. 
Cohen 1969) to obtain short-range aims in a situation of assumed open 
competition (Depres 1975, among others).
The socio-anthropological literature on ethnicity in the liberal 
tradition either avoids or explicitely rejects class analysis. It is 
maintained that interest groups and not class operate in concrete reality 
(A. Cohen 1974 b: 17) on the basis of competition (Barth's "choices",
(27) Compare the results of one case-study from two different 
perspectives: Siverts' study of ethnic relations in Chiapas, following 
Barth's model (1970: 101-116), and R. Stavenhagen's study of the 
same (1975: 223-243).
(28) For J. C. Mitchell:
The cognitive framework of ethnicity...[is] a set of shared meanings 
attached to socially identifiable ethnic cues that provide the actors with 
sets of expectations of behaviour....(1974: 14. See also Epstein 1973: 
232).
(29) The historical dimension is often reduced to a mere background. 
Social phenomena are not seen as historical products. Ethnicity acquires 
primacy over historical processes.
(30) See,-for instance, Qlazer and Moynihan's conception of society and 
of the State (1976). Cf. with Sklar 1967: 4-5, 9.
1970: 33) (31), and that ethnicity and not class is "seen" (Glazer and 
Moynihan 1976: 15). The confusion arises from a conception of class as 
"a thing" or a cataloguing category instead of "a process" (E.P. 
Thompson 1968: 9-12; Hobsbawm 1971: 5-21).
The latest development on ethnicity from this perspective is the 
New Ethnicity (Despres 1975; J. W. Bennett 1975). The notion of 
ethnicity as an adaptative mechanism is central in the volumes edited by 
Despres and Bennett, either as a strategic device (Bennett) or in the 
context of competition for resources (Despres). The New Ethnicists are 
also quick to separate ethnicity from class. Only in one article in 
Bennett's volume is the issue of class discussed (Robbins 1975: 285- 
304).
The New Ethnicists acknowledge Barth's influence and that of 
social transactionalism and strategy analysis (Despres ibid.: 3; Bennett 
ibid.: 4). A further source has been C. Geertz's notion of "primordial 
attachments" (1963). Thus, C.F. Keyes (1981) combines the cultural 
interpretation of ethnicity as a primordial characteristic of identity and its 
manipulation to attain goals.
The New Ethnicity does not represent a fresh contribution to 
socio-anthropological theory but rather, a readaptation of former views 
held in the pluralist tradition (32). Some of the New Ethnicists and 
pluralists themselves are aware that ethnic studies have reached a 
theoretical impasse (Keyes 1981: 4; A. Cohen 1981: 307).
e.“ The Marxist perspective.
In the Marxist analyses of "race relations" and ethnicity, class is 
placed at centre stage. Ethnicity is considered a political phenomenon, 
grounded in the system and relations of production. Generally, the 
reinforcement of racial and ethnic differences is seen as a mechanism for
(31) While Despres differentiates ethnic from class stratification (1975: 
195), van den Berghe gives ethnicity the same analytical value as class 
and, with others, ends up giving it primacy (1976: 242, 251-252). A. 
Cohen is more explicit: "Classes are figments of the imagination of 
sociologists. What actually exist are large numbers of interest 
groups...."(1974b: 17).
(32) Despres (1975), for instance, rephrases the concept of plural 
society as "poly-ethnic.system", using for that purpose an ecological 
language.
the recreation of hegemony and the reproduction of socioeconomic 
inequality. Issues such as ethnic struggles in relation to class struggle, 
the emergence of an "ethnic problem" as a result of colonialism or 
related to internal colonialism, have been raised within this perspective. 
Nevertheless, on the whole, the crucial issue, the structuring of ethnic 
and class differences, is still the subject of discussion and further 
elaboration.
Class theories on ethnicity can roughly be divided into those 
centered on the issue of superexploitation and those based on the internal 
colonialism thesis. Some Marxist studies focus on the nature of national 
liberation movements, self-determination, and ethnicity's strategic 
political role..
Ethnicity is not seen as a natural outcome of sociocultural 
differences. In some cases it tends to be portrayed as an instance of 
"false consciousness" and its potential in situations of domination are 
dismissed (C/. Bridges 1973: 335 ff.). Marxist reaction to the liberal 
sociological approaches to ethnic and "race" relations has produced 
economistic analyses which leave ethnicity unexplained, or explained as 
a vague superstructural phenomenon serving ruling class interests (for 
instance, de Lepervanche 1980) (33). The approach that centers on the 
issue of the superexploitation of the work force, in its turn, sees the 
demarcation along ethnic or racial lines at the work place as a mechanism 
to keep the work force divided and to preclude the development of class 
consciousness (Cox 1970; Nikolinakos 1973. See Miles' critique
1980).
The notion of "internal colonialism" (34), used by some Marxist 
scholars to study the nature of cultural and political domination and the 
economic exploitation of subordinate ethnic groups emerged out of the 
conceptualization of underdevelopment by A. Gunder Frank (1966, 
1969) and the writings of P. Gonzalez Casanova (1965) and R. 
Stavenhagen (1968, 1973, 1975, 1982), While the internal colonialism
(33) On the insufficiency of "immediate" economic explanations, see 
Saxton 1979.
(34) A.Gunder Frank (1966) defines underdevelopment on the basis of 
the existence of unequal metropolitan-satelite relationships, as an 
essential feature in the development of the capitalist system on a world 
scale. For P. Gonzalez Casanova "internal colonialism corresponds to a 
structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among 
culturally heterogeneous, distinct groups" (1965: 33), See also 
Stavenhagen's "First thesis" (1968).
thesis acknowledges the class nature of the oppression of subordinate 
ethnic groups, it emphasizes the "colonial" nature of this oppression 
(Stavenhagen 1982: 25). H. Wolpe has criticized this approach on the 
grounds that it treats class relations as residual and that it does not 
explain the relations between systems of class exploitation and 
domination on ethnic or cultural grounds (1971; also Sloan 1979).
Exploring class and ethnic relations that resulted from Western 
expansion, some recent studies have focussed on the indigenous 
bourgeoisie and the use they make of ethnic or nationalist ideologies to 
mobilize mass support. For instance, Fitzpatrick (1980) studied the 
emergence of capitalist relations and the preservation of traditional 
modes in Papua New Guinea, identifying "race" as a fundamental 
ideological category in the colonial context and in the national 
bourgeoisie's project for decolonization.
f.- The civilizational approach.
The civilizational approach, developed in Latin America and 
Africa, is specifically addressed to the realities of present non-Western 
societies and specially to the situation of indigenous populations. It 
emerged in opposition to both extremes in the perception of ethnicity: to 
perspectives that maintain the autonomy of ethnicity, and to economistic 
reductionism. At the base of this approach one finds the ideas of 
scholars like A, Abdel-Malek (1975) and Darcy Ribeiro (1968, 1969, 
1981, 1984), and echoes of Cabral's thought (1973).
Ethnicity is seen as an expression of civilizational alternatives 
based on a people's awareness of the historical depth of their collective 
socio-cultural style. The existence of this awareness phrased in ethnic, 
national or cultural terms, is considered to indicate the possibility for a 
veritable process of decolonization to develop (Abdel-Malek 1975: 20- 
21). This approach views conflicts expressed in ethnic terms as 
confrontations with economic as well as with socio-cultural domination.
A new concept of civilization is central to this perspective. 
Abdel-Malek locates the driving forces behind present world political 
transformations in the non-Western social formations where combined 
processes of renaissance and national liberation movements have taken 
the -shape of- "an explicitely civilizational process". Importance is given
to the "depth of the historical field", the crucial factor for the 
maintenance of an ethno-national ("civilizational") style, and the concept 
of specificity is used as a main conceptual tool (35).
Darcy Ribeiro considers combined ethnic and class demands as a 
possible channel to develop wars of liberation, as happens, for instance, 
in Guatemala (1984: 28-29), For Ribeiro, ethnic formations are 
"operative units of the civilizational process" (1968). He gives the 
"Emerging Peoples" (Pueblos Emergentes) a central role in the forging 
of a new society. These peoples correspond to the historico-cultural 
configurations of oppressed national ethnic groups who are presently 
"stressing their ethnic and cultural profiles as national 
minorities...aiming at self-determination" (1984: 28) (36).
Critiques of the civilizational approach have come from some 
Marxist anthropologists who underline the weak treatment given to the 
location of indigenous movements in the class structure of the specific 
Nation-State (Medina 1983), the idealization of the "ethnic essence" and 
a "return to the sources" (Ortega Hegg et al. 1983), and the emphasis on 
the confrontation of ethno-national groups with the West as a basic 
contradiction (ibid.', Guerrero 1983) (37). This controversy within 
Marxism regarding ethnicity in non-Western societies opposes an 
economistic to a political perspective. The civilizational approach has, in 
fact, considered issues on the class articulation of indigenous 
populations and the role of the State. Varese (1979), for instance, 
provides promising theoretical insights, specifically on the crucial issue 
of class and ethnic consciousness.
(35) "The study of specificity is...undertaken...within the framework of 
the concrete evolution of given societies...To talk of societal 
maintenance is to address oneself to the long historical duration that 
moulds events, not to contingency...." (Ibid. 164-165).
(36) In this respect, Stavenhagen points out that, in Latin America, there 
is rather "an emerging social movement and an incipient ideology based 
on ethnic criteria" (1984: 201), The aims of indigenous movements in 
Latin America are summarized in Bonfil Batalla 1981. See the 
Declaration o f Barbados (1971) and the Second Declaration (1977) 
(Documentos,..1979).
(37) Earlier, Jean Copans had expressed his doubts on the "chevaliers of 
ethnocide" (a direct reference to R. Jaulin [1973]), viewing with 
suspicion what he considered a new praise of "primitiveness" (1974: 
144).
g.- The cuitural-assimilationist approach and reconstructive 
ethnography in Indian anthropology,
Indian anthropology has operated within borrowed theoretical 
frameworks: British functionalism and, after the sixties, under a 
growing American influence. On the whole, and especially with 
reference to "tribal studies", it has not produced an independent line of 
thought, with very few recent exceptions. The tradition of applied 
anthropology, based on the assimilationist perspective, on the other 
hand, was taken up in earnest. American influence resulted, in turn, in 
studies focussed on the village as the unit of study, and in a further 
impetus to "community development" (for instance, Pande 1968: 33- 
57). "Community development" complemented applied anthropology 
and justified the role of some anthropologists as government planners 
(Saberwal 1979: 245,247). These scientists cum administrators adopted 
the basic derogatory attitude toward the societies they studied 
characteristic of applied anthropology. For instance, V. K. Mathur 
echoes one of Lucy Mair's consistent lines:
The program of community development is one 
of...peaceful replacement o f old undesirable tribal 
practices with new scientifically accepted superior 
practices....
(1967:16. Italics added).
The emphasis on the need for "desirable modifications" appears 
often in the writings of Indian anthropologists, some of whom openly 
express their support for "directed cultural change" towards the 
dominant Hindu model (for instance, Sahay 1980: 25-71).
On the other hand, a considerable amount of research has 
developed in India in the line of reconstructive ethnography. This 
approach reached with V. Elwin's proposal to establish Bhaiga and 
Gond reservations the point where whole societies were to be "living 
museums" (1943, 1960. See Grigson's comments [1946: 81-96]).
Given the belief in the inevitable acculturation of the adivasis, the 
study of cultural change as "an urgent necessity" has received attention 
since the sixties (Sachchidananda 1964). It was the loss of culture and 
not the adivasis as creators of culture that became the research focus. 
According to the assimilationist perspective, what should be preserved
are only "the rich, colorful and conducive traits of tribal culture" (V.K, 
Mathur 1967: 21), following a pedestrian conception of "folklore" (Cf. 
Jaulin 1979b: 85-90; Leiris 1976: 303-320), The rescuing spirit is still 
strong in India judging by the recent drive for the development of 
anthropological museums where, inevitably, the products of adivasi 
cultures fall under the headings "primitive" and "tribal" art (Koppar 
1976) (38).
Although cultural assimilationism and reconstructive 
ethnography still dominate the field of "tribal studies" in India, some 
scholars have recently applied the notion of "internal colonialism" to the 
Indian situation. The issue of uneven development and internal 
colonialism has been explored by Nirmal Sengupta (1982a: 3-39) and S. 
Corbridge (1982:40-62) while examining the situation in Jharkhand.
Conclusion
This chapter has evaluated the state-of-the-art in the field of 
ethnic studies. Production is plentiful. However, this production reveals 
a series of problems: the inadequacy of some of the social categories in 
use; a lack of agreement in the definition of the subject of study and, for 
the most part, limited theoretical advances.
Of late, there has been a significant shift in the approach to the 
problem. First, there have been new insights from a Marxist perspective 
and second, a turn from reductionism (be it cultural or economic) to a 
social and political perspective. Consequently, there has been a change 
in the conception of the "object". Are we then witnessing "the end of 
ethnicity"? To obtain an answer to this question, culture and the 
development of collective identities will be explored in the following 
chapters.
(38) See also other articles in The Eastern Anthropologist 1976.
SECOND PART 
R E A L I T I E S
The preceeding chapter discussed various approaches to ethnicity. The 
treatment of ethnicity as an autonomous subject and the inadequacy of 
the social categories that have been used for studying it were especially 
underlined. With the aim of modifying current perceptions in the study 
of the Indian adivasi population, this part of the thesis contrasts the 
evidence of Jharkhand's ethnohistory with the "tribal" paradigm. It 
locates Jharkhand's adivasis in their historical context (Chapter II) and 
in the regional social formation (Chapter HI). At the same time, these 
chapters provide the background for understanding the role of the ethnic 
factor in present-day Jharkhand, the theme discussed in the Third and 
Fourth Parts of this thesis.
CHAPTER II
THE MYTH OF THE TRIBE : ETHNOHISTORY OF 
JHARKHAND
Father of the Earth, ours is the land...
In Nagpur, our ancestors left their footprints.
In the country reclaimed by us, you made others sit in our 
property.
Our ancient order was wiped out....
Birsaite song.
British colonial and Indian administrative ethnography, 
combined with applied anthropology, have generated an epistemology 
which views Bihar as a living museum of tribes. In constructing these 
representations, facts in the history of Jharkhand’s ethnic communities 
have been largerly ignored or altered to uphold the "myth of the tribe". 
The existence of different systems of production, the incorporation of 
these communities into a cash economy and later into a colonial 
economy, and their subsumption under the capitalist mode of 
production, processes of class formation, changes in the social division 
of labour and in the relations of production, and the evolving nature of 
power relationships are not discussed in existing ethnographies of 
Jharkhand.
The concrete realities of Jharkhand's populations, the 
transformations they had experienced over time, and their economic- 
political location in the wider social context, were ignored and instead 
partial socio-economic indexes were arbitrarily attributed to them, in 
order to make them fit the construct of "tribe".
It is my contention that the tribal construct in India is a colonial 
category, and that it formed part of the colonial legitimizing ideology, as 
already pointed out in Chapter I. As such, this category operated as a 
device to catalogue conquered populations, to formulate imperial policies 
and to facilitate the incorporation of these populations into the colonial 
system. The ideology of tribe did not dissolve with the end of
colonialism. It is still functional in independent India's underdeveloped 
capitalism, as will be shown in the next chapter.
Jharkhand's ethnohistory reveals not the existence of "tribes", 
but rather a variegated development of its indigenous societies and 
processes of transition from lineage and communally-based societies to a 
class-based society.
A review of Jharkhand's ethnohistory makes visible the 
historical depth of its adivasi communities' socio-cultural styles, and 
how social maintenance and the attachment to land and territory have 
acted as an axis for the reproduction of collective identities. These 
dynamics were present in the past (see Chapter IV), and they survive 
today (Chapters V and VI).
Jharkhand's reality challenges the myth of the tribe with the 
evidence provided by history. To evaluate this evidence, this chapter 
focusses on key processes that affected adivasi societies and not on 
isolated communities (1). For that purpose, illustrative instances are 
presented to show the processes of transformation which Jharkhand’s 
adivasi societies undewent in the course of time. Internal discontinuities 
occurring in these societies, like the development of social 
differentiation, are also observed in these cases. An analysis of the 
modes of incorporation of Jharkhand's adivasi societies into the colonial 
system follows. In this way, I will question the tribal paradigm by 
examining both different specific "histories" and general processes like 
colonialism.
In sum, I will argue that there were no "tribes" in Jharkhand 
until the European perception of Indian reality constructed them and 
colonial authorities gave them their administrative sanction. The tribal 
paradigm is ill-suited to categorize past and present adivasi societies. In 
Jharkhand, these societies are now basically peasant societies inserted in 
a class society, portraying at the same time specific ethno-cultural styles.
(1) To isolate particular communities would have meant to reproduce the 
perspective that has ensured the existence of the tribal paradigm. The 
intention is precisely to demonstrate that the elements used to 
characterize Jharkhand's adivasis as "tribes" (isolation, inherent 
egalitarism, autonomy, economic independence, slow change) are 
invalid.
1.- The region.
With 5,810,867 persons registered as Scheduled Tribes out of 
an all-India total of 51,628,638, the state of Bihar (2) has one of the 
largest proportions of indigenous ethnic communities (8.31% of the 
population). Of the total Scheduled Tribes population in Bihar, 
5,329,283 persons (91.7%) are located in its Jharkhand region (Cl 
1981: series 1, part II-B, iii).
More important than Bihar’s existing internal administrative 
divisions is the geo-ecological regional differentiation of the state, 
resulting in three well-demarcated regions: North Bihar to the north of 
the Ganges River, the South Ganges Plain or South Bihar, and the 
South Bihar Plateau comprising Chotanagpur and Santal Parganas (Map 
3). The distinctive geo-ecological characteristics of these areas have 
partially conditioned the development of systems of production and the 
emergence of socio-cultural patterns. The Ganges River divides Bihar 
into two physically different regions: the fertile plain of the north, and 
the south which, being fertile along the Ganges, becomes hillier as one 
proceeds south into the Chotanagpur plateau. In the past, the Ganges 
divide already marked the development of two different regions (3).
Until the middle of the sixteenth century, when Akbar acceded 
to the throne of Delhi, Chotanagpur seemed to have been little affected 
by external influences. Under the Mughals, the Raja of Chotanagpur 
was made a tributary. Whatever independence and isolation 
Chotanagpur had enjoyed in Mughal times was relative. Chotanagpur 
was surrounded by a cash economy and, if this economy did not 
penetrate the entire area it was because the lower productivity of its land 
was not particularly vital for the reproduction of Mughal "feudal” 
economy (Habib 1963). In 1765 the East India Company acquired the 
Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, which included Jharkhand.
(2) The modern state of Bihar borders on the north with the Nepalese 
Terai, on the east with the state of West Bengal, on the south with the 
state of Orissa, and with the state of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh 
on the west.
(3) The state of Videha on the north was already on the decline in the VI 
century B.C., and the state of Magadha in the south rose to prominence 
around that time. The hilly and forest region of Jharkhand 
(Jharakhanda: ’’forest territory") may have formed part of the Magadha 
state during Ashoka's reign (273-232 B.C.) (Thapar 1966: 50-69; Spear 
1958). The name Jharkhand for Chotanagpur appears in the late Sanskrit 
literature and continued to be used by Muslim historians, changing to 
Kokrah (possibly from the Oraon Kurukh) in the XVI c. (S.C. Roy 
1912: 151,176, 359; Bradley-Birt 1903: 10,12; Pandey 1963: 111).
Today the Jharkhand area of Bihar comprises practically half 
the state's territory, extending over the districts of Palamau, Hazaribagh, 
Giridih, Santal Parganas, Dhanbad, Ranchi and Singhbhum (Map 2). 
Jharkhand, however, denotes more than a geographical region. Together 
with the adjacent districts of the states of West Bengal, Orissa and 
Madhya Pradesh it forms part of a distinct socio-cultural region: Greater 
Jharkhand.
Demands for a separate state for this region were presented in 
1928 to the Simon Commission and later, in 1954, to the States 
Reorganization Commission (5). In 1973, the Jharkhand Party 
demanded a state comprising over 72,619 sq. miles of territory with a 
population of 30,598,991 , covering three districts of West Bengal 
(Bankura, Midnapur, Purulia), seven from Bihar (Ranchi, Singhbhum, 
Dhanbad, Hazaribagh, Giridih, Palamau, Santal Parganas), four from 
Orissa (Sundargarh, Keonjhor, Majurbhanj, Sambalpur), and two from 
Madhya Pradesh (Raigarh and Sarguja). Greater Jharkhand can be 
claimed to extend even further if the hilly and jungle areas of Rajasthan, 
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh are included on the basis of their 
pattern of uneven development and ethno-cultural composition (A.K. 
Roy 1982a: 5).
2.- Paths leading to Jharkhand.
F. B. Bradley-Birt noted at the beginning of the century:
Nothing but a special volume...could attempt to give 
a detailed account of all the tribes and castes that 
people Chota Nagpore...All the races of Northern 
India seem to have collected in this comer of the 
empire....
(1903: 22)
From ancient times Jharkhand received people who migrated 
into the area. Major adivasi groups like the Mundas, Santals, Oraons 
and Hos and other early settlers reached Jharkhand after a series of 
migrations (6).
(5) Jharkhand was to embrace 63,859 sq. miles of territory with a 
population of 16,367,175. This proposal differred from later claims in 
that it excluded some parts of West Bengal but included larger areas of 
Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, and the hill and jungle areas of southern 
Uttar Pradesh
(6) Pioneer ethnographers like S, C, Roy (1912, 1915), E. T. Dalton 
(1872) and W. W. Hunter (1868, 1877) attempted to reconstruct the 
early history of these groups on the basis of archaeological and linguistic 
data, the analysis of Hindu scriptures and adivasi oral history.
The ancestors of the adivasis have been identified as the native 
opponents the Indo-aryans encountered when they entered the 
subcontinent. They were the dasas and dasyus of the Rig Veda.
The differentiation between Aryans and adivasis persisted 
across the centuries, later formulated on a racial basis as the one between 
"superior" and "inferior" communities. The racial basis (the construct of 
"racial purity") which has sustained this dichotomy is untenable on 
historical grounds, not to mention its ethnocentric-racist bias. As pointed 
out by N. Sengupta (1982b), attention should shift to the evolution of a 
different mode of production in the fertile river basins after the discovery 
of iron and the development of agricultural technology and irrigation, 
leading to an intensive use of land and to economic specialization, social 
differentiation and regional integration. This process did not take place 
in the hilly areas because the terrain did not allow such intense land 
utilization. The developments that were possible in the plains were 
understood as expressions of a "higher civilization", while the people of 
the hills and the jungles were seen as not so technologically advanced 
and, following a fallacious correlation, as belonging to an "inferior 
race". These regional-economic identifications did not become fixed 
until the advent of colonialism, when different pre-capitalist societies 
were integrated in the capitalist system in various ways. Existing 
differences were used by British colonial administrators, and isolationist 
policies towards the adivasis were shaped with a rhetorical protectionist 
intent. In the background of these policies stood a history of military 
repression and economic exploitation of adivasi land and labour. The 
process of unequal integration based on the construction of fixed 
categories (Scheduled Tribes) continued after Independence.
The Mundas and other Austric-speaking people (7) in early 
times lived in the hilly regions along the Aravalli and Vindhyan ranges. 
Later they occupied the valleys of the big rivers of northern India, and 
finally were displaced southwards by the incoming Indo-aryan invaders 
(S. C, Roy 1912) (8). The migrations of the Mundas before they
(7) Hodson gave them the name Kol or Kolarian. Max Muller 
recognized the Kolarian languages as part of an independent linguistic 
Munda family, different from the Dravidian to which the Oraons 
linguistically belong. The term Munda embraces several related 
languages and peoples. Santal oral history speaks of Mundas, Hos, 
Santals, Bhumijs, etc., known as Kherwars, as having the same origin 
and speaking the same language (Grierson 1967; Gautam 1977).
(8) The Rig Veda depicted these groups as of advanced culture and 
socio-political organization. Some were already living in permanent 
villages (hatu in Mundari), which appears to have been an endogenous
- development, and had well-built cities and fortifications whose riches 
were the envy of the invaders (Ibid.: 26-27,55-60).
reached Jharkhand are preserved in their collective memory in the 
cosmogonical myth of the primeval couple and in the story of Lutkum 
Hamm and Lutkum Buria (Ibid.: App. I and II) (9).
Of the different people comprising the Munda group latu sensu, 
the' Mundas finally settled in the central Chotanagpur plateau, 
concentrating in the forest areas of what is now Ranchi District. The 
Bhumijs settled in Manbhum. The Hos proceeded further south and, 
after displacing the Bhuiyas, established themselves in Singhbhum. The 
Oraons, of Dravidian origin, possibly migrating from the western coast 
of India, already found some scattered Munda communities in the 
Chotanagpur plateau when they reached it. They settied in the northwest 
and west of the region, which they sucessfully opened to cultivation 
(10), and gradually extended their settlements up to the centre of 
Chotanagpur (S. C. Roy 1912: vii, 1915: 17-39; Dalton 1872: 176-177, 
237; Bradley-Birt 1903: 23-24).
Little is known about the Santals1 original habitat. Their oral 
history records their recurrent migrations (11). As a result of the 1793 
Permanent Settlement, they ultimately reached what was later known as 
Santal Parganas (probably from Birbhum, West Bengal) towards the 
end of the eighteenth century, brought by the British administration to 
clear the lowlands of wild animals and open them to cultivation. By 
1830 their migration into the area was considerable. They became 
concentrated in the Rajmahal forest after the British administration 
created the Damin-i-koh in 1835.
Santal traditions show that in many cases the recurrent 
migrations were organized to avoid direct confrontation in conflictive 
situations. This survival technique continued to be used at least until the 
mid-nineteenth century (12).
The hill-tops of the Rajmahal plateau had long been inhabited 
by the Paharias (13). While the Paharias used land mainly as a "subject
(9) Recent linguistic studies suggest that in an early period, the Munda- 
speaking people were distributed in the region to the north-west and 
west of Chotanagpur (Zide 1971).
(10) Possibly introducing the use of the plough.
(11) Dalton located their origins in the area between the Hoogly and the 
Kasai rivers, while W. W. Hunter believed they originally came from 
the Himalayas, theory that Dalton did not accept (Dalton 1872: 208-211; 
Hunter 1868: 149,152, 219, 221).
(12) W. J. Culshaw refers to this phenomenon of constant displacement 
(1949: 5).
(13) The Paharias are the Maler or Savaria Paharias in the present 
subdivisions of Rajmahal, Pakur and Godala in Santal Parganas District 
(Vidyarthi 1960: 26). They maintained that "the human race was first 
produced on the hills",-and their traditions do not speak of migrations. 
Oraon oral history, however, mentions the Paharias’ migration from
of labour", the originally self-sustaining communities like the Santals, 
Mundas, Oraons and Hos, exploited land as an "instrument of labour" 
(14). This meant that socio-economic organization had to be based on 
continuity, with the agricultural team investing its labour in the land. 
Subsistence and the reproduction of the productive unit became 
' essential. The individual producer was functional only when linked to 
the family group, lineage and village unit; land was held in common and 
work was collective. Labour was neither remunerated nor a commodity.
Total self-sufficiency was not the norm among Jharkhand's 
agricultural communities. For baskets, pottery and metal objects, 
Santals relied on craftmen from other communities. The Munda Lutkum 
Haram and Lutkum Buria myth (Asur legend) speaks of the Asur, 
settled in the midst of Munda communities, producing iron (15).
3.- From a variety of indigenous formations to the 
forging of ”tribes”.
a.- The stigma of the "tribe of predatory freebooters": 
the Paharias.
In the nineteenth century, the Paharias were described as 
"thieves and murderers" (Heber 1861: 120). The appelation dates back 
to 1770 when the British administration became interested in the 
Paharias, a "tribe of predatory freebooters, raiding and terrorizing the 
plain country from the foot of the hills to the Ganges" (Russell 1916: 
155). That was precisely the year when the great Bengal famine of 1770 
started to be felt with severity in the region between the Rajmahal hills 
and the Ganges (Hunter 1868: ch. II; N. K. Sinha 1962: ch. HI; Mishra 
1970). In the years that followed, the Paharias systematically plundered 
the plains, to such an extent that these were abandoned by the cultivators 
(Hunter 1877: 303; O'Malley 1910: 34-35).
In such years of scarcity and starvation, plunder was an activity 
not restrcited to the peoples of the hills, but one to which many peasants
Rohtas when driven out by the Indo-aryans. Some then went towards 
Chotanagpur and others to the Rajmahal hills (Dalton 1872: 236, 255- 
256).
(14) Conducive to "a type of 'instantaneous' production whose output is 
immediately available, allowing a process of sharing which takes place 
at the end of each enterprise" (Meillassoux 1972: 99) as in the case of 
hunting and gathering.
(15) The Asur seem to have been in the region before the coming of the 
Mundas. Archaeological remains seem to indicate they engaged in some 
trade (Thapar and Siddiqi 1979: 22 ff.)
resorted after having been forced by famine and drought to abandon 
their lands and to take refuge in the hills. Wandering sannyasis were 
active in Rungpur, Rajshahi and Malda in groups of fifty thousand 
strong (Monckton Jones 1918: 180, 212, 213; Hunter 1868: 70 ff,). 
They were joined by crowds of starving peasants. Bands of up to five 
hundred men moved, unresisted, across abandoned villages and lands 
from Kharakpur to Rajmahal. In the winter of 1772, these starving 
masses fell upon the Lower Bengal fields, burning and plundering. 
Dacoity became "a standing trouble present in all parts of the provinces 
and at all seasons of the year" (Hunter ibid.: 178), the result of the 
general economic conditions at the time, of the insensibility of an 
administration mostly worried about the collection of revenue, and of the 
hoarding of grain (16). Despite the famine, revenue was rigorously 
collected (17).
Deep transformations in the land tenure system occurred in the 
1770's. According to Hunter:
Before the commencement of 1771, one-third of a 
generation of peasants had been swept from the face 
of the earth and a whole generation of once rich 
families had been reduced to indigence...In 1776 the 
scarcity of cultivators had completely transposed the 
relations of landlords and tenants in Bengal.............
(1868: 56, 59-60).
The process of depopulation continued for fifteen years after 
the famine; cultivators fled to the cities; the impossibility of paying the 
revenue resulted in many going to prison.
a.i.- The Paharias' communal system of production:
The situation of disorder and scarcity brought about by the 
famine affected the Paharias to a lesser degree since they could retreat to
(16) Monckton Jones op. cit. letters and documents: 207, 211-212; 
Patwardhan 1971, Fort William-India House, letters dated 4 February, 
31 August, 11 September 1770, 28 August 1771, 9 March 1772: 117- 
131, 361-368; B. Prasad (ed.) 1960: 191-194, 224-229.
(17) The East India Company was informed in 1772:
The influence [of the 1770 famine] on the revenue has been yet 
unnoticed, and even unfelt, but by those from whom it is collected; for 
notwithstanding the loss of at least one-third of the inhabitants of the 
province, and the consequent decrease of the cultivation, the net 
collections of the year 1771 exceeded even those o f 1768....(Letter from 
the Revenue Department, Fort William, Nov. 3, 1772. Prasad op. cit, 
417-430. Italics added. Alsri N. K. Sinha op. cit.: 54-55). Revenue 
collection was made under pressure (Forrest 1910: 265-266).
the forests for survival. It added, nevertheless, to the changes that had 
been taking place in the agreements between them and the zamindars of 
the plains.
At that time, the economic life of the Paharias could be 
characterized as based on a communal system of production, dependent 
on a territory of forests and hill slopes (Pathy 1982: 37-39). The 
Paharias used land mainly as a subject of labour. They depended on 
forest products and hunting but practiced some agriculture (O'Malley 
1910: 34), which puts them marginally into the agricultural self- 
sustaining category. Labour was family-based and followed the 
principle of reciprocity.
Today they still live off the forests and practice slash-and-burn 
cultivation on the flat hill-tops. On the low hilly areas they have taken 
to plough cultivation where the forests have dissappeared, and to a 
combination of both forms of cultivation at intermediate altitudes 
(Vidyarthi 1960: 26-27). Their original mode of production in which 
shifting cultivation and the right to its usufruct were collectively vested 
in the community became endangered by the immigration of non-adivasi 
cultivators and a consequent reduction of forest lands when these were 
opened to intensive agriculture (18).
The Paharias had until the end of the eighteenth century a 
history of independence. The Mughal government only exerted nominal 
control over them and seemed to have accepted the idea that no revenue 
was obtainable from the hilly areas. In my view, by the eighteenth 
century a modified version of the arrangements based on reciprocity had 
already been extended beyond the community in the form of the annual 
agreements with the zamindars of the plains, whereby divisional and 
village headmen (,sardars and manjhis) took charge of detecting crime, 
and Paharia contingents guarded the hill passes and prevented raids 
upon the plains. The Paharias thus exchanged protection for the 
zamindars' respect for their economic independence. The sardars were 
given service tenures (jagirs) in the plains. However, the zamindars’ 
growing desire for control over people and land became a real threat to 
Paharia economic self-sufficiency. Raids that took place following the 
1770 famine often reflected the need of the Paharias to check the 
advance of the cultivators from the plains. More than survival guided
(18) The Paharia is the only "Scheduled Tribe" whose population has 
been constantly declining since 1931 (set at 93,282 in the 1971 Census). 
The formerly self-sufficient Paharias are now plagued by illness, 
malnutrition, debts, harassrhent by forest officials, and by the illegal use 
of their lands (as for mining) (H. Narayan 1984: 26-27).
the Paharias in their raids at the end of the eighteenth century: by then 
they were engaged in an open guerrilla warfare to safeguard their 
independence.
a.2.- Colonialism: "the most rational mode of domination",
British military penetration into these areas began two years 
after acquiring the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1765. From 
1767 to 1778 the British extended their control over these areas with the 
aim of subjecting them to the payment of revenue. Captain Brooke, 
Military Governor of the Jungleterry (19), established armed control 
over the area and set up a scheme "of pacification" based on the 
transformation of the Paharias into instruments of the colonial 
administration, and on their incorporation into the colonial economy by 
settling them and establishing markets at the outskirts of the plains 
(O'Malley 1910: 36). The plan, sanctioned by the Government in 1778, 
was carried out by August Cleveland, Collector of Bhagalpur.
Cleveland's subjugation of the Jungleterry has been referred to 
as "the most permanent,...the most rational mode of domination" (20). 
His mode of domination proved not to be permanent and was abandoned 
after Cleveland died.
Cleveland's measures were neither conciliatory nor benevolent, 
as usually portrayed. They were an example of colonial control tactics
(21). Among other things, he formed a corps of Paharia archers (the 
Bhagalpur Hill Rangers, disbanded in 1857), who were to be used 
against their own people. He also set up a tribunal of sardars, presided 
over by himself, to try their brethren and execute the sentences. 
Cleveland took advantage of the animosity between Paharias and 
Santals. Santals were sentenced on false charges of dacoity and murder, 
sometimes to death, by the Paharia Councils he set up. Adivasi protest 
in the area could thus be repressed by the new bodies of native 
collaborators created by Cleveland.
(19) The British called Santal Parganas, parts of Hazaribagh, Monghyr 
and Bhagalpur, the Jungleterry or Jungle tarai.
(20) As stated in the inscription on the monument dedicated to him in 
Bhagalpur (O'Malley 1910:41).
(2-1) See D.C. Ganguly 1958: 19; Forrest 1910: 79; O'Malley 1910: 37; 
Hunter 1877: 305-307; A. Srivastava 1981 b.
Cleveland made explicit his colonial policy in a letter dated 
November 21,1780:
The circulation o f money in the hills by Government 
appears to me the most likely bait to ensure the 
attachment of the chiefs..,77je enemies o f Government 
are to be considered as enemies by the hill people,.It 
shall be...the duty of the Corps to bring all refractory 
hill chiefs and Gautwalls to terms....
(O' Malley 1910: 38-39. Italics added).
Sardars and manjhis began receiving regular cash payments for 
their collaboration. The administration considered the operative "a 
financial success" which contributed to breaking the control of the local 
zamindars and facilitated the Government's direct management of the 
area (22).
b.- How the Santals became "the day labourers of 
Lowland Bengal".
b.l.- The Santals as settled agriculturalists:
The Santals, although not considered to be as "fierce...nor as 
hostile" as the Paharias were nevertheless an obstacle for the regional 
completion of colonial control:
Until 1790, the Santals were the pest of the adjacent 
lowlands...Every winter, as soon as they had gathered in the rice 
crop..., the whole nation moved down upon the plains, hunting in the 
forests and plundering the open country on the line of march....
(Hunter 1868: 219).
Hunting and gathering - complementary activities for these 
settled agriculturalists - were considered to be plundering by the British. 
Paradoxically, Hunter also remarks that amongst the Santals "crime and 
criminal officers...[were] almost unknown" (Ibid.: 217).
' Santals considered land to be a village patrimony. According to 
customary law, the individual had the right to the usufruct of land but
(22) Out of the East India Company's experiences in the control of the 
Rajmahal hills originated the Non-regulation system (Regulation /, 
1796 , on justice). In 1823 the Government promised not to take 
revenue from the Paharias. By the beginning of the nineteenth century 
the Paharias were Government tenants with occupancy rights on their 
lands but unable to dispose of them (Ibid.: 214-217).
not to its possession nor inheritance. All economic activities were based 
on cooperation (23).
Since it is relevant to the JMM proposals discussed in Chapter 
VI, we indicate here some traits of Santal social organization: Santals 
were territorialy organized into confederacies of about twelve villages 
(parganas), which regulated matters of justice and conflict resolution, 
the decisions being implemented by a council (panchayat). Superior to 
this council was the Hunt Council (Lo Bir Sendra) with jurisdiction over 
a larger number of villages. Village chiefs (manjhis), with no special 
prerogatives, were first informally elected and later accepted on 
hereditary grounds. A more hor ("group of five"), similar to the 
panchayat, was found in every village. Decisions were usually taken by 
consensus. Temporary or permanent excommunication (bitlaha) was the 
most severe possible punishment (24).
b.2.- Colonialism gives birth to a "tribal reserve":
At the end of the eighteenth century important migrations took 
place among the Santals of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa due to problems 
they had with the local zamindars and to the situation created by the 
1770 famine (O'Malley 1938: 51).
In 1812, Sutherland, Magistrate of Bhagalpur, recommended 
that the colonial Government declare the hill tract and the-adjacent plains 
in Paharia and Santal country to be Government property. 
Subsequently, the colonial Government took possession of the Damin-i- 
koh as direct proprietor and from 1832 on promoted the migration of 
Santals, reputed to be excellect clearers of lands and cultivators, to the 
region (25). By 1851 there were already 82,785 adivasi and non- 
adivasi migrants in the Damin, living in 1,473 villages, as well as
(23) The village paramanik was in charge of matters related to land and 
cultivation, and justly distributed land among the community's members 
at the end of every year, when every family handed over its right to use 
the land it had previously been alloted, for it to be redistributed. The 
Santal clans were not related to occupational ascription, had equal status 
(except for two: Chorai and Besera), and only served to regulate 
marriages (Dalton 1872; Hunter 1868; Risley 1908; Mukheijea 1943; 
Man n.d.; Datta-Majumder 1956; Orans 1965; Culshaw 1949).
(24) Each village had also a religious chief (naia, nay aka, naeke or 
lay a). The solar deity, Sing Bonga, was the most important one in the 
Santal pantheon, followed by Chando, the moon, and Marang Buru, the 
Great Mountain, and lesser deities, with whom the ojha acted as an 
intermediary (Ibid.).
(25) Migrants came from Orissa, Dhalbhum, Manbhum, Barabhum, 
Chotanagpur, Palamau, Hazaribagh, Midnapur, Bankura and Birbhum.
10,000 people established beyond the demarcation fence (26). Only the 
1,164 Santal villages paid rent. The Paharias, meanwhile, remained in 
the high part of the hills.
What did the creation of the Damin imply? The colonial 
Government expropriated the lands of the inhabitants of the area and 
created a "tribal reserve" for its own profit. It exacted labour from the 
Santals who worked as day labourers to open the area to cultivation. 
Subsequently, Santals were transformed into tenants paying rent in cash 
on lands onto which the then Deputy Collector Pontet brought new 
migrants. The area under cultivation was thus enlarged and "a 
handsome revenue" obtained (27). A money economy expanded through 
the new weekly markets and new commodities were introduced (Hunter 
1868: 228). The control of the Rajmahal hills was also considered by the 
British to be a strategic imperative that provided them with a guard post 
over the Ganges River route.
The Santals, transformed into "the day-labourers of Lowland 
Bengal", began to be described as industrious, as an agricultural reserve 
army. However, the moment they challenged the pattern of colonial 
domination in 1855, they were again depicted as "blood-thirsty savages" 
(Hunter ibid.: 220-225; CR 1856: 259). It was precisely in the Damin-i- 
koh where the 1855 Santal Movement started (Chapter IV).
c.- From lineage-based societies to state formation: Mundas. Oraons. 
Bhumiis.
Chotanagpur's settled agricultural communities shared a similar 
language and social institutions and, up to the advent of the first 
Chotanagpur Nagbansi raja (c. fifth century A. D.), followed parallel 
patterns of social, economic and cultural development.
According to S. C. Roy, the Mundas settled in Chotanagpur 
around the sixth century B. C. (28). The lands they occupied were
(26) The. ring fence of pillars marking the Damin-i-koh was 295 miles in 
circumference and embraced 866 sq, miles of highland and 500 of 
lowland territory (Hunter 1868: 223 fn. 61a). For details, see Gait et al. 
1909: 237 ff.; Hunter 1877: 309-310; CR 1856: 238; Roy Chaudhuri 
1965a: 74-75; Raghavaiah 1971:148).
(27) The aims of the administration are clearly stated in the letter Deputy 
Collector Pontet sent to H. I. James, Acting Collector of Bhagalpur, in 
1837 (Cit. in Roy Chaudhuri 1959: 3 ff).
(28) At first there were groups of independent villages led by a secular 
(munda) and a religious chief (pahan), and a panchayat. Later, villages 
came together in confederancies (parka oxpatti), led by a manki and a 
parhapanchayat. Mundas were divided in exogamous groups (kili),
considered, to be the village's patrimony. The descendants of the 
founding clan of the village (khuntkattidars) controlled the land, 
protecting their rights under customary inheritance laws. Individuals 
integrated into the community through adoption (29) could have the 
usufruct of lands alloted to them for maintenance, but did not have other 
rights over them (S. C. Roy 1912: 166 ff., 433, 435; Hoffmann 1961).
The khuntkatti system and the egalitarian character of Munda 
society began to change with the development of social stratification 
based on a differential attainment of power over land and with the 
transformation of the offices of the chiefs of villages and confederancies 
into hereditary positions. This marked the beginning of a tendency 
towards the establishment of chiefdoms.
The election of a raja among the Mundas and the Oraons, 
initially with no prerogatives over land, initiated a change in their 
economic and political patterns which led to state formation. In time, the 
Raj Nagbansi family of Chotanagpur drew up genealogies to support its 
claims to a Rajput origin (30).
Settled agriculture, the continuous occupation of a territory and 
a territorial administrative organization provided the basis for state 
formation among the Mundas and Oraons. The emergence of an 
aristocracy with economic privileges (control over land, labour, services 
and rent), accelerated the already existing process of social 
differentiation. The ensuing mode of production has been characterized 
as "feudal" (31).
At first, the village community had to make collective payments 
of a permantly-fixed rent to the overlord, and the peasants had to 
provide free labour (began). Later, these demands evolved into a system
each of whom founded a village. The descendants were known as 
khuntkattidars. Mundas and pahans came usually from the founding 
clan. Sing Bonga, the solar deity, leads the Munda pantheon. Village 
deities (hatu bongako) are venerated in the sacred grove (sarna).
(29) They were called eta haturenko or parha horoko 
("men from other villages").
(30) There is no historical account of the emergence of kinship among 
the Mundas nor on the origins of the Nagbansis. S. C. Roy (Ibid.: 141; 
1915: 136 ff.) and Dalton (1872: 164-168) recorded a myth of origin 
according to which the first raja may have been a Naga adopted by a 
manki. See also P. C. Roy Chaudhuri 1965b: 143-144 and K. S. Singh 
1971b: 170.
(31) Patty 1982; K. S. Singh 1971b; S. C. Roy 1912. There is an 
ongoing debate on. the categorization of pre-colonial non-European 
social formations and the applicability of the category "feudalism" to 
India (See The Journal o f Peasant Studies 1985. Cf. H. Mukhia 1981 
with R. S. Sharma 1965, 1985).
of awabs (tributes) levied by the raja and the jagirdars (K. S. Singh 
1966: 3-4; 1977: 175).
Munda society ceased to be egalitarian and based on the 
communal holding of resources with a collective organization of labour 
and production. Dalton has noted the emergence of two classes in each 
village: the privileged bhuinhars ("the militia of the state"), and the mass 
of the peasantry working on rent-paying lands (rajhas) (1872: 167). The 
situation was more complicated.
I visualize the system of social stratification based on the 
control of land and labour that developed in Chotanagpur together with 
state formation as follows: There was a rent-receiving ruling class at the 
top composed of the raja, his family and the new landlord sector (32). 
There followed a dominant peasant group (khuntkattidars, later 
bhuinhars), descendants of the original settlers and principal office­
holders. This sector had a privileged position* paying quit rent to the raja 
and holding some lands rent free. However, they were also found 
cultivating rajha lands ("the share of the raja") and rendering free 
services. This dominant peasant sector could preserve a relative control 
over the means of production at the level of production (Mukhia 1981: 
290; Stein 1985: 21). To a certain extent this may have also been the 
case with the next group in the hierarchy: peasants working the lands of 
the former group and on rajha lands who paid rent, produce or both to 
the upper groups. A fourth layer was that of the landless agricultural 
labourers working on the landlords' privileged private lands (manjihas), 
paying the landlord in services mostly translated into unpaid cultivation, 
with no right of occupancy.
In general terms, it was the existence of a group's superior 
rights over the rest of the peasants' lands that allowed the extraction of 
surplus in various forms: the lord's share of rent, labour, gift and free 
sevices. Given that only the surplus was extracted, the self-sufficiency 
of the peasantry probably did not break down in the case of cultivators 
working land under rent or giving part of the produce (33). It seems 
doubtful that this applied in the case of the fourth group, who had an 
insecure position on the land they tilled and were made to contribute 
forced labour.
(32) The new landlord sector comprised jagirdars (holders of a jagir: 
conditional or unconditional assigment of land for its revenue), the 
korposhdars (maintenance grantees) and the thikadars (holders of a 
. temporary of permanent land leases).
(33) See Habib (1985: 48) for medieval India .
The rajas, who became increasingly Hinduized, began to give 
land grants to brahmins from Upper and Central India, who were 
brought to spread Hinduism among the population. Hindu and Muslim 
moneylenders, merchants and potential courtiers followed in their wake, 
also obtaining land grants from the raja. They eventually appropriated 
these lands for themselves by dispossessing the cultivators who had 
opened them to cultivation and tilled them (34).
The process of immigration intensified during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Peasants were encouraged to migrate to the 
area to extend agriculture and thus generate a larger surplus. The raja 
also brought military mercenaries, who were remunerated with jagirs, 
for puiposes of defence and to control the peasantry. Land grants were 
given to all these alien elements. This led to the emergence of the 
jagirdars who, at first, collected part of the agricultural produce, and 
later established a cash rent system.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century the raja, his family 
and the jagirdars were already indebted to Muslim, Hindu and Sikh 
moneylenders and merchants who were paid with permanent or 
temporary leases (thikas), with perpetual leases at fixed rentals and with 
usufructuary leases. By the nineteenth century many of the original 
settlers had been transformed through this process of making land grants 
into tenants. Ultimately, only the wastelands and the forests were left to 
them.
It has been sometimes argued that the raja gave land grants as a 
way of relinquishing his claims over the surplus generated in those lands 
in favour of the jagirdars (S. C. Roy 1912: 165) but that he did not 
intend to give them full control over them, which was what eventually 
happened. In contrast to what happened in the European feudal system 
(peasants received land grants to cultivate these lands for the lord), 
Indian rajas gave land grants in order to get the surplus collected. 
Peasants paid rent to the jagirdars, but did not necessarily enjoy security 
on the land they tilled since they could be replaced by other peasants 
who provided forced labour in the form of agricultural work (Sharma 
1985: fn. 31).
The new landlords also intervened in the internal affairs of the 
villages, restricting the activities of the panchayat and exerting pressure 
on the chiefs in order to preclude independent decisions. Non-economic 
coercion served to reinforce the economic control over the means and
(34) The concept of service land grants seems to have been alien to the 
area. The practice may have started quite late since the oldest registered 
lease dates back only to 1676 (S. C. Roy 1912:164-165).
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processes of production, and formed an integral part of the pre-capitalist 
mode of exploitation. A complex land tenure system thus evolved in 
Chotanagpur together with the rising power of the rajas. All this was 
later compounded with the changes brought about by British colonial 
administration (35).
A process of "feudalization" also took place among the 
Bhumijs. Surajit Sinha (1962: 42) as well as K. S. Singh (1971: 171) 
suggest that the emergence of the state among the Bhumijs was an 
endogenous development, a fact that would make them the exception 
among other Kolarian groups. Dalton earlier noted that the Raja of 
Dhalbhum, for instance, was unmistakenly of Bhumij origin, despite the 
Dhalbhum rajas' claim of being kshatriyas or Rajputs. Dalton further 
stated that the zamindars were also of "the same race as their people" 
(Op. cit.: 174).
S. Sinha considers that brahmanic influence, starting between 
the seventh and twelfth centuries A.D., was a force that could have 
contributed to state formation. By the sixteenth century the Bhumijs 
were already organized in kingdoms and claimed to be Rajputs. At the 
end of the eighteenth century the British, after encountering the strong 
resistance of the local chiefs, forced their way into the Jungle Mahals 
where they found well established kingdoms in Barabhum and Patkum 
(S. Sinha 1953).
S. Sinha views this development as being one of "a feudalistic 
structure [evolving] from a tribal democratic base", in the course of 
which former administrative units did not change their democratic 
character. But was this democratic base maintained once the social 
stratification accompanying a "feudalistic structure" emerged? This 
seems not to have been the case. A land-holding sector, with the raja or 
zamindar at the top, included the chiefs (sardar ghatwals) of a number of 
administrative units of twelve villages, the chiefs of each of these units 
(sadiyals), village headmen with service tenures (ghatwals), soldiers 
(tanbedars or paiks) also with tenures of cultivable land, and the 
kuntkattidars. Poor peasants, artisans and landless labourers came last.
The raja obtained his income mainly from agricultural land in 
the villages over which he had attained proprietorship. The tenants 
provided free labour and a certain amount of "tribute" in kind on the 
occasion of the Durga Puja festival. Artisans gave a share of their 
products to the raja in exchange for land free of rent. The sardar
(35) See S. C. Roy 1912: app. El, and 1961: 278-323.
ghatwals only paid a symbolic revenue to the raja, and in fact preserved 
a great deal of autonomy.
Different communities - brahmins as priests, literate people as 
officers for the administration, service castes, craftmen and trading 
groups - were encouraged to immigrate to the territories of the 
Barabhum, Patkum and Bhagmundi "feudal" chiefs. These elements did 
not endanger the supremacy of the Bhumijs, praticularly over land. The 
brahmins, however, acquired economic and political power after 
receiving generous land and village grants (brahmottars). Many of 
them settled as tenants or started operating as moneylenders and diwans 
(J.C. Jha 1967: 109-110).
In addition, the ghatwals (village headmen), entrusted with 
defence and the maintenance of order, became "proprietors of states 
comprising each from one to twenty manors...the most substantial 
tenants under them...[being] also hereditary Ghatwals rendering 
services andpaying...a very low fixed rent..." (Dalton 1872: 175).
The differential access to land and politico-administrative 
offices, and thus to power, gave rise to a fairly rigid social stratification, 
ritually expressed in caste-ranking combined with widespread 
Hinduization.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the immigrants' 
encroachment on Bhumij economic life was considerable, a situation 
aggravated by the effects of the Permanent Settlement. British law 
tended to favour the usurious activities of the moneylenders and this 
adversely affected the indebted rajas and chiefs as well as other sectors 
of the population. Zamindars and sardars had also began to exact an 
increasing number of illegal cesses that soon became permanent taxes 
which added to the toll levied by the petty officials of the East India 
Company.
As we will see later, the common grievance of indebtedness 
finally induced some rajas and zamindars to join forces with the 
discontented people in a series of armed insurgencies that swept the 
Jungle Mahals and Dhalbhum, culminating in the 1832 uprising 
(Chapter IV).
d.- Chotanagpur and Sinehbum under colonial rule.
In 1765, Chotanagpur came under the rule of the East India 
Company, and the first agreement on rents was reached with the Raja of 
Chotanagpur-in 1771. -In*..1789 it was suggested that the Permanent
Settlement should not apply to Chotanagpur since the revenue received 
from this area was more a fixed tribute than a tax determined by land 
production. Nevertheless, the Permanent Settlement was introduced in 
the last years of the eighteenth century. This caused an adverse reaction 
in the rural areas among the zamindars when lands on which they had 
been declared full proprietors came to be auctioned off to cover revenue 
arrears (Gopal 1949; J.C. Jha 1963; Guha 1981). The zamindars' 
indebtedness and the operation of usurious capital became one of the 
pivots around which the land market revolved, with the result that land 
started passing into the hands of moneylenders. With regard to the 
adivasi peasantry, there was no room in the new provisions for the 
customary land rights of the original settlers and the village office­
holders. These omissions in the new system gave the zamindars 
increased power to evict peasants from their lands. Customary law was 
abruptly replaced by contract law (36).
Increasing rent demands began to affect the zamindars. The 
Raja of Chotanagpur had constant difficulties in paying the revenue, 
zamindars were ruined, landlords with unlimited power increased the 
rents of the cultivators, and the oppression and pauperization of the 
peasantry grew.
In 1817, Munda and Oraon lands were put under the direct 
administration of the East India Company as part of the District of 
Ramgarh and the Raja of Chotanagpur ceased to be a tributary. In 1823, 
the Government took over from the Raja and his jagirdars the right to 
tax the production of liquor, to collect road-tolls, and to tax the products 
sold in the market. For all this the Government received Rs. 6,500 
which was added to the Rs. 15,041 fixed as revenue payment under the 
1799 Settlement.
The situation of instability and the incidence of recurrent rural 
insurgency (37) led in 1833 to an administrative change: the creation of 
the South West Frontier Agency. With the establishment of courts of 
justice and military cantonments, the jagirdars and thikadars continued
(36) The Permanent Settlement vested individual land proprietorship on 
a host of landholders taken in bloc to be zamindars, who then could 
freely inherit, sell, morgage or give away these lands. While the 
Permanent Settlement reinforced the new zamindars1 position, it 
seriously weakened that of the common peasantry, and created sharp 
conflicts in the countryside.
(37) For instance: the protests of the Mundas of Tamar in 1789 and 
1797, the one led by Dukan Shahi Manki in 1807, those in Rahe and 
Silli in 1796-1798, in Rahe in 1812, the major movements of 1819- 
1820 led by Rudu and Konta Munda, and of the Mundas of Sonepur in
'1831-1832.
the despoliation of the adivasi peasantry, but now under a semblance of 
legality. Around 1856, the jagirdars, some 600 in number, had come to 
control approximately 150 villages each. Munda land inheritance laws 
were disregarded by the landlords. Backed by British law, the landlord 
"regained" possession of lands when there were no male heirs. As 
Hoffmann noted in relation to laws forbidding adivasis to sell their 
lands:
The lawgiver intended the lands to be inalienable, 
i.e., to remain in the possession of the raiyats. The 
lawyer says: they are unsaleable, i.e., the raiyat 
cannot give his valuable right in the land for money, 
but he can give it for nothing...,
(Hoffmann 1961: fn. 337. Italics in the
original).
Complete villages could be bought at the Ranchi Court, as for 
instance, when the village headman went into debt and gave his village 
as a guarantee. As soon as the creditor won the case, he started acting 
as a zamindar, demanding rent from the khuntkattidar peasants.
The process of peasant exploitation and land alienation 
commenced in Chotanagpur well before the establishment of colonial 
control, but it acquired major proportions under British administration 
with the introduction of an alien legal and tax system and administrative 
measures that aimed at attaining an effective system of economic 
exploitation. For instance, the system of rent payment in services 
(kamioti or beth begari), which had evolved into a veritable bonded 
labour system, was regulated but not abolished by different laws that 
culminated in The Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act (1920) 
(A.G. Roy e ta l .1964: 2120 ff; R. Mukherjee 1933: 232).
Alienation of the peasants' land was not contained by The 
Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (Act IIBC, 1869), neither was the incidence 
of illegal rent increases controlled by The Chota Nagpur Landlord and 
Tenants Procedure Act (1879) (Rent Law). Landlords imposed rents 
even on trees, especially those that produced lac, as well as making 
other exactions (Gait etal. 1909; S, C. Roy 1912: 292) (38).
(38) The situation of Chotanagpur's adivasi peasants in mid-nineteenth 
century was graphically described by the Calcutta Review in 1869: 
"When the oppressor wants a horse, the Kol must pay; when he 
desires a palki, the Kols have to pay, and afterwards to bear him 
therein...Does somebody die in his house? he taxes them; is a child 
bom? again a tax...And this plundering, punishing, robbing system 
goes on-till the-Kols run away. These unjust people,..even force the 
Kols to borrow..." (pit. in S. C. Roy 1912: 221).
The Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (1908) (Bengal Act VI of 
1908) protecting khuntkatti rights on land, was enacted when it was 
already too late. By then few khuntkatti villages still existed (39), The 
restrictions on land transfers from "tribals to non-tribals" under section 
46 of the Act also fostered the emergence of a class of adivasis who 
were moneylenders on a part-time basis (lending as a complementary 
activity to agriculture) when laws made moneylending to and the 
appropriation of lands from debtors difficult for non-adivasis (K. S. 
Singh 1972 a: 370-380).
Further south, the Hos had settled in Singhbhum, a region well 
suited for defense, after migrating from Chotanagpur. The central 
plateau was well protected by ranges of hills and thick jungle. To the 
south, where the hill ranges are higher, lay the Kolhan. The Hos owed 
nominal allegiance to the Raja of Singhbhum and remained independent, 
resisting the attempts of the Raja to subjugate them militarily. Only forty 
years after the East India Company gained control over Bengal, Bihar 
and Orissa, did British troops enter the Kolhan. Later, after major 
military operations in 1836, the Hos surrended. In 1837, Kolhan was 
made a Government Estate. Singhbhum was constituted as a new 
district, and a British officer was posted at Chaibasa with authority over 
620 villages and around 90,000 people (Risley 1908: Ch. IV), A rent of 
eight annas for every plough was fixed after the British 1819-1820 
military campaign. This system was confirmed in 1837. Thirty years 
later, a settlement based on a fixed assesment on the lands was 
introduced (Dalton 1872: 181-182; J.C. Jha 1971: 74), This mode of 
assesment marked the end of the semi-independent life of the Hos.
The Hos' previous system of government through heads of pirs 
(divisions) and of villages was absorbed into the colonial administration. 
The munda (village chief), for instance, came to act as the village police 
officer and helped to collect the tax revenue.
The first regular settlement took place in 1897, following the 
introduction of forest reservation policies and the opening of the Bengal 
Nagpur Railway (40). At that time, non-adivasis had already acquired 
land in the area, and moneylenders were giving loans at high interest and 
taking land from indebted Ho cultivators.
(39) See Govt, of Bihar and Orissa 1931: 8-9,109 ff,; chapter XVIII, 
sec. 242 to 256; S. C. Roy 1961; K. S. Singh 1971: 102-107.
(40) The last settlement took place in 1913-1918 under the provisions of 
The Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (1908).
According to Dalton (Ibid.), the Hos were thus "tamed, 
softened, and civilized". In other words, they were conquered and 
forcibly integrated into the colonial system. The process of despoliation 
of their lands and resources that then started was to be further 
accelerated when Singhbhum was acknowledged as a source of 
industrial wealth.
4.- Jharkhand’s incorporation into the colonial system.
The main factors that marked the incorporation of Jharkhand's 
adivasi societies into the colonial system may be summed up as follows:
1.- Precapitalist systems of production were articulated with the 
colonial economic formation under the dominance of capitalism.
The changes imposed upon the existing precapitalist societies 
by colonialism were totally different in nature and scale to the ones these 
societies had formerly ..experienced. The introduction of individual land 
ownership by means of the Permanent Settlement, resulted in the 
alienation of adivasi lands, in the pauperization of the peasantry, and in 
the migration of contract labourers - in fact a form of bonded labour - to 
the tea plantations in Assam and to the coal mines of Bihar and Bengal. 
A new legal system came to regulate both land alienation in the form of 
transfers or sales - since land became a commodity - and the kamioti 
system of exploitation of peasant labour.
The pervasive effect of a money economy, the creation of a 
market in land, the emergence of a moneylending landed sector and the 
development of chronic peasant indebtedness, were instrumental in 
producing fundamental transformations in agrarian economic 
relationships.
The main conflict that emerged in Chotanagpur as a result of 
progressive subinfeudation was the one between different kinds of 
landlords and the peasantry. The adivasi states were small and lacked 
the necessary resources to give rise to a separate landlord class with 
autonomous power, able to drastically undermine the resilient communal 
base. It was the inflow of elements alien to these societies, like 
merchants and moneylenders, who found in the system of land-grants 
the channel through which to obtain and augment their control over land 
and peasants. This emerging landlord class was precisely the one that 
gained from British conquest. The members of this alien class presented
themselves to the British rulers as if they were zamindars (Hoffmann 
1961: fn. 325). The new laws accepted them as such and at the same 
time ignored the existing khuntkatti system. It was colonialism that 
created the conditions for the emergence of a rich peasant class from 
among the claimants to the old zamindar status. The first step in this 
direction, the Permanent Settlement of 1793, was "as much a permanent 
settlement of rights as of revenue" (Gopal 1949: 7).
The imposition of the capitalist mode of production in its 
colonial form brought with it the restructuration of the existing 
precapitalist systems which were simultaneously undermined and 
preserved but distorted, to fulfil the needs of capital and colonialism. 
The transformation of the original communal systems was completed in 
the 1770's, as in the case of the Paharias when they were "settled" and 
incorporated into the market economy. In the case of the Santals, the 
creation of the Damin-i-koh initiated their transformation into an 
agricultural reserve army and a pool of captive labour for the capitalist 
plantations in Assam.
Adivasi societies were shaped by colonialism into units - "the 
tribes" - and given a subordinate role in the new economic system. 
They were "preserved" in this constructed way to permit the 
reproduction of the labour force and to ensure their survival at the level 
of subsistence. Capitalist plantations in Assam, indigo plantations in 
Bengal, and mines in Jharkhand, developed on the basis of the 
exploitation of the labour of temporary adivasi workers. Their rural 
communities of origin were also exploited since, besides reproducing 
the labour force, they took care of the sick, the aged and the jobless 
(41).
In the context of the colonial economy, the rural community 
became "an organic component of capitalist production" (Meillassoux 
1972: 103). Wages were kept low, barely permitting the physical 
survival of the worker himself. In consequence, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, Hazaribagh and Ranchi were considered "the best recruiting 
districts to get labourers for the tea plantations" (42). In the three years
(41) Temporary workers in the mines were not entitled to any sick leave 
or privilege. The very way in which mining companies acquired rights 
over land under the Land Acquisition Act (1894) was based on the 
assumption that the rural communities had to perform this supportive 
role. In Singhbum, a constant supply of a cheap labour was ensured 
when former rights and tenures were trespassed (Corbridge 1982).
(42) See The Bengalee 1886 No. 40, 41, 43; 1887. Antrobus 1957. 
Laws passed in 1901 forbade the recruitment except by licensed 
contractors. The 1932 Tea Districts ^ Emigrant Labour Act (Act XXII of 
1932) allowed the free movement of labourers and gave them a certain
between 1864 and 1867, one per cent of the total population of 
Chotanagpur District had been recruited (many emigrants were not 
recorded) (43). The drain of migrant labour came from areas that were 
certainly not overpopulated. At the end of the nineteenth century the 
effects of this drain were compared to those of the Black Death in 
Europe (Thapar and Siddiqi 1979: 55).
The Bengalee stated in 1886 that Santal Parganas constituted 
"the mainstay of the labour force" in the Assam tea gardens, supplying 
44.7% of the workers (1886, No. 39). Santals had also been 
considered since the beginning of the nineteenth century to be "the 
means of rendering British [indigo] enterprise possible through the 
whole of Bengal". They formed a labour force that capital exploited, 
making use of ethnic stereotypes which marked them for specific forms 
of wage slavery. These peoples were seen as:
Patient of labour...able to live on a penny a day, 
contented with roots when better food is not to be 
had....
(Hunter 1868: 224,,226-227).
The fact that there was an assured pool of labour in Jharkhand 
also made the rising death-toll of workers due to illness and harsh 
working conditions a matter of small concern and precluded 
improvements in the situation. Contemporary reports on the tea 
plantations clearly indicate a declining birth-rate, abortions and suicides 
among the labourers, showing that adivasi workers had reached the 
limits of endurance and were unwilling to perpetuate the group ("ethnic 
suicide"). From the point of view of the capitalist enterprise, the 
unwanted workers, disabled by illness or starvation, could not be sent 
back to their original communities, neither was the enterprise going to 
incur any social welfare expense, In the light of this, the high death-tolls 
and the declining birth-rates point to a situation that I call gradual 
genocide.
degree of security. The Payment o f Wages Act (1936), the Industrial 
Employment Standing Order Act (1946), and the Industrial Dispute Act 
(1947), benefitted the labourers only marginally (M.R. Chaudhuri 1978: 
22).
(43) In the 1901 Census, more than 91,000 persons born in 
Chotanagpur were registered as working in Assam (Antrobus 1957: 
384-385; B.B. Sinha 1979: 180).
2.- The process of colonial conquest and consolidation was not 
a peaceful affair. Subjugation, often glossed over as the "pacification" of 
territories, was attained by force.
Military operations consistently preceeded the establishment of 
administrative control in all areas of Jharkhand, and were launched 
every time there were signs of protest. Control was not only attained by 
the actual exercise of force but by a permanent threat of violence (see 
Chapter IV). This total "culture of repression" (Huizer 1974: 21 ff.) 
used physical violence as well as other means of coercion which 
crystallized in a legal and revenue system that fostered the operation of 
pressure mechanisms like the reproduction of indebtedness and 
extensive forced labour. It also used native institutions and forms of 
social organization, putting them at the service of the colonial system.
3.- Fixed ethnic stereotypes - "the tribes" - were constructed to 
denote a variety of systems of production and cultures, ignoring the 
complexities in the socioeconomic organization, law systems, history 
and civilizational patterns of the adivasi societies. These societies were 
perceived as an undifferentiated mass from which to extract labour and 
revenue, a process that was thought to lead automatically to their 
"civilization"; to the creation of the colonized man in body and soul.
The existing diku-adivasi (alien-indigenous) opposition - 
implying regional/ethnic cum economic differences - was indirectly 
sanctioned by early legal provisions like the Permanent Settlement, and 
fixed in the new correlations established in the transformed system of 
agrarian relationships: diku landlord - "tribal" tenant/agricultural 
labourer. The "alien exploiters" gained added strength when they 
became zamindars under the protection of a British legal and 
administrative system which conferred on them the status of private land 
proprietors (44). In the new division of labour, "the tribals" functioned 
as agricultural labourers and as a reserve of labour force.
Under colonialism, communities that evaded the other dominant 
cataloguing device - caste - were defined according to the tribal 
paradigm. It was then that "the tribes" made their appearance in the 
Indian scenario. A creation of European origin, "tribe" was one of the 
elements through which Europe constructed part of the Indian reality.
(44) Private property of land was known in India prior to 1793 under 
Hindu and Muslim rule. In medieval India, the raiyats preserved their 
rights on the land they cleared and tilled, while those who were granted 
service tenures (jagirs) only had a conditional grant and depended on the 
State. The fundamental change introduced with the Permanent 
Settlement was to give the zamindars the status of private proprietors.
4.- A final factor must be considered for nineteenth century 
colonial Chotanagpur: the arrival of German Evangelican Lutheran, 
Anglican and Roman Catholic missions. In this way, the pillars that 
have classically sustained colonial penetration and ensured colonial 
hegemony - the military, a legal and administrative system, a capitalist 
economy, and the Church with its ‘'civilizing"/educational mission - 
were all present in Jharkhand (45). Education given by the different 
missions, based on European values, contributed to the adivasis' 
deculturation, and its effects are clearly observable today (see Chapter 
V).
Some expected consequences resulted from the relations of the 
adivasi peasantry with the missions: an initial perception of British rule 
as just, and the use of legal means to channel protest (which would 
partly account for the long years of legal struggle during the Sardar 
Movement). In this way, the questioning of the colonial system was 
controlled, and violent conflict avoided until it surged up with great 
force at the close of the century in the Birsaite Movement (see Chapter 
IV).
Other results were not so predictable. Adivasis who came into 
contact with the missions became more aware of the way in which the 
colonial system worked, and organized themselves to resist it. Converts 
refused to work for the zamindars without pay. While the mass of the 
cultivators held uneconomic holdings and had to resort to migration to 
survive, some converts had secured their lands through registration, 
including some mundas and mankis who retained land for their private 
use. Moreover, since rents did not increase as much as the prices of 
agricultural products, a more affluent peasant sector emerged among 
Chotanagpur's adivasi converts. It was possible for them to transform a 
certain amount of surplus into savings, as the payment of the cost of 
many legal procedures during the Sardar Movement seems to indicate. 
However, their economic power was insufficient to enable them to 
evolve into a rich peasant sector. Capital, good lands and market control
(45) The core of the Munda area was contained in the Quadrilateral, 
flanked by the Catholic churches at Bandgaon, Sarwada, Dolda and 
Burudith. Later on other Catholic stations were established in Karra 
(1891), Khunti (1892-1896), Darma (1899-1900) and Torpa (1886- 
1889). The Roman Catholic mission attained the fastest rate of 
conversions (15,000 converts in 1887; 71,270 by 1900). The German 
Evangelical Lutheran mission was the first to settle in Chotanagpur 
when it established stations in Munda territory in 1845. It had 40,000 
converts by 1895. The Anglicans established their first mission at 
Murhu by the late 1860's, followed in succeeding years by a series of 
' outposts (K. S. SinghJ.966: 13 ff.). Santals and Hos rarely converted; 
the bulk of adivasi Christians were Mundas and Oraons.
(subordinated to the colonial economy) was in the hands of diku 
zamindars (Thapar and Siddiqi 1979: 40-51) (46).
It is against this background that the history of Jharkhand's 
adivasis from the end of the eighteenth century should be understood. 
This history later led to an anti-colonial and ethno-national struggle, an 
aspect discussed in Chapter IV.
After Independence the situation did not substantially improve 
with the legal abolition of the zamindari system (Bihar Land Reform 
Bills [1950]) and the land ceiling legislation (47). In fact, peasants were 
evicted by the landlords in great numbers in the sixties, transfers of 
lands increased, and the landlord class maintained its position, now 
relieved of the formal responsibility they had towards their tenants 
(Tomasson Jannuzi 1974; Das and Sengupta n.d.). As a result, the 
process of peasant differentiation accelerated. Many cultivators became 
agricultural labourers. In the sixties and seventies, class oppositions 
were translated into an intense class struggle in Bihar's countryside, 
reflected in the mounting incidents of violence against dalit and adivasi 
peasants (A. Sinha 1982).
Special laws like the Chota Nagpur and the SantalParganas 
Tenancy Act account for the fact that the proportion of adivasi 
agricultural labourers is lower than among other sectors, and that the 
amount of land sales in adivasi areas is low (S. R. Bose 1971:17, 21). 
However, the proportion of adivasis who are cultivators has decreased
(48) since this legislation could not contain moneylending and land 
alienation through a manipulation of the law (49).
(46) Furthermore, it was the landlord class that British legislation 
protected, especially from the consequences of indebtedness, with laws 
like the Relief o f Encumbered Estates in Chutia Nagpur Bill (1875), and 
the Chota Nagpur Act (1876).
(47) Bihar Agricultural Lands - Ceilings and Management - Bill, 
(1955); Bihar Land Reforms - Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition 
o f Surplus Land - Act (1961); Bihar Act, (1962). See Tomasson 
Jannuzi op.cit.,
(48) Among the Santals, for instance, it decreased from 73.51% in 1961 
to 54.9% in 1971, while the proportion of landless labourers increased 
from 12.19% to 34.26% in the same years (Hrach 1978: 100).
(49) This occurred despite the amendments to existing laws like the 
Chotanagpur Tenancy Amendment Act (1969), and the Moneylenders' 
Act (1974). Although rural indebtedness is endemic in Bihar, the Bihar 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Denotified Tribes Debt Relief 
Act, and the Bihar Moneylenders' Act were only passed in 1974. 
Bonded labour, regulated by the 1920 Act, is still a feature of rural 
Bihar.
Conclusion: The Myth of the Tribe.
Jharkhand's socioeconomic evolution in the course of history, 
described above, gives evidence that supports my contention that it is 
erroneous to place Jharkhand's adivasi societies within the artificially- 
created framework of "tribe". The assumed egalitarianism, the 
"primitive" subsistence economy with little or no external trade, the 
autonomy and isolation of such an ideal unit, are not to be found among 
Jharkhand's adivasis either now or in the past.
Well before the incorporation of adivasi precapitalist societies 
into the capitalist system through colonialism, internal social 
differentiation had already emerged. The collective holding of lands, 
characteristic of a communal mode of production, gave way to 
privileged hereditary holdings in the hands of some members of the 
community (mundas, pahans and mankis). There is evidence of the 
development of an "aristocracy" in some of Jharkhand's adivasi 
societies when a family acquired special prerogatives and power over 
land and people. This happened among the Mundas and the Bhumijs 
where some lineages became ruling ones. The development of a social 
division of labour, which partially replaced former collective labour 
forms, and a differential distribution of the products of work, wealth 
and access to land gave rise to class divisions and to state formation in 
these societies.
Social differentiation also started appearing in societies like that 
of the Paharias, based on a communal system of production, when the 
zamindars began to reward the headmen with service tenures in the 
plains. No longer was the emergence of a social hierarchy precluded. 
Jagir  lands were employed as an instrument for production and the 
Paharia ja g ird a rs  became involved in new relations of production 
(zamindar-intermediate jagirdars-cultivaXoTs).
In sum, given the qualitative aspects of the social and economic 
organization of the adivasi precapitalist societies of Jharkhand in pre­
colonial India as well as after their subsumption under colonial 
capitalism, their categorization as "tribal" is, at best, out of place and, at 
worst, ahistorical and sociologically groundless. There were in fact no 
tribes in Jharkhand. In essence they were a parthenogenetic creation of 
the British colonial administration. Therefore, only a curious trick of 
historical reversion could give support to the idea that tribes exist 
nowadays in Jharkhand.
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MAP 4: JHARKHAND. POPULATION PERCENTAGES 
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CHAPTER III 
THE POVERTY OF DEVELOPMENT IN 
JHARKHAN D.
As in private life one differentiates between what a 
man thinks and says of himself and what he really is 
or does, so in historical struggles one must 
distinguish still more the phases and fancies of parties 
from the real organism and their real interests, their 
conceptions of themselves from reality....
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
Indian social anthropology, with very few exceptions, has 
focused on the microlevel. The result has been a plethora of 
monographs on Indian villages, castes and tribes. The epistemological 
basis on which Indian society has been studied has only recently begun 
to be examined. The results have been shattering. The much talked- 
about self-sufficiency of the Indian village has been questioned, caste 
ranking seems to have had more to do with British administrative 
concerns rather than the realities of India, and tribe -as shown in the 
previous chapter - to have been one of the metropolitan-imperial 
taxonomies that helped in the process of colonization.
In order to question this pattern, theoretical guidelines derived 
from the discussion on the "development of underdevelopment" (Frank 
1966) have been followed here to analyze the situation of the majority of 
the adivasis in Jharkhand's social formation (1). Previously, only some 
researchers (N. Sengupta 1982a and contributions in ibid.) have 
attempted a sociological analysis at a regional level. In N. Sengupta's 
case, the analysis follows the internal colonialism thesis, not fully 
subscribed to here for reasons discussed in Chapter I. The attempts at 
producing a theoretical-methodological rupture with the still prevalent 
tradition of "tribal studies" are recent.
The present situation in Jharkhand is one of the clearest 
examples of a process of "development of underdevelopment" taking
(1) Two concepts are used here: economic formation  and social 
formation, Economic formation refers to the articulation of modes of 
production, while social formation indicates "the nexus of economic, 
political and ideological instances" on the basis of the relationships of 
production. See debate Jn  Luporini and Sereni 1976, Mafeje 1981, 
Wolpe 1980, among others.
place in underdeveloped capitalist formations (like India) (2). The 
socioeconomic picture of Jharkhand obtained through the application of 
the "development of underdevelopment" paradigm is a new one, as also 
are some of the proposals in this chapter, for instance, the existence and 
role of "labour reserves", a point that has been discussed for Africa but 
never for Jharkhand.
One can observe in the small universe of Jharkhand how 
different factors have acted to produce an apparent paradoxical situation 
in which a much praised industrial development is accompanied by 
agrarian impoverishment (3). The economic side of the phenomenon is 
combined with social and ideological instances that make 
underdevelopment a unitary and complex phenomenon.
That the paradox is apparent and the ensuing "dualistic model" 
false, can be proven precisely by showing the simultaneity of both 
processes - development and underdevelopment - and the role the latter 
plays at a certain stage in capitalist development (4).
The dualistic model opposes a stagnant "traditional society" to 
an economically progressive "modem society", the first conceived as an 
obstacle to the economic development the second is supposed to entail 
(Frank 1966; Stavenhagen 1968: First Thesis). Adivasis have been 
qualified as "backward". They are usually blamed for this condition, the 
blame being placed on what is perceived as their attachment to 
"tradition" and their not readily adopting changes that are alledgedly 
introduced for their or "the Nation's" interest. This view was expressed 
in the course of interviews with people engaged in rural development 
projects in Chotanagpur (5). These interviews talk about the adivasis'
(2) Underdeveloped capitalism refers to societies "which have been 
incorporated into the international capitalist economy by the imperialist 
expansion (not necessarily in its colonial variant) of such powers as 
Britain, France, the United States and Japan", and in which precapitalist 
and capitalist modes of production are found in articulation (Post 1979: 
281-282).
(3) I will not deal with the relationships between Jharkhand's economic 
formation in the Indian context and the international system, a logical 
follow-up to the present discussion. These limitations are essential to 
maintain the focus on the main issue under study, ethnicity.
(4) In Meillassoux's words:
The "dual" theory is intended to conceal the exploitation of the rural 
community, integrated...as an organic component of capitalist 
production...The agricultural communities, maintained as reserves of 
cheap labour, are being both undermined and perpetuated at the same 
time, undergoing a prolongated crisis and not a smooth transition to 
capitalism...,(1972: 103)^See also Magubane 1976.
(5) Refer to testimonial data in Chapter Y.
"traditional background", their "lack of understanding of how market 
economy works" and of "competition and profit". All these factors were 
indicated as major obstacles for their development. In reality, the 
adivasis have been maintained in their backwardness, which is neither 
inherent nor old but has specific origins and causes as shown in Chapter 
II and through the data in the second section of this chapter.
This "backwardness", that is, underdevelopment, must be 
understood as a historical product, born out of capitalist expansion in 
non-industrialized areas, inaugurated with colonialism and later evolving 
as an integral part of underdeveloped capitalism in India.
In this.chapter, in order to make a socioeconomic analysis at a 
regional level (and of a very complex region), and to handle the 
necessary order of objectivity at that level of observation, it has proved 
appropriate to use a sociological methodology. Therefore, the sources to 
be used had to be different from those employed in anthropological 
microstudies. In this context, commentaries of individual informants on 
the situation have only testimonial value (Oberoi 1986: 272). These 
testimonies may show, for instance, if the informants are aware or not 
of the situation, but in themselves do not constitute a sufficient source 
on which to base the analysis of the general socioeconomic panorama of 
a region.
A socioecononomic profile of Bihar's Jharkhand region is 
given as basic empirical data for the analysis that follows. It will then 
be shown how the structuration of ethnic and class differences are an 
integral part of the historically determined totality of economic, political 
and ideological instances which together make up Jharkhand's social 
formation. For that purpose, the modes in which underdevelopment is 
reproduced through the use of non-economic forms of coercion, the 
creation of a "coolie-proletariat" and of "labour reserves", and the uses 
of ethnic differences for economic ends, are examined. This chapter 
ends with an evaluation of the responses to development in the area.
I.- Jharkhand's Socioeconomic Profile.
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In our fields,
In our lands,
There is a world of riches....
Santal song.
a.- An economically depressed population.
The majority of the Scheduled Tribes’ population of Bihar 
(97.7%), together with two of the ten million persons registered as 
Scheduled Castes in the state, live in the Jharkhand region (Tables 1 to 
4) (6). This fact is of prime importance for the socioeconomic 
configuration of the area as well as for present regional political 
formulations. Scheduled Tribes and Castes together amount to 42% of 
Jharkhand's population (7).
The massive presence of Scheduled Tribes and Castes, a high 
proportion of lower Backward Castes (A.K. Roy 1982a: 5), and a 
considerable number of poor migrants, point to one of the fundamental 
characteristics of Jharkhand: a significant economically depressed 
population in an underdeveloped region. This reality has given the basis 
for N. Sengupta's (1982a) definition of the Jharkhandis as "the 
destitutes of Jharkhand".
Of the state's total Scheduled Tribes's population, 75% reside 
in the districts of Ranchi, Singhbhum and Santal Parganas (Table 5) (8). 
The regional distribution of the major adivasi groups can be clearly
(6) Over 98% of the Scheduled Castes of Pan or Sawasi, Ghasi and 
Bauri, of the state of Bihar reside in Jharkhand. Not only are they 
viewed as part of the original inhabitants of the area but also as of 
"tribal" origin (Mehta 1982: 93 ff.).
(7) The percentages given in the Census understate the number of 
depressed communities. Communities that are as economically 
depressed as other Scheduled Castes are not included in the list. Census 
data are taken as general indicators. There are many inconsistencies 
which make comparisons between Census data not very reliable. Since 
to have a picture of the economic situation in Jharkhand we have to 
follow Census data, we are constrained to use the official categories 
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes.
(8) Thirty three groups registered as Scheduled Tribes and twenty three 
Scheduled Castes are found in the state of Bihar (Cl 1981),
appreciated, with the Santals in the north, and the Mundas, Hos, 
Bhumijs and Oraons in the south of Jharkhand (Map 4).
The equation indigenous (non-caste) people = tribes, which 
emerged under colonial rule, was legitimized the first time tribes were 
recorded in the Census. It was reformulated in independent India in the 
equation adivasis = tribes, distorting the broad concept of indigenous 
ethnic group (N. Sengupta 1986) which is based on regional and 
historical self-identification (9). The term adivasi has increasingly tended 
to refer only to the population listed as Scheduled Tribes. One should 
note that the adivasis are not the only people presently to consider 
themselves Jharkhandis, Furthermore, in the recent redrawing of states' 
boundaries, major ethnic gropus like the Santal have ended up divided 
among different states. Their territorial integration into viable separate 
units has thus been precluded, and their numerical strength in the 
political arena weakened. By an administrative artifice, major ethnic 
groups appear as minorities in "non-tribal" states, a situation further 
aggravated by the steady inflow of migrants into these areas.
According to Census data, 89% of the Scheduled Tribes' and 
74% of the Scheduled Castes' working population in Jharkhand were 
engaged in agriculture. Out of the total population in the Chotanagpur 
plateau, with the exception of Dhanbad, an average of 67.8% were 
cultivators, mostly of single crops on small holdings. Scheduled 
Tribes and Castes, meanwhile, showed low percentages in the industrial 
categories. They amounted to 32% of the total work-force in mining 
and quarrying (Cl 1971). This percenteage was further reduced after the 
nationalization of the coal mines in 1971 (Kumar 1981 a and b) followed 
by the massive retrenchement of Jharkhandi miners (10), who were 
replaced by Bihari immigrants who received higher wages than the local 
miners.
b.- The. "Ruhr" of India: the foundations of underdevelopment.
(9) For instance, the Kurmis or Bauris of Jharkhand were at first (1913) 
included in the Scheduled Tribes' list and later excluded from it. They 
had been living in the area as long as the Mundas and the Santals had or 
even longer, and could rightly be considered natives of the place. In the 
seventies they demanded to be included again in the Scheduled Tribes' 
list (Mehta 1982: 94 ff.),
(10) The number of retrenched workers in the first week after 
nationalization was estimated at 50,000. Further retrenchements 
occurred during the Emergency (N. Sengupta 1980: 667).
Bihar has been called "the Ruhr of India". The largest mineral 
deposits in the state are located in the heart of Jharkhand, where more 
than a fourth of the mining in India takes place (Map 5).
In 1980, coal production in Bihar reached 44.35 million tons 
out of an all-India production of 109,10 million tons. Important coal 
fields are located in Jharia, Bokaro, Ramgarh and Giridih. Inferior grade 
coal is mined in Santal Parganas. Iron ore is mined in Singhbhum (11) 
where Gua and Noamundi are the main mining centres, This district is 
also the only producer of copper (12). Manganese ore deposits are 
found together with iron ore.
Ranchi and Palamau Districts produce bauxite, mostly used for 
making aluminium (13). Mica is found in north Hazaribagh; chromite in 
Singhbhum; clay in Singhbhum, Ranchi and Santal parganas; fire-clay 
in the Jharia coal-fields and in Hazaribagh; apatite (useful as a fertilizer) 
in Singhbhum (G/ 1982).
Jharkhand receives a fifth of the total public sector investments 
in industrial pursuits (14). The Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (TISCO), 
one of the most profitable concerns in the private sector, runs some of 
the mines, including Noamundi. Other important landmarks in 
Jharkhand are the steel plant at Jamshedpur, the Heavy Engineering 
factory at Ranchi, the copper plant at Ghatshila, the mica industry at 
Giridih, the aluminium factory at Muri, and uranium mining at Jaduguda
(15).
The production of cement, brick and tiles, glass and glassware 
in Bihar is overwhelmingly carried out in Jharkhand where six out of the 
ten cement factories, and five out of the total six glass and glassware 
factories in all of Bihar are found (GI 1968: 207). Half of the state's 
factories making heavy machinery and tools, and nearly half of the
(11) 5.71 million tons in 1980.
(12) 423,270 tons in 1961; 1,145,386 in 1980.
(13) 502,382 tons in 1980.
(14) The majority of the iron ore mines in Singhbhum are worked under 
the Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (ILSCO) and the Bokaro Steel Plant, 
subsidiaries of the Steel Authority of India (SAIL). ILSCO is 
responsible for the Gua, Chiria and Manoharpur mines, and Bokaro for 
the Kiriburu and Megahataburu mines.
(15) In 1981 it was announced that the uranium mill at Jaduguda was to 
be expanded,, three uranium mills were to open and another two 
established. The existing" mines were then producing 67,000 tons of 
. uranium (771981 c).
manufacturing and assembly of non-electrical machinery and general 
engineering goods are located in Jharkhand (Ibid.: 209).
The rapid pace of industrialization in Jharkhand has been 
accompanied by fast urban growth and by a steady increase in the rate of 
immigration. These three factors, operating in the midst of an already 
depressed agrarian economy, have to be taken into account to be able to 
understand the reproduction of underdevelopment in the region. The 
lack of investment in agriculture, land alienation for industrial 
development, restrictions on the use of forest resources, the super­
exploitation of adivasi labour to sustain industrial development, and the 
fact that the beneficiaries of this development are not the majority of the 
Jharkhandis, must be considered.
For the adivasis, industrial development has resulted in 
increasing land alienation and displacement since all large public 
industrial projects in Bihar are situated in its Jharkhand area. 
Displacement has been inadequatly met by slow rehabilitation programs
(16). Eighty-eight per cent of the local adivasi population was displaced 
by the Hatia complex, 52% by Jamshedpur, 3% by the Bokaro Steel 
Plant, and 70% by Rourkela (Vidyarthi 1970). Many of the displaced 
persons were not rehabilitated, received less land than what they had 
prior to displacement, or received compensation in cash below the 
market rate and not on the basis of land value appreciation after 
industrial development. The cash received in compensation was not 
adequately invested and quickly spent (GI 1967: 71). The displaced 
persons could not find suitable land in these areas. Displaced adivasis 
have remained in the vicinity of the new industries, hoping to get 
employment, clustered in the poor quarters around the new complexes 
where living conditions are precarious. With inadequate or no 
compensation, adivasis who owned land before displacement have 
become landless labourers and, only during the industries' initial 
building stages, unskilled workers.
The lack of compensation, the vagueness about the 
compensation rates, the methods of land acquisition, the nature of 
resettlement schemes and the uncertainty of future employment for
(16) For the period between 1951 and 1961, 17% (7,961) of the 
displaced families in Bihar were adivasis, a high proportion considering 
that the percenteage of Scheduled Tribes' in relation to the total 
population of the state was 9% (M.L. Patel, 1974). The process has 
accelerated with further industrialization.
displaced persons, have become a focus of tension in the industrial areas 
(see section 3).
Between 1901 and 1961, Bihar's urban population registered 
an increase of 259%. While the rate of urbanization in North Bihar has 
been slow, the districts comprising Jharkhand are precisely the ones that 
show very high increases, especially Singhbhum where the urban 
population has grown fifty times between 1901 and 1961 (17). Ranchi 
town has had a mounting growth rate since 1961 with the establishment 
of the Hindustan Steel Company, the national Coal Development 
Corporation, -the Heavy Engineering Corporation, the High Tension 
Insulator Factory and other industrial and administrative units (Cl 1961: 
vol. 15). Despite this picture of spectacular urban growth, a very small 
percentage of the population classified as Scheduled Tribes and Castes 
lives in urban areas and enjoys their facilities. For 1971, N. Sengupta 
calculates that only 17% of Jharkhand's urban population belong to 
these two sectors combined, and that all Jharkhandis (including non­
scheduled communities) would have hardly made half of the total urban 
population (1980: 667).
The last Census data on Scheduled Tribes give indications of 
the uneven ethnic-based distribution of the population in urban and rural 
areas (Table 6).
Natural resources (minerals, timber) are extracted from adivasi 
areas in Jharkhand and absorbed by the more developed urban and rural 
areas of the plains. Few adivasis benefit from urban-industrial 
development and in fact most have been adversedly affected by it. In the 
process, in addition to being displaced from their lands to make room 
for industrial schemes, they have been practically excluded from 
employment in the modern sector or maintained as a pool of cheap 
labour.
As part of the pattern of resource extraction, the electricity 
generated in the area is not predominantly for rural Jharkhand, but for 
the industrial and urban centres, despite the fact that Jharkhand produces 
90% of the electricity in the state of Bihar and that it is the biggest 
producer of power in India (18).
(17) From 1921 to 1961, Dhanbad's urban population augmented forty 
times. Santal Parganas, Palamau, Hazaribagh and Ranchi also showed a 
significant urban growth (Cl 1961),
(18) Hazaribagh has the  ^greatest generating capacity and is the largest 
generator of electricity in Bihar, followed by Dhanbad and Singhbhum.
Regarding irrigation needs, rainfall variability is low in most of 
Jharkhand (19). Theoretically, there is a fair degree of rainfall reliability. 
Accordingly, the administration has considered these areas' inigational 
needs to be low. However, the characteristics of the soil and the terrain 
in the area are unfavourable, tending not to retain water. Indigenous 
methods of irrigation - the collection of water in embankments (bundhs) 
- a feature noticeable in Santal Parganas and Singhbhum, have been left 
to deteriorate (N. Sengupta 1985: 44). The scope of the traditional 
methods which covered up to 85% of the inigational needs until the first 
quarter of the century, has been reduced to half, while the modern 
methods sponsored by the Government have not benefitted the areas that 
need them most. Jharkhand's irrigated area has been substantially 
reduced since the fifties, adversely affecting the agrarian economy (Das 
and Sengupta n.d.; N, Sengupta ibid., 1982 b).
The danger of crop failure due to the lack of rains has proved to 
be more than a mere possibility. There is no major irrigation project 
in Santal Parganas. Paddy, maize and rabi crops depend totally on 
rainfall. The district has been affected regularly by drought. Paddy 
crops failed totally in 1955-56 in the Damin area. In 1967, drought and 
famine affected 73% of the population in Central and South Bihar on 
account of deficient rainfall from 1965 to 1967 (S. Bose 1971: 127- 
135). From 1979 to 1982 Santal Parganas experienced drought in 
various degrees, culminating in 1982 in the loss of 72% of paddy crops 
and the near starvation of the peasants. No prompt relief measures were 
put into practice. The official response to relief appeals was repression 
(20).
The neglect of irrigation has created increasing tension in the 
rural areas since it accentuates already existing problems. The result has 
been a growing number of peasants who are jobless for most of the 
year, since only one crop is possible without irrigation. This in its turn
In these and other districts of Jharkhand, almost all the power generated 
is consumed for industrial purposes and a very low percentage is used 
for irrigation and other public purposes (Table 7). Electrification in rural 
Jharkhand reached only 5% of the area by 1973.
(19) Rainfall has moderate coefficients in the north of Hazaribagh and 
Palamau, northwestern Santal Parganas and southwestern Singhbhum.
(20) In this particular instance, it ended in the firing on starving adivasis 
asking for relief at Palajori Block headquarters on 7 October, 1982. 
Four days later, a demonstration of 15,000 adivasis led by Sibu Soren 
(JMM), protesting against the firing and demanding relief, met police 
violence after section 1-44 Cr. PC, restricting the gathering of people, 
had been invoked (Link 1982 a, b, c).
has led to a seasonal exodus in search of work and to trafficking with 
young Jharkhandi labourers to take them to work under miserable 
conditions in far removed areas (like the Punjab).
Iyer and Maharaj point to a general problem in rural Jharkhand: 
the flow of funds and loans available for the construction or maintenance 
of irrigation works is appropriated by rich non-adivasi peasants who 
then do not invest them in productive activities in the countryside. In 
consequence, Government-sponsored schemes rarely improve the 
economic conditions of the common peasantry. Big landowners are 
thought to tap some 60% of the Government's loans, while the 
remaining loans benefit upper caste Hindu peasants who own land 
(1977: 47-49).-
Regarding natural resources, four-fifths of Bihar's forest areas 
are found in the Chotanagpur plateau (21). All the forests in Bihar are 
considered marketable. Although the aim of the Government is to 
develop the forests commercially, this has meant that increasing 
restrictions have been put on their use by the local people. In any case, 
a relatively small amount of the forests is presently commercially 
exploited (Jones 1978: 58).
Forests are an essential complementary source of livelihood for 
the adivasis. They used to reclaim land from the forest for agricultural 
purposes, and had traditional rights over the collection of forest 
products. The restricition of the adivasis* forest rights goes back to the 
British Forest Policy Resolution (1894), according to which the adivasis 
could no longer claim the forests as their own. Independent India's 
forest policy was formulated in 1952, clearly stating that village 
communities would not be permitted to use forests "at the cost of 
national interests" (Kannan 1982: 936). One of the national needs was 
to generate "the maximum annual revenue in peipetuity" (Kulkami 1983: 
192). The effects of this policy have been disastrous (N. Sengupta 1982 
a: 17). The rights of the adivasis to cultivate foodcrops and to collect 
forest products were transformed into "concessions". At the same time, 
from the fifties onwards, more forest areas have been declared reserved 
forests (22).
(21) 9,770.38 sq. miles out of a total of 12,105.4 sq. miles. Forests 
cover more than 45% of Palamau and Hazaribagh, 33.92% of 
Singhbhum and 23.83% of Ranchi districts (GI 1983: 65) (Map 6).
(22) For 1977-1978, 17.2% of the total forest area of Bihar was 
declared reserved, 82.5%-protected, and 0.17% unclassed. Practically 
all the area is under the control of the Forest Department; a small margin
Future plans for the commercial exploitation of the forests and 
not the assumed ecological damage caused by the way they have been 
traditionally used (as stated by the National Commission on 
Agriculture), are the main reasons for the growing exclusion of the 
adivasis from the use of forest areas. Land reclamation from the forest 
has been substantially curtailed by increasing reservation, thereby 
eliminating one balancing factor which helped to cope with the growing 
population pressure on land. The collection and sale of forest products 
(lac, honey and m ahua) as a second means of livelihood is also 
becoming difficult for the adivasis. Moreover, the introduction by the 
Forest Development Corporation of teak plantations in Jharkhand with 
purely commercial goals, has resulted in continuous and violent tensions 
in the area. Peasants have been displaced from lands in the forests which 
were suitable for cultivation (a cultivation that did not endanger the 
traditional forest) when the Government decided to introduce 
commercial trees.
Not only is teak useless for the adivasis (unlike sal, which is 
being replaced) but it also tends to adversely affect the soil, since other 
crops cannot grow at its side. In the South Bengal region of Jharkhand, 
eucalyptus (its wood used to make paper) has developed as a 
monoculture after the clearing of sal, mahua and kendu forests. Massive 
deforestation has brought the total area under forests from 33% in 1947 
to 10% in 1980. Droughts and soil erosion, both with disastrous 
consequences for agriculture, have increased with deforestation.
Forests, legally owned by the Government of India, are being 
auctioned by the state governments, and the rights over them handed 
over, for instance, to paper mills (EPW 1982b: 1901-1902). New 
restrictions, as under the Indian Forest Bill (1980), and commercial 
monoculture in the forests have been opposed by organized popular 
protest (see section 3) and questioned by experts in the field (Kulkami 
1983).'
c.- Locals and migrants.
of 0.15% is controlled by civil authorities. The Indian State earned a 
gross revenue of 2.6 billion Rs. in 1978-1979 at an all-India level. For 
Bihar, the amount was Rs. 181 million, to which Jharkhand contributed 
a significant part given .the extension of its forests, Only 5.5% of the 
total area in the state was afforested (GI 1982: 66-71).
One important issue to address is that of the changing 
composition of Jharkhand's population after independence. These 
changes accompanied urban-industrial growth and resulted from a heavy 
inflow of immigrants.
Approximately 10% of Jharkhand's total population are 
immigrants (Cl 1971: Migration tables, series 4, Bihar, part II-D). 
Despite their low percentage, they occupy more than 50% of the 
industrial jobs (N. Sengupta 1982 a: 15, 18), are better paid as skilled 
workers and hired mostly on a permanent basis. Professionals, big 
traders and administrative officials usually are also migrants. The 
situation is one in which some of the immigrants tend to get the benefits 
of development in Jharkhand, while the adivasis together with other 
Jharkhandis largerly remain unskilled workers and peasants.
Areas of Jharkhand like Ranchi and Singhbhum that had almost 
an entirely adivasi population at the end of the nineteenth century, 
experienced a radical change in their composition over a period of three 
quarters of a century (Cl 1961).
Taking the number of people bom outside the districts of 
enumeration (8.92% for 1961; 11.56% for 1971), one can obtain the 
approximate percentages of immigrants into Jharkhand (Table 9). In all 
districts of Jharkhand, immigration continued to increase after 1971. As 
for the places of origin of the major contigents of immigrants, the 
highest percentages are of people from West Bengal (1.83%), followed 
by Uttar Pradesh (0.67%) and Orissa (0.47%) (Table 10) (23). 
Singhbhum and Dhanbad, settings of industrial schemes and mines, are 
the districts with the highest percentage of people bom outside Bihar (Cl 
1971),
This picture should not be taken as a reflection of the easy 
equation outsiders-exploiters vs Jharhandi-oppressed workers. This 
equation has been one of the constant themes in Jharkhand by which 
social contradictions have been explained, and also fits well into the 
internal colonialism thesis. In this way, problems of class differentiation
(23) Bengalis concentrate heavily in Dhanbad, Santal Pargans and 
Singhbhum. The higher concentration of people from Uttar Pradesh is 
registered in Dhanbad, and from Orissa in Singhbhum. Dhanbad and 
Singhbhum reveal the highest percentages of Punjabis, Gujaratis, 
Andhra Pradeshis . and Rajasthanis. Assamese are mostly found in 
Ranchi.
and the nature of the economic system as it variously affects the different 
social sectors tend to be submerged under the ethno-regional question.
There is not and there never was in Jharkhand a strict 
correspondence between class and ethnic ascription. As was shown in 
the previous chapter, internal social stratification has long been present 
in the indigenous groups. The "sons of the soil" do not constitute a 
single bloc in class terms (Cf. Weiner etal. 1981) (24). However, there 
is a trend in the labour market that makes it appear as if the growing 
number of outsiders were monopolizing the existing jobs. Among the 
immigrants, the following sectors should be differentiated: (1) the rural 
poor who migrate in search of work in the industries and are as ill-paid 
and ill-treated as Jharkhandi workers; (2) the skilled workers in the 
organized industry, small traders and employees who rarely identify 
with the plight of the first group, and (3) the dikus (in the "outsider- 
exploiter" sense): moneylenders, corrupt officials, muscle-men and 
profiteers in general (N. Sengupta 1980: 668).
As shown in the preceeding and the following chapter, the 
emphasis on the presence of outsiders and their characterization as 
exploiters is not new and has persisted, although with changes in the 
definition of who are these aliens.
The term diku ("they" in Kurukh, according to a Munda 
informant) has been specifically used in Jharkhand to name the 
"outsider-exploiter", more precisely those from outside the community 
or the region, who came to control land by illegal or dubious means and 
the moneylenders. It does not apply, however, to exploitative elements 
in the local communities, nor to groups that have lived in the region for a 
long time. Moneylenders, traders and individuals eager for land on a big 
scale, zamindars and jagirdars, who started pouring into the area in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, did all fall into the diku category. 
In the fifties, the term came to be applied to upper-class non-adivasis. 
Later on, it was used to identify people of North Bihar, "those who earn 
their living here and send their earnings out to their homes in Bihar" 
(Sen 1972: 434; K. S. Singh 1972a: 377-378).
(24) Jharkhand shows the emergence of a fragmented working class 
within the frame of a subsistence economy. This is partially related to 
the development of "industrial enclaves". The expansion of industrial 
capitalism and the growing strength of a rural bourgeoisie have affected 
the rural class structure resulting in a growing number of agricultural 
labourers, a pauperized peasant sector working as bonded labourers, 
and a semi-proletarized mass of reserve labour.
The old pejorative and xenophobic connotation in the term diku 
still persists to address
...the dirty, filthy, bad outsider-exploiter. When 
politics come into it, worse things are said of them....
(Interview with a Munda elder).
For the m ost part, the use of the term persists because the social 
sectors at whom it was aimed are still active in Jharkhand. It took a long 
time to reformulate the "we-they" opposition into one that combines 
regional and class elements. In the seventies, one of the terms of the 
dyad was defined anew: Jharkhandi ("we") is a producer working in 
Jharkhand (see Chapter VI).
2,-  M echanisms for the reproduction of adivasi 
underdevelopment.
a,- Non-economic coercion.
The apparently  humanitarian ideals of the protection of 
"traditional" culture and forms of social organization, the rhetorical 
avoidance of changes that might disturb "traditional society", were and 
are deeply rooted in  the capitalist economic logic of how best to use 
existing conditions to  make them serve an economic system of profit 
maximization at the lowest possible cost.
In the c ru d e s t sense, Jharkhand's adivasi peasants have 
maintained their subsistence form of agriculture not just from an 
assumed love for tradition, but because it is the locus of their struggle 
for survival, in th e  last instance, to avoid simple starvation. This 
circumstance favours the logic of development at a minimum cost. The 
peasant and the rural migrant cost nothing. It is their social environment 
- "traditional society" - which bears the burden of the reproduction of the 
labour force and ensures its survival.
At the sam e time, there is, at the level of collective identity, 
another side to this defence mechanism: cultural and social patterns are 
preserved to avoid de-historization. Adivasi peasants strive to survive 
not just in mere physica l terms but also as historical agents (and not as
"objects"). The tendency towards preservation, while not fostered by the 
"modem" economic rationale (although "used" in economic practice) and 
constantly undermined by politico-ideological means, is nevertheless 
used by the sectors in power to support domination in Jharkhand by 
placing the legitimating ideological focus on "racial", "tribal" or ethnic 
issues. The tribal construct becomes functional in this context, 
facilitating the operation of non-economic methods of coercion.
A lethal combination of condescendent and derogative attitudes 
merge to mould a perception of the adivasis that directly bears on the 
way they are treated. Both attitudes presuppose the inferiority of the 
adivasis and are instrumental in the operation of a culture o f oppression 
in Jharkhand (Chapter VII).
This condescendent-derogatory attitude has given rise to the 
idea of the adivasi as an "object" for development, a role some adivasi 
intellectuals have internalized. In this line, I heard one of them say at a 
public meeting:
We, the tribals, are so grateful for your [the 
anthropologists' and administrators'] concern for our 
development...You are developing us....
Social degradation, racial discrimination, deculturation and 
cultural distortion have acted as effective mechanisms in the process of 
economic control and exploitation of the adivasis, pervading all aspects 
of their lives. In this way, for instance, in the eyes of non-adivasi 
interlocutors, the prejudiced image of adivasi women as "free" and 
"naive" justified their social degradation into prostitution and their 
exploitation around the industrial towns, and even their becoming the 
"natural objects" of rape. There was no moral judgement against the 
responsible agents of prostitution and rape when these belonged to the 
dominant social sectors. When this topic arose in interviews with non- 
adivasi women (particularly with development agents1 wives), the 
portrait they painted of adivasi women mixed references to their "free" 
behaviour with the fact that they "work and earn":
They are the ones who work. The men pay a 
brideprice depending on how much the women can 
work and earn. Adivasi women are too free, go out 
of the house, work, and are cheated....
Anything can happen to them since they go around so 
freely.,..
Remarks on the "freedom" of adivasi women relates to the 
more general "danger" that free behaviour among subaltern sectors may 
entail the "freedom to act". Peasant adivasi women not only "work" and 
"earn" but also have become politically active.
In this context, the sharp reaction of adivasi men to the rape of 
adivasi women by the powerful is, among other things, a response to a 
manifestation of class violence (25). In Bihar's countryside, rape is a 
form of non-economic coercion to reinforce subordination, grounded in 
the landlord's arrogated rights over the people that work his land.
The issue of alcoholism among the adivasis provides another 
instance of social degradation as a form of non-economic coercion. 
Alcoholism among the adivasis is not a "traditional vice" but an acquired 
and patronized one. In the mines, the contractors are at the same time the 
owners of liquor shops, thus exercising a combined control over the 
miners. Adivasis have fought degradation by alcoholism with the JMM 
anti-liquor campaign (Chapter VI),
Non-economic coercion, essentially a pre-capitalist method, is 
used in Jharkhand for capitalist ends. In this respect, A.K. Bagchi 
remarks:
A continual interchange between capitalist and pre­
cap ita list relations has not ceased [after 
Independence]...Capitalist profit-making itself uses 
pre-capitalist methods....
(Cit> in Thomer 1982:1998)
In Jharkhand, social degradation is directly translated into 
economic exploitation, the outcome of development for the adivasis. As 
concisely put by a concerned government officer:
Industrialization has made them landless and 
destitute. Now they are relegated to be rickshaw 
pullers, porters, prostitutes.,,,
(Interview)
The economic super-exploitation of the adivasis in the rural and 
industrial areas, justified and reinforced by social and racial 
discrimination, is supported by violence. As discussed in detail in
(25) Maria Mies precisely points at rape as an instrument of class 
oppression "of one class of men to punish or humiliate another class of 
men" (1982: 13).
Chapter VH, this violence permeates Bihar society, is directed against its 
economically depressed sectors, and fuelled by the prevailing racist 
preconceptions. The entrenched nature of this upper-class violence is 
shown in the frequency of atrocities perpetrated against dalits and 
adivasis in Bihar. Usually portrayed as "caste wars" or outbreaks of 
communalism, these incidents, particularly in the rural areas - place of 
origin of adivasi peasants and workers alike - are in fact expressions of 
fierce class confrontations. The triggering elements have been the 
peasants' economic demands and their will to organize themselves 
independently.
The use of non-economic means of coercion is not a "feudal" 
remain, but a mechanism used by the upper-classes, the police and the 
administration to control the peasantry.
b.- Segmentation of the labour force along ethnic and
regional lines.
Prejudiced stereotypes work against adivasi workers. They are 
considered unreliable and lazy, as people unfit for the regular work 
needed by modern economy. In the eyes of industry, they make a very 
indisciplined labour force. They are the unskilled workers, seen as 
unable to become skilled. Thus:
It is practically impossible to plan industrial 
production on the basis of tribal workers. They come 
one day and then dissappear for two or three. They 
get drunk and do not come to work...It is impossible 
to make them work....
Tribals are not suited for our modern economy. They 
are not skilled and are ill-fitted for the industrial 
environment....
(Comments of two engineers based in Dhanbad).
It is not so much the level of skill that counts but the "traits" 
ascribed to the adivasis which define their "suitability" for certain jobs 
and not others, and influence recruitment practices (see N. Sengupta 
1981: 17-18):
Tribals are strong-built and do work that does not ask 
for precision but for energy, like loading and 
unloading....
Tribals are honest but with no sense of money or 
deadlines. One cannot give them jobs that require 
responsability..,.
(An industrial consultant and an engineer 
working for the collieries).
It appears that adivasis are reluctant to abide by the time-work- 
discipline that capitalism demands to reach its targets of productivity and 
profit. It is no surprise to find a message displayed on huge placards at 
Hatia industrial complex:
"Your time is gold, don't fritter it away"
Time is monetarized; it can be saved, wasted, sold. The adivasi 
vision of time-work control is quite different from that of industrial 
managers:
After working all day at the mercy of somebody else, 
we find our stomachs empty....
(An adivasi informant with experience in 
wage labour).
The attitude of the adivasis is not only related to different 
conceptions of time and work in the pre-industrial context -where life 
and work cycles are closely interrelated- and in the industrial setting - 
where time is marketed. It also refers to their resistance as workers to 
being totally subordinated to the tyranny of time control linked to labour 
exploitation (see Thompson 1967).
All the factors mentioned regarding the current stereotype of the 
adivasi worker contribute to maintain the adivasis in the position of a 
reserve of unskilled and temporary labour force, and justify the low 
wages they are paid.
As an example of how the adivasis are perceived in relation to 
work (in this case with reference to the rural areas), the words of a non- 
adivasi social worker may be illustrative:
Bonded labour is more common among the lower 
castes than among the tribals because the adivasi is 
not so much of a slave and leaves. Ordinary men, the 
small landowner and moneylender, will not employ 
the adivasis as such....
(Interview).
A distorted conception of bonded labour as "employment", of 
who are "ordinary men", and that adivasis are not considered good 
working people compared to slaves, are elements worth noting in this 
quote.
Furthermore, an adivasi "psychological nature" has been 
constructed which is seen as an obstacle to development and, at the same 
time, to control the adivasi workers. For instance, it was said:
They do not have an outlet to release tension and, 
when they cannot bear it any more, they turn to 
violence....
(A development planner).
Once again, adivasis are not reliable and, moreover, are 
potentially dangerous. They are not wanted for the permanent working 
force in the organized sector, but are nevertheless considered "suitable" 
to work as coolies to support industrial development at a low cost and in 
unfavourable working conditions. The labour market is thus segmented 
along ethnic or regional lines, and a secondary labour market of 
insecure, lowly-paid jobs evolves.
Through racism and by unfavourably stressing cultural and 
pseudo-psychological traits, adivasi workers are artificially separated 
from the rest of the working class. This separation has been reinforced 
when workers from outside the region were hired under better working 
conditions and then compared to the local displaced or badly-paid 
working force. The rationale behind the preference given to a migrant 
labour force is clear. First, there is the idea that only in the very long run 
("two or three generations") would local workers become properly 
skilled. Second, a migrant labour force does not have social links in the 
host society that could provide a basis for solidarity, especially in labour 
politics. Third, the employment of migrants in a region where ethnic 
differences are important and where unemployment and semi­
employment are the norm, contributes to divide the working class. The 
result of this segmentation has been the emergence of a "labour 
aristocracy" in Jharkhand's working force.
The implications of these labour tactics are clear for those 
politically involved:
The contradictions between skilled and non-skilled 
workers are used by the employer to divide the mass 
of the workers....
(Political worker)
Others also said:
It is the ideal situation for the industry. It pays the 
local workers little. They can be fired and just left to 
fend for themselves. There is always the village to 
dump them in,,,.
Migrants are paid well but must behave as the 
industry says. They do not understand our problems.
They do not want to mix [with us]. They are not like 
us. They do not think like us....
Despite this segmentation, local as well as migrant workers are 
exploited by the same moneylenders and contractors, a common 
grievance that in some cases has helped the workers to attain unity, as in 
Dhanbad under the leadership of A.K. Roy (Chapter VI).
In this context, it is also more profitable for capital not to 
modernize certain jobs, like sectors of the building and mining 
industries, as long as a cheap and abundant reserve of labour is available
(26).
c.- The creation of a "coolie-proletariat" and "labour1 
reserves".
The clue to the simultaneously developed and underdeveloped 
nature of Jharkhand’s economic formation lies in the articulation of non­
capitalist modes of production with the capitalist mode, to which the first 
are subordinated (27).
(26) The role of the Jharkhandi workers, particulary the adivasis, can 
be considered to be similar to that of the immigrant workers in Western 
Europe who, in Castell’s words:
Do not exist because there are "arduous and badly paid" jobs..,but, 
rather... [these] jobs exist because immigrant workers are present or can 
be sent for to do them....(1979: 365. Italics in the original),
(27) For a discussion on the articulation of modes of production, see 
Wolpe 1980. For a characterization of pre-capitalist and capitalist 
relations of production by Indian economists, see Rudra 1978:919.
Jharkhand's economic formation appearing both as capitalist 
and non-capitalist is an illusion. In Jharkhand there is no such a thing as 
a "traditional system of production" any more. Modes of production 
may have remained pre-capitalist in form  but, while not fully 
transformed, they have been restructured and subordinated to the needs 
of capital (28). The opinions expressed to me by informants engaged in 
developmentalism, saying that "Chotanagpur is not yet involved in the 
market economy", amounts to a dismissal of practically two centuries of 
history.
In Jharkhand, the tendency towards the complete dissolution of 
the non-capitalist economic modes has been restrained in order to allow 
for the continuation of a level of subsistence high enough to maintain 
the reproduction of labour, and at the same time, low enough to insure a 
reserve of semi-proletarianized labour force which will be compelled to 
migrate or to accept marginal lowly-paid jobs. Rural "backwardness" is 
reproduced.
The production of commodities by means of non-capitalist 
forms of production in the rural sector once the capitalist mode becomes 
dominant, includes labour as a commodity. This last aspect shows a 
specific form of surplus extraction from the peasant economy - the one 
that covers the reproduction of the reserve of labour - by the capitalist 
mode of production.
The task of reproducing the labour force rests on the village 
communities. This accounts for the payment of low wages to Jharkhandi 
workers. That is, the costs of reproducing labour, as well as of the 
means of production on which this process is based, remain unpaid by 
the workers’ wages. In this way, elements of the non-capitalist modes 
like village and kinship-based reciprocal obligations of mutual support 
(the peasants' "social security system"), are also made to function for 
the benefit of capital while the payment of indirect wages is avoided. As 
Meillassoux has more generally noted:
The cheap cost of labour...comes from the super­
exploitation, not only of the labour of the wage-eamer 
himself but also of the labour of his kin- 
group....(1972: 102).
In the words of an adivasi peasant/temporary worker:
(28) For similar comments see Bettlelheim 1972: 297-298; Me Eachern 
1976; Dhoquois 1976.
When I got sick in the chest, I came back [to my 
village]. My family did not have enough for 
medicine. The mine does not care if I die. It takes us 
[our lives] and does not give anything [in return]....
In this context, the Jharkhand Party has failed to understand the 
economic dynamics in which Jharkhand's village communities have 
long been involved. Ethnic loyalties are thought to be able to defy the 
dominant economic tendencies. The President of the Jharkhand Party 
told me in an interview:
Those who migrate to town areas do not like to return 
to the villages....I tell them: "You are a Munda. You 
are a tribal, so you must [return]"....Munda economy 
has been broken. We need to recover the self- 
sufficient economy as it was....
Adivasis, as a relative surplus population, whether or not they 
like to stay in the towns to work, stay as long as needed. They are easily 
expelled and have to return to their villages. The problem is not that they 
"must" stay in the villages, but that they must sell their labour power, 
cheaply at that, in order to survive. Their economy cannot become self- 
sufficient "as it was", neither can it change while no alternative 
socioeconomic project to the existing one is proposed. As we will see in 
Chapter V, this alternative is absent from the Jharkhand Party's 
program.
Some areas of Jharkhand have become suppliers of specific 
kinds of labour. I perceive them in terms similar to Samir Amin's 
African "labour reserves" (1974: 172), but without institutionalized 
segregation. Chotanagpur and Santal Parganas were made into areas 
from where labour was extracted for the tea plantations in Assam. As 
long as mining remained technologically unsophisticated, Jharkhand 
was used as a ground to recruit miners. Industry particularly benefitted 
from the gang-system, the gang composed of families, including women 
and children, paid by piece-rates.
The inclusion of women and children in the work force, with 
wages lower than those of an adult male, directly contributed to lower 
the general wage level still further. It was this system - which 
transformed the agriculturalist adivasis' tradition of collective work into
a device for their super-exploitation as semi-proletarianized labour - that 
Bradley-Birt glorified at the beginning of the century (29).
The continuing sardari system of recruitment of adivasi labour, 
particularly of women, is based on the same principle of wage- 
depression by creating a bonded labour force with long working hours 
(12 to 14 hours per day), no medical arrangements and, in the women's 
case, sexual exploitation. Bihar’s "tribal belt" functions as a huge 
"labour reserve" for contract (bonded) labour which is sent, for 
instance, to the brick kilns in and outside the state, despite the 
provisions of the Bonded Labour SystemJAbolition) Act (1976) (Devi 
1981a: 1010-1013; S. Kumar 1978: 14-15).
"Forest villages", significantly called "labour camps" by the 
Forest Department, function as small reserve units with a practically 
captive labour force. Not having tenancy rights, the people in these 
villages are under constant threat of eviction. They have to work for the 
Forest Department whenever it demands. They receive poor wages and 
cannot take up other paid jobs without permission (interviews; Jones 
1978: 57; Link 1978: 21-23). Profits resulting from the exploitation of 
adivasi labour in the forest areas are immense, thanks largely to the low 
level of wages (30).
Not truly proletarianized, Jharkhandi workers now function, as 
Simeon puts it, as a "reserve army of coolie-proletariat for capital" 
(1982: 227). They are that part of the relative surplus population of 
disposable labour power and pauperized sectors of society Marx called 
"the victims of industry" (1976,1: 794 ff.).
The aftermath of the nationalization of the coal mines in 1971 
brought about the retrenchement of Jharkhandi workers and their 
replacement by immigrants once the working conditions improved. This 
is a clear example of how this reserve of labour is used. After 
nationalization adivasis continued to be employed as cheap labour in
(29) "The opening out of the [Jherria] coal-field has altered the whole 
face of the land as if by magic...The coolies always work in 
gangs...The labourer who lives close-by scores most of all...The lucky 
ryot cultivates his well-watered fields and earns besides a good day's 
wage in the colliery close at hand...".(1903: 282-286).
(30) Contractors controlling sal seed collection pay Rs. 50per quintal to 
the labourer, and resell it for Rs. 250. Sal seeds reach finally a 
multinational soap manufacturer which realizes a profit of up to Rs. 15 
per kg. of seed processed (Ramachandra Guha 1983:1890).
illegal private mining operations run by outsiders (F 1980b: 2-7) and in 
mines controlled by the public sector SAIL (Ahmed 1983: 50-53).
Two hundred mines were closed during nationalization as being 
uneconomic. Five years later, however, there was a shortage of coal and 
illegal mining started. Most of the illegal miners were adivasis who had 
been retrenched in the past (31). In general, the minimum wages of Rs.
6.65 per day for unskilled workers are not paid in the mines, and wages 
axe also sometimes withheld for two or three months (32).
Legal procedures to acquire land for mining purposes have 
been largely ignored. As a result, peasants are driven out of their lands 
to make place for illegal mining operations, lands for which, 
nevertheless, they continue to pay tax (EPW1981; 1525).
At the Giridih mines, where wages are Rs. 3-4 daily, the risks 
for the workers are immense. Some twenty miners, including women 
and children, die each month in working accidents (33). Hazaribagh's 
mining area has been called a "graveyard of coalminers" (EPW 1982a: 
1641). Accidents have resulted from the Government policy to step up 
coal production at the lowest cost, disregarding safety regulations. 
According to this logic, the workers killed were cheap and easily 
replaceable. Similarly, preventive measures against coalminers1 
occupational diseases are inadequate (34). Furthemore, in fear that he 
may lose his job, the sick miner continues working and does not get 
treatment (A. Sinha 1982a: 118, fn. 6).
S. Jones maintains that the adivasis do not face either ethnocide 
or genocide (1978: 64). On the basis of current evidence one is inclined 
to disagree. Ethnocidal attempts (leading to the elimination of a 
people's identity) have been part of an uninterrupted process affecting 
the adivasis, whose origins can be traced to about the mid-nineteenth 
century, and its effects are noticeable today (Chapter V). Regarding
(31) Although the mines still belong to the Central Coalfields Ltd. 
(CCL) and are a Government property, their illegal mining is now 
controlled by private gangs.
(32) In the approximately 250 mines in the Kolhan area (Singhbhum), 
mostly privately operated, daily wages are Rs. 3 to 3,50. In the iron-ore 
mines they amount to Rs. 15 weekly (EPW 1981:1525),
(33) On Badua hill, for instance, some twenty mines collapsed on 13 
February 1981, killing between 300 and 500 miners, 200 of them 
adivasis. No rescue operations or investigation seem to have ensued 
(Ranjan 1981: 19-21; J. Singh 1981: 19).
(34) Pneumoconiosis, produced by exposure to fine dust, bronchial 
asthma, filaria, and abdominal diseases are common.
genocide (the decimation of specific populations), one finds in 
Jharkhand what I call deferred genocide. This is not the result of any 
official policy but of the working out of social and economic forces and 
of administrative negligence. Deferred genocide for the adivasis takes 
place by means of the starvation and illnesses arising from growing 
pauperization caused by the decline in land production due to the effects 
of industrial waste (Devi 1983: 329-330; A. Sinha 1980), the neglect of 
irrigation, and the curtailing of alternative sources of subsistence like 
forests. To this one must add the prevailing physical violence 
perpetuated against Jharkhand's subaltern sectors. This violence is 
political in nature, a way of maintaining the labourer "in his place" and 
of precluding any effort at the labourers' organization on independent 
grounds.
One may ask why such a treatment for a population that has 
obviously been a profitable reserve of labour? The demand of capitalism 
for this kind of labour is limited (Bradby 1980: 116-118; Mafeje 1981: 
134). Control over land and natural resources seems to be gaining 
primacy over the need for an expanded reserve of labour. The demand 
for a reserve of labour decreases with growing industrial employment 
requiring skilled labour. Since adivasi workers are not given skills to 
satisfy this demand, they tend to become redundant in certain sectors, an 
unwanted labour force which is expelled back to the countryside where 
its chances for survival are minimal. Thus, the village communities may 
pass from being the craddle of a reserve of labour to become the 
graveyard of the unwanted adivasi worker. This reverse tide to the rural 
areas may not be favourably received by the rural elites, since it tends to 
sharpen existing contradictions and to introduce new elements 
(experiences, ideas, principles of organization, that the returned worker 
may have acquired at the industrial setting) that could eventually have 
political uses.
The operation of all these forces combined has tended to 
acquire the character of an attack on the very survival of the adivasis. 
This situation is at the base of the recent rural movements in Jharkhand 
which have taken up the questions of access to land and resources, 
endogenous patterns of organization, and human rights issues. 
Significantly, in the coal mines of Dhanbad, political and human rights, 
and not just economic demands, have become the focus of the workers' 
political struggle (Chapter VI).
d.- The question of natural resources and internal colonialism.
In Jharkhand, the arguments of "primitiveness" vs  
"development", and "traditional society" vs "progress", have served to 
justify the exploitation of natural resources on adivasi territories in 
instances where labour extraction has become secondary and the 
reproduction of surplus labour begins to appear as a liability. In the last 
case, the tendency towards the dissolution of non-capitalist forms may 
gain primacy over the conservation tendency. What are seen as errors in 
planning, like the massive displacement of rural communities under 
inadequate rehabilitation programs, could instead be understood as part 
of the drive towards dissolution, congruent with purely extractive aims. 
According to a Munda elder:
Sand, stone, soil, land, trees, the Government takes 
it all, and we even have to pay for it...The 
Government denies us our rights,...
The extractive nature of capitalism in Jharkhand accounts for 
the situation being perceived as "colonial". However, what we observe 
now in such dependent formations is not just a reflection of former 
colonial processes in the form of "internal colonialism". In order to 
extract labour, raw materials and resources, capitalism employs in 
Jharkhand mechanisms of a "colonial" type, including the manipulation 
of ethnic differences. The direct producers in Jharkhand are working for 
capital in various ways in the context of India's underdeveloped 
capitalism incorporated to the international capitalist economy.
The links between the exploitation of labour and resources in 
remote Jharkhand and the international market managed by multinational 
corporations from the central capitalist countries can be traced. For 
instance, sal seed collection at the lowest cost is transformed into profits 
for the international cosmetics industry. For this reason, it has been 
considered advantageous to preserve some sal forests. In other cases, 
the existing forest has been replaced with "desirable" commercial species 
like eucalyptus, pine and teak. The US Agency for International 
Development made such a recommendation to the Indian Government in 
1970 stating that, by exploiting forest resources and "one of the lowest 
wages in the world", foreign exchange could be generated from the
export of furniture and paper (Ramachandra Guha 1983: 1889-1890). 
The planting of teak in Jharkhand has followed the same aim of profit 
maximization. As shown in section 3, these projects have been opposed 
by the local adivasi population. Among some adivasis there is an 
awareness of the links of these projects with the international market. A 
Munda village headman in Chotanagpur's "deep country" told me:
There is a lot of lac in Chotanagpur, but it goes to 
Japan and the United States, and the people of 
Chotanagpur get nothing..,.
"RaciaT/ethnic justifications that back the exploitation of labour 
and resources in Jharkhand do not stop at the regional or country level. 
In the neocolonial era, international capitalism has consistently looked at 
those areas of the world that formed part of the colonial realm, and 
specifically to regions rich in natural resources with a population labelled 
as "primitive", to scientifically plunder them. Their populations are 
considered expendable in the name of progress. This situation raises the 
question of indigenous rights over natural resources in the territories 
these populations occupy.
e.- Jharkhand's combined ethnic/class domination.
It is necessary to counterbalance the stress put by the internal 
colonialism thesis on the fact that relationships of domination are 
primarily of an ethnic nature (see Chapter I).
What we find in Jharkhand is a system of class exploitation 
and domination reinforced by the ideological uses of ethnic differences. 
Ideological justifications are phrased in "racial" or/and ethnic terms, not 
in class terms. We are not, however, in the presence of two different 
phenomena (class domination and ethnic domination) but of one (35).
As we have seen in this and the previous chapter, the way in 
which the capitalist mode constructed its relations with the non-capitalist 
modes in Jharkhand from the moment colonial capitalism began its 
expansion in India, resulted in the structuration of ethnic and class 
relations and marked their later evolution. In Jharkhand, subordination
(35) Ethnic relations do not exist independently of the concrete structure 
of specific social formations, but depend on the nature of class relations 
present in them, and the relationships established among different modes 
of production in the given economic formation.
is simultaneosly regional (and ethnic, in the adivasis' case) and 
economic, is conditioned by specific patterns of economic development 
and by class factors (see Simeon 1982). For analytical purposes, 
however, it is convenient to keep in mind the difference between the 
content and the form of this subordination. The contents refers to the 
essential class character of exploitation in Jharkhand. The form points at 
the ideological instances used to exert domination, as with ethnic and 
regional differences.
From the point of view of the Jharkhandis themselves, 
oppression is perceived and experienced in its combined ethno/regional- 
class form. An awareness of this global form of domination has given 
the ground for the adivasi grass-roots protests that reject reformism. The 
adivasis are "decided to struggle to the end, making no compromise", 
because for them, "to preserve the integrity of the community is vital" 
(interview with political activist). There is then no demarcation in their 
perception of the situation between economic and socio-cultural issues, 
but a globally experienced reality. Grass-roots struggles precisely show 
the present class contradictions in the configuration of ethnic 
differentiation in Jharkhand (Chapter VI).
3.- Subaltern discourses; People confronting development.
In the course of interviews, adivasis from across the political 
spectrum criticized the present pattern of development in Jharkhand. 
Development was variously called "civilization" and "progress", and 
was not necessarily considered to be positive. In many instances, it was 
perceived as an autonomous force with much of an "evil" content, as a 
plague that has befallen upon the adivasis. This view, however, was 
balanced with realistic remarks. For instance;
We are the victims of progress. Without self- 
determination there is no development....
Civilization has not been good for the tribes. Fifty 
lakhs of families have been uprooted in 33 
years....Jharkhand is very important in minerals and 
forests. Everybody's food is cooked here. [For this 
reason,] they will not agree easily to have a 
Jharkhand state....The big industrial projects are 
colonial-oriented, exploitative, not for the benefit of 
the common man....
Underprivileged people always take the trash of 
civilization and later on realize what they have lost....
Civilization, development, have little to offer. [They 
are] corrupting....
(Several adivasis interviewed).
S. Jones has already remarked on the illusory nature of 
development in Jharkhand where "industries have remained small 
modern non-tribal enclaves in the middle of large areas of rural, tribal 
underdevelopment" (1978: 55). The fact that development has not been 
translated into concrete benefits for the Jharkhandis but rather into 
further pauperization and extraction of resources, has been understood 
by the people of the area. This is evidenced in their open rejection of 
several development schemes.
The continuing opposition to the Koel Karo project provides an 
instance of this awareness. The project's capacity to produce 732 MW 
will be at the cost of 45,000 acres of agricultural and sacred land (sacred 
groves and burial grounds), and the means of livelihood of peasants 
from 200 villages. Peasants whom the project was to displace have 
practically stopped work on it since 1981. According to N. E. Horo, the 
cash compensations are not enough, although they surpass the amount 
the Government has given in similar cases. After many past broken 
promises, adivasis have refused to take this offer as a serious one. An 
adivasi informant stated:
Part [of the money] is taken by the Government 
officers and the moneylenders...After displacement 
[we] become labourers, unskilled workers, 
migrants....
The question of employment for members of the estimated 
15,000 families to be displaced by this project is uncertain. They may be 
employed during the initial construction stages but finally only some 200 
people will remained employed. At Koel Karo, protest turned to boycott:
Nobody lifted anything [of the building material]. At 
Torpa road blockades were set up, tents burnt and 
engineers harassed....
(Interview with an adivasi).
In 1984 the Government sent armed police to supervise the 
operations (TT 1984: 7).
The Subamarekha river multipurpose project in Singhbhum 
produced a similar response from the local population after survey 
operations started in 1970. The project involved the displacement of 
around 75,000 people. After appeals made in 1978 to the Government 
proved ineffective, the peasants refused to collect their compensations, 
paid at rates much below the amount demanded. Protest took the form of 
a fasting program which ended in police firing (A. Sinha 1978: 750-751; 
77 1978a; NR 1980e and f).
Protests against industrial projects continued cropping up in all 
areas of Jharkhand. Around 15,000 peasants stopped work at 
Hazaribagh and Kujju coal-fields of CCL and Tata's West Bokaro 
Colliery in July 1980 by digging trenches and blocking roads, 
succeeding in paralysing the works for several days. They demanded 
employment for the local people and due compensation for the lands 
appropriated by the management of CCL and Tata. Peasants regained 
possession of some 500 acres of land by force and started ploughing. 
Two platoons of the Central Reserve Police were sent to contain the 
protest (interviews; NR 1980b: 3).
On March 1982, a group of Mundas blew up the foundations of 
the future microwave tower at the Sukunburu hilltop in Chotanagpur 
(the abode of Buru Bonga and a pilgrimage place). In this case, they 
responded not only to an agression on their khuntkatti land rights but 
also on their culture. Protest ended with the imprisonment of several 
people (Amit Roy 1982: 2-3).
Protest in the forest areas against the growing encroachement 
on land and natural resources have occurred since the fifties. In the 
eighties, protest became widespread and militant. At the same time, the 
powers of the police and the bureaucracy have been extended and their 
numbers progressively augmented since 1952 (Ramachandra Guha 
1983: 1891). The opposition to the replacement of the sal forest with 
teak has been met with police repression, launched as a "preventive 
measure" before any confrontation takes place. This happened in 
Ichahatu (on the Chaibasa-Goilkera road) in late 1978. The excuse for 
the firing was the rumour that teak trees would be felled and a bridge 
burnt. Around that time, another firing took place at Serengda village on 
an unarmed crowd, as a response to the villagers' symbolic cutting of
some teak saplings (PUCL 1979: 9-16). As an adivasi put it: "Teak is 
killing us". This was not just a metaphor. Thus, the so-called "felling 
craze" started. As a political activist explained in the course of an 
interview:
The Government wanted to remove sal and mahua to 
plant commercial teak. We cannot use teak, so we cut 
it. We feel the traditional forest is being destroyed 
and that we do not get anything out of it. [Therefore] 
it is better to make the land cultivable....In the 
Himalayan track there is a movement against jungle 
cutting and the land becoming an income for the 
Government...In Jharkhand, we could not prevent 
the cutting of the forest...but we do not want the 
teak....
Around 1978, the Jharkhand Party initiated a one-month 
protest on the issue of teak, with the purpose of negotiating with the 
Government, In its President's words:
We oppose teak. We want to protect the traditional 
forest on which our economy is based and to reclaim 
our land....
Repression and not dialogue ensued (36). When the 
negotiations of the Jharkhand Party failed, the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 
backed the continuation of the protest to the Party's annoyance:
The Mukti Morcha continued with the protest and 
stopped our discussions with the Government...They 
began to cut trees....If we cut trees, we will suffer,...
(Interview with N. E. Horo).
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) leader Sibu Soren, 
meanwhile, curtly stated:
Adivasis will stop felling trees when their needs are met....
Why was the Government reaction to the forest protests so out 
of proportion? On the one hand, the authorities feared that the protesters 
could implement their threats to stop dispatches of coal, iron-ore,
(36) Like the first of the 1978 incidents in Goelkera (Singhbhum) where 
three were killed by the police and Horo arrested while delivering a 
speech.
bamboo, timber and minerals. On the other, the "felling craze" was 
directly related to the demands for land restoration and for a Jharkhand 
state. The JMM was then (1980) backing the jungle kato movement in 
Singhbhum with the aim of reclaiming land for cultivation in the forest 
tracts. The control of forest lands and resources has become a highly 
political issue. The confrontations with Government agencies culminated 
in September 1980 in the Gua killings (Singhbhum), discussed in detail 
in Chapter VII.
Development is taking place in Jharkhand under the threat of 
guns. Behind the repression that accompanies development, lies a 
perception of the adivasi peasantry as physical obstacles in the drive to 
gain full access to the land, raw materials and natural resources. They 
stand in the way, persistently despite repression, while the expansion of 
extractive capitalism demands their removal.
Conclusion.
The underdevelopment of the adivasis is part of the reality of 
Jharkhand's social formation. It cannot be understood as a result of a 
reluctance to change "traditional tribal society" but has to be related to 
the pattern of development espoused in the region.
Non-economic coercion and ideological instances that make use 
of ethnic differences have served to reproduce the underdevelopment of 
Jharkhand's subaltern sectors. The fact that the adivasis are at the vortex 
of this process challenges the conception of them as "tribes", as units 
isolated from the operation of general economic forces and with peculiar 
problems.
The situation in Jharkhand also raises questions on the need to 
attain a proper balance between national and regional interests in 
development planning.
It is against this economic background and that of the region's 
history that the present socioeconomic conditions of the adivasis in 
Jharkhand and their political expressions should be evaluated.
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Table 1: Jharkhand. Scheduled C astes
Total Scheduled % o f Total Scheduled
Caste Population C astes pop ulation  In
th e  S ta te
10, 142, 368
2 , 056, 911
100
20.2
122
Table 2: D istr ib u tio n  o f Jharkhand's Scheduled C aste P opulation
D is t r ic t
Total
Population
Total Scheduled  
C astes Population
X  D is tr ib u tio n  to  Total 
Scheduled C astes Population  
In Bihar
Palamau 1,917 ,528 478,225 4.71
Hazarlbagh 2,1 9 8 ,3 1 0 414,971 4 .09
G lr ld lh 1 ,731 ,462 225,993 2 .22
Santa! Parganas 3 ,717 ,528 311,801 3 .07
Dhanbad 2 ,115 ,010 330,767 3 .26
Ranch 1 3 ,070 ,432 158,099 1 .55
Singhbhum 2 ,8 6 1 ,7 9 9 137,055 1.35
Total 17,612 ,069 2,056,911 20.25
(On th e  b a s is  o f th e  Primary Census A b stract. Scheduled C a stes .
Census o f  India 1981, s e r ie s  1, part II B ( I I ) ) .
1 2 3
Table 3: Jharkhand. Sheduled T ribes
Total Scheduled Tribes 
Population
X  o f  Total Scheduled T ribes  
Population In Bihar
Bihar 5 ,810 ,867 100.0
Jharkhand 5 ,329 ,283 9 1 .7
(Primary Census A b stra ct. Census o f India 1981, part II B I ) .
Table 4: D istr ib u tio n  o f Jharkhand's a d iv a si population
D is t r ic t
Total
Population
Total Scheduled 
T ribes P opulation
% D is tr ib u tio n  to  Total 
Scheduled T ribes Pop. 
in Bihar
Palamau 1,917,528 351,432 6.04
Hazaribagh 2 ,1 9 8 ,3 1 0 198,792 3 ,4 2
G lr ld lh 1,731 ,462 224,878 3 .8 7
Santa I 
Parganas 3 ,717 ,528 1 ,367 ,868 23 .54
Dhanbad 2 .11 5 .0 1 0 192,777 3.31
Ranchi 3 ,070 ,432 1 ,732 ,032 29.80
Singhbhum 2 ,861 ,799 1 ,261 ,504 21 .70
Total 17,612 ,069 5 ,3 2 9 ,2 8 3 91 .78
(On th e  b a s is  o f the Primary Census A b stra ct. Census o f India 1981, 
p a rt II B ( i ) ) .
1 2 4
Table 5: Percentage o f some o f  the major ad ivasi g ro ip s re s id in g  
In Jharkhand
Total
Pop.
D is t r ic t  per Santa I Minda Oraon BhumlJ Ha 
group
1,801,304 723,166 876,218 124,918 505,172
Palamau -  2% 123! -
Hazarlbagh 11% 5% 3%
Santa I Parganas 56% 1%
Dhanbad 7% 1% -
Ranchi -  72% 74% 1%
Singhbhum 15% 19% 3% 99.% 99.9%
Source: Census o f India 1971. Bihar, s e r ie s  4, part V-A. 1981 data not 
y e t  a v a ila b le .  For 1961 and 1971 G lrld lh  does not appear sep a ra te ly  
from Hazarlbagh.
Table 6: Adlvasl rural and urban population In Jharkhand
•
Adlvasl rural % Adlvasl Adlvasl urban X Adlvasu
D is t r ic t population rural pop. population urban pop.
Santa I
Parganas 1 ,358 ,063 99.28 9 ,805 0.71
Dhanbad 150,882 78 .26 41,895 21 .73
HazarIbagh 175,306 88,18 23,486 11.81
Palamau 346,538 98.60 4,894 1,39
Ranchi • 1 ,584 ,907 9 1 .5 147,125 8 .4 9
Slnghbhun 1,161,491 92.07 100,013 7 .9 2
Total 4 ,777 ,187 93.58 327,218 6.41
(On th e  b a s is  o f  s t a t i s t i c s  fo r  the Scheduled T rib es.
Census o f India 1981, s e r ie s  1, part l l - B - l l l )
Table 7: Jharkhand: Consumption Pattern of Electricity (1961)
Generation o f  Consumption Percentage d is tr ib u t io n  X rural pop. 
energy In KWh o f  power In o f  power by u ses with
D is t r ic t  KHg   e le c t r i f ie d
Irrlga  v i l la g e s  
Domest. Indust. Commerc. t lo n ,
e t c .
Hazarlbagh 1 ,310 ,001 ,149 46 ,654 ,800
Dhanbad 571,420,170 709 ,115,753
Slnghbhum 414,383,330 7 80 ,797 ,997
Palamau 37,500 ,000 37 ,340 ,000
Ranchi 27,048,021 71 ,481 ,092
Santa 1 
Parganas 1 ,176 ,226 5 ,2 3 0 ,0 0 0
T ota l:
Jharkhand 2 ,3 6 0 ,5 2 8 ,8 9 8  1 ,650 ,6 1 9 ,6 4 2  
Bihar 2 ,5 4 7 .4 1 3 ,7 2 5  2 ,026 ,2 9 2 ,6 7 4
4 .2 9 83 .35 7 .0 2 .36 5 .0 7
2 .3 7 94.71 0 .6 9 2 .23 13.05
0 .3 0 99 .19 0 .4 5 0 .06 2 .6 3
0 .9 7 95 .39 1 .98 1.66 1 .99
3 .41 87.54 7 .9 6 1 .09 1.55
15.87 41 .87 32.51 9 .75 -
4 .5 3 7 2 .5 7 .2 6 2.74 4 .04
2 .7 7 92 .83 1 .85 2 .55 6 .0 6
Source: Bihar S ta te  E le c t r ic i t y  Board, Patna; Damodar V alley  C orp., C alcu tta .
1 2 7
Table 8: Jharkhand: Percentage o f Irr igated  area to  net sown area
D is tr ic t
Santa I Parganas 3 .6
Palamau 16.0
Hazarlbagh 2.1
Dhanbad 2.1
Ranchi 2 .1
SI nghbhum 3 .9
Jharkhand to ta l 4 .96
All Bihar 19 .5
Source: A gricu ltural Census. B ihar. 
Census o f India 1971.
1 2 8
T a b l e  9
X o f people born o u ts id e  the d i s t r i c t s  
D is t r ic t  o f  enumeration
19611 1971 ^
Palamau 3 .5 7 5 .0
Hazarlbagh 5 .1 7 8 .2
Santa 1 Parganas 5 .0 9 5 .6
Dhanbad 24.92 30 .3
Ranchi 4 .57 7.1
SInghbhum 12.78 13.2
Total 8 .9 2 11.56
' Appendix o f Part ll-D , M igration T ables, v o l .  V. B ihar. Census 
o f India 1961.
^ Part D - lI , M igration T ables, s e r ie s  4 , B ihar, Census of India 1971
Table 10
F ive major migrant gro ip s In Jharkhand born o u ts id e  Bihar
D is t r ic t
P lace
of
B irth
West
Bengal
Uttar
Pradesh
O rissa Madhya
Pradesh
Punjab Total pei 
D is tr ic t
Palamau 1,360 7,843 170 6,072 270 15,715
Hazaribagh 19,222 12,682 1,810 9,726 4,161 47,601
Santa 1 
Parganas 56,911 3 ,226 ■ 325 125 120 60,707
Dhanbad 86,197 43,851 6,471 7,977 6 ,966 151,462
Ranchi 25,921 9 ,159 10,911 8,469 3 ,145 57,605
Slnghbhim 70,745 19,771 48,348 8,000 9 ,8 7 0 155,734
Total 260,356 96,532 68,035 40,169 24 ,532
X o f  to ta l  
population  
o f Jiarkhand 1.83 0 .6 7 0 .4 7 0 .2 8 0 .1 7
On th e  b a s is  o f data from Part l l-D , s e r ie s  4 , Bihar, M igration T ab les, Census o f  
India 1971: 51-65 .
THIRD PART
THE POLITICAL TERRAIN
The historical development and the socioeconomic location of 
the adivasis in Jharkhand's social formation were discussed in the 
proceeding two chapters. Having this background in view, the various 
formulations of ethnicity amongst Jharkhand's adivasis as they were 
and are expressed in a tradition of protest are now examined.
The existence of this tradition is clearly revealed in moments of 
"high density", that is, when the tension between socioeconomic and 
political transformation and historico-cultural identity maintenance 
becomes acute. Chapter Y focusses on adivasi peasant protest in the 
nineteenth century and on the birth of urban-based political 
organizations in the present century. Following that, the two recent 
political projects for Jharkhand - that of the reformists and that of the 
grass-roots Jharkhand Mukti Morcha - are discussed in Chapter V and 
VI. To examine these projects and the formulations of collective identity 
in present-day Jharkhand, two related concepts will be employed: that of 
community, and that of the legitimating traditions supporting it (see 
introductory chapter).
CHAPTER IV
THE TRADITION OF PROTEST IN JHARKHAND: 
THE EXPERIENCE OF UNITY.
The true word is in the land...
The word of the land is with us....
Birsaite song.
It is not possible to fully reconstruct here the history of the 
adivasis of Jharkhand. However, the initial development of an ethnic 
consciousness among the adivasis can be traced for the colonial period 
(from the end of the eighteenth century through the nineteenth century), 
a period in which they unmistakenly appear as actors on the stage of 
history. This process of emergence of an ethnic consciousness in the 
course of political actions and its development up to the end of the 
1960's is examined in the present chapter. The discussion of 
Jharkhand's ethnohistory developed in Chapter II helps to set the adivasi 
tradition of protest in context.
Agrarian insurgency shook Jharkhand from the time the British 
first attempted to integrate the region into the colonial system. It is my 
contention that in the colonial situation, when socio-cultural identities 
were distorted to facilitate a new division of labour, the adivasis in 
Jharkhand responded by forging wide ethnic solidarity links. Ethnic and 
class solidarity usually combined giving impetus to many of the 
nineteenth century adivasi movements (1).
Starting at the end of the eighteenth century, social 
contradictions encouraged economic oppositions that were 
simultaneously perceived as ethnic or regional. In this situation, the 
"they" in the we-thev opposition came to refer to the dikus (see Chapter 
II) as well as to the colonizer, the other "alien-exploiter". The 
confrontation with the colonial power was, however, the key factor that
(1) The comments made on nineteenth century movements are partly 
based on data published in Devalle 1977a and 1980a. The cases 
presented here are discussed at length in Devalle 1977a. Some of the 
aspects examined in this chapter, however, have not been dealt with in 
my previous writings.
shaped the mode in which social, economic and cultural differences 
were structured starting from the end of the eighteenth century. The 
other was not any more the diku in isolation, but a complex and plural 
other incarnated in a combination of powerholders: landlords and 
moneylenders, and the colonial government, its representatives and 
allies. It was against this composite they that the Jharkhand peasantry 
launched its protests grounded in its ethnic and class solidarity.
In the changed context of independent India, the w e-thev 
opposition began to be expressed in Jharkhand in regional/community 
and class terms, in accordance with a reality in which socio-cultural 
differences had become constitutive elements in the maintenance of 
capitalist development.
In the present century, the centre of political activity among 
Jharkhand's adivasis shifted towards urban pressure groups and 
regionalism, and a deculturated, mostly Western-educated urban 
leadership. This shift culminated in the formation of the Jharkhand Party 
in 1950. However, the agrarian factor surfaced again by the end of the 
1960's as the main locus of adivasi political action. The conditions in 
the rural areas and at the industrial centres of Jharkhand led in 1972 to 
the emergence of a regionally-based movement around the Jharkhand 
Mukti Morcha, oriented towards class struggle (see Chapters HI and 
VI),
The rise of a political consciousness among the urban adivasi 
elite is evident to the observer since it is expressed in formal political 
terms. The same does not apply to the development of a political 
consciousness among the adivasi peasantry which usually becomes 
evident at the exceptional moments in which peasant protest takes the 
shape of mass movements, not infrequently bursting into armed struggle 
(P. C. Mukherjee et al. 1974). This is the case of the movements of 
Jharkhand's adivasi peasantry in the nineteenth century discussed here.
l.-Modes and contents of peasant protest in Jharkhand.
In 1974, K. Gough (1974) stressed the fact that, despite their 
absence in historiography, peasant expressions of protest had been 
common in India under British rule (2). Peasants repeatedly rose 
against the oppression of landlords, moneylenders, tax collectors, the 
military and the police, sometimes in widespread and numerically strong 
movements. Only a few of the many instances of peasant protest in 
colonial India have been studied since the mid-seventies. Nevertheless, 
these studies challenge the view of a passively subjugated Indian 
peasantry.
Some of these protests, like the XJlgulan of 1895 discussed in 
section 3,a, were expressed partially in religious terms, and 
consequently have been studied as primarily religious, usually with 
reference to the main Indian religion or to Christianity. The political 
character and the agrarian base of these movements were largerly 
ignored (e.g. Fuchs 1965, E. Jay 1961). The "partial isomorphism" of 
agrarian classes with major ethnic, religious or linguistic categories, 
already noted by Gough (1974: 1403), often obscures the actual 
occurrence of class struggles and may partly account for the way in 
which peasant movements in India have been perceived by some 
scholars.
Since a mere description of the formal aspects of peasant 
oppositional actions seems insufficient to understand them, I prefer to 
look at two dimensions in this social phenomenon:
(a) The first is what I call a tradition of protest. Such a tradition 
presuposses that peasant protest is not confined to the isolated events 
when peasants openly rebel. A tradition of protest refers to a 
continuous, not just occasional, stance of opposition to the established 
power when this is experienced as oppressive.
(2) Peasant protest, sometimes violent in form was present in 
precolonial times as well. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were 
marked by revolts against the Moghuls accompanying the extension of 
commercial relations and increases in taxes.
The concept of a tradition of protest serves to disclose the 
temporal distribution of different kinds of peasant protests and their 
condensed occurrence in times of crisis. More importantly, it reveals the 
long historical duration of peasant struggles, a duration which enables 
the formation of a pool of cummulative experiences from which new 
political actions may develop (Devalle 1977a; Agiiero, Devalle, Tanaka 
1981).
(b) The second dimension is that of a culture o f resistance 
among the peasants, a theme that will be discussed in Chapter VH. This 
dimension refers to the existence of a consciousness of opposition and 
resistance among the peasantry. The ideas that back political actions, 
their emergence and development, the means to channel protest in daily 
life and at the special times of overt rebellion, can be found in this 
. culture, This culture does not remain static but is transformed in the 
course of history (Devalle 1985a).
By considering these two dimensions in peasant protest we can 
avoid judgements about its rare successes and usual failure to attain 
power. Its "failure" is relative. Peasants fight an unequal war against 
powerful opponents. In the cases under study, rural insurgency 
challenged the colonial apparatus of control, the State and the many 
ways in which the dominant groups sought to impose their hegemony 
over society. In this light, peasant movements should be evaluated not in 
terms of their "success" or "failure", but in terms of their role in the 
history of the subaltern social sectors.
Peasant protest in Jharkhand presented a double-faced, 
coordinated resistance to the established order: first, as an agrarian 
struggle, a struggle common to peasants at all times of history who 
strive for economic redress as epitomized in the struggle for land; 
secondly, as the defense of the historical identity of the community. This 
coordinated resistance is reflected in the meaning given to land as 
territory and to its defence. That is, land is not only conceived as a 
means of production but also as an anchor for self-definition.
Colonialism was perceived as a situation in which aggregated 
levels of domination reinforced each other. To previous injustices, new 
socioeconomic inequalities were added. This resulted in a general 
dislocation of the social order and in a reorganization of the local 
economies which became subordinated to the colonial system. At 
another level, the indigenous cultures came to be threatened by the
culture introduced by the colonizers through the Christian missions, a 
new system of education and new moral and legal codes.
Colonialism also implied the enhancement of socio-cultural 
differences with a racist perspective, creating new inequalities that 
proved functional for the colonial system. These differences not only 
separated the colonizer from the colonized, but also strengthened 
existing social divisions such as the opposition between "hill" and 
"plains" people. In nineteenth century Jharkhand, the contradictions 
arising from the unequal relationships between colonizer and colonized 
people was reflected in interethnic relations.
The peasantry normally relies on non-violent means to exert 
pressure, for instance, by withdrawing from or slowing down the 
process of production. Even when the limits of endurance have been 
reached, peasants remain legalistic, requsting justice from the 
authorities. They take to violence only when all possible ways to obtain 
redress fail. However, when they resort to violence through organized 
actions, this violence is always selective, measured according to the 
strength of the opponents and with a clear perception about who these 
opponnents are. Peasant wrath has rarely been blind or irrational.
The causes of the protests that occurred in the nineteenth 
century among the adivasis of Jharkhand under British rule included the 
following: the establishment of outsiders on adivasi lands and land 
dispossession, tax and rent increases, violation of forest rights, the 
generalization of forced labour in payment of debts, and socio-cultural 
dislocation. Originally, protest arose as an immediate response to the 
need to solve conflicts of an agrarian character. The early uprisings and 
the actions of "social banditry" and non-cooperation stemmed from these 
problems. Sometimes non-violent actions were resorted to, for 
instance, when peasants and even entire communities abandoned their 
lands in order to avoid direct confrontation. The effects of these actions 
were very limited at first, but later they became a real threat to the 
colonial economy, as happened in the aftermath of the Santal Movement. 
The pressure on the colonial economy was stronger when peasants 
decided to abandon cultivation and to stop production, organizing 
themselves for non-cooperation. This happened during the first stages 
of the Birsaite Movement.
There were also actions of "social banditry". Long traditions of 
protest of this kind can be detected, for instance, among the Bhumijs, as
a way of questioning inefficient authorities. "Social banditry", however, 
does not aim at producing structural changes but only to modify a 
situation to make it less oppressive (Hobsbawm 1963; 1976). When 
persisting and endemic, "social banditry" can be a symptom of 
generalized peasant unrest. Economic crises in precapitalist peasant 
societies have been often accompanied by a rise in the incidence of 
"social banditry". From the end of the eighteenth century until the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century, banditry and widespread protest 
formed the background of a tradition of opposition to colonial rule 
among the Bhumijs of the then Districts of Jungle Mahalas and 
Dhalbhum, that was to culminate in 1832 in Ganga Narain's movement 
(Table 2; map 7) (3).
To what extent can the Bhumij chrnrs be strictly called "social 
bandits"? They were not always opposed to the landlords and the State, 
nor engaged in the defence of the interests of the rural poor. They 
certainly resisted a colonial conquest that threatened to destroy "the 
traditional order of things". Their anticolonial struggle was mostly 
linked to the defence of established landlords and rajas, and to the 
maintenance of the positions of power of the upper rural strata. They 
often rose in response to British intervention in favour of local 
authorities loyal to the colonizer (Table 1). Their protests also involved 
the peasantry, especially the bhumihars (4). The imposition of colonial 
rule over Bhumij territories brought about great hardship for the 
peasants and trouble for the overlords. This situation led different 
sectors of Bhumij society to join forces to fight the intruder but did not 
result in a questioning of their society's internal contradictions. On those 
occassions, Bhumij collective identity prevailed over existing 
socioeconomic cleavages.
(3) There were numerous chuar revolts in the area from the end of the 
eighteenth century. Particularly since the 1820's, the Bhumij peasantry 
and especially the descendants of the original settlers, took to arms when 
rajas and zamindars did not defend them from outsiders (dikus and 
British alike), and when some of them allied with the British (J. C. Jha 
1967: 106 ff). The 1832 movement rose against British intervention in 
the succession of Ganga Narain as Raja of Barabhum. (Coupland 1911; 
E. Jay 1961; Fuchs 1965; Bradley-Birt 1903; S. Sinha 1953; Devalle 
1977b).
(4) Another source of conflict was the situation in which the ghatwals 
found themselves after losing their rights over the service tenures 
received for taking care of defence and order. The colonial 
administration took over these duties. In 1793, Cornwallis introduced 
the daroga system and a police alien to the region. As a result, violent 
uprisings "occurred (J.C. Jha 1963: 266). The colonial authorities had to 
restore the ghatwals their lands in 1800. By that time also, the District of 
Jungle Mahals was created (Regulation XVIII [1805]).
During the nineteenth century in Jharkhand, the adivasis made 
their grievances known to the colonial authorities through legal channels: 
memoranda, petitions and documents asking for justice. These petitions 
remained unattended. For instance, the government ignored those sent 
by the Santals before and during the Santal Movement of 1855. The 
Mulkui Larai or Sardar Movement, antecedent of the Birsaite Movement, 
is an example of a long and unsuccessful attempt at legal protest by the 
Mundas.
"Passive" resistance, non-cooperation and legal actions are 
common among peasants. These forms of protest are not spectacular 
and pass frequently unnoticed or are explained away as products of a 
vaguely defined "peasant mentality". Eric Wolf (1975) has described 
some of the difficulties the peasantry faces in developing a sustained 
rebellion. These difficulties explain the peasantry's apparent slowness in 
openly rebelling against the oppression of local rural dominant elements 
or the State. Peasants appear in this light as legalist, respectful of an 
order that has been imposed on them, eager to negotiate with the rulers 
and to show them a reality of which they are apparently unaware. 
Peasants give opportunities to the powerful to correct the situation and to 
be just. For instance, Santal peasants sent a petition in 1854 to 
Commissioner Brown, saying:
We have no protection but Government and pray that 
inquiry be made and the mahajans removed from the 
Damin and that we be saved from their claws....
(Roy Chaudhuri 1959: 26-27).
Legalist actions were pursued before the start of the two major 
movements of 1855 and 1895. This legalist approach persisted even at 
the moment of selecting targets and announcing attacks. Opponents were 
warned by sending them branches of sal or messages, so that they 
would not be treacherously surprised. When it became clear that neither 
protection nor answers to the petitions or justice could be expected from 
the government, the ideal of an alternative government and a new social 
order began to emerge. This new social order was to be established by 
destroying the existing one. In the Santal case, only when all legal 
channels were exhausted did armed struggle begin. The Santals then 
proclaimed that the land was theirs and that British rule had come to an 
end. One of the participants in the 1855 movement, imprisoned at
Birbhum after its suppression, explained the reasons why armed action 
became inevitable:
You [the government] forced us to fight against you.
We asked only what was fair, and you gave us no 
answer. When we tried to get redress by arms, you 
shot us like leopards in the jungle....
(Hunter 1868: 254).
Forty years later the Birsaite Movement was to enunciate the 
same final goal: independence. The targets of attack became all the 
dikus, all the aliens, including the Christians and the hakims (the 
British). The Birsaites foresaw that only with their elimination could the 
establishment of the New Kingdom of justice be possible.
By means of their experiences in legal and armed protest and 
their contact with officials of the colonial administration and with people 
who carried the ideology of the colonizers, the adivasi peasants became 
aware of the nature of the colonial system and the new unequal 
relationships in which they had become involved. On the basis of this 
awareness, the adivasi peasantry began to assert its historical identity 
(ethnicity) as a part of its political discourse, and began to launch its 
struggle against the colonizer, his local allies and the social products of 
colonialism such as the new zamindars. British administration was 
acknowledged to be the apex of the system of domination in the colony. 
Direct references were made during the Birsaite Movement to the 
metropolis, on which the colonial administrative apparatus was seen to 
depend.
Anticolonial feelings with clear political content inspired the 
prayers and songs of the Birsaites as well as the speeches of their leader. 
Similar feelings were present among the participants in the Santal 
Movement (K. S. Singh 1966: 98-144; Culshaw and Archer 1945: 
220). Both movements were crushed after long repressive campaigns. 
The suppression of the Santal Movement left the Santals with their 
villages burnt down and their people decimated and facing famine. The 
Birsaite Movement also ended brutally with the massacre at Dombari 
Hill.
The agrarian base, a constant element in the long history of 
protest of the adivasis of the area, was included in another type of action
of resistance. The political strategy came to be based on the 
establishment of ethnic solidarity links, leading to actions in defence of 
adivasi cultural and social integrity. In this struggle a colonized people 
sought to preserve its historical identity, a driving force in all 
movements for decolonization. Among the adivasis, ethnicity became 
the vehicle to express their demands for political and economic 
independence, and an instrument to organize action and form alliances 
against the colonizer and his representatives (5).
Practically all the major agrarian movements in Jharkhand 
during the nineteenth century brought adivasi peasants together across 
what were tenuous ethnic demarcations. This potentiality of ethnic 
solidarity for sustaining protest was well understood by the colonial 
authorities (6). Ethnic solidarity appeared to be grounded more on a 
broad historically and territorially defined identity as original settlers 
than on particular ethnic ascriptions. At the same time, the existence of a 
correlated class solidarity across the low rural sections of the population 
- agriculturalists and artisans - in the major peasant movements of 
nineteenth century Jharkhand, added an important qualitative dimension. 
This class dimension has been underplayed by contemporary observers, 
colonial administrators and later scholars whose perceptions of the 
phenomenon was shaped by the colonial category of tribe. 
Consequently, these movements have been perceived as "tribal”, with 
no participation of the general peasantry which supposedly remained 
passive spectators. Contrary to this perception, there is evidence of the 
support and participation of the general peasantry in these movements, 
as in the case of the Santal Movement of 1855 when all sectors of the 
peasantry - "tribal" and "non-tribal" - were mobilized (7). By the end of 
1855, this, formidable rural contingent had joined the movement (Hunter
(5) For instance, the alliance of Mundas, Oraons and Hos in the Kol 
Movement of 1831-32; of Santals and Mundas in the Kherwar 
Movement of 1871; of Santals and Oraons in the Kherwar Movement of 
1891, and of Mundas and Oraons in the Birsaite Movement. The Larka 
Kols of Singhbhum, although "they had none of the real grievances of 
their neighbours" as yet, came forward to aid the Kol Movement as "the 
most formidable division of the rebel army". Insurgency spread to 
Palamau, where it was taken up by the Kherwar Movement to which 
most of the adivasi peasantry of Chotanagpur and Palamau provided 
armed collaboration (Dalton 1872: 169-171; Bradley-Birt 1903: 92-93).
(6) When disturbances started after Birsa's arrest in 1895 and crowds 
began to gather at Chalkad, for instance, landlords were instructed to 
forbid the adivasis in the villages under their control to join the meeting 
(K. S. Singh 1966: 54-55; 63-64).
(7). Blacksmiths, for instance, who usually made agricultural tools in 
times of peace, provided weapons for the insurgents (Hunter 1868: 
250).
1868: 250; CR 1856: 246), united in a "brotherhood of class". It is 
perhaps in the selection of the targets of attack that the class character of 
adivasi peasant insurgency is most evident. The rich and the powerful 
were invariably subjected to violence, while peasants and artisans were 
carefully spared (Table 3).
The adivasis of Jharkhand sought legitimisation and support for 
their struggle for their rights and independence in their own traditions 
and in their real or ideal past. This is what Birsa, the Ulgulan's leader, 
meant when he urged his followers to pay "homage to the first people of 
our race".
2.- The tradition of protest among the Santals.
Sidhu, why axe you bathed in blood? 
Kanhu, why do you cry "hul, hul!"?
-For our people we have bathed in blood,
since the trader thieves
have robbed us of our land....
Santal song.
The 1855 Movement started among the Santal peasantry of the 
Damin-i-koh and later embraced the rural population across an extensive 
area (Maps 8 and 9).
The Damin offered good prospects to traders and moneylenders 
who started pouring into the area from nearby regions. Colonial 
administration was satisfied with the Damin as a source of revenue (8).
The conditions prevailing in the Damin were not, however, 
satisfactory for the Santal peasants who became dependent on merchants 
for loans in kind or cash at high interest rates. Almost their entire 
harvest went to pay debts. Santals became trapped in the circle of debts 
and the kamioti system. British Courts declared in favour of the creditor 
and "contracts" in dubious terms were signed (Man n.d.: 111-113; R. 
Mukherjee 1933: 229, fn. 2) (9). The Santal peasant worked the 
creditor's land without pay and did not have time to cultivate his own. 
The system of loans finally forced the Santals to pay their debts with the 
very lands they had opened to cultivation. These lands gradually passed 
to diku hands (10).
As earlier mentioned, Santal oral history frequently refers to the 
use of the "exodus technique" to avoid social conflicts. Santals explain
(8) The annual rents on land the Damin peasants had to pay 
progressively rose from Rs. 6,682 in 1837 to Rs. 58,033 in 1855 (Roy 
Chaudhuri 1959: 4-11; CR 1856; 238). Based on the report by A.C. 
Bidwell's (special Commissioner in charge of the supression of the 
Santal Movement), the Judicial Department stated that the payment 
exacted was "moderate in the extreme" (Roy Chaudhuri ibid.: 21-30. 
See also CR ibid.: 240).
(9) See transcriptions of some of these contracts in Man ibid. and R. 
Mukherjee ibid..
(10) See a description of the situation in CalcuttaJReview 1856: 240- 
241.
their migrations with reference to the presence of "foreigners", who are 
always associated with dispossession (usually of land), or to incidents 
that could have resulted in breaking customary laws. In the nineteenth 
century, when the only lands left were unsuitable for cultivation and 
only the jungle remained as a place for refuge, this kind of response 
continued to occur. Among the Santals of Birbhum "in 1848 three whole 
townships...throwing up their clearings, fled in despair to the jungle" to 
escape from a permanent situation of indebtness with the moneylenders 
(Hunter 1868: 232), Furthermore, Santals in the area surrounding the 
Damin had in their tradition rebellions that took place at the end of the 
eighteenth century (11).
The 1855 Movement was preceeded by different kinds of 
protests. In 1854, actions of "social banditry", led by Bir Singh, were 
reported, mostly directed against merchants and moneylenders (12). By 
that time, meetings of village headmen and chiefs of parganas had 
already been taking place to discuss the situation and to determine the 
course of action to follow. As a first step to eliminate oppression it was 
decided to exert pressure on mahajans and traders. Magistrate Hey wood 
reported in August 1854:
The number of persons ready and willing to commit 
these dacoities...may I fear be reckoned by 
thousands....
(Roy Chaudhuri op.cit.: 25).
It was acknowledged that these actions received the consent of all the 
Santal population (Ibid.).
From the beginning of 1855 petitions were sent to the 
Collector, the Commissioner and the Government demanding that usury 
be contained and all dikus expelled from Santal lands. These petitions
(11) According to nineteenth century sources, the Santals tried to 
organize themselves under the leadership of headman Morgo Rajah, 
aiming at "the union into an independent kingdom of the south country, 
meaning the original country of the Sonthal tribe" (CR 1856: 242). 
Discontent in Hazaribagh is also mentioned.
(12) In my view, these actions of protest did not amount to a "messianic 
movement" as Fuchs (1965) calls them.
remained unanswered or were considered too late, when the Santals had 
already taken to armed struggle (Basu 1934:192).
a.- The Santal Movement of 1855.
The Santal Movement followed a clear pattern of development. 
At first, religious elements served to legitimize the protest and the 
selection of the leaders. Premonitions and divine revelations marked the 
beginning of a special, sacralized time, the right moment to gain 
independence and to create a new and just society.
The second stage was legalist. Documents asking for justice 
were submitted to the authorities. In June 1855 the march to Calcutta 
was organized. The failure of the short-lived march led on 7 July 1855 
to an overt armed struggle, conceived as the last resort to obtain redress.
Four Santal brothers from Bhagnadihi village were selected as 
leaders, symbolically by divine intervention and in practice by the people 
who decided to follow them. Two of the brothers, Sidhu and Kanhu, 
emerged as the actual leaders of the movement. They had become 
landless peasants after their father had lost his lands to the dikus (Datta 
1940: 14 ff.).
Before launching their protest, the Santals sought strength and 
assurance for the success of their struggle in a series of symbolic 
actions. They started by differentiating themselves from the rest of men 
as "the chosen people". For the Santals, to belong to "the chosen ones" 
meant to be conscious of their collective identity.
The main goal of the movement became the elimination of 
merchants, moneylenders, colonial officials and alien landlords. Later 
on, final objectives were enunciated: Santal independence, land 
restoration and the establishment of a Santal government. New letters 
were sent to the Government, the authorities at Bhagalpur and Birbhum, 
some darogas and zamindars (Culshaw and Archer 1945: 219-220; Roy 
Chaudhuri 1965a: 80).
Only W.W. Hunter and S. Fuchs mention the march to 
Calcutta. Others talk of a gathering of between ten to thirty thousand
people. The aborted march was the last of the legal actions before armed 
struggle began (13). Once the avenues for legal protest and dialogue 
with the colonial authorities were severed, the Santals proclaimed that 
the land was theirs and that British rule had come to an end.
The consistent pattern in the choice of targets for insurgent 
violence indicates the existence both of consensus among the 
participants regarding who their enemy was and a precise organization 
(Table 3). The most frequent targets were the moneylenders and the 
merchants. Starting in 1854 with Bir Singh's actions, the insurgents 
pillaged the houses of the rich. When the struggle became openly 
anticolonial, Government representatives, the police, the railways’ high 
employees and the army, were added to the list. Several Europeans were 
killed, Bengalis were threatened, houses in some villages were looted 
and burnt, markets pillaged, and zamindars, local rajas and the centres 
of trade in indigo attacked (14).
In July 1855 the Santals made their goal of self-rule explicit. 
The yearning for an independent kingdom was reinforced by the belief, 
which antedated the movement, that a powerful independent Santal 
kingdom had existed in the past.
The suppression of the movement was particularly severe. 
Santal property was destroyed and villages burnt down under the excuse 
that they were "full of booty". The movement, nevertheless, continued 
to spread, reaching Colong-Rajmahal in the east and Raniganj and 
Sainthia in the south, and spilling over into Birbhum, Bankura and 
Hazaribagh (Raghavaiah 1971: 153; Roy Chaudhuri 1969a: 19; 
O'Malley 1938: 59-60). The escalation of repression finally forced up to 
30,000 Santals to take refuge in the jungles. Local zamindars, ghatwals 
and the police aided the counter-insurgency forces, which were also
(13) The circumstances that ended this march are rather confusing. 
Datta mentions the killing of five mahajans in Panchkutia which 
provoked police intervention on 7 July. The police party was led by the 
daroga Mahesh Lai Datta, known to the Santals for his past outrages. 
The marchers captured the daroga, tried and executed him. It seems he 
had been bribed by.Hindu usurers and asked to arrest the Santal leaders 
under false accusations of robbery (K.K. Datta 1940).
(14) Messages were sent by the insurgents prior to their attacks, 
promising not to harm the cultivators. Gregor Grant's establishment 
was captured and destroyed only after two proclamations were sent 
advising him to leave with all his belongings (Santal communiques and 
letters, BJP 1956).
helped by funds provided by the indigo planters (15). The collaboration 
of planters and zamindars in the repression was, ironically, in the last 
instance funded by the income from the peasants' own work (WBDR 
1855: 1786-1797; Indian Records 1870: 196 ff,). More than ten 
thousand Santals died in this unequal war.
Conflicts internal to the movement contributed to its 
disintegration. The environment of violence and fear and an increasingly 
authoritarian leadership discouraged and alienated many participants. 
Many left the movement and fled, only to encounter the troops or their 
burnt villages.
Santals who were arrested were treated as common criminals. 
Even the possibility of Santal political dissidence was not considered 
(y/BD R  1855: 119-120, 129-130). The colonial administration was 
worried about the number of cultivators not willing to return to the 
Damin who were instead fleeing the area. The editorial of Friends of 
India demanded exemplary punishments for the insurgents -described as 
"blood-thirsty savages"- to "avenge the outrages committed...[and] to 
restore the prestige of British-authority". Calcutta Review saw the 
problem in more practical terms, and advised:
[The Santals] should be compelled, by force, if need 
be, to return to the Damin-i-koh and to the waste 
country in Bhaugulpore and Beerbhoom, to rebuild 
the ruined villages, restore the desolate fields to 
cultivation, open roads, and advance general public 
works; and do this under watch and guard, for 
otherwise they will run away....
(1856: 262-263).
In short, from the colonialist perspective, the Santals had to be forced 
again into the mould of the obedient coolie.
After the suppression of the movement, revenue collection was 
resumed in the Damin with good results for the Government. It was
(15)The planters were alarmed because the indigo cultivators were 
willing to back the insurgents. The persisting demands of the planters to 
the Government for compensation contributed to the escalation of the 
final repression of the movement.
only thirty years later that legislation was enacted to stop land alienation 
in Santal territories. Since the underlying socioeconomic structure was 
not modified by the new laws, the exploitation of the Santals by 
landlords and moneylenders continued. Rents were increased further, 
and village authorities were displaced under external pressure.
The tradition of protest among the Santals was not broken. By 
mid-1861 sal branches again carried messages of dissidence among the 
Santal villages. The time coincided both with a prophecy made by 
Kanhu in which he promised to return to his people and with a rent 
increase by the zamindars. In the end, the protest did not materialize in 
action.
Demands for independence surfaced again in the Kherwar 
Movement of 1871, led by Bhagrit of Taldiha, a movement which was 
messianic in form and Hinduist in the reforms it sought to introduce. 
The beginnings of this movement coincided with an increase in rents. 
This circumstance shows once again that the formal aspects of a 
movement (religious elements) concealed causes that had more to do 
with the economic situation.
Incidents continued to take place, especially in 1874 during a 
serious famine in Santal Parganas. By 1880-1881, demands for 
independence were again expressed, this time under the leadership of 
Dubia Gosain, a Hindu ascetic. The Kherwar Movement revived in 
1891. Its participants announced the end of colonial rule, the advent of 
self-government, the elimination of rents and the restoration of lands to 
the adivasis, repeating demands that had been uttered for half a century 
(16).
3.- The tradition of protest among the adivasis of 
Chotanagpur.
White men, go away, hurry up,
Your land is in the West, you must leave.
Go away with the wind to your land,
You must leave..,.
Birsaite song.
(16) Later on, the strongly anti-British Sapha-Hor Movement of 1942- 
1943 became involvedln the Indian national struggle for independence 
(K. K. Datta 1958: 185 ff.; Mac Dougall 1977).
The Birsaite Movement (Ulgulan) of 1895 was millenarian in 
form, and agrarian and anticolonial in character. It was also messianic. 
Birsa, the leader, acted as a divine messenger and later came to be seen 
as the deity himself on earth. The revolutionary spirit that usually 
animates millenarian movements was broken in the Birsaite Movement 
when it failed to attain its aims and repression had destroyed the 
movement's organization.
The Ulgulan formed part of a long tradition of protest and of a 
chain of suppressed uprisings. Since the end of the eighteenth century 
Chotanagpur had shown signs of agrarian unrest. Movements of protest 
and actions of "social banditry" were developed by the adivasis of the 
area, sometimes united in pan-ethnic fronts. The period between 1780 
and 1833 was one of intense agrarian protest (17). Towards the mid­
nineteenth century, the Mulkui Larai ("The fight for the land") or Sardar 
Movement started, a legalist struggle that was to last for almost forty 
years.
The deterioration of the relations between the adivasis and the 
missions established in Chotanagpur started when the missionaries 
began to show interest in the lands of the converts. Other factors 
included the growing intolerance of the Lutheran church, the persistence 
of land alienation, forced labour and continuous rent increases. All this 
led the Mundas to organize themselves to fight for land restoration (S. 
P. Sinha 1959: 393; Zide and Munda 1969). The adivasi sardars, mostly 
Christian, undertook the laborious task of sending petitions to the 
authorities and collecting funds to pay for the legal procedures at the 
Calcutta courts. The government did not listen to these petitions. Even 
S. C. Roy considered the Sardars to be "unscrupuluos agitators", their 
claims "extravagant" and their petitions "recklessly rabid" (1912: 281- 
281). The claim that seems to have particularly incensed the colonial 
government was that Chotanagpur belonged to the Mundas, that the
(17) 1789: Mundas rose against the new alien landlords in Tamar. 1796 
and 1798: peasant protests among the Mundas of Rahe and Silli. 1807: 
agrarian unrest in Tamar. 1831: Mundas, Oraons and Hos participated 
in the Kol Movement around the question of land grants (S.C. Roy 
1912; 1961: 287; Elwin 1945: 258, Hallet and Mcpherson 1917: 31-35). 
Representatives of various adivasi communities gathered at Lanka 
(Tamar) decided they "should commence to cut, plunder, murder and 
eat..." (testimony in Elwin ibid.: 259). The movement suppressed, the 
South West Frontier Agency was established, Doranda transformed into 
a military cantonment, and the zamindari police system reinstated.
Hindus had no right on these territories and, consequently, that no rents 
would be paid (18).
After legal actions repeatedly failed, the Sardars concluded that 
the path of legal protest was closed. The idea of establishing an 
independent government began to take shape. By then, close to the end 
of the century, the adivasis of Chotanagpur were looking for a leader 
who could organize them in their struggle for independence.
a.- The Birsaite Movement of 1895.
The Ulgulan revolved around Birsa, a young Munda who came 
to be seen by his people as the New King and by some Indian 
nationalists as a patriot. He belonged to a poor peasant family from 
Chalkad, was converted to Christianity and educated for some years at 
the missions where he acquired some knowledge of English. Birsa was 
excommunicated by the Lutheran missionaries, possibly because he was 
a Sardar sympathizer and because of his position on the land rights 
question (Zide and Munda 1969: 39) (19).
Several extraordinary events came to indicate in the eyes of the 
people and of Birsa himself that he had been chosen by Sing Bonga, the 
supreme deity, as his divine messenger and that he was endowed with 
miraculous powers. The Birsaites started protest actions which resulted 
in the refusal to transplant rice and the abandonement of cultivation. 
They organized a movement for non-cooperation against the landlords of 
such proportions that the administration feared it could result in food 
scarcity and famine (20).
(18) See the petition addressed by the chiefs of eight parganas and 
"fourteen thousand Christians" to the Commissioner of Chotanagpur, in 
S. C. Roy ibid.: 282-283, where it is said: "If Chota Nagpore does not 
belong to the Mundas, it belongs to none,..". Some missionaries like F. 
Nottrott and F. Dedlockes aided in the incarceration of some Sardars, 
The confrontation with the missions escalated resulting, for instance, in 
the Oraons establishing independent churches in the jungles.
(19) He participated in the agrarian struggle and, consequently, was 
marked by the police as the instigator of the peasant protest march in 
Sigrida in 1894 in demand of a reduction in the forest tax.
(20) A serious food shortage overcame Chotanagpur in 1895 and 1896. 
Important insurgent centres (Khunti, Sisal and Basia) were affected by 
famine. Later, the climax of the protest in 1898 and 1899 coincided 
with a famine in Ranchi and Palamau and the 1898 cholera epidemic.
Birsa began to announce the destruction of the world, an 
apocalypse from which only the Birsaites would be saved. The end of 
this world being imminent, agricultural work and cattle were abandoned, 
and savings spent.
Three phases can be detected in this movement (Map 10). In 
the first, during the first months of 1895, religious elements 
predominated. The second, lasting to the end of 1900, can be called the 
agrarian-political phase and included efforts at collective self-assertion 
(1898 and 1899). From February to October 1901 came the period of 
disintegration of the movement.
Birsa was imprisoned in 1895 but the movement continued its 
course underground with the help of the Sardars (21). The presence of 
the Sardars remained constant in the Birsaite Movement. The colonial 
administration clearly detected the merger of the two movements and 
was consequently alarmed at the danger to "law and order" from the 
collaboration of Sardars and Birsaites, who were seen respectively as 
"agitators" and "false prophets" (Document in K. K. Datta 1958: 99). 
This alliance appeared as a threat precisely because it embodied the 
union of two forces: elements of class struggle and the ethnic struggle, 
both expressed in the defence of land and territory.
After Birsa's release from jail, the Birsaites reaffirmed their 
cultural identity with visits to the temples of Chutia and Jagamathpur 
and the fort at Naw Rattan. They believed that these landmarks had been 
built by the Mundas, who were later forced to leave them by the dikus. 
The visits were aimed at recovering sacred possessions thought to be in 
these places and honouring the ancestors of the Munda people. The 
Birsaites were also looking for a copper plate in Chutia where Munda 
land rights were said to be recorded.
The grounds for identifying these places as part of the Munda 
heritage seem to be fictitious. Whatever the historical basis of this 
identification, however, the Birsaites were challenging the dominant 
sectors by appropriating their cultural symbols. They did so by 
undermining one of the most salient features of Hindu culture, its
(21) At the same time, there was a new wave of conversions to 
Christianity - symbol and part of the culture of the colonizer - between 
1895 and 1897, possibly as a way to avoid harassment by the authorities 
and for other practical reasons. Zide and Munda (1969) suggest that the 
critical situation resulting from the 1896 famine was used to force 
conversions in exchange for food aid.
religion epitomized in the temple, which was also a status symbol of the 
landed rich (Roy Chaudhuri 1965b: 142-151; R. Guha 1983). The visit 
to Chutia resulted in the defilement of images and the desecration of the 
temple. The impact of this defiance via appropriation was reinforced by 
the destruction of a sacred symbol of Hindu culture. The form 
(aggression, re-appropriation) and content (defiance of the established 
order) of these actions were combined in symbolic collective actions, as 
it is common in peasant insurgency (Hobsbawm 1963: Ch. IX). 
Symbolic action embodies codes - of conduct, of strategy, of perceiving 
reality - that remain private to its users. This is the "language" of the 
oppositional clandestine culture of the subaltern classes. Collective 
symbolism and ritualized actions in peasant movements reinforce the 
"complicity" that underlies the cohesion among those who participate in 
them.
After these visits, the Birsaites considered themselves to be 
prepared for offensive action. The visual symbols of war then 
proliferated. A landscape of red flags rose at Dombari Hill announcing 
the beginning of a bloody war that was to engulf all the dikus, thikadars, 
jagirdars, rajas and Christians. After a Birsaite meeting at Simbua, 
Queen Victoria was burnt in effigy, and the raja and the British were 
symbolically destroyed in the angry felling of a plantain tree.
The missions in Singhbhum and Ranchi and the houses of 
converts became the first targets in the wave of attacks and arson in late 
1899. Significantly, violence broke out on Christmas Eve, a choice of 
date that gave the actions the symbolic meaning of overturning the 
meaning of that day for the Christians: peace. The symbolic was, 
however, also well rationalized. The Birsaites considered that:
They have suffered in the hands of the Christian priests who 
destroyed their caste [sic] by converting them to their 
religion....
(Cit. in K. S. Singh 1966: 88).
This perception was compounded by distrust of the missionaries 
regarding the land question.
By 1900 the attention of the Birsaites turned to the Hindus and 
the representatives of the colonial order. Armed confrontations ensued, 
among them the attack at Etkedih on the Deputy Commissioner and the 
takeover of the Khunti police station, both visible symbols of authority.
With the launching of counter-insurgency operations, the Birsaites had 
to resort to defensive tactics culminating in the retreat into Sail Rakab 
Hill. They took their families and food with them and prepared for a 
prolonged siege (22). Sail Rakab and Dombari Hill were to be the final 
sites where protest was silenced in a massacre that was subsequently 
officially "forgotten" to avoid inquiries into the role of the army and the 
police. The people's collective memory, however, did not forget. The 
images of death in Dombari Hill were kept alive in oral history (23).
Less than a month afterwards, Birsa was again arrested. He 
died in jail shortly after in dubious circumstances. When taken to prison 
he assured his followers he would return one day to establish the 
promised kingdom, and gave the British only ten more years to live. 
Officially, the political character of the movement was never 
acknowledged, although it was labelled "a conspiracy". Birsa was 
brought to trial as a common criminal and not as a political prisoner.
Following the suppression of the movement, Birsaism was 
reduced to the life of the sect, preserving only the religious elements and 
circumscribing the Birsaites in a new but closed society. This was an 
introvert response that attempted to create a new world through 
segregation.
While the people involved in the Birsaite Movement did relate 
their struggle to the struggle for national independence (24), the Indian 
Nationalist Movement did not embrace foci of anticolonial resistance 
such as this one.
Birsa's promise to return was not forgotten, and some 
continued to wait for his second coming. Songs are still composed in
(22) Until that moment the movement had been in control of 1,024 sq. 
miles of hilly terrain with forces that contemporary sources establish at 
15,000. The confrontations at Etkedih, Khunti and, finally, Dombari 
Hill, happened in rapid succession in less than a week. The Khunti 
incident convinced the colonial authorities that general insurgency 
obtained in the area between Khunti and Bandgaon,
(23) For instance, a Birsaite song says:
Oh, Birsa!, [your] followers fell on the milk-like land.
They were overrun on the cream-like land.
Little children were trampled upon...
Oh, Birsa!, your people mourn....(Cit. in K. S. Singh 1966: 121).
(24) This is reflected, for instance, in the relation established between 
the role of two leaders, Birsa and Gandhi, evidenced in some later local 
songs, and in comments made to me by some adivasis.
Birsa's memory (25), and even today the search for a leader by part of 
the Munda intelligentsia evokes the image of Birsa:
A mystic leader, like Birsa, a man that with simplicity 
can dominate the minds of the powerful...somebody 
like a saint...who cannot be corrupted....
(Interview with a Munda intellectual).
b.- The Millennium's promised land.
The Ulgulan of 1895 took the form of a millenarian movement 
with messianic elements, characteristics that were also present in the 
Santal Movement of 1855. Millenarian mass movements have often 
arisen among the underprivileged in critical situations (Cf. P. Worsley 
1970: xi, with N. Cohn 1962, 1970). Scholars like G. Balandier 
(1955), V. Lanternari (1965), E. Hobsbawm (1963) and P. Worsley 
(ibid.), consider these movements to be antecedents in the formation of a 
political consciousness.
The revolutionary spirit in millenarism is embedded in the 
concept of a better world to be attained through total structural changes. 
Reformist tendencies can arise at certain junctures in the development of 
a millenarian movement. In the Ulgulan, this tendency appeared after its 
suppression, as a kind of compromise with a world that at the moment 
proved to be impossible to radically change.
Hobsbawm defends the utopianism of millenarism as "a 
necessary social device for generating the superhuman efforts without 
which no major revolution is achieved" (ibid.). Millenarism does not, 
however, offer a remote utopia: for the millenarists problems are to be 
solved "here and now" in order to correct and change a concrete
(25) Note, for instance, the song in Mundari composed by Ram Dayal 
Munda (1967):
Looking for you again,
Muchia Chaflcad is asking for you...
Dombari Hill is searching for you... 
with the [metallic] sound of arrows and axes.
The rumbling of guns is searching for you.
Bows, and arrows touch and jingle 
■■ for our mother country....
(My translation).
situation of which they are aware. Millenarism should not be seen as a 
form of escapism from intolerable situations.
In the Santal and the Birsaite Movements, the millenarian 
project had as its final objective the inauguration of a new social and 
moral order. In the course of these movements, societies that had been 
dislocated by colonialism reorganized themselves and forged new social 
projects.
In the millenarian context, time acquires a special meaning. 
The Millenium marks the end of one time and the beginning of a 
qualitatively different one (Eliade 1954: 376), The arrival of messiahs in 
the two aforementioned cases indicated the opening of a new era, a time 
of salvation and renovation. Catastrophes and chaos (conquest, famine, 
epidemics like that of cholera in Chotanagpur in 1898) were understood 
as signs of the end of one time ahd the beginning of a new one. In the 
New Era, Birsa the messiah was to become the New King. For the 
Birsaites, "the land is in the grip of a consuming fire, like dry grass" 
since "customs, traditions and our honour have been snatched from us" 
(K. S. Singh 1966: 132-133, 151 [Rogoto Manuscript]), The messiah 
had come to correct the situation. Birsa was born "to sweep the earth 
clean", "to light up the land" (Ibid.: 131,133).
The New Era entailed an absolute new beginning. For this to 
happen, a complete process of regeneration had to take place: the 
elimination of suffering, insecurity, injustice and death. From the 
dissolution of the old world only "the chosen ones" were to be saved. It 
was to them that the New Kingdom, the perfect land, was to belong. 
For the Birsaites, hope in the advent of a world without oppression was 
so strong that at least twice in their songs and prayers collected by K. S. 
Singh the New Kingdom is said to have been already established and 
forever regained (Ibid.: 142).
In the yearning for the New Kingdom, the will to recover 
territory and land converged. For the Mundas, their territory was given 
to their ancestors by the supreme deity "at the beginning of time". It was 
not merely a geographical place where men lived and worked. It was the 
only possible place for them to live. In it they could define themselves 
and their lives in relation to the land as the source of sustenance, in 
relation to a sacred landscape and to the places in which their history 
was written. Territory becomes an existential geography. Outside this 
vital space, existence for the Mundas would have no meaning. The roots
of the community are in the land that its members share, a space that 
becomes the pillar of the social world.
Land-territory appears as the foundation of all the vital 
manifestations of the community. It relates men firmly to their origins 
as they are established in their history ("imagined" or "real"). It gives 
them a concrete present and a hopeful future, the reassurance of 
continuity in time and space. This is the meaning of the words of a 
Munda elder, who says:
We should not forget our Mari Disum...This is our 
land, it has always fed us. Our father was here and 
[before him] his father....
(Interview).
All aspects of life are endangered when the relation between 
land-territory and men is put at risk. The land of the Mundas was in 
danger when "others took over our land" and "when the old social order 
was displaced". Mundas lamented that "the land is floating away like a 
rolling tortoise" (Ibid.: 132). This is why Birsa's call to unite under 
"the khuntkatti banner" to recover their land and territory was heard by 
the adivasis of Chotanagpur. A Birsaite song says:
The true word is in the land...
The word of the land is with us.
With that ally they marched forward in search of victory.
4.- Urban-based political organizations in the twentieth 
century.
Jharkhand is just here in my fist....
Jaipal Singh (According to a Munda, Interview).
The twentieth century inaugurates the modality of formal 
politics in Jharkhand. Its dynamics since the 1930’s was aptly 
summarized during an interview with a Munda intellectual:
Leaders have been coming up like mushrooms in
• each area with contradictory solutions for the 
different problems, and end up fighting among 
themselves....
The development of the urban-based political organizations in 
Jharkhand followed an intricate pattern of continuous fission that 
mirrowed the cleavages among the emerging strata of well-to-do 
adivasis and the sectoral interests that guided their proposals. The 
concern for socioeconomic issues often became a mere rhetorical stance 
in which the only clear statement was the call for a separate state. This 
demand never went beyond generalities about the possible extension of 
this state. Considering the "booty" at stake (Chapter III: l.b, 2.d), the 
question that remained unanswered, except for references to 
ethnic/regional restrictions, was who was to benefit from this separation 
and in what fashion. Vague formulations concerning the demand for a 
separate Jharkhand state marked the inception of the reformist line that 
we still encounter in the Jharkhand Party and among sectors of the 
adivasi petty-bourgeoisie (Chapter V).
A feature of Jharkhand's modern political organizations is the 
distance - formalized by the mechanisms of modem politics and by class 
relations - established between the "intellectual-organizer" (Gramsci 
1973: 12; 1975) and the predominantly rural masses. At the same time, 
the "intellectual-organizer" functions as a mediator between the dominant 
groups and the State, on the one hand, and the subordinated sectors, on 
the other.
K. Gough has remarked that since the 1920's, peasant 
insurgency in India has been coordinated by political parties and has 
been of two kinds: (1) movements for independence or for regional or 
national autonomy (she gives the Jharkhand Movement as an example), 
and (2) uprisings that have been primarily class struggles, guided by the 
left parties (1974: 1403). The differences between these two, however, 
are not so clear-cut. A variety of positions, ideologies and class interests 
are found in what has been generally labelled "Jharkhand Movement". 
There are a multiplicity of projects which are often in open contradiction. 
The crux of the matter ultimately lies in the class base, the leadership's 
class links and the interests that have given substance to the various 
movements in Jharkhand.
Jharkhand's political field was dominated by the urban-based 
organizations from the 1930's to the 1960's. The following summary of 
events during that period will give, however, a partial view of the total 
political life of the times since only its most visible manifestations can be 
discussed. The reformist project was mostly an urban phenomenon but 
it had echoes in the countryside (26). Given the emergence of forceful 
peasant protests in Jharkhand from the 1970's onwards, one is inclined 
to believe that the political life of the peasantry continued to develop 
independently from the reformist project.
Reformist activities by missionaries and Christian teachers and 
students were already under way at the beginning of the century. Their 
efforts centered on organizing the adivasis into cooperative societies and 
on promoting Western-oriented education and values. They put 
emphasis on welfare phrased according to Christian religious ideals of 
morality and charity. "Mission culture" led to the formation of "native" 
intellectuals of a new vintage.
The clearest example of the mediating nature of the 
relationships established by the eccleasiatic-intellectuals between the 
superstuctural field (providing social models) and the economic domains 
is the Chota Nagpur Catholic Co-operative Credit Society, founded in 
1909 by Rev. J. Hoffmann. It had as its matrix a Central Banking 
Union. A Government Report of 1909-1910 commented:
It is a large centralized society embracing the whole 
Roman Catholic population of Ranchi...with the 
object of enabling the members of the Mission to 
constitute themselves into a system of federated and 
autonomuous societies within the central 
institution...The area... is divided into some sixteen 
circles corresponding to missionary circles, each in 
charge of a Missionary. The circles again are divided 
into villages or group of villages, each of which 
forms a rural unit,...
(Pit. in S.C. Roy 1912: 320-321) (27).
(26) Electoral results during those years seems to indicate this fact. See 
Vidyarthi and Sahay 1976: Ch. VI, VII; Jha and Jha 1964.
(27) By mid-1910 there were already 229 rural units and the Society 
counted with Rs. 22,845 as capital.
The Society or The Bank, as it is commonly known, translated 
into practice the capitalist values of individualism, saving and profit. It 
supported the model of the farmer-entrepreneur and contributed to the 
emergence of a rural petty bougeoisie (refer to Chapter V 4.b, 4.C.3).
The period of the associations and cooperative societies also 
marked the intensification of cleavages between Christian and non- 
Christian adivasis and among people adhering to various Christian 
denominations. The internalization among the converts of the "tribal 
ideology" also dates from this period. Cultural colonialism penetrated 
via education and Christianity. Schools and missionaries took in their 
hands the West's mission civilisatrice in Jharkhand.
In the educational field, several associations were formed like 
the early Christian Association founded by Lutheran students in 1898 
that, when joined in 1918 by the Catholics, amalgamated into the 
Christian College Union. A Christian student's organization was 
founded in 1912 by J. Bartholmen, of the Anglican Mission. The same 
year, a broad adivasi organization was formed; the Chotanagpur 
Charitable Association, being the first attempt at unity over ethnic 
cleavages.
The idea that the problems of the adivasis were those of cultural 
revival and "backwardness" gave birth in the 1920's to the inter­
denominational Chotanagpur Improvement Society (Chotanagpur Unnati 
Samaj), whose members were mostly Christian adivasis from the 
emerging educated elite (Anglicans and Lutherans). There emerged in 
the 1930's the demand for a separate adivasi state, which was presented 
to the Simon Commission and the Cripps Mission (Vidyarthi and Sahay 
1976: 87).
A fissiparous trend gradually became manifest. Some members 
of the Samaj separated from it to approach the peasants through the 
Kisan Sabha (Vidyarthi 1967b: 133; Sachchidananda 1976: 13; N. 
Sengupta 1982c: 28). The Catholics formed the Chota Nagpur Catholic 
Sa6ha. These organizations finally merged around 1938 into the Adivasi 
Mahasabha, ancestor of the Jharkhand Party. The Mahasabha remained 
outside the Nationalist Movement and, in fact, ended up supporting the 
British (28).
(28) Several circumstances helped to maintain the Adivasi Mahasabha 
Outside the Nationalist Movement. The Congress Party, with its victory 
in the 1937 elections, was not thought to represent the interests of the
In 1939, the Anglican Munda Jaipal Singh became prominent in 
the Adivasi Mahasabha and was later made its Chairman. Oxford 
educated and pro-British, he backed the British in the war and was 
involved in the recruitment of adivasis for their army (K. S. Singh 1977: 
321). The Westernized adivasi elite, not involved in the Indian 
Nationalist Movement, dismissed more than a century of adivasi anti­
colonial struggles. In the end, the Mahasabha launched a struggle not 
against the British Raj but against the Diku Raj (29).
The Jharkhand Party was founded in 1950 as the political wing 
of the Adivasi Mahasabha with the aim of attracting the people of 
Chotanagpur and Santal Parganas into a wide regional political 
organization. From 1952 to 1957, the party dominanted electoral 
politics in these regions. In the 1962 elections, however, it started to 
decline, a development that led in September 1963 to its controversial 
merger with the Congress Party and eventually to the formation of a 
"new" Jharkhand Party under the leadership of N. E. Horo.
It appears that the change in electoral preferences was due to the 
activity of several all-India parties in the area and also to the increasing 
economic gap between the rising elite and the rest of the adivasis. The 
class interests that guided the party started to come more sharply into the 
light. The party did not have an agrarian program, as is still the case, 
and failed to address the needs of the growing adivasi industrial working 
force. Furthermore, it accepted landlords and moneylenders as 
members, and they came to hold important executive positions. This 
was understood by the electorate as an aligment of the Jharkhand Party 
with diku interests. Moreover, the party failed to win its only explicit 
and widely accepted demand: the creation of a separate state at a time 
when India was being geographically reorganized along linguistic and 
regional lines.
Opinions on Jaipal Singh, the most important leader the 
Jharkhand Party has had, vary from favourable to highly critical. For 
instance, an Anglican Munda priest proudly told me:
You know, he was one of our boys!....
adivasis. The nationalists opposed the partition of Bengal and Bihar 
while the Bengali-Biharis looked for an alliance with the adivasis to 
support the demand for a separate Bihar.
(29) Understood in its restricted sense of the dominance of non-adivasi 
"outsiders".
In interviews with non-Christian adivasis he was portrayed as
A sophisticated man, who smoked cigars, dressed 
well and had money...[He] started to drink a lot and 
to spend on expensive things, habits he had acquired 
in England....
It was insinuated that he had become corrupt and was receiving money. 
It was also remarked:
He was also violent but had to mellow because the 
people did not follow his violent line. He ended up 
divorced from the people....
Furthermore:
He exploited the image of Birsa and his ideas....
According to Sachchidananda, Jaipal Singh acted as if he was 
the reincarnation of Birsa (197.6: 14). He also resorted to invoking the 
old millenarian dream of the New Kingdom, modifying it to suit a 
Christian audience: Jharkhand became the New Kingdom of Christ.
Jaipal Singh’s political skills are acknowledged by all. Still, 
his inability to forge a solid front by bringing together the different 
leaders, the suspicions of corruption against him and the alliances he 
sought all undermined his image as a leader in the eyes of the educated 
adivasis. That is why nowadays some of them openly long for a "mystic 
leader" not susceptible to corruption or cooptation.
People I talked to who were critical of Jaipal Singh, restricted 
their comments to the personality of the leader and the heterogeneous 
nature of the Jharkhand reformist movement. Comments on wider 
political issues and on the difficulties the reformist line has encountered 
were avoided. Consequently, the weakness that characterized the first 
phases of the Jharkhand Party continues to permeate its present 
performance as well as other options put forward by the adivasi elite.
From 1963 onwards recurrent splits fragmented the Jharkhand 
Party. The splintered groups did not have major differences in their 
programs, and mostly emerged out of personal differences among their 
leaders (30). Other organizations emerged in the late 1960's and early
(30) The All-India Jharkhand Party was formed in 1967 in opposition to 
the Jharkhand Party’s merger with the Congress Party, and was in turn 
divided as a result oTalliances with various Indian parties. In 1968 the 
Santal Hul Jharkhand Political Party was formed from which the
1970's like the Birsa Seva Dal, the All-India Sido-Kanhu Baisi and the 
Adivasi Socio-Educational and Cultural Association. The last two were 
mostly concerned with cultural revivalism and took up a verbal defence 
of adivasi land rights (Gautam 1978b: 114-115).
The Birsa Seva Dal, formed in 1967 as an urban pressure 
group with missionary support, focussed on the industrial complexes 
and on the demand for jobs and educational reservations for the 
adivasis. For a while it may have had links with the CPI (ML). Until 
1969, the Birsa Seva Dal was radical and militant. It was directly 
involved in the re-appropriation of urban lands in Jamshedpur which 
ended in police repression in 1968 (Vidyarthi and Sahay 1976). The 
Birsa Seva Dal then ceased to carry out direct actions, retaining only an 
intermitent influence at Jamshedpur. At about the same time, Naxalite 
activity extended to the rural areas of Jharkhand (31). The situation was 
commented to me during an interview with a political activist:
The situation in the villages was already explosive 
when the Naxalites arrived with a revolutionary 
ideology and supported land demands, a crucial issue 
for the adivasis...[However,] the Naxalites failed to 
understand the Jharkhand and the land issues...The 
adivasi elite has lands and exploits their fellows, but 
com pared  to the land lords they are 
insignificant...Naxalites ignored the question of tribal 
identity....
The history of fragmentation of the Jharkhand Party and the 
proliferation of sectorial groups shows that ethnicity has been variously 
used in the political arena. These uses depend on the class situation, 
alliances and interests of the those who appeal to the ethnic factor in their 
ideological discourses. In Jharkhand there never has been a only one 
discourse of ethnicity but several, following socioeconomic cleavages. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, ethnic assertion responded to 
a situation of conquest and was an expression of the adivasi peasantry. 
In the 1940's, the rising indigenous petty-bourgeoisie resorted to ethnic 
politics to place itself in a better position and to gain benefits from an 
established colonial system whose end was mistakenly not perceived as
Progressive Hul Jharkhand Party emerged in 1972 (Sachchidanada 
1976: 19).
(31) The alleged presence of Naxalites still justifies counter-insurgency 
operations in Bihar when rural dissidence arises, and 
landlords'campaigns to terrorize the peasantry (PUCL 1979: 3; 
Mukherjee andKala 1979; Sengupta 1982 c).
being imminent. Apparently, this elite saw itself as Jharkhand's natural 
leadership. It took up the task of directing the rest of their communities 
on the basis of its class position, "superior" Western education and, in 
many cases, its alledged "superior" religious ascription through 
conversion to Christianity. By stressing adivasi "backwardness" and not 
acknowledging existing structural socioeconomic problems, this elite 
fostered a dangerous "inferiority complex" (Fanon 1973: 59-76) (See 
Chapter V).
Meanwhile, Jharkhand's adivasi peasants took to action 
independently of the elite and the political parties, responding to a 
situation which turned critical in the 1960's and was made worse by the 
Bihar drought and subsequent famine of 1966. In this context, forcible 
harvesting by adivasi peasants marked the 1968 season and together 
with violent confrontations .in the rural areas between landlords and 
peasants, continued to occur in the years that followed (see Chapter VI).
Conclusion.
The development of a tradition of protest among Jharkhand's 
adivasi peasantry can be observed since at least the end of the eighteenth 
century. Opposition to colonial power was expressed in various sorts of 
protest that combined agrarian struggle with ethnic - often pan-ethnic - 
defence. This agrarian-based tradition has constituted the background to 
the expressions of protest and movements that followed, like the JMM 
grass-roots movement of the 1970's.
The twentieth century witnessed the emergence in Jharkhand of 
urban-based pressure groups and parties which accompanied the birth of 
an adivasi elite and the beginning of the reformist project. The 
introduction of formal politics crystallized in the Jharkhand Party.
The development of political processes in Jharkhand appear 
linked to one of two "traditions": the agrarian, and the more recent, 
urban. .Although the ethnic element has been and is present in both, 
these "traditions" clearly diverge in their nature and aims which reflect 
their different class contents. It is in the course of the present century 
that ethnic discourses in Jharkhand start to multiply, accompanying 
processes of class differentiation and the evolution of the project for an 
Indian Nation-State.
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i n c r e a s e  t a x e s .  
R e b e l  1 i o n a g a  i n s t  
B r  i t  i s h c o n t r o l .  
M i g r a n t s  e n t e r -  t h e  
a r e a .  Th e  r a j a ,  
i n d e b t  e d , l o s e s  
p o w e r .  D i s t u r b a n c e s  
d u e  t o  i mp o s i t i o n  
o f  t a x e s  a n d ' ' n o n -  
B h u m i. j  o f f i c e r s .
1 7 9 3 P e  r mar i en t
Se  1 1 1 e rnen t . S a l e  o f  
l a n d s  t o ' p a y  t a x e s .
1 7 9 5 R a j a  i n d e b t e d .  Th e  
s t a t e  p u t  u p f o r
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1 7 9 7 - 9 6
1 7 9 3
1 7 9 9
sii ' J 18 t h  c .
p u b l i c  a u c t i o n .
Di  s  t  u r b a n c e s .
CuItivation 
a b a n d o n e d .  S a l e  o f  
1ands. Refusal to 
pay revenue. War 
to the "foreigners"
B e n g a l i s  who h a d  
b o u g h t  l a n d  arid 
t h e i r  e m p l o y e e s ,  
k i 1 l e d ,
D i s s a t i s f i e d  
ghatw&Is p l a n  t o  
r e b e l .
L a n d s  r e s  b o r e d  
t o  ttie r a j a .
Diku m e r c h a n t s  
a 11d a U v e n l u r e i s  
e n t e r  t h e  a r e a .
( * )  On t h e  b a s i s  o f  d a t a  p r o v i d e d  i n  J . C .  J h a  C19G3J .
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1854
1855
TABLE 3
Tar gets o f San 1. a 1 ai tacks ^  1856 ._
M a 11 c v I © vi cl e j s ’ pi  o p © r t  i © s .
! -I vi i. i s i 1 o i j I eel t I sf ee Bh a t. a I ' s  < /,•? a h <r< J a r i ,
L i t J p a j a  )
T i 1 a  !•; P- h a  I a  k ’ s t in a ha Ja  n ,
Li  I i j»a j ■ a  
<J i. '■ u 10: i I Viu ’ s  ( o i 1 in a n  ,
By g s .1 s a ) .
S © v g i ■ a I h o u s e s  J n 
Dm i a p u r  .
H o u s e s  o f  t h e  r i c h  i n  
K u s in a  .
B e n g a l  i mo n e y  l e n d e r s .
F i v e  m o n e y l e n d e r s  k i l l e d  a t  Pa  n u 11 k u t  i a  
b a z s a i  .
?  J u l y ;  e x e c u t i o n  o f  t h e  d a r o g a  M a h e s h  
La  1 L’b t  t a , k i l l i n g  o f  9 t o  19 o f h i s 
men,  o n e  m a h a j a n ,  t wo  b a r k a n t i a z e s  a n d  
s e v e i a l  v i l l a g e  g u a i d i  a n s .
K i 1 1 i n g o f P r a t a b n a r a i n ,  na i  b a u z a  iva ; 
o f  t h a n a  K u r h e r r e a  (Goclda.  S u b d i v i s i o n ) ,  
a f t e r  tie a t t e m p t e d  t o  a r r e s t  p e o p l e .
S i e g e  of  G o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c e r s  a n d  
r a i l w a y  p e r s o n n e l  a t  V i g o r ’ s h o u s e .
L o o t i n g  o f  B a r  ha  i t  b a z a a r  w h e r e  r i c h  
maha j a n s  o p e r a t e d .
8 - 12 :  J u l y :  S i e g e  t o  P a k u r , Vi  I Lag© 
l o o t e d ;  a t t e m p t  t o  l o o t  t h e  h o u s e  o f  t h e  
l o c a l  z a m i n d a r }  k i l l i n g  o f  t h e  b r a h m i n .  
R a d h a u a t h  P a n d e  a n d  o f  L a k s h m a n  Ma r i d a l .
13 J u l y :  e n c o u n t e r  w i t h  a  g r o u p  o f  
p e o p l e  f r o m t h e  r a i l w a y s .
16 J u l y :  e n c o u n t e r  n e a r  P i r p a i n t i .  S g t .
B r a d d o n  ( f r o m  t h e  r a i l w a y s ’ p e r s o n n e l >, 
s o me  n a t i v e  o f f i c e r s  a n d  2 5  s e p o y s  
k i l l e d  i n  a  o t i o n .
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18 J u l y :  B a r k o p e ,  Dhur n i a  a n d  B h u r e a  
v i l l a g e s  l o o t e d .
S e v e r a l  E u r o p e a n s  k i l l e d .
B e n g a  I i s t h r e a t e n e d .
L a k s h a n p u r  v i l l a g e  l o o t e d ,
N a h a j a n z  I s r e e  a n d  T i l a k  B h a k a t ’ s h o u s e s  
l o o t e d .  C a r e t a k e r  o f  t h e i r  p r o p e r t y ,  
k i 1 l e d .
M e r c h a n t s  k i l l e d  a t  J i t p u r  v i l l a g e .  
H i r a n p u r  b a z a a r  l o o t e d .
H o u s e  o f  a. r i c h  Mu s l i m  p e a s a n t ,  E a h m a d i  
M a. n cl a 1 , I n o t e d  a  n d b u r  n t .
D i n d a y a l  R a y ,  m o n e y l e n d e r  o f  P a k u r ,  
kill eel.
K i l l i n g s  i n  B a l l a b h p u r .
Loot ,  j ng  i n Ka 1 i k a p u r  , B a l l  a b h p u r  ,
B a 1i h a r p u r ,  S a h a b a z p u r  a n d  M a b i n a g a r  
v i 1 l e g e s .
A t t a c k  t o  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  i n d i g o  t r a d e  o f  
1-L M a s e y k  i n  Ka . d a ms a . i r .
H a h e s h p u r  r a j a ’ s  h o u s e  l o o t e d .
K i l l i n g  o f  t wo  E n g l i s h  wome n ,  Th o ma s  a n d  
F e  1 1 .
T h r e e  E u r o p e a n s  k i l l e d :  H e n s h a  we a n d  h i s
two s o n s .
C e n t r e  o f  i n d i g o  t r a d e  i n  E a l b a d d a  
b u r n t .
M i t h i j a n p u r  a n d  N a r a i n p u r , l o o t e d . . .
D e s t r u c t i o n  o f  G u r p u r  t o w n  a n d  v i l l a g e s  
i n  B i r b h u m .
L o o t i n g  i n  N a g o r e .
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S e p t e m b e r :  t h i r t y  v i J  l e g e s  i n  
□ p e r b a n d h a h  a n d  L a n g u 1 i a ,  l o o t e d  a n d  
bur Vi I *
O c t o b e r : p i  1 l a g e  o f  B h a g a l p u r .  K i 1 1 i n g
o f t h r e e  B e n g a l i s .
1 8 5 6  18 J a n u a r y :  d i s t u r b a n c e s  n e a r  J a i p u r  a n d
a t  t h e  b o r d e r  w i t h  M c m g h y r .
2 3  J a n u a r y :  c a p t u r e  a n d  l o o t i n g  of
G r e g o r  G r a n t ' s  f a c t o r y  i n  S a n g r a m p u r .
21 - 2 . 2  F e b r u a r y :  s e v e r a l  m o n e y l e n d e r s
r o b b e d  n e a r  S e r a m p u r .
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MAP 7: GANGA NARAIN’S MOVEMENT OF 1832-1833
Area covered
by the movement of 1832-1833
Source for the data on population: S.C. Sinha, “Some Aspects of 
Change in Bhumij Religion in South Manbhum, Bihar", Man in In­
dia, vol. 33, no. 2, 1953.
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MAP 9: THE SANTAL MOVEMENT OF 1855
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CHAPTER V 
THE REFORMISTS: A CAPTIVE 
PROJECT?
We are all equal...
An adivasi intellectual.
I.- Introduction:
The modes in which the reformists formulate their ethnic 
discourse and integrate it into their Jharkhand project are considered in 
the present chapter. The discussion will focus on the reformists' 
definition of collective (ethnic) identity, their efforts at cultural 
revivalism, the forging of a legitimizing tradition to support their project, 
and their endorsement of a certain pattern of economic development.
Chotanagpur, the craddle of the reformist movement, is the 
region of Jharkhand where the influence of Western education and 
mission Christianity has been sustained and strong. These two factors 
have been instrumental in the development of an urban and rural adivasi 
petty-bourgeoisie. Some of its members, mostly through the prestige 
obtained through education and, in some cases, conversion, came to 
form an elite attempting to perform the role of "educators" (in 
Gramsciam terms) for the rest of their communities of ethnic ascription. 
In this elite, Mundas and Oraons - the ethnic macrogroups in the region 
who consider themselves on top of an ethnic ("tribal") hierarchy - are 
substantially represented and perform a leading role.
The adivasi petty-bourgeoisie has reformulated the basic 
ideology that shaped the political line initiated in the thirties (see Chapter 
IV). The proposals of the present Jharkhand Party are inscribed in this 
political tradition. Although different sectors of the indigenous petty- 
bourgeoisie may differ on formal points in their formulation of a 
Jharkhand project, the commonalities in their perceptions of social 
reality, in the resulting political proposals, and the common class 
situation of those involved, justify, at a collective level, the qualifying of 
their position as reformist.
The data shows that the trajectory followed by the reformists is 
one of political compromise and accommodation sought through the 
introduction of reforms within the existing socioeconomic and political 
framework. This path avoids any substantial questioning of the present 
system or any direct confrontation with the State and the ruling classes. 
The reformists see as their task "to make the Government aware of the 
[adivasis1] problems.,.so it can solve them". At the same time they 
complain about "too much spoon feeding". In addition, the State is 
perceived in terms of dominance:
The Government denies us our rights: to have a 
Jharkhand state that we could organize....
. (Interviews with Christian and non-Christian 
adivasis).
That is to say, a right to a territory and to self-determination. 
The question of leadership ("organization"), however, remains to be 
clarified. The reformist petty-bourgeoisie believes this to be its role, it is 
already acting as spokesman for "all the tribals" and has a leading role in 
social welfare and cultural groups, associations and projects.
By contrast, the question of the adivasis' rights is understood at 
the peasant level as a denial over territory and land as a means of 
production. As expressed by a Munda peasant:
Sand, stone, soil, land, trees, the Government takes 
it all...We do not have any rights...
What is the reformists' solution to this situation? A Jharkhand 
Party spokesman argued that:
Nothing is possible without power. That is why we 
want a provincial state within the Constitutional 
framework...
This old demand of vague contents seems to be a magical 
formula. The unanswered question, whose importance the reformists do 
not seem to consider, is precisely what will be the nature of this state? 
One of the Jharkhand Party leaders told me matter-of-facdy: "We have to 
define this state". This definition has been pending for some thirty 
years. Substance can be given, however, to the reformists' proposal of 
a Jharkhand state-by disclosing the everpresent element in their political 
discourse: the separate state phrased on ethnic grounds only, the
culmination of a conflict between "tribals and non-tribals", disregarding 
basic socioeconomic issues. This position has been gaining strength 
since the eighties, once the adivasi grass-roots movements were 
contained (1).
As we will shortly see, the reformists repeat the old ideological 
discourse synthetized in the exclusive demand for a separate state, 
making extrapolations of past socioeconomic structures into the present, 
and interpreting the present through a "nostalgia of the past". They 
define themselves often through the eyes of others (the tribal construct), 
always within the limits permitted by the hegemonic sectors. Ultimately 
and most probably unwillingly, their position confirms the State 
ideology and helps to reproduce the adivasis* dependency.
2,- Conceptualization of collective identity. Jharkhand as an 
imagined community.
a.-Jharkhand as an imagined community.
The data shows that the reformists' conception of a Jharkhand 
community takes as its starting point an ideological colonial legacy 
perpetuated by the indigenous intelligentsia: the tribal construct. 
Government and academic advocates of the "tribe" in India have thus 
found an unwilling ally in the adivasi elite. This elite repeats the official 
"tribal" discourse, finally legitimating the tribal construct as a social 
reality. The words "tribe" and "tribal" and, more importantly, 
references to attributes associated with the "tribals" - "backwardness", 
"weakness" and "ignorance" - were frequently used by members of this 
social sector during interviews. This perception is reinforced by a 
feeling of helplessness and dependency verbalized in constant appeals 
such as:
If only the Government knew about us, it could help 
us...The Government would [then] solve our 
problems...
(An adivasi intellectual).
(1) Of late (1987), reports on recent adivasi political activity seems to 
indicate a strengthening of the reformist line, with a strong emphasis on 
cultural revivalism, as expressed in the position of adivasi students from 
Ranchi University. Reformism appears to have permeated as well the 
younger elements of the JMM (to be discussed in the following chapter) 
organized into the All-Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU), acting 
independently from the JMM since 1986 (The Week 1987; 34-40).
There is, however, an awareness that Government paternalism 
alone will not really solve all of the adivasis' problems, since
If we, the tribals. do not stand with all our strength, 
politically and socially, we will not be able to save 
ourselves...
(Jharkhand Party spokesman. Emphasis added).
The roots of the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie’s ambiguous 
perception of its "tribal" identity are easy to detect. The actual culture 
this social sector and, particularly, its Christian elements, lives is a 
mixture of some old remains and newer alien elements, cut from its 
indigenous social roots.
The reformists phrasing of their identity according to the 
"tribal" model helps to reproduce the ideology of "tribalism", a 
mechanism through which the indigenous elites seek a share in power 
over their own societies by using a pool of common traditions and 
cultural codes (see Mafeje 1971). The adivasi elite is precisely the most 
vocal adivasi sector in proclaiming its "tribal" identity. The "tribalist" 
ideology permitted the adivasi elite to enter the political arena and 
dominate certain fields like that of education, particularly through the 
channels provided by the missions, also keen on promoting the tribal 
construct (2).
The adivasi elite's self-definition as "tribal" helps push 
underground the class affiliations, privileges and ambitions of its 
members, and contributes to present social conflict in Jharkhand only in 
terms of ethnic confrontations. Thus the assertion:
We are all equal...We are all tribals...
(An adivasi intellectual. Emphasis added).
The members of the adivasi elite know they belong to 
subordinated ethnic groups and claim solidarity with the lower ranges
(2) The Christian Churches' attachment to the tribal construct is related 
to the conception of missionary activity as being at the same time a 
"civilizing" mission. This conception translates in the concentration of 
mission activities in education and in the diffusion of (Western) values 
and forms of behaviour. A "civilizing" effort has to have an "object" that 
has not supposedly attained what is considered a "civilized status". The 
tribal construct readily provides such an "object".
of their own societies on ethnic grounds. This is, however, a temporary 
solidarity - a contingent brotherhood - conditioned by their perception's 
narrow "ethnic" angle. This solidarity is used to confront the Indian 
dominant sectors which are also not perceived in class but in ethnic or 
regional terms. The contingent brotherhood either breaks down when 
the class interests of the elite take precedence or when a class 
consciousness develops among the subaltern sectors of the dominated 
ethnic groups. This is precisely what happened when the grass-roots 
movement (see Chapter VI) gained strength. The words of the 
Jharkhand Party leader are illustrative:
The Mukti Morcha people continued with the [forest] 
protest and stopped our discussions with the 
G overnm ent. We suffered due to these 
"friends"...We will have problems with the CPI 
"friends"...[Due to them] our movement is 
discredited and suspected by tribals and non-tribals...
On the other hand, the fragility of the reformists' Jharkhand 
brotherhood was clearly understood by JMM activists:
The Jharkhand state is conceived as a broad alliance 
of all the classes in the region. In Lalkhand 
[Jharkhand's socialist version] this alliance will be 
impossible...
(Interview with a political activist).
I will argue that the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie present two non­
integrated levels of social consciousness. First, they are aware that they 
belong to subordinated ethnic groups and present a muted resistance to 
subordination. Second, as a transitional class without a defined class 
consciousness, they act as a dominant sector vis a vis the lower sectors 
of their own ethnic groups. These non-integrated levels of social 
consciousness produce serious conflicts of identity and an unclear 
formulation of a social project. Not acknowledging the class character of 
exploitation and its links with ethnic differentiation, the adivasi petty- 
bourgeoisie finally accommodates itself to the expectations of the ruling 
classes, Thereby its constant insistence on "a dialogue with the 
Government" and on not openly contesting the State ("It is no use 
fighting all the time"; "Let us convince the Government"; "They 
[administrators; academics] can show us how to be developed").
A song composed in the seventies by an urban adivasi 
- intellectual in the hope that "one day it may become Jharkhand's
anthem" (interview with the author), illustrates the extension of the 
reformists' imagined Jharkhand community. Unity and consensus are 
the dominant themes. At present, ten years later, the author of this song 
is emerging as a strong reformist leader. Some of the song's lines read:
They speak the same language... 
in a united Jharkhand...
Hindus and Muslims
Adi dharmi (3) and Christians,
Sikhs, Jains and those of other faiths, 
they all can live here 
in a united Jharkhand...
Mundas, Oraons, Santals, 
let them go forward together.
Kharias, Hos, Paharias, 
together with the Sadans 
in a united Jharkhand...
All are pained in one pain.
All are happy in one happiness.
For us only one destiny is written 
by the Ordainer 
in a united Jharkhand...
(From the author's manuscript in 
Nagpuri, following his oral
translation).
Nobody is excluded from the Jharkhand community on the 
basis of language, religion or ethnic ascription. The scope of the 
Jharkhand community described in the song seems to respond to the 
political need to surpass a narrow "tribal" conception of the proposed 
state by including the Sadans. The Sadans are the old d iku s , 
Jharkhandis that have not been catalogued as Scheduled Tribes who 
immigrated into the region in early times. As a young adivasi intellectual 
explained to me:
The old-established friendly diku can stay...
Adding, in what seems a practical compromise:
We must have the dikus [in Jharkhand] since they 
have money and could corrupt the leaders,,.
(3) Adi dharmi: "those whose dharma is the original one", the adivasis 
who follow their own religion.
The slightly broader scope of the proposed community also 
appears to respond to a situation in which other political movements had 
come to dispute the reformists' monopoly over the Jharkhand project. 
The song dates from the mid-seventies, precisely when the JMM 
movement based on the peasant-worker alliance was gaining strength. 
We note, however, that social differences that may shatter the ideal 
Jharkhandi unity are not mentioned in the song-anthem. Therefore, the 
sharp contrast between the reformists' and the grass-roots' conception 
of Jharkhand stands unchanged.
The reformists' statements in interviews regarding the scope of 
the Jharkhand state are often contradictory. In one breath, a spokesman 
of the Jharkhand Party told me:
The idea of a separate state must be implemented for 
the Jharkhandis. tribals and non-tribals. This 
population forms a nationality...Qur opponents - the 
landlords, the contractors - say accusing us: "This 
demand is a tribal demand. With a separate state all 
the outsiders will be thrown out". This is not 
true...On the question of a separate state all the tribes 
are united. The tribals want to be a polity...
Jharkhand's imagined community stretches and contracts, 
within limits, in the reformists' minds: it shifts from "the tribals" to "all 
Jharkhandis". What moulds their conception of a Jharkhand 
community? The major formative element appears to be the tribal 
construct. The adivasi petty-bourgeoisie has accepted this construct 
together with the racist derogatory stereotypes and the attributes of 
weakness and backwardness it implies, as a basis to formulate its 
identity. The results are serious contradictions in this social sector's self­
perception.
b.-The reformists' self-perception.
"Mundas sing to remember themselves who they are", 
explained to me one adivasi intellectual. "Social" tunes, however, differ 
according to the voices that utter them and those who listen to them. By 
no stretch of the imagination are those who sing in the fields while 
working "remembering themselves" in the same way as the family of an 
adivasi engineer I met that sung gospel songs, in English, to the 
accompaniment of a tape-recorded guitar, under the shade of a plastic 
Christmas tree. This last instance illustrates the degree of deculturation
of the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie. Even a superficial situational 
. comparison provides a picture of the enormous class and cultural gaps 
existing in the reformists' imagined Jharkhand brotherhood: the human 
voice in chorus versus a tape-recorder; music for work versus music for 
leisure; the fields versus the living-room; nature versus consumer's 
market tree.
At the level of self-definition, this example shows the different 
ways identity is expressed by different social sectors. Those singing 
"work songs" provide a succinct self-explanatory statement about who 
they are. The engineer's family felt instead the need to verbalize its 
identity, as if they had to justify their behaviour. Unasked, the engineer 
explained to me:
I am a Munda. My wife is not originally Munda but 
Oraon. She is an old Christian. We [himself and their 
children] became Christians two years ago. We want 
to celebrate Christmas as it should be [shows the 
plastic tree]. My children get a good education and 
can dress properly [two teen-age boys dressed in 
crisp shirts and trousers and wearing ties]....
The boys set up the tape-recorder and we listened to gospel
songs.
-The singers are a Swede and an Italian, they 
explained.
[The singing was, nevertheless, in English.]
Do you know other songs, maybe in Mundari? I 
asked.
-Oh, no. We know English, These are pretty songs.
[The father intervenes]
-We are bom knowing how to dance. Music is in our blood. 
My wife knows [the dances],..she could teach you.
Does she dance? Where? I asked.
-Oh, no! not in public. But we know the things of the past. 
We keep them, [addressing the boys] Show her!
[The boys take an assorted lot of broken ornaments and the 
remains of an arrow wrapped in a bundle out of a trunk. The 
wife enters the living-room and serves tea in a china set].
Although this example comes from a Christian family, the 
situation it describes refers generally to the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie's 
self-perception and attitutes. These attitudes have to do more with the
ambiguous class situation of the petty-bourgeoisie and its identity than 
with religious ascription.
The weight of the tribal construct on the reformists' formulation 
of Jharkhand also bears on their self-perception. Consequently, they 
catalogue their own societies according to the superiority-inferiority 
paradigm the Indian hegemonic sectors employ in their classifications. 
This was evident at a meeting of members of the adivasi petty- 
bourgeoisie in Ranchi (all of them Mundas), discussing the formation of 
a cultural society (4). The initial defensive attitude of those present 
towards me broke when it was finally acknowledged that I (a yet 
uncatalogued being) belonged to "this Ote Disum" [this world]. I was 
somehow "catalogued" in a satisfactory manner.
The following dialogue ensued:
School teacher : -We are all tribals. [However] the 
primitive tribes [the Bir Hors and the Asurs] are more 
backward than the tribes themselves.
Young man: Where you come from,are there tribes 
like us? Are there primitive tribes?
[I tried to explain that our "cataloguing system" is 
somewhat different, that there is not such a thing as 
"primitive". Disconcerted looks].
Another person: Do they speak many languages?
How do they preserve them?
P.O. clerk: What do they work in?
Do they use the bow and arrow?
What do they hunt?
[I explained that Mexico's indigenous people are 
mostly peasants, and refrained from saying that, if 
they possess weapons, they would probably be some 
old "30-30s" and firearms, not necessarily used for 
hunting].
The issues raised at this gathering, similarly expressed on other 
occassions, show that the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie tends to see the 
"tribal community" in terms of the official evolutionary continuum. In 
this continuum, the Munda elite consider their group more advanced and
(4) There were a dozen people present, including professionals, a retired 
school teacher, a Postal Office clerk, a petty-zamindar, the landed pahan 
(religious leader) from near-by Hatia, a retired army-man, and a retired 
Christian priest. The age of the participants varied from 22 to 70 years 
old. The discussion was conducted in Mundari, sometimes shifting to 
English.
other ethnic groups "backward" and "more backward". The questions 
on the characteristics of other indigenous groups referred only to ethnic 
markers (language; material culture) and to stereotyped images of the 
unchanging "tribal" (the bow-and-arrow hunter). There were no 
questions on the situation of the indigenous peasantry they were asking 
me about. On the other hand, the audience was rather surprised at the 
absence of "primitives" (of a cataloguing continuum) in my part of the 
world.
To speak of a complete internalization of an imposed derogatory 
image among the deculturated members of the petty-bourgeisie when 
they conceptualize their collective identity is erroneous. They are aware 
that ruling-class control is exerted over the adivasis as ethnic groups 
through cultural hegemony. This is reflected in the constant 
preoccupation with the preservation of their languages, the need to 
prepare school text-books and to find the best teaching methods (issues 
discussed at the above-mentioned meeting). However, these activities 
end up being conditioned to the Government willingness to fund them 
(idem).
Images of power and subordination are constantly evoked, 
principally through the stereotype of the "inferior" and "dependent" 
adivasi, showing the pervasiveness of cultural hegemony over the 
adivasis as ethnic groups. However, stereotypes are never blindly 
accepted by those on which they are imposed. In fact, there seems to be 
a "make believe" game going on. The rejection of the derogatory image 
by the adivasi elite is never explicit. On the contrary, what is explicit is 
their assertion that adivasis are indeed "backward" (thus inferior, 
primitive, ignorant). There is, nevertheless, a muted protest, mostly 
individually expressed, accompanied by a feeling of impotence that is 
translated in perceiving the efforts to eliminate the stereotypes as a waste 
of time (refer to Chapter IX).
C-- "Tribes". India and the West in the eves of the 
adivasi elite.
The term "cultural colonialism" has been applied to the 
acceptance of exogenous cultural elements and values in situations of 
subordination, a mechanism through which the "centre expands its 
. ■ hegemony over the "periphery". In Jharkhand, especially in the urban
areas, the members of the adivasi elite function as bearers of exogenous 
cultural values, and aid in the spread of a ’’colonized culture". Their 
influence, however, is relative since their audience is restricted by class 
barriers. They appeal to the same class sector to which they themselves 
belong, attempting in the process to extend their influence to the rural 
areas through development and educational programs.
On the one hand, the members of the adivasi elite feel proud of 
their Western education and values; on the other, they earnestly pursue 
cultural revivalism. This contradiction is reflected in the case of a young 
non-Christian reformist leader, urban-based, educated and with long 
periods of residence abroad, who remarked:
The educational system takes you gradually out of the 
village. Suddenly, you are out of it...To belong to the 
village one must be in it...How can we preserve our 
culture otherwise?...
Jaipal Singh was another example of this contradiction.
The younger elements of the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie are 
educated within the assumptions of both the tribal construct and Western 
values. Somehow, these two so diverse paradigms - Western and 
"tribal" - do not clash, possibly because they are compartmentalized. 
Their self-definition, however, seems to continue locked within the 
tribal paradigm. How does this paradigm relate to the Hindu and the 
Western paradigms? A leading non-Christian adivasi intellectual defined 
"the tribals" in this way:
The tribals feel they belong to India. We consider 
ourselves equal to the Hindus. We don't have any 
caste. We are all equal...Tribal society is becoming 
similar to the highest stratum of Hindu society in 
education, marriage patterns, even in dress. The 
tribes are more universal because of their free and 
fearless outlook; they are closer to the W es t. 
W e s te rn iz a t io n  tends to level up people. 
C h ristian iza tion  has led to a loss of identity. 
Christianism regiments society all over the world. By 
converting to it, the adivasis come to resemble the 
Hindus; their emotions are not expressed in normal 
life....
(Emphasis added).
Endogenous values: equality, freedom, strength, are praised in 
this and other similar statements. A Christian adivasi leader highlighted
five major qualities of "tribal life": "equality, dignity of labour, common 
ownership of the means of production, dancing and singing to make life 
livable, and efforts towards community welfare". These traits are 
included in the Rousseauian stereotype held by some defenders of "the 
tribes". In the words of a European priest established in Chotanagpur, 
"tribal society" is "egalitarian, based on consensus, [formed by] good, 
simple and honest people". However, he felt the need to add, "they are 
not children, they are free men".
Coming back to the first statement, emphasis is put on the equal 
standing of the adivasis and the higher Hindu castes, despite the caste 
system being rejected. Even more, "the tribes" are described as 
universal, all-embracing..."like the West". We encounter here still 
another construct, a product of a colonized perception of the world: the 
universal W est, source of equality. Christianity is not seen as part of the 
Western heritage but as an autonomous powerful ordering system, as 
restrictive as the caste system. The counterpart of the West is India, the 
actual starting point for comparisons. India is straightforwardly equated 
with the caste system, Hinduism and inequality. Therefore, the point of 
reference is Hindu India. Had this interview taken place today, it would 
have shown an awareness of the rising Hindu fundamentalism evident in 
India in the eighties (Devalle 1985b).
Contrary to what the "emulation" and "Hinduization" theorists 
maintain, the adivasi intellectuals perceive Hinduism and Hinduization 
as the greatest threat their societies face. Hinduism has been present 
amongst them for a long time (see Chapter II), possibly making the 
adivasis more sensitive to the present Hindu attempted all-India 
hegemonism.
There was genuine alarm in the words of a Jharkhand Party 
leader when he said:
The majority of the tribes are very Hinduized. The 
Bhumijs are totally Hinduized and have associated 
themselves with the Hindus. Those in the Government 
belong to Hindu society, so the Bhumijs want to be 
related to the ruling classes. I have said to them: "You 
have become Hindu! You have lost your identity!". I 
tell those tribals who are not Christians: "You are now 
free, but if you become Hinduized you lose your 
status and vou become slaves in a society that has 
already made millions of slaves"....
(Emphasis added).
The rejection of caste, a very volatile political issue in caste- 
ridden Bihar, is one of the clearest statements in the adivasi elite's 
definition of its identity. Rev. N. Mintz (Oraon), has probably been the 
most virulent adivasi denouncer of casteism in the Chotanagpur region:
The "Cowdung culture area" of the north has 
systematically penetrated into the fertile central tribal 
belt with all its antisocial and antihuman activities.
The tribals were exploited socially and economically 
in the past. But the present exploitation is of the mind 
and the heart of the tribal communities in the central 
tribal belt. The expansion of schools and colleges, 
even universities, as bearers of corrupt ideas and 
attitudes are a means of intellectual exploitation by the 
people of the "Cowdung culture area" of the tribes of 
this region...
(Mintz 1979; public statements and interviews).
We observe here an understanding of Hindu cultural 
hegemony. However, by concentrating on the caste issue as solely a 
cultural problem, the attention is diverted from the existing class 
relations expressed in caste terms, since these are considered a 
phenomenon of the past. Yet, at a meeting dominated by "tribal 
administrators" (some of them adivasis), it was enough for Mintz to 
raise the issue of caste and of the exploitation of the adivasis, for him to 
be vehemently accused by several of those present of...denouncing 
casteism in Bihar! He was asked "to leave politics aside", and the 
audience was exhorted:
Let us forget the moneylenders, exploitation, 
missionaries, politicians, and let us do something 
together. This Ranchi will show the path...
The participants in the meeting found .comfort in nationalistic 
outbursts that piously camouflaged the realities of inter-ethnic and class 
conflicts (direct observation).
d.- Christianity: a "replacement community".
Another construct of community enters the picture among the 
converted members of the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie: that of 
Christendom. It does not form part of the Christian reformists' political 
discourse. For the formulation of their identity, on the other hand, it
tends to remain a supportive base, as a "replacement community". To be 
Christian is to acquire a parallel identity by adhering to what is 
considered a prestigious community. Usually, this prestige and a certain 
social mobility come via education at the missions, processes that, as 
discussed in Chapter n.4, began in the middle of the nineteenth century 
(5).
Why is Christendom considered a "replacement community"? 
It offers a solution to the uncertain identity of the members of the adivasi 
petty-bourgeoisie. On the one hand, their members distance themselves 
from the ethnic style of their rural communities of origin by their class 
situation. On the other hand, they do not fully belong to the Indian 
"middle classes" with which they wish to identify since they are still 
catalogued in ethnic/racial terms and perceived as "different", no matter 
how deculturated they may be.
Christianity has provided the converts with a corporate feeling. 
They believe they belong to a powerful world organization that will lead 
them to "progress" and thus, out of the derogatory stereotype. The 
effects of imagining themselves part of this super-community can be 
observed in the economic sphere, to be discussed in section IV of this 
chapter.
Conversion to Christianity has introduced a divisive element 
among the adivasis. The dissimilarities among the converts of different 
denominations are constantly stressed. For instance:
The Catholic Church is a world organization, a 
feudal system in which the people do what the pastor 
says...Protestants are free; they discuss; they have a 
taste of democracy; they depend on themselves...
(A Lutheran Munda).
Accusations came back from an Kharia Catholic priest:
(5) Conversions started among the lower and landed (khuntkattidar) 
sectors of adivasi society. The spread of Western education through 
mission schools and capitalist penetration in the countryside resulted in 
the development of a rural indigenous petty-bourgeoisie, some of whose 
elements moved to the urban centers to become part of the social sector 
ambiguously called "middle classes" in India (teachers, clerks, 
technicians, public servants). Conversions also led to the creation of an 
indigenous clergy.
The Catholic Church is better organized. It is not so 
divided because it is hierarchical. The Lutherans are 
too democratic...
Ethnic boundaries seem to have been reinforced inside the 
converts' community. The Lutherans, for instance, have two religious 
heads, one Munda and the other Oraon, each addressing his own ethnic 
community.
From the elite's Christian members' point of view, what 
results has conversion brought to the adivasis?
Christianism has maintained the tribes' identity. It 
solved the tribal problem in India by giving them a 
place of honour in the country, in society. This 
should be contrasted with what Hinduization has done 
to the tribals....
(Christian adivasi political leader. Emphasis 
added).
All the elements pointed out earlier are present in this statement. 
The elite's Christian adivasis seem to have solved their "tribal problem". 
Their Christianity has a dual aim. First, to stop Hinduization since deep 
down it is identified with diku dominance. Second, to acquire a 
powerful ally:
It is said that the tribes that go to Christianity are not 
tribes any more, that they are part of Hindu society.
We say, no! After Independence there has been a 
belief all over India that the tribals are being 
Christianized for political reasons, that if they convert 
in great numbers they will be a political threat in the 
future since the other Christian countries of the world 
may intervene fto back theml...The Hindu dominator 
wanted to convert all tribals to Hinduism. They 
started schools in Bihar to educate adivasis who 
would then have a good position as part of Hindu 
society and act against the Christian sector....
(Ibid.. Emphasis added).
In this vein, a European missionary flatly stated during an 
interview:
Christians in Ranchi District are a political force and 
the Government cannot afford to antagonize them...
With reference to the Jharkhand question, the Lutherans are 
usually associated with politics, while the Catholics are perceived as 
"not interested in Jharkliand" (opinions of non-adivasi informants). This
seems to be the case in formal politics. In the words of a Lutheran 
political leader:
Among politicians, the majority are Protestants. They 
are prepared to take risks...
The direct association of Jharkhand politics with the Lutherans 
partly derives from the fact that the President of the Jharkhand Party 
lives in the Gossner Evangelical Lutheran Mission (G.E.L.) compound 
in Ranchi, and that he was the G.E.L’s Secretary from 1953 to 1966. 
He mentioned at an interview that he had been accused of "plotting with 
the missionaries" and asserted: "Let them prove it!". Following that, he 
offered his opinion about the role that all the Churches (Catholic, 
Lutheran and Anglican) should perform:
The Churches have money, influence, people, and 
should be preaching the Gospel, training people and 
opening technical projects in the rural and not in the 
urban areas as they try to do now...
Christendom as conceived by the converted members of the 
adivasi petty-bourgeoisie, represents another instance of an imagined 
community in B. Anderson's (1983) terms (6). As in the Jharkhandi 
brotherhood of the reformists' political formulation, inequalities among 
its members are not acknowledged, while the differences with those 
outside the fold are. Thus,
The unconverted toiling masses suffer in bondage 
because of their ignorance....
(Adivasi Catholic priest referring to
bonded labour in Palamau).
. In this context, ignorance is seen as the cause of exploitation 
and contrasted to education at the mission schools.
The community of the Christians do not acknowledge the roots 
of social inequality. However, as we will see in section 4, the converted 
adivasis, acting as a body, have in fact helped to enhance class
(6) The parallel conceptions of "tribal" and Christian communities are 
used also by the missionaries to explain the meaning of conversion. For 
instance:
Adivasi Catholics do not want to be second-rate; they know the teaching 
of the church, which completes their ancestral conception of universal 
brotherhood; they know that her very name implies a need to go to all 
the nations...(van Exem 1975: 70).
differences through the selective implementation of development 
projects.
3.- Cultural revivalism and invented traditions.
a.- The conception of culture
The reformists devote a great deal of their efforts to the 
promotion of cultural revivalism. What does this revivalism imply? To 
be revived, a culture has to be dead or dying. A culture dies only when 
those who live it die, is destroyed by external forces (ethnocide), or 
when the culture's links with the material conditions of existence are 
severed. The last seems to be the case of the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie 
whose constituents have experienced changes in their class character and 
passed through a consistent process of deculturation.
Cultural revivalism takes as its point of reference a culture that 
has been fixed at an idealist plane. This is the field from which the 
reformists take the material for the invented traditions that help them to 
forge their identity, legitimize their leading role and back their struggle 
for political power. Cultural revivalism is an effort at social engineering 
when searching for legitimation.
The adivasi elite's efforts in this respect are immense given that 
they partly live within borrowed cultural frames stemming from Western 
education and, in many cases, from mission Christianity models (7), 
They are, however, sincerely concerned with preserving the culture of 
their communities. This culture is nevertheless conceived as an idealized 
("traditional") one.
The transitional class nature of the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie 
may be made accountable for this sector's extreme susceptibility to the 
influence of dominant ideologies. Education, the means to acquire 
prestige, respect and authority, has become the channel for the 
socialization of the members of this social sector into (dominant) 
extraneous values. The culture they live has been moulded by these 
values.
(7) One must note that in the case of some of the reformist leaders of 
recent times Western education means university training in England or 
the United States, often updated with visits to these countries.
The following statement, given in the course of an interview, 
illustrates the adivasi elite's conception of culture and resulting cultural 
distortion:
I organized a cultural society for the Mundas with 
young artists...Through this organization I wanted to 
say that all this culture can and should be preserved, 
also in an urban setting. In this new setting we try to 
present it to a new audience. In the akhra one dances 
to eniov. not to perform. Therefore, for the dances [in 
a performance] I thought of a uniform [trousers for 
the boys and saris with blouses for the girls] so they 
will not be ashamed. Otherwise, they would be 
naked...
(Interview with Jharkhand Party leader. Emphasis 
added).
For the creators of these dances, adivasi peasants, dance is 
never a performance but a collective activity in which men and women, 
young and old, participate, only acknowledging the authority of the 
pahan and the elders. This point was firmly stressed by adivasis in the 
countryside:
We dance for ourselves. Nobody can ask us to dance 
for them and then sit and watch us...
The dancers are not naked. Educated adivasis, particularly the 
converts, have acquired Western puritanical values, filtered through the 
missions. They seem to consider Western dress (usually used by men of 
this sector) as a mark of "civilization". The usual way of dressing of the 
adivasi peasantry is perceived as so inadequate that the existence of 
clothes is denied: they are "naked". The educated adivasis, not 
necessarily the dancers, feel ashamed.
Another element enters the picture: culture as a commodity. 
Dances are planned for commercial shows, euphemistically called 
"folklorical ballets" the world over: sterile and expurgated samples of 
popular culture. One clear instance of this kind of performance, taking 
place with official blessings, was observed at the opening of a meeting 
of local applied anthropologists in Ranchi. Although without a 
commercial purpose, this performance in fact was "selling" something: a 
version of "the traditional tribal culture". The participants were received 
by girls dancing a "tribal dance", well wrapped in new saris. The 
leading (Hindu) anthropologist was greeted as if he were the pahan, an
unlikely role that he seemed to accept naturally, as a person conscious of 
his authority over a community to which he did not in fact belong. The 
anthropologists and administrators present celebrated the performance as 
if it were an everyday event, thus becoming accomplices in the distortion 
of popular culture. It is in ways such as this that those in a position of 
power can invent "tribal traditions" for the "tribals".
Some educated adivasis are aware of the consequences of 
deculturation. This shows, for example, in the attitude towards dress. 
This awareness refers to deculturation produced by Hinduization and not 
by Westernization. The referent not to be imitated is the model of Hindu 
prudery:
Sometimes they [read "we"] ill-define pride: covering 
the body from head to toe, hiding the women or not 
educating them...Hindu women are dirty, they do not 
take off their clothes when they bathe....
(Interview with an educated adivasi).
b.- Efforts at cultural development.
The educated adivasis are earnestly occupied in the promotion 
of Jharkhand's vernacular languages, succeeding, for instance, in 
opening an extensive language program at Ranchi University, and in 
engaging adivasis from their own ranks to develop a common literary 
language. The multitude of Jharkhand's ethnic groups implies the 
existence of a host of languages. An additional common language for 
cross-communication and a common script for the existing ones would 
be advantageous. Already Sadani or Nagpuri has been spontaneously 
gaining use as a lingua franca (interviews; Keshari 1982:145-163).
The educated adivasis' efforts to maintain their languages - 
important identity markers - are a form of legitimating their ethnicity. 
This is mostly reflected in the literary field (poetry, fiction, drama) in 
works published for the educated adivasis' use in papers, magazines and 
books. Thus, the first issue of Johar was launched at the end of 1980 in 
a limited edition of 150 copies. Its (adivasi) editor described it as a 
"tribal magazine" and "a literary forum", It is published in Mundari, 
Santali, Ho and Khariya. The journal is financially sponsored by the 
Government, but it is a .group of Mundas around Ranchi that is mostly 
responsible for its publication.
Another important issue that has been raised by the educated 
Mundas is the production of school text-books in Mundari and the need 
to consider new teaching methods. A discussion on such topics took 
place at a meeting of the Board of Directors of one of the Munda cultural 
associations I attended. The Horo Cultural Centre has already prepared 
text-books to be used at the intermediate and bachelor levels at Ranchi 
University. However, the question of re-writing their own history, 
usually considered by the intelligentsia of subordinated ethnic groups as 
a vital issue (8), has not as yet been broached by the adivasis.
Another project is the Horo Cultural Centre, established at Jade 
village (Horo Senra Samaiti or Horo University (9)), which the retired 
Anglican Bishop, Dr. Hans, himself a Munda, has founded and is 
actively promoting. When I visited the site, the foundations had already 
been laid. It is a centre dedicated to the Munda community. Dr. Hans 
explained to me:
My dream is to have a Munda University here, for all 
the Munda branches. I have launched the word 
sasankir for "culture", and it has been accepted. The 
people are very happy. They ask: "Is it going to be 
our Nalanda [a major Buddhist university in the first 
millenium] ?"....
This centre will lodge a library and what Dr. Hans described as 
a "village university". The project attempts to direct the efforts at cultural 
maintainance to the rural areas. Two aspects of this strategy should be 
noted. First, it is planned as a cultural centre for one of the dominant 
ethnic groups in the Chotanagpur area. Second, the project possibly 
shows an "elitist conception of culture (revealed, for instance, in the idea 
of a library), despite it being called "a village university". One may 
consider, however, the future reach of the efforts at cultural 
development, for instance, the spread of a new written (in this case, 
Munda) tradition outside the urban areas and the centres for formal 
education. At the same time, one cannot but compare the spirit of this
(8) For instance:
Until now the colonizers have spoken for us...We are beginning to use 
some of [their] weapons: paper, and through it we declare that we are 
tired of oppression, and that we wish to spread our culture and to write 
the history of domination. This time it will be written by historians from 
the dominated sector...(Jimenez Turdn, Ye'cuana [Venezuela], 1979: 
201-206. My translation i f  om Spanish. Original in Yecuana).
(9) "Horo University" means University of the Munda People.
project with the new uses the JMM gave to the akhra as a venue for 
basic teaching, open to everybody (see Chapter VI).
There is an element underlying the adivasi elite's efforts at 
cultural development that should be mentioned: an uneasy mixture of 
pride and shame when "using" their "ethnic" culture, that I attribute to 
the already mentioned class/ethnic contradictions present in their 
identity's formulation.
Their concern about their languages has two aims: one, to 
preserve them; the other, to upgrade them, to make them "literary" and 
written, to make them "civilized", according to the dominant canons that 
oppose a written to an oral tradition. At the same time, the educated 
adivasis feel uncomfortable when using their own languages. On 
different occasions I heard comments by educated adivasis like the 
following:
They [read "we"] feel shy to speak their own 
language...
(A Munda. His wife even refused to speak 
Mundari to him in private).
At home, in the urban areas, mothers speak to their children 
in Hindi because there might be other people around and 
they would feel shy...
The use of the pronoum "they" and not "we" in these and other 
quoted comments (English was used) is worth noting. The educated 
adivasis put distance between themselves and their ethnic identity. Their 
"we" side prefers to speak Hindi or English, the two hegemonic 
languages, as repeatedly observed in the urban environment and 
particularly in Ranchi, a local centre for the diffussion of cultural 
hegemony. Thus the insistence: "our people will have to learn to speak 
Hindi" (comment made in English). The "we" side is uncomfortable 
with ethnicity (the distanced "they") and feels ashamed of revealing it by 
speaking in the vernacular.
Shame created by deculturation spills from the urban to the 
nearby areas. For instance, in the villages around centres like Ranchi:
The people now feel shy to dance at night, and with 
the coming modern culture nave begun to forget their 
own. They now dance only at festivals. The flutes 
are gone now....
' (A Munda).
c.-In vented traditions.
Cultural revivalism provides legitimating support to the 
reformists' ideology. Part of Jharkhand's history and cultures have been 
selected and reformulated to legitimize a political discourse based on 
ethnic referents and to call for a broad ethnic solidarity. Images of the 
past, not the flow of history, have been chosen by the reformists and 
often institutionalized. The ensuing invented traditions are concerned 
with establishing a continuity of the political discourse with the past and 
not with an understanding of historical discontinuities or the presence of 
social contradictions.
The image of Birsa, for instance, has been abstracted from the 
past, and its symbolic contents institutionalized in a statue erected on the 
road to Khunti. The statue as such is not a creation of the reformists, 
but a product of official populism. It is also not unique in the region 
(10). The symbolism of these statues - particularly the one at the 
outskirts of Ranchi, the stronghold of the reformists - goes beyond the 
initial populist gesture. Birsa has been hailed by the reformists as the 
symbolic representative of the people of Jharkhand and of the ideal of 
good leadership, a connotation that was not lost on Jaipal Singh when 
he tried to act as a second Birsa (informant's comment).
As a point of reference with the past, the symbol attempts to 
unite all the adivasis in the tribal brotherhood. The statue fixes Birsa 
beyond time and beyond the social context in which the leader of the 
Ulgulan once operated. He has become the official, institutionalized, 
"father" of Jharkhand. Significantly, the statue depicts Birsa in the pose 
shown in an extensively reproduced old photo: with tied hands while 
being taken to prison. The statue's pose was criticized in the local press, 
but only by a Bengali resident (NR 1980a; interviews), since a statue 
depicting a free Birsa was considered to be more appropriate. Did the 
original populist gesture inadvertently help "to fix" a symbol of the
(10) Statues like this - probably casted of the same mould - in bronze, 
started to crop up in the seventies and the eighties, possibly as a 
Govemement conciliatory move after years of rural unrest in the region. 
In 1984, a new Birsa statue rose near Rourkela, accompanying the 
opening of a cement mini-plant at Mandikubar village (Orissa). The 
Chief Minister of Orissa, J.B. Patnaik, unveiled the statue while calling 
"upon the tribals to help build a prosperous nation through hard work" 
(The Stateman 1984b).
adivasis as a people in bondage, thus creating a permanent reminder of 
what is still to be done?
The detail of the tied hands has caught the attention of all. The 
retired Anglican Bishop (Munda) told me he had written a play in one act 
around the imagery of the statue. The play was performed with great 
success in the villages (possibly those where the Anglican mission is 
active), in Mundari. The author's description of its plot was very 
succinct:
Birsa is tied with ropes. Then culture comes and cuts 
the ropes. With that, the Mundas are liberated.
In this context, culture means education, and liberation means 
abandoning "tribal backwardness", a product of ignorance. The 
educated adivasis' self-perception following the tribal construct is 
reflected in the play: the adivasis' situation derives from deficiencies in 
their own societies (ignorance). The play fits well with the reformists' 
discourse; it does not intend to question the statu quo since there is no 
mention of the need of any social change, except for education. Given 
the circumstances, the plot possibly praises the goodness of mission 
education.
Other possible meanings of the Birsa statue: an anti-colonial 
symbol, a political statement of opposition and struggle by a "freedom 
fighter of Chotanagpur" (as the press now qualifies Birsa), are not 
generally perceived. In addition, the Munda intellectuals seem to 
monopolize the image of Birsa. From this, two results may ensue: the 
weakening of the ideal of "tribal" brotherhood, and the reinforcement of 
the Mundas' feelings of superiority over other local adivasi groups.
For the reformists, the links Birsa establishes with the historical 
past are tenuous. This is a highly idealized past of freedom and 
economic independence until the dikus came. The historical context on 
which the past as invented tradition has been built is not always known 
to the bulk of the deculturated adivasis. This was noted, for instance, at 
a gathering of urban-based educated adivasis. The elderly man who had 
guided me into Chotanagpur's "deep country" commented that we had 
reached a village at the foot of Dombari Hill, Dombari Hill, where Birsa 
fought his last battle, is a very precise historical landmark in 
„ Chotanagpur's history, the theme of many old songs (see Chapter IV).
Neither the name of the place nor my mention of some of Birsa's deeds 
seemed to provoke signs of recognition. It appeared as if it was the first 
time they were hearing the story of the Ulgulan (11).
The lament of one of the elite's elderly members sums up a 
feeling some have of losing touch with their ethno-cultural roots:
Sometimes we talk of going back to Mari Disum, the 
old land, the original village [in symbolic terms], but 
now people are forgetting it....
Ethnic identity is becoming elusive for the members of the elite. 
Their desperate efforts at capturing their identity translate into the 
invention of traditions: an ideal past with not many historical referents 
and a fixed "traditional culture", very much in line with Hobsbawm's 
analysis (loc. cit. in fn. 11). These traditions may help the elite attain a 
certain social cohesion in the political arena, but can never encompass 
more than a small part of the ethnic style that was their source.
Symbols, once institutionalized, tend to change their meanings. 
The bow and arrow (a'sar) are held as symbols of adivasi culture. 
However, while proudly carried by adivasi peasants in their marches 
(see Chapter VI), at the homes of the urban petty-bourgeoisie they are 
not usually displayed but stored out of view. Some were amused to 
show me how to handle them, although they did not have any use for 
them any more. On more than one occasion, what was brought out of 
the cupboard were broken remains: a bow without a string, an arrow 
with its decorative feathers broken.
The bow and arrow is a powerful but, for some, a risky 
symbol. It is a symbol of struggle and not of compromise. As such, it 
does not fit comfortably in the reformists' repertoire (12). For the elite,
(11) One may then say with E. Hobsbawm that,
Movements for the defence or revival of traditions...common among 
intellectuals...can never develop or even preserve a living past...but 
must become "invented traditions"...(1983: 8).
(12) At the end of the sixties, for instance, the Birsa Seva Dal used the 
slogan Jharkhand Larke Lenge-Teer Ke Bal Par ("Jharkhand will be 
won by a struggle with the force of arrows"). Sachchidananda says that 
this proposal "was not relished by the old or new Jharkhand leaders", 
that is, the reformists (1979:253). It was not so much, as 
Sachchidananda believes, because it pointed at a "tribalist" conception of 
the Jharkhand state, but because the Birsa Seva Dal was becoming 
radicalized ("passing into the hands of the Communists"), and a
the bow and arrow symbol has become a depoliticized ethnic marker. 
The Bihar Government's 1980 ban on the possession of bows and 
arrows, made an adivasi politician complain:
The already dehumanized tribals were now being 
subjected to a process of "detribalization"...The 
association of bows and arrows...started at birth itself 
when the placenta was cut by an arrow. The custom 
still prevails in the interior areas. Bows and arrows 
[are] an integral part of tribal life....(AT? 1980d: 1).
The symbol of struggle dissappears to become an element of 
"tribal life" in the "interior areas", reinforcing the "tribal" stereotype.
Through cultural revivalism and invented traditions, the 
reformists codify and fix ethnicity, following their class needs, interests 
and cosmovision. They may not necessarily use their version of 
ethnicity to increase their power, but certainly to legitimize and 
strengthen their position as the heirs of "true tradition". As such, they 
become their ethnic groups' official interlocutors in the eyes of the State 
and the ruling sectors.
4.- The economic proposal: the limits of the ideal 
brotherhood.
a.- The reformists' view of the economic situation.
Interviews with reformist leaders reveal that they do not offer a 
clear-cut economic program as part of their political platform. In the 
case of the Jharkhand Party, the priority given to the demand for a 
separate state of undefined contents, pushes Jharkhand's economic 
problems into the background. This priority also fosters an unrealistic 
utopianism reflected in the already mentioned statement of the Party's 
President:
The tribe must become a self-sufficient economy as it 
used to be...
Explanations of the economic situation often shift to remarks 
on the lack of formal education among the bulk of the adivasi peasantry. 
Education is thought to automatically bring "freedom from all bondages:
potential disturbing element for the reformists'attitude of political 
compromise.
poverty, superstition, disunity, mental servility...." (An educated 
Munda).
The Jharkhand Party considers the pace and not the nature of 
socioeconomic changes. The effects of the present economic processes 
are mistaken for the problems to be solved. Acute social conflicts are 
seen in terms of a clash between "tradition" and "modernity":
If things are planned so they do not disturb, people 
would not be exploited...Change should be 
smooth...Industrialization, modem civilization, have 
not been good for the tribes...
(Jharkhand Party leader).
Explicitly removed from politics, the rural development projects 
in operation in Chotanagpur broadly coincide with the line of thought 
held by the reformists. These projects are sponsored by the Christian 
adivasi elite with the support of the Churches. Even though they are not 
expressed in a global agrarian program, the different organizations act in 
concert, aiming at the development of capitalist agriculture (13).
The paradigms of "tribal" and Christian community together 
with Western liberal values guide the planning of these programs, the 
first gradually losing ground and becoming a stereotyped "tradition" and 
an obstacle to "progress". The promoters of "tribal entrepreneurship", 
discussed in the following pages, oppose "the cultural and mental make­
up of the tribal people" - considered a hindrance to development - to the 
adivasis' acceptance of some "modern" elements conducive to their 
- successful adaptation to change: formal education, modem employment, 
migration, Christianity (Interviews with the head of XISS' project; 
Bogaert et.aL,n.d,:3-4),
The promoters of these projects acknowledge certain problems: 
continuing land alienation, loss of rights over the use of forests, 
indebtness to moneylenders and traders, the exploitative role of the 
intermediaries in the market economy. However, these problems are 
isolated from the operation of the economic system that makes possible 
their existence, thus becoming part of the ethnically-determined "tribal
(13) The data on which the analysis of these organizations is based come 
from interviews, and from the publications and writings of persons 
connected with their projects.
problem" (see van Exem 1973). This perception of the economic 
situation is common to the adivasi petty-bourgeoisie (whose Christian 
elements are active in the above-mentioned projects). For instance, at a 
gathering of urban-employed and retired adivasis who declared to be at 
the same time "petty zamindars" (14), some remembered with 
dissatisfaction the loss to industrial development of some of their lands 
in Hatia, and the meagre Government compensations (around Rs. 
45/acre). However, in the course of this conversation, the loss of 
individual lands ended up expressed as a loss of territory ("We are 
losing our ancestors' lands!"). By a swift slight of hand these urban 
adivasis located the problem at an ethnic level (territoriality), detaching it 
from the objective economic level (Direct observation). Many have been 
affected by displacement due to industrial development (see Chapter m). 
The fact that land loss has differently affected an urban employee 
compared to a peasant living on subsistence, was lost to these urban 
adivasis. The isolation of the ethnic question from political and 
economic concerns, is frequent among the adivasi petty-bourgeois 
reformers.
b.- The "farmer" ideal.
Three independent organizations based in Ranchi are 
responsible for the programs for rural development we have been 
referring to: the Xavier Institute of Social Service (XISS) with its 
"Tribal Entrepreneur Development Programme", Vikas Maitri 
(Friendship for Development) with its Silent Revolution, and the old 
Chotanagpur Cooperative Society or The Bank. These organizations 
maintain close links with each other, are exclusively in the hands of the 
Christian community, have the backing (and inspiration) of the Christian 
Churches, and are mostly oriented towards the Christian adivasis of the 
Chotanagpur ethnic macrogro'ups (Mundas, Oraons, some Kharia 
villages). Given the general distrust in the rural areas of government 
officials and the ineffectiveness of Government programs, these 
organizations fill the gap left by the Government agencies (Volken 
1979: 14). They act within the limits of the existing Indian capitalist 
economy, and have attained some success at a small scale level. This 
way of operating through reforms within the existing economic system, 
therefore without questioning it, guarantees their success and their
(14) Claiming an average of 150 to 200 acres. General regional average 
in Chotanagpur is 1-5 acres, 10 at the most (according to informants, 
checked with official figures).
freedom to operate (15). The nature of the JMM's project for rural 
revitalization was very different both in content and the reactions it 
provoked, as we will see in the following chapter.
The reformist programs foster the development of a fanner and 
small business rural petty-bourgeoisie, separated by its orientation, 
modus operandi, technical and agricultural resources, education, and 
institutional backing from the rest of the common peasantry, and 
aspiring to become a model to be emulated. With these programs, 
directed mostly to the Christian adivasis and creating new 
socioeconomic differences, the ideal of Jharkhand's brotherhood starts 
to crumble.
The programs' aims are to create two different sorts of "agents 
of modernization": the village entrepreneur or small businessman, and 
the (capitalist) farmer. At no point during interviwes or in these 
organizations' publications, were peasants mentioned. The "farmer" 
concept and model was the prevalent one, and was contrasted not with 
the peasant model but with the "tribal" stereotype. It was considered 
that:
Farming is the tribal vocation "par excellence". 
[Therefore] we have to look in farming itself for 
opportunities to change the tribals' basic economic 
attitudes....
(van Exem op.cit,: 39-40).
A "tribal entrepreneur, on the other hand, was described as:
A self-employed person of tribal origin who has 
ventured into non-traditional ways (not agriculture) of 
earning a livelihood, such as business, industry, trade 
or related services, and who performs the major 
functions of a business enterprise, being responsible 
for decision-making and financial risk-taking....
(XISS 1980:
5 ff.).
The "farmer" model and the ideas of maximization of profits, 
competition, saving (capital accumulation and investment), and 
"entrepeneurial skills" that go with it, seem ill-suited for the general
(15) These development programs have the backing and sometimes the 
financial support of the Government, for instance, in the "food for 
work" and educational programs (Bara 1980).
reality and needs of the Jharkhand peasantry (Chapter III), The issue 
does not seen to be "how tribal society can pass into a surplus 
[capitalist] economy" (Volken op. cit.\ 10), but how to augment 
production on the base of endogenous economic structures without 
necessarily introducing the profit and competition ethos.
We find here a parallel with the missions' role in Africa in 
introducing a European conception of agrarian organization (Ranger 
1983: 213-214). Father Bogaert (XISS) records that the majority of the 
Catholic missionaries that arrived in Chotanagpur at the end of the 
nineteenth century came from Belgium and the Netherlands, many of 
them being of farmer background. In the wake of the Industrial 
Revolution, Church-related organizations created associations of mutual 
aid, cooperatives and trade unions. One of them was a farmers' union, 
the Belgische Boerenband, founded by a priest in 1880. The Belgian 
Jesuits in Chotanagpur found in it a source of inspiration for the 
development of similar organizations in Chotanagpur. When The Bank 
was created in 1909, it looked back on the Belgian farmers' experience 
to formulate its basic aims (Bogaert 1980: 30 ff.). In the missionaries' 
view, Chotanagpur could become another Belgium by transplanting 
"Christian model villages" into the heart of Jharkhand. In the words of a 
Christian informant:
They planned [development] as if this place was 
Europe ....
These "model villages" were not to be the nucleus of protected 
pre-industrial peasant communities as they had became in Africa, but a 
recreated milieu for the small capitalist farmer.
"Capitalism for export" produced phenomena like the Green 
Revolution, praised by the Chotanagpurian developmentalists even 
when it had already shown disturbing socioeconomic consequences 
where it was introduced: rural unemployment (with mechanization), loss 
of lands and a growing number of peasants transformed into agricultural 
labourers, concentration of wealth among those (the farmers) able to get 
loans or afford improved seeds and new technology, increasing 
socioeconomic disparities in the rural areas, and the enhancement of
class conflicts (Frankel 1971). Vikas Maitri closely follows the tenets of 
the Green Revolution, reformulated in the Silent Revolution (16).
c.- The local organizations.
C.I.-  Vikas Maitri. of "tribal character and composition", 
defines itself as
A coordinating body of the Christian Churches in 
Chotanagpur and Santal Parganas...[aiming] at 
bringing Christians more closely together, in order to 
work for the socioeconomic development and good 
health of the people of the area,...
(Vikas Maitri 1970:
9).
Its aims are two: to preserve the Christian adivasis' identity "as 
Christians and adivasis", and "to encourage cooperative farming" 
(interviews at Vikas Maitri). The first pursuit leans heavily on Christian 
morals (the introduction of "good and clean literature", of a sense of 
"Christian responsibilities [whereby] every plot capable of being 
cultivated which is not ploughed constitutes a sm ...'\ of family planning 
methods "consonant with the Church's ideology"). Vikas Maitri declares 
to develop a [Christian] "Ecumenical Revolution" (Interviews at Vikas 
Maitri; Volken op.cit. : 1; Vikas Maitri op,civ. 3-4).
The second aim relies on the Silent Revolution. The idea dates 
from 1968, when the effects of the Green Revolution on which it is 
based were already beginning to cause concern in India. Despite the 
warnings, two decades after its foundation Vikas Maitri still follows the 
basic principles of the Green Revolution. The Silent Revolution is 
describedas
A silent and non-violent one..., a basic change of 
attitudes, a fight against "vested interests "...within 
ourselves, and our own institutions. Let old traditions 
which have serve their time gently die....
(Vikas Maitri op. cit.: 33. Emphasis added).
(16) The XISS published , without comments, excerpts from the 
Newsletter of the Christian Conference of Asia, Colleagues in 
Development, which questioned a modality of development that is the 
one basically followed by the Christian-based organizations in 
Chotanagpur, particularly criticizing its supposed apolitical character. It 
seems there was no response when this document was published (XISS 
1980).
In practical terms, Vikas Maitri guides cooperative advanced 
farming with a maximum use of resorces and labour among some 
villagers, and promotes the idea of "tribal entrepreneurs" (really 
developed by XISS). In some villages, 30% of the surplus was 
collectively accumulated in a common fund. In others, saving schemes 
started (on a money basis), with the aim of avoiding taking loans from 
the moneylenders. Rural pre-schools and Adult Education Centres with 
agricultural extension education were established.
Vikas Maitri conceives development as a process beyond
politics:
Rather than being concerned about power and 
authority, let us adopt the feeling of the Lord...If [the 
Silent Revolution]. is not brought about soon in 
Chotanagpur, somebody else may carry along the 
people in the name of violent revolution....
(ibid.:
33-34).
This "violent revolution" corresponds to the "adverse forces" 
frequently mentioned in interviews with the reformists: the agrarian 
struggle in Jharkhand.
One of the comments made to Vikas Maitri by the Indian Social 
Institute after an evaluation-study, precisely was on this theme:
Vikas Maitri declared itself to be an Association 
which is non-political in character...Development has 
a political dimension. The life of rural people cannot 
be apolitical....
" (Volken op.cit.: 22).
Reforms and aid via "developmentalism" may defuse political 
issues in the rural areas. At the same time, the economic disparities they 
may create, would tend to sharpen social conflicts which would 
eventually reach the political arena.
c.2,- The XISS started its program to train village entrepreneurs 
in Ranchi District. Under the false assumption that the money economy 
has only recently penetrated adivasi peasant economy, its aim are:
To introduce persons who have the knowledge of 
money as "capital", and who know how to save, 
foster, manage and increase it_
(Bogaert et al. o p .c i t6).
Small groups of young adivasis with "appropriate attitudes" are 
selected for the program, with the addition of a few non-adivasi 
candidates (interviews at XISS). Their attitudes and "achievement 
motivation" leanings are checked by means of a test. Courses taught at 
XISS deal with "psychological training", management, accounting, law 
and marketing, followed by a period of apprenticenship in shops and 
practice in the candidate's village of origin. The students' integration 
into Vikas Maitri's projects is encouraged, and an esprit de corps among 
these selected groups fostered (Interviews at XISS; Bogaert et al. 
op.cit.'. 9-13).
The XISS and Vikas Maitri share the same perspective. Both 
have selective programs, the first at the individual and the second at the 
community level. While they imply a consistent effort at introducing 
reforms of a social welfare nature in the rural areas, their selective 
character ends up creating pockets of development in the vastness of 
Jharkhand's underdevelopment.
The XISS's "Training Program for Village Entrepreneurs" also 
declares itself to be apolitical. Thus, a person "actively engaged in 
village party politics" cannot become a village entrepreneur (XISS 
op.cit.: 9).
c.3.- The Bank: This set-up for rural capitalist development is 
supported by the Chotanagpur Catholic Cooperative Society: The Bank, 
whose origins were already mentioned in the previous chapter. The 
Bank is perfectly organized in a network of units that acts as an 
insurance policy for the repayment of loans granted in cash on an 
individual basis. Using moral coercion, local priests and the 
management committees make sure that the loans are repaid.
Established as a credit union, The Bank embraced 52,971 
members (heads of adivasi families and Catholics) by mid-1979, 
divided into 58 "circles" subdivided into 1,224 "units" spread in Ranchi 
District and neighbouring areas of Hazaribagh, Palamau and Singhbhum
(Bogaert 1980: 4; van Exem op.cit.: 43). Loans are granted "only for 
purposes that are productive", at an interest rate of 6% (17).
An Agricultural Training Centre was established in the late 
fifties for The Bank's members' sons to
Impart leadership and extension skills [and]...to 
speed up the Green Revolution....
(Bogaert ibid.: 65-66)
The majority of those who completed the courses became 
supervisors in The Bank's Extension Service or farm managers.
Despite the long presence of The Bank in the area, it is admitted 
that "it has not changed the attitudes of its members". The amount of 
savings is considered low. The Bank can be contrasted with the grain 
golas and "farm banks" established by the JMM, with very little cash 
involved (see Chapter VT).
The promoters of The Bank's philosophy have misunderstood 
the propensity for consumption among its members, considered 
irrational squandering:
They spend freely all they have...Their economy [is] 
geared...to an immediate consumption....
(Interviews with development extensionists; van 
Exem ibid.: 6,7, 12).
The pre-capitalist logic behind the mode of consumption and 
non-accumulation, why surplus cannot be obtained in a starved 
economy, and the feast of prodigality as a mechanism to reinforce 
peasant solidarity, are all aspects lost to the promoters of development in 
Jharkhand.
(17) According to Bogaert (1980), the total assets of The Bank 
amounted in 1979 to Rs. 28,762,908 , with an annual growth rate of 
9.6%. More than 99% of The Bank's members and employees are 
adivasis.
Conclusion:
The reformist Jharkhand project - a project of the adivasi petty- 
bourgeisie - rests on the acceptance of the tribal construct, and of 
exogenous (Western) cultural values acquired through education and, in 
some cases, conversion to Christianity. The reformists' definition of 
their identity is marked by these elements and by the nature of their class 
situation. They look for legitimation - for their identity and for their 
Jharkhand project - in cultural revivalism and the invention of traditions.
The reformist formulation of Jharkhand as a broad "tribal 
brotherhood" is full of contradictions, as is evident in the old and new 
elements of differentiation that it contains and which the reformists do 
not acknowledge. The reformist Jharkhand project can be qualified as 
"closed" in terms of its formulation, participation, implementation and 
future development. The nature of this project is synthetized in the 
exclusive demand for a separate state on ideal ethnic grounds and 
without social and economic qualifications.
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CHAPTER VI
THE GRASS-ROOTS MOVEMENT: THE EXTENSION OF
THE POSSIBLE.
We put red and green on the fields.
A Santal peasant.
1.- Introduction,
The recent agrarian protests of the adivasis and the role the 
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) played in it, are the focus of the 
present chapter, taking into consideration the interplay of class and 
ethnic elements.
The data presented in this and the preceeding chapter seek to 
provide elements for the comparison of two ethnic discourses in 
Jharkhand, each stemming from different class situations and social 
experiences.
Given the situation of the ongoing protest in the area (Santal 
Parganas and Singhbhum, principally) at the moment field-work took 
place, and the situation of the people interviewed, the collection of data 
for this chapter faced particular difficulties. For instance, interviews 
were discrete, often brief and sometimes piecemeal.
A discussion of the evolution of the grass-roots protest and the 
JMM in the seventies is followed by an analysis of the formulation of a 
Jharkhandi identity in terms of a community of labouring people, on the 
integration of cultural elements in the agrarian struggle and in the JMM 
project, and on the characteristics of the JMM economic project.
2.- A Continuing Tradition of Agrarian Protest.
The Santal peasantry figured prominently in the ongoing rural 
agitation in Jharkhand's Santal belt. Press reports and comments during 
interviews indicate the development in the sixties and the seventies of a 
repeated pattern of forcible harvesting of paddy on alienated lands in
Santal Parganas, Dhanbad, Giridih and adjacent regions of the West 
Bengal countryside. These seasonal actions of protest well preceeded the 
emergence of the JMM in 1972. The JMM in fact came to lead an 
already mobilized peasantry, providing organizational elements.
In the seventies, agrarian protest combined with the struggle of 
the colliery workers in Dhanbad. The worker-peasant alliance that 
emerged included both adivasi and non-adivasi components. The 
coming together of the workers, the Santal peasants and the non-adivasi 
peasantry crystallized at the end of 1972 in the linking of the struggles of 
the Shivaji Samaj, formed in 1970 among the Kurmi peasants (officially 
defined as "a detribalized backward caste"), the JMM, mostly among the 
Santal peasantry, and the Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union (BCKU). This 
coalition operated under a triple leadership comprised of the Kurmi 
lawyer Binod Bihari Mahato, the Santal leader Sibu Soren, and the 
Dhanbad trade-unionist A. K. Roy (Marxist Coordination Committee, 
MCC).
In 1973, the Shivaji Samaj was replaced by the Morcha led by 
Binod Bihari Mahato, Sibu Soren and Sadanand Sha. Significantly, 
Sadanand Sha was not a Jharkhandi but came from North Bihar. A 
young trade-union leader in Dhanbad, he was murdered in 1973, 
possibly by the collieries' muscle-men. Sha's committment to the 
Jharkhandi workers' struggle, he being an outsider, and his death, 
condense the spirit of the emergent movement in Jharkhand in which 
class solidarity and alliances strove to supersede narrow ethno/regional 
cleavages.
The Kurmis of the Shivaji Samaj as well as the adivasi peasants 
had been struggling for the restoration of lands alienated by landlords 
and moneylenders. Under the JMM they concentrated on this issue and 
on the situation of the sharecroppers and the agricultural labourers.
It was around 1971 that Sibu Soren began organizing the 
people in Tundi (Dhanbad) (1) to demand a better deal for the 
agricultural labourers and the sharecroppers. At that time, the forcible 
harvesting of paddy had already become a consistent feature of the 
agrarian scene despite continuous police and landlord repression. This
(1) Tundi: a development block in Dhanbad district, in the Chotanagpur 
plateau region of South Bihar, comprising 296 villages. Santals 
constitute nearly 49% of Tundi's population.
form of protest was tapped by Sibu Soren and the JMM from 1972 
onwards. The JMM movement spread to Santal Parganas, Giridih and 
Hazaribagh. The years between 1973 and 1975 were the most intense 
and violent in the struggle carried on in the form of forcible harvesting, 
the Dhan kato andolan ("Recover your paddy") campaign, which 
involved adivasi peasants as well as other rural poor. These years of 
unrest in the countryside did not go without a loss of lives when arrows 
had to compete with the guns of the Central Reserve Police, the 
landlords and their guards (press reports; interviews with Mainstream's 
journalists).
In the same period, the early seventies, the independent trade- 
unionists from the collieries, led by A.K. Roy, engaged in a struggle 
against the coal companies in Dhanbad and Hazaribagh on the issue of 
compensation and rehabilitation of displaced peasants. The years 1973 
and 1974, when forcible harvesting gained momentum, were also the 
peak years of the worker-peasant alliance.
During 1974 and 1975, while popular protest was underway 
and A.K. Roy, Binod Bihari Mahato and other Jharkhandi leaders were 
in jail, Sibu Soren entered into a compromise with the Congress (I). By 
then he seems to have become valuable in the eyes of the Congress (I) in 
maintaining the Party's base in Bihar and containing the rural movement 
and the worker-peasant alliance. This, however, did not forestall 
Soren's imprisonment in 1979 under Bihar's Maintenance o f Internal 
Security Act (MISA), A year later, already an MP, Soren joined hands 
again with the Congress (I). As we will later see, his political position 
has continued shifting until today.
In 1978, under the Janata government, the demand for a 
separate Jharkhand state was put forward on a United Front basis. Nine 
parties and organizations formed the Front's committee: the Jharkhand 
Party led by N.E. Horo, the MCC led by A.K. Roy, the JMM with Sibu 
Soren as General Secretary, the CPI (ML), the Birsa Seval Dal, the 
Jharkhand Muslim Morcha, the Hul Jharkhand, the Revolutionary 
Socialist Party of India and the Congress (I). Why did the idea of an 
United Front emerge? It appears that the'strength of the adivasi grass­
roots movement "caught the attention of some political parties", although 
in various ways and for different purposes:
When the [grass-roots] tribal movement reached its 
climax in 1974-1975 many parties became interested 
in gaining influence over it. They needed the tribal 
leadership....
(A political activist).
The combination of political positions and diverging aims 
doomed the Front to failure. The President of the Jharkhand Party saw it 
in this way:
The United Front did not work and never will. It is 
true tactics of the Communist Party all the time....
"Communist Party" means in this context any progressive 
organization, including the early JMM and the MCC. Furthermore:
In the villages where the "Communist Party" [read 
JMM and MCC] has worked, protest takes the form 
of forcible harvesting. This is not the way to help 
people. A dialogue should be opened with the 
Government and the non-tribals. This proposal will 
not be appreciated by the leftists...In Singhbhum they 
did not listen to me and started to fell trees. We 
should struggle with dignity; they acted as 
extremists...1The leftists should support us..,.(ibid.).
On the part of the Jharkhand Party - according to one of the 
representatives of the reformists - there seems to be a miscomprehension 
of ideological differences as well as of the modalities of social protest. 
The reformists avoided a dialogue with the other local organizations of 
the United Front:
We are going to have problems with the communist 
friends. They will support the demand for a state, 
but one should not believe them. It is a trick, 
tactics.... (ibid.).
Unrest in Santal Parganas continued well into 1979, marked by 
violent clashes between peasants and landlords (2). That was also the 
time when two factors contributed to affect the course of the grass-roots
(2) H. Dhar (1980a) provides a chronology of events during that year in 
the district. The incidents ranged from demonstrations against land 
eviction; CPI (ML)'s demands for a better share for adivasi 
sharecroppers and minimum wages for the agricultural labourers; 
"harvest clashes"; JMM's protests against atrocities committed against 
adivasis; incidents of rape of Santal and harijan women by policemen 
and landlords; and CPI (ML)1 s demands for the implementation of the 
Act against moneylending.
movement: (1) a State policy of containment, and (2) the participation of 
new social elements in the movement.
By 1979 it was clear that the mass movement in Jharkhand had 
become the target of State policies of containment first, and then, overt 
repression. The then Chief Minister of Bihar considered the movement 
as the product of "anti-social" and "anti-national" elements that had to be 
curbed or suppressed. The policy of containment and conciliation was 
reflected in the appointments as Commissioner, Tribal Welfare 
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of persons (generally from 
the ruling Janata Party), with a sympathetic attitude towards the rural 
poor, particularly towards the adivasis and harijans. This policy 
crystallized in plan proposals and the allocation of resources for 
economic development which, in fact, never reached those who were 
supposed to benefit from them, .
Economic populism was not effective enough. State repression 
then attempted to attain what populism could not. The Central Reserve 
Police, the Bihar Military Police and the Bihar Armed Police were given 
a free hand. They did not act independently but in collusion with 
moneylenders and landlords in Santal Parganas and with forest 
contractors in Singhbhum. Indiscriminate arrests of people in the rural 
areas, the plunder of villages, molestation of peasant women, and 
killings of protesters became commonplace, transforming parts of 
Jharkhand into areas under siege. As in former troubled times, adivasi 
peasants fled their villages to avoid violence (see Chapter IV). For 
instance, in March 1980, the combing operations of the Central Reserve 
Police in the villages around Pakaria (Godda thana) resulted in the 
exodus of more than 15,000 adivasis to the Sundarpahadi hills, where 
they remained for weeks under starvation conditions (EPW 1979a: 650). 
The common experience of resorting to fleeing and hiding in moments 
of peril is condensed in the words of an adivasi peasant:
When they come, we go away...There is no more to
do....
In addition, by 1980 the Bihar government divided the district 
of Santal Parganas into five, and Chotanagpur into eight new districts, 
therefore fragmenting the areas that have traditionally been the 
strongholds of Jharkhand movements.
Originally a peasant organization independent from formal 
politics, at the close of the seventies the JMM increasingly attracted well- 
to-do Jharkhandis and elements of the adivasi elite with a political profile 
that set them close to the reformist position earlier discussed: isolation of 
the ethnic question and stress on the "tribal/non- tribal" confrontation. 
At the same time, popular agitation began to be contained in formal 
politics. The consequence of this, as more recently reported in the press 
in 1986 and 1987, has been the coming again to pre-eminence of the 
demand for a separate state to the exclusion of socioeconomic issues.
Considering the central government's common practice of 
coopting leaders via their involvement in parliamentary politics, the 
events from the end of the seventies onwards show that this kind of 
mechanism operated in relation to the JMM's leader Sibu Soren when he 
entered electoral politics and repeatedly searched for an alliance with the 
ruling party. Already in 1980, Sibu Soren announced a possible alliance 
between the JMM and the CP (I), which A.K. Roy opposed. Sibu 
Soren fully entered the field of formal politics when elected in 1977 to 
the Lok Sabha, to which he was re-elected in 1980; in 1985 he was 
elected to the Bihar assembly. These facts have not passed without 
notice. N., a keen observer of Jharkhand's political scenario, 
commented in the early eighties:
The degeneration of conventional leaders is portrayed 
by the media as the degeneration of the [grass-roots] 
movement...Leaders come and go. The movement is 
^strong as ever....
(Personal communication).
On the other hand, the All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU) 
leaders see this problem in terms of a competition for leadership:
The so-called leaders of the tribals played into the 
hands of the ruling parties, just for a ministerial post 
or for filthy lucre. This time the Adivasi students have 
come up to wrest power from those greedy leaders....
(The Week's interview with Besra, 1987: 34-35).
A more balanced view of the matter was given to me by a 
political activist:
The State policy is to buy them [grass-roots leaders]. 
The first step is to make them MPs. The native 
intellectuals want to work for their people but find 
themselves already inside the State apparatus and, 
although they may benefit their communities by 
providing them with wells and the like, these material 
achievements end up in the hands of the 
moneylenders....
In the early eighties, elements in the JMM like Suraj Mandal 
(MLA) began to be more vocal, striving to make the movement 
exclusively ethnic-based (3). Therefore, they pressed for ending the 
relationship between the JMM and the MCC. In 1980, the MCC started 
loosing ground in Santal Parganas. By then, MCC activists considered 
that:
Only in the areas in which Roy [directly] worked, like 
in Hazaribagh and Dhanbad, is there still a broad 
[worker-peasant] unity....
At the end of the eighties the reformist tendency practically 
dominates the JMM, which had receded to a narrow ethnic stand. 
Attention had been diverted from a combined ethnic/class struggle to 
focus solely on the demand for a separate state and calls for cultural 
revivalism. It is thus not suiprising that in 1986 the JMM leaders tried to 
work out an alliance with the Jharkhand Party, which was refused 
despite both movements' now converging on approaches to the 
Jharkhand question (India Today 1986a: 3). "Reformism" in the JMM 
crystallized on June 22,1987 in the formation of the All-Jharkhand 
Students Union (AJSU), officially a front organization of the JMM but 
in practice independent from it. Its only aim is to attain a Jharkhand state 
by the end of 1988. Surya Singh Besra, its General Secretary, stated in 
a memorandum to the Prime Minister dated September 26,1987:
Our demand is for a separate state of Jharkhand 
within [the] Indian Union...[Otherwise AJSU] would 
be compelled to start a movement to bring to a
(3) In the search for an alternative, a group of mass organizations met in 
Patna on 12-13 December, 1980 to establish a program for a new 
nation-wide organization. Representatives from the JMM, the MCC, the 
Dalit Panthers and a dissident group of the West Bengal CPI (M) were 
present. Out of it, the Rashtriya Mukti Morcha was formed with Sibu 
Soren as chairman. It was described as an organization of the adivasis,
. the harijans, the dalits and the workers. The nationalities question was 
integrated into the need for economic transformation and for joint 
political action (IE 1980c; Srivastava 1981a).
standstill transport of all resources from 
Jharkhand.,..
(The Week 1987: 34).
With no political nor economic program, AJSU takes the 
Jharkhand movement back to narrow ethnic-based positions and gives 
the leading role, as with Chotanagpur's reformism, to the educated 
adivasis, the university students. AJSU's reformist movement is 
ideologically related to the position of the adivasi students at Ranchi 
University. These last concentrate their efforts on cultural revivalism, a 
constant tradition among Chotanagpur's reformists (4). The JMM mass 
rally on November 15,1987 was held, significantly, in Ranchi.
JMM's change in character has also been sensed by the 
Government which, facing AJSU's militancy, attempts a 
rapproachement with "the moderate leaders of the tribals, especially of 
the JMM" (ibid.: 34). The once radical JMM's old guard is perceived 
now as "moderate", even in relation to the reformist students' 
movement.
3.- Conceptualization of Collective Identity: Jharkhand 
as Lalkhand.
a.- The Community of Labouring People.
The formulation of Jharkhand as Lalkhand ("Red land"), a 
community of labouring people, guided the JMM while it responded to 
its grass-roots base. This was still the situation when field-work took 
place. The comments that follow refer to the JMM as it then was and not 
after it underwent the changes alluded to in the preceding section.
Jharkhand was initially defined in the JMM's program on the 
basis that:
A Jharkhandi is a producer, irrespective of caste, tribe 
or religion, within the boundaries of Jharkhand....
(Cit. in Maharaj and Iyer 1977: fn. 160).
(4) The commonality of both groups was reflected in the attendance of 
representatives of the Ranchi University group to the convention of 
adivasi students and intellectuals held at Sitaramdera, Jamshedpur, in 
October 1987, where Besra was accepted as AJSU's leader (The Week 
1987: 38-39).
The role played by the social actors in Jharkhand’s economic 
system determined Jharkhandi identity. The regional location provided 
the context, the locus where this community was to develop. It is to be 
noted that the definition expresses an anti-casteist and non-xenophobic 
stance, and that it does not follow the usual "tribal/non-tribal" model 
adopted by the various reformist movements. The early JMM attempted 
to be a regional class-based and not an ethnic-based movement. The 
new conception of Jharkhand came to question the ideal of the harmonic 
brotherhood which the reformists espoused.
Devendra Manjhi (MLA) stated bluntly the aims of the 
Jharkhand project, still current in 1980:
We want a Jharkhand free of exploitation, a 
Jharkhand where those who work will eat, while 
those who loot will go...,
(Election manifesto for the Lok Sabha).
In a similar way, Sibu Soren then stated that the Santals were 
taking back lands and crops that were in the hands of the moneylenders 
"not because these are outsiders" but because they were engaged in 
usury, and that "those who work the land themselves have a right to 
keep it".
If the reformist construct of a Jharkhand community is based on 
the ideal of the non-confiictive coexistence of all classes in Jharkhand, 
the grass-roots movement built up its conception of community 
acknowledging the existing contradictions as expressed in class, ethnic 
and regional antagonisms. For those involved in the movement, being a 
Jharkhandi came to mean not just "a way of life" but a "way of conflict". 
Thus, in the already quoted statement of a political activist:
The Jharkhand state is conceived as a broad alliance 
of all classes in the region. In Lalkhand this alliance 
will be impossible....
The conception of community and collective identity was 
constructed in this case on the basis of concrete experiences of workers 
and peasants in and around the Santal belt, with reference not to a 
narrow perception of the ethnic but taking as referent the regional 
socioeconomic context. In fact, the socieconomic referents came to 
acquire primacy over the particular ethnic ones, in turn rephrased in
regional terms. Jharkhand, defined with social, economic and cultural 
contents, became more than a mere geographical conception.
The community of labouring people was not just an idea. In the 
seventies it crystallized in the worker-peasant alliance and joint political 
actions. This translated, for instance, into the active support given by 
adivasi peasants to Bera colliery's workers (1974) and to those from 
Khaskuian and Sijua collieries who opposed the management's 
"pressure groups" (1975), by joining the demonstrations of Sindri's 
factory retrenched workers, and by backing the demands of the railway 
workers from Gomoh (1975), The workers as well made common cause 
with the peasants in the peak years of the movement between 1973 and 
1975, for instance, by joining forcible harvesting operations.
The nature and contents of the community of labouring people 
was forged in practice. The new leaders put into words a non-verbal 
discourse that had been already spelled out at harvest time, around the 
planting of teak, and in the repeated confrontations of workers with the 
industries' "pressure groups" (usually called goondas or lathaits). 
Signals showing the path ahead were already present when in the early 
seventies trade-union leader A.K. Roy engaged in a struggle against the 
coal companies in Dhanbad and Hazaribagh on the issue of the 
compensation and rehabilitation of peasants displaced by industrial 
development.
A.K. Roy appears as the key leader in explicitly formulating the 
new community and a new tactics for joint political action which would 
embrace the miners and the peasantry of the area. From the start, the 
idea of an alliance to carry forward political struggle was conceived as 
one between labouring people and not as one limited to any specific 
community or ethnic cluster. The ethnic question was, nevertheless, 
considered:
At the beginning Roy did not feel [the need to 
consider] it [the ethnic question] ideologically. 
Afterwards, he entered into a close relationship with 
the tribal leaders, especially with Sibu Soren and 
Binod Bihari Mahato...Then came the peasant- 
worker alliance when the tribal movement reached its 
peak and the question of a separate state emerged.
Roy had ambiguous feelings. He thought of 
Lalkhand. Could it be possible in the tribal areas?....
(Interview with political activist)
The linking of the peasants' and workers' political actions was 
formalized in late 1972. The composition of this new coalition (adivasi 
peasantry, non-adivasi peasantry, miners) was reflected in their triple 
leadership. In organizational political terms it meant an alliance of the 
JMM with the MCC, The new conception of Jharkhand was put into 
practice by both the JMM and the MCC combined. However, it was 
perceived by the Jharkhand Party and it is perceived now by the new 
reformists in the JMM as only the making of A.K. Roy and the MCC. 
For instance, the President of the Jharkhand Party said to me, with a 
laughter:
C
A.K.Roy said at a public meeting: "First Lalkhand 
and then Jharkhand"! One does not need to be a 
communist rebel to obtain what one wants without 
violence....
By a combination of circumstances I arranged a meeting with 
A.K, Roy. He had just been released from jail. Very late at night and 
with many precautions, I was received in a small and badly-lit room 
empty of furniture. A person kept watch at the window. Despite the 
feeling of suspended expectation - of people on watch - there was no 
tension in our talk, and Roy spoke with confidence about the situation in 
Jharkhand. We began to talk about other peasants and workers, about 
Latin America, what was being done and what could be done there. 
Then I heard about the formation of the worker-peasant alliance in 
Dhanbad, the difficulties of this task, the oppressed nationalities 
question, and the linkage of the class and ethnic questions. In his words:
Jharkhand can not just be separated. It should be 
liberated [since] it is the home of a majority of 
downtrodden people and oppressed nationalities.
They are socially and economically exploited and are 
set in an area that in its turn is exploited as an internal 
colony....
Casteism has turned into open racism. Take the case 
of Gua [discussed in Chapter VII]. Repression there 
could proceed with impunity because it was launched 
against a tribal agitation. Or think about the atrocities 
committed against harijans (5)...The present system 
injects communalism at every level.,.. .
In Dhanbad the non-tribal workers were mobilized in 
support of the tribals. The working class first 
acquired a consciousness of itself as a class, 
regardless of ethnic differences and avoiding 
communalism. A bond was built between the 
workers and the rural poor, who are the vast majority 
in Jharkhand. Then the workers came in support of 
the oppressed nationalities in their process of 
emancipation....
The struggles of the working class cannot succeed 
unless they take into account the aspirations of the 
oppressed nationalities, the tribals, the dalits, the 
socially downtrodden....
Talking with A. K. Roy, the nature of the grass-roots 
Jharkhand project emerged in sharp contrast to the reformists' proposal. 
In Roy's vision, this project formed part of a wider conception, beyond 
Jharkhand's geographical boundaries. He talked about the need to 
develop the concept of "Indianism", in which the emphasis was to be 
put on both class issues and on the situation of the many "nationalities 
and subnationalities of India". In this way, "Indianism" appears as an 
alternative to the state-ist conception of the Nation in India, where State 
and Nation have been conflated into one single overpowering entity.
Contrary to the criticism made by some observers (Chakraborty 
1982), neither Roy nor the MCC working together with the JMM 
ignored the class character of exploitation in Jharkhand. In fact, the 
conception of Jharkhand as Lalkhand tended to emphasize the class 
factor. The ethnic factor was often defined in the course of interviews 
as a strategical element. For instance:
(5) In one of his published articles, A.K. Roy compared the situation of 
internal colonialism in India with the South African case, a point that the 
left criticized. He wrote:
Here belated capitalism, social uneveness and regional disparity 
combined together have created a phenomenon of internal colonialism in 
the pattern of South Africa or pre-liberated Rhodesia...In South Africa, 
the rulers and the ruled are separated by colour, in India by physical 
work though colour prejudice is also there in social life....(A.K. Roy 
1983: 7).
The question of tribal identity is more important in 
strategical terms [mobilization, solidarity] than 
class....
It is said that tribals follow a leader and die for him.
This happens not just because of the leader's 
charisma, but due to the strong unity of the 
community. This is what makes them act together....
The tribals are determined to struggle to the end, 
together...,
(MCC political activists)
In other interviews the situation in Jharkhand was approached 
in more holistic terms, avoiding the "class only" path that has usually 
taken the left to failure in the rural areas. For instance:
' The tribal and the class questions coincide [in 
Jharkhand]. The struggle in this case is one that does 
not accept any [political] compromise....
(A MCC activist)
The Government, on the other hand, judging by its response to 
the movement (cooptation, repression), has paid keen attention to the 
combined class/ethnic struggle, visualizing it as dangerous.
If we compare the conception of the community of labouring 
people to the reformist conception of Jharkhand, we see that the terms 
used to define the first of these have been reversed and enlarged. In the 
conception of Jharkhand as a community of labouring people, the old 
demand for a separate state lingers in the background and, until the later 
changes operated in the JMM as a formal political organization, it 
remained there, not necessarily as a priority. On the other hand, the 
reformists - Jaipal Singh and those who came after him (the adivasi elite) 
- were and are still struggling primarily for a territory and special 
prerogatives. In their project, the bulk of the Jharkhandis are absent as 
social agents. The grass-roots Jharkhand movement, on the other hand, 
is aimed at a political Jharkhand by means of mass struggles for concrete 
economic and social ends. The labouring people of Jharkhand seemed 
not willing to wait until the separate state became a reality, especially as 
this has proved to be a Utopia hard to attain. That is why in the JMM's 
and the MCC's view, and particularly in that of the latter, Lalkhand, 
meaning the economic and social transformation of the peasants' and 
workers' situation, came first. The aim was "a liberated Jharkhand", not
merely ”a separate Jharkhand". Sibu Soren himself used to be 
unconcerned about the moment of the separate state's birth:
I do not care if I do not live to see [a] Jharkhand 
[state]. I care much more about us as human beings 
after we dispose of all those who exploit us,,..
The concept of Jharkhand as Lalkhand much incensed the 
reformists: it excluded them as active elements in the process, especially 
in their usual leadership role.
Building up Lalkhand fused two struggles: the one against class 
exploitation and the other against "national" oppression. At the concrete 
level, the situation of the majority of the Jharkhandis - particularly of the
t ,
adivasis - matches the political combination. An awareness of the 
double-facedness of the phenomenon was certainly there. Otherwise it 
will not be possible to explain the following and success of the 
movement in the seventies. For instance, in the words of a Santal 
peasant:
They call us junglee and take away what is ours: the 
land.,,I may be a black Santal, but I well know 
[which one is] my piece of land....
Identity consciousness is present, the narrow and prejudiced 
"tribal" definition is questioned ("black" but not gullible), and an ethnic 
cum socioeconomic profile comes to the foreground. Thus, oppression 
is experienced in a comprehensive way: as an object of racism, as 
belonging to a subordinate ethnic group and as a dispossessed peasant.
Jharkhand's community of labouring people became 
endangered by the early eighties not by ethnic divisiveness but by the 
increasing institutionalization of the JMM, the effects of State policies of 
containment and repression, and a change in the ideological correlations 
emerging from class differences present in the movement's new social 
composition mentioned in the preceeding section.
All these factors seriously threatened to undermine the unity 
achieved among Jharkhand's labouring people. This change in the JMM 
was symbolized in the demands made by its newly included reformist 
elements in 1980 that "the green flag cannot go with the red flag" (Dhar 
1980b: 1299), the first being that of the JMM, the second that of the
MCC, both together symbolizing the worker-peasant alliance 
(Interviews). During the 1986 Jharkhand Diwas annual celebration (see 
Chapter VII), in which the reformists were conspicuously vocal, the 
green flag flew alone (India Today 1986a: 3). Meanwhile, Lalkhand 
remains as a community for peasants and workers to shape. Judging by 
the past history of Jharkhand, the green and red flags may fly again over 
the harvested fields.
b.- Questions of Self-definition.
The bonds among those constructing the community of 
labouring people were not only "acted out" - as in the peasants' and 
workers' political actions of mutual support - but also "felt". To the 
question of what peasants and workers have in common, usual 
responses were:
We work and they work, and we [both] end up with 
our stomachs empty....
After all, we are all brothers....
What happens there [factory, collieries] is not 
different to what happens here [rural areas]. We are 
always working for somebody else and getting 
little....
He may work there [industry] but comes from my 
village...[Therefore,] we know him...,
When they threw me out [retrenchment], I went back 
to my place [village]....
The landlord and the mine-owner are the same. We 
[who work] are the same....
We toil with the coal and have to face the goondas.
They [peasants] toil in the fields and cannot protest 
either. [In the end] our problems are not so 
different....
My land was taken away [through indebtness]. I 
wanted to work and went to the mine. They said they 
wanted us [peasants] there. We did dirty jobs, [then] 
they did not want us any more. They took my land 
and my job. They take everything [and even] rob the 
earth of all it has [crops, coal]....
Jharkhand peasants have frequently had the experience of wage 
labour in non-agricultural work, usually temporary and not conducive to 
their transformation into a true industrial labour force (see Chapter HI). 
Peasants and workers are aware of their mutual grievances given their 
mobile location in the forces of production. As it happened in the mid- 
1970's, this awareness can be politically mobilized.
Class oppression is not perceived by the peasants and workers 
of Jharkhand in the abstract as a product of a well articulated system of 
modes of production in the countryside, or as derived from industrial 
capitalism in the coal mines or the industrial complexes. Peasants 
concretely experience the loss of their land, the pillage of the products of 
their labour, the consequent deprivation and hunger, and the terror of the 
landlords' paramilitary groups. Workers face the inhuman time-work- 
discipline for the sake of increased production, ruthless retrenchment 
from jobs, the lack of labour protection and rights, and maiming and 
death at the hands of the management’s muscle-men (A.Sinha 1982a: 
111-134) (6). These circumstances are reflected in the succinct statement 
of an adivasi peasant with wage labour experience in the industrial 
setting:
After working all day at the mercy of somebody else, 
we find our stomachs empty....
Whether the reference was to agricultural or industrial work it 
did not seem to matter much in terms of results and the situation of 
helpless subordination.
At the base, in Jharkhand the interests and demands of peasants 
and workers coincide regarding fundamental needs and rights. Their life 
experiences provide the grounds for a common dialogue. In this way, a 
common issue has been an axis around which the combined struggle has 
taken place: the compensation of peasants displaced from lands which
(6) The system of control through terror seems to have settled on the 
muscle-men or lathaits - those trained in the use of lathis or batons - in 
collusion with the bureaucrats that took over management from the 
private mine-owners after nationalization. This system of control 
counted in addition on the support of the police.
have been taken over by the industrial sector, and the unfulfilled 
promises of jobs in this sector for the displaced peasants,a major 
problem that remained unattended after the nationalization of the coal 
mines in the seventies.
Oppression, exploitation, ill-treatment and violent death is 
something that both peasants and workers understand. Underdeveloped 
capitalism has not succeeded in setting up banders to separate the social 
sectors into rigid class categories. The worker-peasant alliance 
materialized largely due to the composition of the working force in the 
collieries, made up of people of rural origins who maintained strong 
links with the agrarian context. Furthermore, a large number of these 
workers were of adivasi peasant origin or belonged to the Scheduled 
Castes, a fact that facilitated the understanding of the combined nature of 
class/ethnic oppression:
The miners in the lowest ranges are harijans and 
tribals. In this area, almost all the harijans are of tribal 
origin, like the Bauris, Detribalization here is 
relatively recent...In a way, they are one and the same 
people....
(A political activist).
At the same time, a problem arises in the Jharkhand context 
with the working force in the industrial organized sector which has come 
from outside the region and were hired under different labour conditions 
(see Chapter HI.l.c and 2.b.). Holding more than 50% of the industrial 
jobs, they have gradually acquired the status of a labour aristocracy. 
Paradoxically, their situation is at the same time privileged and 
uncomfortable for they hold prized jobs but are simultaneously despised 
for being outsiders by the Jharkhandis. This is indicated by the new 
derogatory term Bhojpuri - often applied to the muscle-men - used to 
denote people who will not side with the interests of the Jharkhandis, 
lacking sensitivity towards their problems. One may compare the new 
derogatory term Bhojpuri with the old one diku discussed in previous 
chapters. Common to both is the alien nature of the subjects thus named. 
However, while diku makes sense only in relation to the "tribal/non- 
tribal" dichotomy, Bhojpuri belongs to the realm of class, despite its 
"regional" connotation.
In this situation, the new labouring community was confronted 
with two different political problems. In the case of Jharkhandi peasants
and workers the issue was to present a joint platform and to surmount 
the immigrant workers' segmentation along ethnic or regional lines 
(Chapter IIL2.b). This task was made rather difficult by the 
interpretation of the Jharkhand situation in the media as an issue between 
"immigrants and locals". In interviews with political activists, it was 
stated:
The [worker-peasant] alliance was not so successful 
in places like Ranchi or Jamshedpur where many of 
the workers are outsiders [because] there the 
contradictions between skilled and unskilled workers 
are used by the management to divide them....
The union of all the workers is absent in these places 
[Ranchi, Jamshedpur]....
On the other hand:
It is different in Dhanbad. Roy could even unite the 
workers that came from outside against the 
moneylenders, who equally exploited the workers 
coming from Bihar and West Bengal....
Furthermore, in a complex situation where class and ethnic 
identities so interplay, Roy's success was viewed by political activists 
as:
Particularly important considering the background of 
failures of the tribal leadershhip that take into account 
only tribal unity, and that of the leftist leadership that 
only considers class....
The definition of who is a Jharkhandi ("a producer...[in] 
Jharkhand") is a political formulation, Nirmal Sengupta defines the 
implicit self-perception of the labouring people in the region by 
considering them to be "the destitutes of Jharkhand" (1982a).
4.- Culture and Invented Traditions.
a.- The Forging of Heroes.
Two leaders led the development of the JMM in the seventies: 
Sibu Soren and A.K. Roy. Of them, popular imagination created 
different images of the leader-hero.
A Santal from a village in Hazaribagh, Sibu Soren is the son of 
a school teacher - a familiar "intellectual" figure in rural unrest - who 
consistently opposed the local moneylenders by organizing the adivasis 
against them. In the end, the school teacher was murdered by the 
moneylenders, the crime remained unpunished and Sibu Soren and his 
family were harassed. Soren was fifteen at the time, had to leave school 
and went to work as a labourer. He continued his father's task of 
opposing the moneylenders. Initially, Sibu's entrance into the political 
arena was as an "avenger" (Hobsbawm 1976). This attitude seems to 
have subsequently changed when he realized that,
It was all of us, the Santals, who were being 
exploited, robbed of our land, our crops, even our 
women...and we did not complain....
For almost twenty years he has engaged in organizing the 
Santal peasants to get their lands back. In 1972, with the birth of the 
JMM-MCC coalition, he tapped the forcible harvest protest to launch a 
campaign on that basis. It appears that his main concern has always been 
his own community, the Santals who, in his words:
Walking on a land of theirs, rich even in uranium, go 
around naked....
In the seventies, Soren and the JMM supported the ongoing 
struggle for the forests of the adivasis in Singhbhum.
Sibu Soren's effectiveness as a leader of a grass-roots 
movement made him valuable in the eyes of the Congress (I) which 
started moves for a convenient rapport with him. It was then that what 
have been qualified by some observers as Soren's "mistakes" began (see 
section 2). In consequence, his image among some political activists 
was tarnished to the point that it was scornfully said: "He even calls 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi 'Mataji'!". On the other hand, MCC activists 
avoided during interviews making direct criticisms of Sibu Soren. They
stressed at the same time that he was "undoubtedly a grass-roots leader 
that rose from the base". It was also said: "he has a vague idea of 
ideology". Despite his increasing involvement with institutional politics, 
he still showed a distaste for it in the early eighties. He then said:
City politicians, knowing nothing, not even how to 
work the land, like to come and give speeches on 
how to achieve progress. What do they mean by 
progress when they have not experienced work?
What we need is food....
A point came in Sibu Soren's career when he was labelled "a 
government development officer". On this issue, the MCC remained 
silent. No comment on the matter was obtained during interviews, most 
probably out of solidarity and to avoid endangering the worker-peasant 
alliance by not damaging the peasant leader's prestige.
As stated in a previous quote, the fate of adivasi leadership is 
commonly perceived as sealed: its inevitable cooptation by the State in a 
process in which "the first step is to make them MPs...". Cooptation 
needs identifiable subjects. When grass-roots leadership becomes 
"visible" in the eyes of power-elites as representatives of oppositional 
forces, cooptation may be used as a defusing mechanism. The 
institutionalization of grass-roots leaders by absorbing them into party 
politics performs this role. In this way, these leaders can be "lost" to the 
movements they represent when becoming involved in a different mode 
of political struggle. Cooptation is not the natural fate of the "tribal 
leadership" in India, as commonly argued, but a general feature of the 
present Indian political system.
Despite the fact that in the seventies Soren was drawn into the 
regional worker-peasant movement, his permanent loyalties have 
remained with the Santals. This may be explained by his personal 
history: family experiences, class extraction and the social and cultural 
milieu in which he lived. Later changes in JMM's ideological stance 
have also influenced his present "ethnic only" position, now prevalent in 
the JMM.
Soren has usually been described by the Weberian term 
"charismatic" with its somewhat elusive meaning. This charismatic aura, 
frequently used as a handy explanation for his mass following, was 
■ created on the basis of the peasants' perception of Soren the leader as a
kind of supernatural hero. Extraordinary powers were ascribed to him, 
like riding on a motorbike over water or his ability to appear as four or 
five Sibus, all alike, working here and there simultaneously. Peasant 
heroes tend to become omnipresent. They are everywhere and nowhere, 
a characteristic with a practical side in times of danger (anonymity, 
mobility, hiding). Often too, they become immortal. After they die, they 
remain a lingering presence in the peasants' landscape. They will always 
return, it is believed, although in another shape. It is not, however, 
Soren's turn yet for immortality; it may never be. The press presently 
considers that despite AJSU "[having] snatched the leadership...from 
the older JMM", Soren "is still the most respected figure in all tribal 
land" (The Week 1987: 34, 37). Nevertheless, it is difficult to deduce 
from these comments how peasants do perceive Soren now (7). In his 
present position Soren stands as the inheritor of the Jharkhand dream in 
its Jaipal Singh version. Therefore, presently Soren answers only to one 
of the concerns agitating Jharkhand: a separate state,
A.K. Roy is the other main political figure in Jharkhand's 
grass-roots movement. He has also been described as "charismatic", on 
the basis of the admiration the coal miners feel for him. A mechanical 
engineer in Sindri, described to me as a "declassed professional", he 
became the leader of the workers' movement at Dhanbad coal mines. He 
is highly respected by the workers, who call him Roy Babu, as an 
honest and committed leader. His integrity is acknowledged by all. 
Advisors to the collieries' management, for instance, although not 
agreeing with Roy's political views, spoke of him with respect:
He is the only one who could achieve an alliance 
between peasants and workers in Dhanbad. He is 
articulate and has a logical mind....
At the same time, they compared him with Sibu Soren, whom 
they considered without hesitation:
A criminal...after all a tribal engaged in illegal 
activities like stealing crops....
The contrast between the two leaders was established by these 
advisors on several planes: ethnic ascription (Soren being "a tribal"
(7) At the end of the seventies it was considered that Soren was already 
alienated from the peasantry. He was then forced by circumstances to 
retreat to Pokharia (Tundi), restricting his activities to a handful of 
villages (Iyer and Maharaj 1977:105-108).
therefore engaged in "criminal" activities), class situation (Roy being a 
professional, educated and therefore "logical"), and political strategy 
(Roy's known, therefore understandable, practices = trade unionism, 
alliances, vs. Soren's involvement in informal popular protest).
In the workers' eyes the contrast is in turn established between 
Roy and the leaders of corrupt unions and contractor gangs. At the 
collieries, Roy is perceived as a liberator:
Before Roy Babu formed his union here [Beda], the 
goondas, mahajans and officers tortured us. We then 
chased the goondas and mahajans. Now we are 
free....
(Indian Express interview with a miner, Dec.
31 1979. Cit. in A. Sinha 1982a: 125).
What makes Roy extraordinary in the workers' perception is, 
aside from his capacity to guide them in their struggle, his total 
commitment to them to the point that they could say:
He is one of u s .... He lives like we do .... When we 
have trouble he is with u s ....
That he lives as they do contributes to the image of the leader 
that renounces the benefits of his class and sacrifices all material 
comforts he could otherwise be enjoying. This spartan way of life 
followed by Roy could be observed in the course of interviews with 
him. To the general impression gained from how he lives, the 
"charismatic" element adds up when he speaks, in a soft voice and in a 
patient, convincing tone (a characteristic that others have observed and is 
part of his "special" image). In this, he is contrasted with leftist union 
leaders of the organized sector who "talk much and loud and in the end 
do little".
Alongside the leaders turned into heroes by the people, there are 
also the martyrs, like trade-union leader Sadananda Sha, killed in the 
early seventies, and political activist M., killed in the early eighties. The 
first was a young man, the other a veteran activist. Both however were 
non-Jharkhandis and were related to the worker-peasant alliance and the 
class/ethnic-based ideology of the early JMM. That is to say, they were 
connected to that "tribal/worker struggle" which has been perceived by 
the State as "dangerous".
What is common in the people's perception of leaders as 
"extraordinary" individuals, making them into heroes and martyrs, is 
that these leaders share their lives and that they are with them, even in 
death.
b,- The Drums of Harvest.
The trajectory of agrarian protest in the Santal Parganas- 
Dhanbad area proved a fertile ground for the emergence of the JMM. 
Tundi, a block in the Chotanagpur plateau bordering Santal Parganas 
became the site where the JMM tested the new Jharkhand community, 
capitalizing on the already existing experience in agrarian protest.
As described in Chapter II, the Santals had originally opened 
this area to cultivation and, despite the flow of Hindu immigration, 
continued to constitute a siginificant part of the population. Presently, 
half the peasants in Tundi are Santals. The majority of them have 
become landless in a context in which land alienation and indebtedness 
have been rampant. Santal peasants have been the main protagonists in 
the increasing instances of forcible harvesting of paddy (see also 
Chapter YH).
In the background of present-day agrarian protest lies a long 
struggle for the restoration of alienated lands and a history of 
administrative indifference. The 1969 amendment of the Chotanagpur 
Tenancy Act, 1908 provided for the restoration of all "tribal" land 
alienated in the preceding thirty (in scheduled areas) and twelve years (in 
non-scheduled areas). Legal provisions, however, were not translated 
into practice (8). Faced with this situation, the task of recovering lands 
fell to the peasants themselves. For this purpose, they used an indirect
(8) R. N. Maharaj and K.G. Iyer mention that, in the sixties, before the 
villages of Tundi became the theater of operations of the JMM, the 
Santal peasants of these villages had suffered massive land alienation 
through mortgage for loans, on interest rates ranging from 150% to 
600%. Maharaj and Iyer found in 1969-1970 that almost all the Santal 
households of the two villages in Tundi they surveyed were indebted. 
Land passed into the hands of the moneylenders and was often 
registered outside the area in Purulia. The moneylenders did not invest 
to improve agriculture since their aim was to extract the produce of the 
land and labour. Usury reduced Santal peasants to sharecroppers or 
bonded labourers (1982:173-174).
path, the only one they considered viable; to seize the crops they had 
planted,
To take at least part of what is ours....
We cannot walk away with [take back] our land. We 
then take what the land has given to us [the crops]....
This appropriation of crops was seen by the peasants as a right:
We go [to the fields] to take what is ours....
In this way, forcible harvesting began in Bihar in the shape of peaceful 
collective actions and turned into "harvest clashes" (as reported in the 
press) only when landlords and moneylenders retaliated and fired on the 
peasants.
Forcible harvesting takes place in an organized manner. The 
groups of harvesters range from a hundred to a thousand people. This 
is a community affair: women, men, children, young and old, join the 
"team". A whole village or groups of villages participate. It all starts 
with a march in broad daylight towards the fields to be harvested. The 
men carry their bows and arrows for self-defense against wild animals 
and, increasingly in the course of time, to defend themselves from 
landlords who begun attacking them while attemping to harvest.
Hundreds of people may march to such harvests at the sound 
of drums. The continuous beating of drums marks the rhythm of the 
advancing crowd. The drum "talks" to the Santal peasants. As one of 
them said:
When the drums call, we gather, we go to harvest....
Even when in broad daylight, the sound of drums together with 
the rather solemn behaviour of the crowd, contributes to create an eerie 
atmosphere and, according to non-peasant informants, great alarm in the 
landlords towards whose disputed lands the people advance.
Forcible harvesting is guided by the peasants' decision to 
collect the product of thelands they have tilled, lands whose control they
have lost through illegal alienations. These alienations resulted mainly 
from indebtedness (non-registered, impossible to redeem, high rate 
interest loans) (refer to Chapter II; see also Maharaj and Iyer 1982; 
A.N.Das 1983; N. Sengupta 1982c; Tomasson Jannuzi 1974). 
Moreover, reduced to sharecropping, peasants often do not receive the 
right share of the produce of the land they have cultivated.
The State and part of the media declared these actions to be 
criminal offences. Instead, in the peasants' view:
We are not stealing....
This is our paddy....
Is it a crime to retrieve what has been robbed from
you?....
The peasants' perception of justice is also revealed in the fact that 
forcible harvesting took place only on illegally alienated fields (see 1973 
and 1974 cases in Iyer and Maharaj 1977:75 ff.).
Increasing in frequency and extension, actions of forcible 
harvesting began to be recorded in Bihar and parts of West Bengal by 
the police and the press as early as 1968, With the creation of the JMM, 
forcible harvesting was embraced into the dhan kato andolan as part of 
its program of restoration of illegally alienated lands and became 
widespread.
By 1973 harvesting operations spread from Tundi to other 
blocks in Dhanbad and areas of Giridih with adivasi populations. Later, 
Santal Parganas and Hazaribagh became involved in the protest. At the 
same time, legal actions were undertaken to demand the implementation 
of existing laws like the Bihar Debt Redemption Ordinance. 
Demonstrations of thousands of peasants came before the Deputy 
Commissioner (Giridih) and B.D.O.(Dumri) between October and 
December 1973 asking for land restoration. They faced the authorities' 
unwillingness to enter into a dialogue. The State authorities preferred to 
arrest the protestors (ibid.: 79).
The 1974 and 1975 harvest seasons turned violent. The rising 
tide of committed harvesters was increasingly perceived by landlords 
and moneylenders as a--threat that would become difficult to contain.
Armed clashes began to occur with disquieting frequency. As the 
harvesting campaign gained momentum so did the efforts of the 
landlords, moneylenders and the local administration to crush the 
movement. The landlords reinforced their paramilitary groups and let 
them loose on harvesting peasants.
Forcible harvesting involved not only Santal peasants but other 
rural poor, Kurmis and dalits amongst them, and received the additional 
support of the workers, as in the case of those from Bera colliery 
harvesting paddy together with the peasants in 1974 and 1975. Those 
were the high years of the worker-peasant alliance when solidarity on a 
class basis and across ethnic demarcations was enhanced. Repression, 
as well, strengthened rather than curbed solidarity: protest marches 
gathering thousands of peasants came to complain before the authorities 
for the killings taking place in the rural areas (Maharaj and Iyer 1982: 
184). In the language of the JMM, hundreds of villages had been 
"freed" by 1975 through forcible harvesting. In Sibu Soren's words, 
these areas were "liberated from the dikus".
Forcible harvesting continued unabated in the years that 
followed. Paddy fields were transformed into battlefields during harvest 
season. At the end of 1980 the press still continued to report instances 
of forcible harvesting which had spread by then into West Bengal. For 
instance, under the title "Steps to prevent harvesting clashes", the Patriot 
(1980: 4) published Bengal Minister Jyoti Basu's declarations pointing 
at "adivasis from Bihar under the leadership of the JMM...stealing 
paddy from the fields". The news talked of harvesting on "lands 
belonging to some villagers" and "on a disputed plot of land". It was 
accompanied by a photo of peasants with the caption "peasants 
peacefully harvesting paddy". Nevertheless, it was also reported that in 
four days at least 47 people had been hurt "by bullets and bombs [sic]" 
during clashes between landlords and sharecroppers. The police in turn 
stated that harvest clashes that year were "a real headache".
There were exceptions among Government officials, such as 
Dhanbad's Deputy Commisioner S., with whom I had the opportunity 
to talk. He showed a slight paternalist attitude towards the adivasis, but 
at the same time acknowledged the objective causes of their situation. 
Unlike other Government officials, he visited the JMM headquarters in 
. Tundi and assured the JMM that land restoration would proceed
according to the law. He informed the peasants about the D ebt 
Redemption Ordinance's provisions. He did not take measures to stop 
forcible harvesting but ensured that the operations took place peacefully 
(for instance, setting tripartite committees [officials-adivasis-landlords] 
to settle disputes) (9).
Forcible harvesting attempted to answer the question a Santal 
peasant left hanging in the air:
What is then left to us?..,.
In the peasants' logic, the risk of facing the landlords' guns and arrest 
by the police does not measure up to the threat of hunger, deprivation 
and continuing dispossession. These peasants have "nothing to lose and 
everything to gain" (Fanon 1983: 47) in a situation that may have 
reached the point of "no possible coming to terms".
c.- Culture: a New Morality?.
The JMM, on the one hand, made use of existing indigenous 
elements to address the community's needs, On the other hand, it sought 
to create a "new man" through the introduction of a new moral code, 
partially based on a modified version of the past. The past acted as a 
legitimating agent.
Considerable efforts were made at evolving a feasible 
educational system, independent from Governmental assistance and 
funding. The traditional akhra - "the dancing place" -in every village 
where the movement was operative was transformed into the akil akhra - 
"the place of knowledge". This type of school functioned during the 
night since the youngsters and anyone else who wanted to attend were 
usually working during the day. The lack of practically all educational 
material did not deter the teachers, some of them young villagers with 
some education, others willing adivasi and non-adivasi teachers. 
Significantly, lessons were given in Santali, the everyday language of 
the pupils and a vital anchor for their cultural identity. This early stress
(9) Among the tactics used to contain the JMM was the replacement of 
administrative functionaries in adivasi areas. Saxena was replaced by a 
Deputy Commisioner keen on destroying the movement, among other 
things, by flooding the area with development funds on the condition 
that Soren surrendered (Iyer and Maharaj 1977:107).
on language-identity seems to have weakened later on, at least in 
Soren's view. By the early eighties Soren reluctantly admitted that Hindi 
may have to remain the main educational medium. This position may 
aid in the reproduction of Hindu-Hindi cultural hegemony.
The akil akhra appears as much humbler but at the same time 
more suitable than Chotanagpur’s "village university" (see preceeding 
chapter). Each night at the akhra a bit of a social drama on social 
cohesion took place. Old men and women shared with the very young 
the experience of learning; numbers of children from the lower castes 
would also flock to the "school" and join the adivasi students. Education 
was elementary: reading, writing and some mathematics. It nevertheless 
provided the villagers with defensive elements against moneylenders and 
traders who wanted to cheat "ignorant" peasants.
The issues that became more problematic in the JMM program 
were those that involved a moralizing intention: the attempt to create the 
"new man" through coercion more than conviction. These issues 
revolved around the areas of pleasure and the situation of women.
The JMM approached the issue of the adivasis' liquor 
consumption with the powerful slogan Kalali Toro, Jharkhand chhoro: 
"Smash the liquor shops. Quit Jharkhand". Liquor consumption in 
Jharkhand had indeed become a fostered vice reinforcing mechanisms of 
social degradation. For instance, it helped maintain the adivasis indebted 
in the industrial complexes where meagre wages went rapidly into liquor 
shops (10). On the other hand, for the adivasis, liquor is associated with 
social (communal drinking) and religious (propitiation of deities) 
occasions. This aspect seems not to have been considered by the JMM.
The community's social pressure acted effectively in the 
countryside to curtail liquor consumption drastically. Mobilized women 
made the campaign successful. They took to it with great zeal, since 
prohibition for them meant more resources for the household. The 
method they used was to shamefully expose the drunkards before the 
community. As a result of the campaign, liquor shops disappeared from 
the areas where the JMM operated.
(10) As shown by N.'Sengupta (1982a: 27), liquor consumption in 
Jharkhand means big business and good revenue for the Government.
The anti-consumerism campaign led to the saving of scarce 
resources and the avoidance of heavy debts. However, the campaign led 
to a disavowal of collective pleasure on the basis of economic 
rationality. Anti-consumerism was also put into practice in the 
celebration of marriages. The high expenses derived from bride-price, 
gifts and celebrations were cut down (11).
Other controversial JMM reforms were those related to the 
situation of women, on which Radha Kumar has already commented 
(1982: 203-209). The JMM favoured monogamy, and condemned 
polygamy and divorces that it considered groundless. Young women 
were not allowed to work as maids "for dikus" since this was 
acknowledged to be exploitative and conducive to concubinage and 
prostitution. As stated in interviews, the refusal to send women to work 
as maids, which was thought to encourage their reincorporation into the 
agrarian economy and assure their respect, resulted in an attempt to 
introduce attitudes alien to the adivasi perception of women's roles. In 
this way:
Now it seems inmoral if a woman goes out of the 
house....
At the same time, women's organizations like Mahila Shilp 
Kala Kendra took to learning new skills. However, it emerged during 
interviews that really A.K. Roy "was the only one who really backed the 
women's organizations".
The JMM appears to have aimed at introducing a conception of 
morality alien to adivasi peasant society. For this purpose the JMM 
sometimes used invented traditions. In one instance, contrary to adivasi 
society practices, JMM activists claimed that monogamy and restricted 
divorce were part of adivasi "traditional" society (ibid.). Apparently, the 
JMM started inventing adivasi traditions for the adivasis' consumption. 
At the same time, it ignored a lived ethnic style and its supporting past as 
expressed in religious and social celebrations, forms of marriage and
(11) The JMM reformed the marriage expense pattern by establishing a 
maximun of Rs. 12 in expenses, of 12 for the number of guests, a 
celebration to last only for a day, and the banning of liquor consumption 
during the festivities. The modality of celebrating several marriages at 
the same time was introduced, to pool the existing resources (Iyer and 
Maharaj 1977).
divorce, and the way criminal acts like rape were understood (whereby 
women are not stigmatized).
Some of the JMM reforms were pushed forward by force or 
threat, like the anti-liquor campaign. Possibly, important indigenous 
elements which could have served to maintain the vitality of adivasi 
society and its specificity, and helped in strengthening the grass-roots 
movement (collective festive consumption, confidence brought by 
properly propitiating the deities, the women's equal status), were 
sacrificed for the sake of economic imperatives. By contrast, the 
reformist project has given importance to "the things that make life 
enjoyable" (see preceeding chapter).
5.- JMM's Economic Project.
a.- Attempts at Endogenous Development.
The JMM promoted a new pattern of endogenous development 
in the rural areas. Old but still operative socioeconomic forms of 
organization provided the matrix in which to shape new activities more 
suited to present circumstances and needs (12). Villages became the 
locus where decisions were taken and strategies planned and discussed.
The foundations were laid first in Tundi (Dhanbad), and later in 
Giridih, Santal Parganas and Hazaribagh. The immediate target of the 
agrarian project was to neutralize the control of landlords, moneylenders 
and traders. This was done through the forcible harvesting campaign, 
not paying debts, the anti-consumerism campaign and by building up the 
villages' resources and communal funds.
The long term aim was to revitalize the peasant economy 
through the recovery of alienated lands, the reclamation of wastelands 
and uplands to make them productive, the utilization of ground water 
and the restoration of tanks for irrigation, and the introduction of a 
multiple and more intensive cropping pattern (vegetables, summer rice 
and wheat) replacing monoculture. By 1975 it was claimed that there 
were no landless peasants in Tundi since retrieved lands had been 
distributed amongst those who did not have any. All these aims were
(12) For data on the JMM economic project in the peak years of the mid­
seventies, I rely on Iyer and Maharaj's unpublished report (1977) and 
on talks with Maharaj in 1980. The report was later published in a 
revised and abridged form in N. Sengupta (ed.) 1982a.
attained thanks to the solidarian participation of the communities' 
members and by relying on the indigenous pattern of Santal 
socioeconomic organization.
Cultivation was collectively done, a system Sibu Soren called 
samuhikheti, based on the pooling of all the community's human and 
material resources. The question of land ownership was not approached. 
In the case of lands retrieved from moneylenders and collectively tilled, 
half the produce went to the peasant who had a right over the specific 
plot, a quarter to those who collaborated in cultivating it, and the rest to 
the communal grain bank (grain golas),
Sibu Soren called the grain banks and the collective farm funds 
established under the auspices of the JMM for the benefit of all members 
of the village community, "our own banks". These two organizations 
were crucial in making the moneylenders dysfunctional - by creating 
stable village reserves - and in eliminating market intermediaries - since 
the JMM forbade peasants to sell their produce to intermediaries. The 
grain banks and the collective farms helped to make the villages self- 
sufficient in food and basic agricultural inputs.
The grain golas started to build up their "capital" in seeds with 
what was obtained out of forcible harvesting. This capital was 
augmented and maintained with "deposits" from every household after 
each harvest amounting to double the amount of seeds needed for the 
next sowing season. The quantity required for sowing was used and the 
rest served to help peasants with less land. Iyer and Maharaj (1977: fn. 
198) noted that by 1975 the grain golas could already advance loans for 
seeds and subsistence purposes at a 25% rate of annual interest, to be 
returned at harvest time. Remaining funds were used to pay teachers at 
the akil akhras, legal expenses mostly in relation to cases of forcible 
harvesting, or to further build up the communal "farm banks".
Formerly the rearing of livestock and poultry did not result in 
any long-lasting material benefit since they were consumed at feasts or 
as sacrificial offerings. "Farm banks" attempted to create a standing 
community-owned livestock fund. Every household owning a domestic 
animal would lend it for a year to the farm. The offspring of these 
domestic animals remained at the "farm bank". In this way, no livestock
was bought at the market but reproduced and reared at the collective 
farm.
JMM's collective "banks" may be compared with the 
Chotanagpur Catholic Cooperative Society discussed in the previous 
chapter. The spirit, objectives and operation of each are totally different. 
The grain golas and "farm banks" established under the JMM relied on 
the participation of the whole village community and were oriented 
towards its needs. Most capital was in the form of seeds or livestock, 
cash being a very small part of the households' contributions used to 
support collective activities (13). Emphasis was always put on collective 
- and not on individual - efforts to fulfil everybody's needs and common 
aims.
b.- Use of Indigenous Structures.
Using Santal institutions the JMM put into operation a 
transformed administrative system, counting for its proper functioning 
on the Santal cultural value of ato sagai ("village oneness") and the 
consequent pursuit of consensus (Somers 1977). A change in 
terminology accompanied the institutional modifications.
The organs of the three-tiered hierarchical system were the 
baisies, defined by Soren as "the instruments to clean society". The 
traditional village council became the Atu Baisi. The council used to 
control social behaviour, customary law and land use. It was presided 
over by the village headman (manjhi) and consisted of all the household 
heads. Some of its new tasks related loosely to its former ones, but with 
a shift in emphasis. The council came to control social behaviour in 
relation to consumerism, marriage patterns and drinking. It acquired an 
organizational role by locally mobilizing people for forcible harvesting. 
It repudiated debts contracted with the mahajans, organized the grain 
gola, the collective farm and the akil akhra, and collected the village 
funds. The Atu Baisi fulfilled a new socially integrative role by bringing 
together all oppressed members of the village community regardless of
(13) Aside from the contribution to the grain golas and "farm banks", 
parents with children between four and fifteen years of age provided 10 
kg. of paddy per child a year to the grain gola. Out of it the village 
teacher was paid. Each household contributed as well 10 kg. of paddy 
and Rs. 3 a year to support the movement, and 1 kg. of paddy and Rs. 1 
to take care of guests visiting the village.
caste or ethnic ascription. The manjhi, whose office was hereditary, was 
maintained and made Atu Baisi's president (14).
The second tier in the hierarchical system, the pargana or inter­
village council, had been declining since Independence. It used to be 
formed by elders representing each of the villages in the pargana. 
Renamed Vichar Baisi, it preserved the former composition including 
the presidents of all fifteen to twenty Atu Baisies under its jurisdiction. 
Its role as a supervising body was revived and focused on the Atu 
Baisies's functioning, and on the sociocultural and economic programs. 
It also organized people for protest actions on a medium scale.
The old Lo Bir Sendra or Hunt Council was reformulated as the 
Chetan Baisi and focused on broad issues with a regional perspective. It 
coordinated short and long term objectives, prevented corruption, 
organized large scale mobilizations, took judicial decisions in serious 
cases like those calling for ostracism, and controlled rural exports to 
urban areas.
At the apex of the hierarchy was placed a new institution: the 
Supreme Council at Palma, acting as the highest court of appeal and 
decision-making, and as a body formulating general policies.
As mentioned earlier, as part of the policy of containment, the 
movement in the rural areas was literally smothered by a deluge of 
private and public funds, gifts and loans, until then unseen in the Santal 
areas (15). Dependency on external funds was again reproduced; 
individualism gained some ten-ain over collective effort and self-help.
The weakening of the grass-roots movement has been also 
imputed to changes in Sibu Soren's leadership. It appears that he started 
to monopolize the decision-making process, thus rendering the role of 
the democratic baisies superfluous. A chasm emerged between him and 
the base cadres which increased with time. Sibu Soren had to finally
(14) The same happened with other office-holders, with the exception of 
the ojha or sokha (traditional doctor). This last was another delicate 
issue since JMM cadres perceive it in terms of superstition,
(15) Huge sums of money for rural development, agricultural 
implements (some donated by the Tatas), a tractor for collective farming, 
fertilizers, diesel pumps, electrification in some villages, the building of 
dams and wells, sewing machines and cloth for the women's 
organization, breeding animals to improve the villagers' stocks, etc..
restrict his activities to Pokharia (Tundi) with little scope for generating 
far-reaching socioeconomic changes.
While all these circumstances can be counted as factors that 
diluted the movement towards the late seventies, when A.K. Roy took 
over the task of reviving it, the regional and national context must also 
be considered. Regionally, conditions were favourable after 1974 when 
K.B. Saxena was Deputy Commissioner in Dhanbad, but the situation 
changed when he was transferred. Regarding the national context, the 
Jharkhand grass-roots movement had to survive the Emergency that led 
to the imprisonment of its leadership. The reinforcement of the federal 
authority and the State's coercive mechanisms, especially after 1980 
with the return of Indira Gandhi to power, made sustained peasant 
mobilization difficult.
Conclusion.
Two elements come to notice in the development of 
Jharkhand's grass-roots movement: first, the JMM came to lead an 
already mobilized peasantry; second, it temporarily succeeded in 
attaining an alliance between peasants and workers. Besides, the ethnic 
question introduced a further element of complexity at the political level, 
adding to the major problem of the articulation of the peasants' and the 
workers' struggles.
The question of the possible alliance of peasants and workers 
poses a special problem: combining their interests, demands and modes 
of political struggle, their different "rythms (or cycles) of political 
protest" (Post 1979), and making both sensitive to each other's 
problems. In perspective and with the added element of ethno-regional 
differentiation, JMM's success in the seventies was remarkable. Two 
facts account for this: the composition of the labour force and the efforts 
of the trade-union leader Roy at articulating class and ethnic factors.
In the the rural areas, the movement's aims at self-sufficiency at 
all levels - economic, legal, educational, administrative - favouring 
cooperation and not competition, the opposition it presented to social
sectors like the landlords, and the militancy of its followers made the 
project "subversive" in the eyes of the State. Peasants involved were in 
fact rejecting subordination and paternalism. Ironically, these were two 
of the weapons the State used to defuse the movement.
Organic continuity is not a normal part of peasant political 
action, which is usually localized and limited in time-span according to a 
world-view centered in the community or the region. The motives that 
animate rural protest are specific, and are mostly related to the need to 
have land and to work it for a living, or at least for survival. However, 
hopes of establishing a more general just order are not absent from the 
peasants' goals (Devalle and Oberoi 1983). This Utopian universality 
contributed to the "open" nature of the JMM movement. On the other 
hand, the "openness" of the JMM that prevailed until the early eighties 
also appears to derive from a formulation of the Jharkhand question in 
combined class/ethnic terms.
FOURTH PART
THE DIALECTICS OF CULTURAL STRUGGLE
Chapter VII
THE DIALECTICS OF CULTURAL STRUGGLE
Culture is the vigorous manifestation on the 
ideological or idealist plane of the physical and 
historical reality of the society that is dominated or to 
be dominated...
Amilcar Cabral, Return to the Sources.
1,-Introduction
In this chapter, two concepts - culture of oppression and culture 
of resistance - are introduced (*). These concepts will prove helpful to 
grapple with the nature of ethnicity in Jharkhand, a region where class 
exploitation and ethnic subordination coalesce, and where a dialectical 
movement develops between continuous efforts to make hegemony 
effective and visible as well as clandestine efforts to contain and contest 
it.
After explaining why the accent has been placed on cultural 
tropes, a brief section will be devoted to the situation as perceived by the 
observer (1). This is a datum to be taken into account. It may help to 
understand to a greater degree, how the people that live day by day in 
such a situation experience it, and how they deal with it. It will touch as 
well on the constraints put on the actual field research. We will be able 
then to present and analyze the contents, the purpose and th$ forms in 
which a culture o f oppression and a culture o f resistance are expressed 
in the area under study, and their signifying value at a specific historical 
moment: the present.
Bihar has been described as a "near-lawless state", an example 
of "the culture of torture", an "area of darkness" (Link 1983:10; 1986: 9;
(*) The role of culture in situations of domination has already been 
discussed in Devalle 1985a: 32-57. There a culture o f resistance was 
conceptualized as clandestine culture o f protest. This chapter has been 
partially based on the theoretical contents of that article.
(1) See the discussion on the need to consider this aspect in Marcus and 
Cushman 1982: 33.
EPW  1980b: 1993-1994; India Today 1986b: 40-43) (2). Violence in 
Bihar marks the prevailing social order and has become a signifying 
system: a language, some of its codes open, others exclusive and 
concealed. There are other facts of a different nature in the context of 
this area of India. Some of these facts are somehow less tangible or 
easily acknowledgeable. Of them, it suffices to mention one that 
overrides the picture: the subaltern sectors' collective will to survive. 
This is the most significant and basic manifestation of a culture o f 
resistance, the other side of pervading oppression. Survival is taken here 
in its most plain meaning: physical survival under specific conditions of 
subordination. It may be noted here what V. Das says while 
commenting on Saadat Hasan Manto's stories on communal riots: 
“...death is the unmarked category; it is all-pervasive and unproblematic. 
In contrast, life needs to be explained...'1 (V.Das 1985:7-8).
When approaching the issues to be examined in this chapter, 
the questions of feeling and experience will be kept in mind. In doing 
so, faulty objectivity is not being advocated but the "recovery of 
subjective experience" (Samuel 1981: xviii ff.) (3). Unavoidable elements 
of subjectivity must be acknowledged in any social analysis (Maquet 
1964:51). Recently, E.Said felt the need to underline once more that "no 
production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or 
disclaim its author's involvement as a human subject in his own 
circumstances", this not being "an inert fact" (1979:11). Facts only 
speak - are translated into a discourse - having the observer's as well as 
the "observed's" Erlebnisse - lived experiences with a past and a present 
- as vehicles (4).
2.- Culture.
We live in a transitional society, and the idea of 
culture, too often, has been identified with one or 
other of the forces which the transition contains...We 
are none of us referees in this; we are all in the game, 
and playing in one or other direction....
Raymond Williams, Culture and Society1780-1950.
(2) Although Bihar may be taken as an extreme example, similar 
processes have developed elsewhere in India since the Emergency, 
expressed in different socio-political configurations.
(3) Feelings and experiences, in their actual manifestations, are 
objective. Feelings can order social behaviour, although they have their 
source in a subjective appreciation of reality.
(4) See the discussion in E. P. Thompson 1980: 199-201; 1981: 405- 
406.
Culture is understood here in its deepest meaning, as foremost 
and always social, forming part of everyday social reality and closely 
linked to material life. Culture is shaped around the synthesis of the 
collective consciousness of a people, a class or a social sector, a 
synthesis by which their perception and representation of the social and 
natural totality is organized in each historical moment. Taking place in 
concrete, flowing historical contexts, this constant exercise in synthesis 
is likely to produce changes in the consciousness of the particular 
people, class or sector in its thrust to organize social relationships and 
the relationships between men and nature, be it by preserving them as 
they are presently lived or by altering them radically. As such, then, 
culture far exceeds the empiricist's limits that restrict culture just to its 
material expressions or to the external symbols of identification.
The materialist position understands culture as "a whole social 
order". R.Williams (1982) has discussed the evolution of the concept of 
culture in the field of the sociology of culture to finally concentrate on 
the present convergence of the idealist position - emphasizing the role of 
a "spirit informing a whole way of life" - and the materialist position, 
into a conception of culture as a "signifying system" that operates in all 
forms of social activity. The utilization of this combined perspective has 
widened the analysis in the field of inquiry of culture.
In the discussion and analysis of data that follows, culture will 
be understood as a comprehensive field, embracing all that is produced 
with the hands, the mind and the "heart", not in isolation but in close 
relationship with the social "body", "mind" and "heart". That is, culture 
is conceived here as a way of life moulded by social and economic 
forces, entailing a whole social order which involves a set of signifying 
practices - the languages in which a cosmovision supporting a social 
order is expressed - and a way of feeling - the subjective experience of 
the social that allows one to link, in Samuel's words (1981: xxxii), "the 
individual moment with the longue dureen (5).
. (5) I am indebted to Jorge Galeano for his comments on the importance 
of this element: feeling as constitutive of culture.
In examining the process of dominance and subordination in 
Bihar one must also consider the question of the reproduction of 
hegemony and how this is negated (6).
In brief, hegemony is a whole social process in which specific 
and dominant meanings and values are organized and expressed in 
practices, and incorporated into a social order. Hegemony is related to 
questions of the distribution of power. Hegemony acts on the whole 
level of living, being "in the strongest sense a 'culture'...which has also 
to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular 
classes" (Williams 1978: 110). Hegemony is therefore an uneven 
process in which the discontinuities emerging from an attempted 
hegemonic inclusivity over the whole area of lived experience, set limits 
to these attempts, thus leaving spaces free to be conquered by counter- 
hegemonic forces (7).
Gramsci considered hegemony (consent) and coercion to be 
interdependent, and the use of coercion to be determined by the nature of 
the consent that had been achieved (Gramsci 1973. See also Showstack 
Sassoon 1982: 94-116; Buci-Glucksmann 1982: 116-126). The 
relationships between hegemony and coercion are complex and can be 
approached not in the abstract but by setting politics in a historical 
context. Coercive ways may be used while attempting to establish 
consent or to reinforce a weak hegemonic order.
We observe in Bihar that the achievement of hegemony has 
been sought through the operation of a culture o f oppression and that, at 
the same time, counter-hegemonic practices have become integrated into 
a culture o f resistance in opposition to the first. None of these two 
cultural formations are like any other culture, given that they evolve in 
very specific historical situations, are in mutual dependence and develop 
dialectically. In both cases these cultures are manifested in explicit 
modes as well as in concealed, often clandestine texts. In the present
(6) The concept of hegemony is used following Antonio Gramsci's 
formulation (1973), in essence going back to what is expounded by 
Marx in The German Ideology (Marx and Engels 1965: 61).
(7) In E. Genovese's words:
Hegemony implies class struggles and has no meaning apart from 
them...It has nothing in common with consensus history and represents 
its antithesis - a way of defining the historical content of class struggle 
during times of apparent quiescence.... (1976: 77-98. Cited in E.P. 
Thompson 1978:163, fn. 60).
context, a concealed or clandestine social text (8) refers to those values, 
symbols, and ideas about the world and society that have a social 
meaning and are communicated, principally through codes exclusive to 
the class or social sector concerned, providing background support to 
their explicit expressions. Ingrained in the concealed or clandestine texts 
are the lines for potential action. Explicit as well as concealed texts 
have to do with power; both are purposive and are translated into social 
practices.
3.-Feeling: the sensing of the social phenomena,
i  became aware of everything, as if terror could make 
oneself conscious of every moment and, at the same 
time, as if terror had an autonomous inertia....
C. Monsiv&is. Interview with Proceso,
Mexico, Sept. 23,1985.
Like a text, human action is an open work, the 
meaning of which is "in suspense"...Human 
action...is opened to anybody who can read,.,
P. Ricoeur, The Model of the Text....
Culture is dynamic, continuously constructed at the quotidian 
level, and related to social and material processes implying forms of 
practical consciousness. How, then, can one free events and experiences 
from the fixed forms they are made to adopt as "facts" in common 
scientific discourse? How can one capture the social as it is actually lived 
by the observer as well as by the protagonists?
By the "sensing of the social phenomena" I refer to what 
Raymond Williams calls "the undeniable experience of the present" 
facing "all that is present and moving, all that escapes or seems to escape 
from the fixed and the explicit and the known, [and that] is grasped and 
defined as the personal: this, here, now, alive, active, "subjective"' 
(1978:128). This experience has not only per se as much value as any
(8) I first developed the concept of clandestine text in 1981 (Devalle 
1981b: 26-33; 1985a). Shortly after the publication of my second article I 
came to know J, Scott's (1985) conception of "hidden transcripts" that 
share much in common with my own conceptualization of these texts. 
These texts are conceived here as being part of social and political 
processes. Contrary to Geertz's metaphor of culture as a text, culture is 
understood here as reality, i.e., linked to material social processes.
other quantifiable and catalogueable fact. It is instrumental - as Gramsci 
remarked - to avoid falling into
... the intellectual error...[of] believing that one can 
know without understanding and even more without 
feeling and being impassioned (not only for 
knowledge in itself but also for the object of 
knowledge)....
(1973: 418).
In Bihar, the moment when field-work took place was not 
favourable to inquire and look into social and political phenomena. In 
retrospect, one can think of few moments appropriate for that purpose. 
When in the field, signals were sent to me to remain passive. Even 
after I had returned to Delhi, a local administrator from Bihar, apparently 
alerted by some grapevine, sought me out and commented to me: 1 You 
talk little but you see and hear too well". "Seeing", "listening", "getting 
to know", are not healthy activities in Bihar. References to this fact were 
often made to me during my field-work in the form of advice or 
warnings.
What was it that everybody was afraid would become known? 
Warnings came sometimes in the shape of casual anecdotes, with the 
implicit intention of protecting the observer's safety, as in the following 
case:
You remind them [the peasants] of Miss X [a British 
young lady, possibly a missionary]...They took you 
for her. She was killed. It was said that it was a 
passionate crime. The fact is that she knew too 
much.,..
(Comment made to me while in one of Chota Nagpur's 
villages).
The ground for this confusion was my showing interest in them 
and a feeling that, somehow, I "knew" [what the situation was]. It is 
important to note that the common people regard this kind of 
"knowledge" as dangerous, and feel concerned about those who seek 
"to know".
With respect to those who wielded power, what could be 
clearly felt was their need to demonstrate this power in the form of 
arrogance, scorn for others and authoritarianism. The fact that I was
beyond his control upset Prof. X, who made all kinds of efforts to 
make me understand that he was a person with power and influence in 
the Ranchi area. This circumstance was reflected in an incident in which 
Prof. X withheld a pass given to me by the Commissioner during a 
period of curfew. I was finally forced to use the pass under rather 
uncomfortable circumstances: at night, crossing the fields during tight 
curfew and with riots going on in the area. At night, a little piece of 
paper could not have made much difference. The stage of Nature: 
darkness, a sense of helplessness in lonely surroundings, united to the 
social text: the very tangible presence of violence, were elements that can 
provoke fear (not as an individual psychological event but a social 
event). At that moment, I took the incident of the pass only as an 
annoyance. Fear reached me much later during the derailments and 
disturbances on the road to Patna, on another, quite different night, and 
later still, in November 1984, when what I had perceived before in 
Bihar was magnified a thousand-fold in Delhi and across North India.
As long as the origins of fear are traceable, personalized, it is 
easy to fight it. It is when it comes to be perceived as "an autonomous 
force", as Carlos Monsivais observes (1985), that it successfully 
permeates the social fabric and the collective psychological realm. When 
oppression evolves into a social order structured with forms, patterns, 
designs that seem invisible but are implacable, and is accompanied by 
specific practices, fear - the soul of subordination - installs itself in 
quotidian life. The social field becomes thus governed by the rules of 
violence - physical and psychological, open and subtle, not occasional 
but persistent, repetitive. Finally, fear may develop into something 
"learned", "natural", apart of the process of socialization (9).
The Bihar stage was filled with the constant inteiplay of 
practices of dominance and subordination in daily life feeding servile 
attitudes, the treatment given to the lesser people, the shouts, the 
commands, the expressions of petty power, the racist scorn in daily 
conversations and attitudes, the insidious crushing of self-respect.
The way in which many of my interviews were arranged and 
conducted also reflected the social climate. Many interviews were
(9) Other elements also contributed to create in the observer a first 
impression of Bihar's social stage, for instance, the disclosure at that 
moment of the Bhagalpur blindings (Kamath 1981: 17; EPW  1980b: 
1993-94; 2 7 1981b: 3 ; IE 1980a and b).
anonymous, unexpected, at odd hours and usually took place with great 
precautions. This happened not only in Bihar but in Delhi as well when 
the interviews were with people active in Bihar oppositional politics. In 
these instances, care was taken to ensure my safety.
In such a climate, certain attitudes start developing. The 
observer begins to "speak little", to look and listen intently. But, what 
happens to people that daily live in such a social environment?
The signs of resistance were more subtle than the reality of 
oppression but still could be read: the silence of contempt, the unspoken 
distrust, the endurance and the preservation of vitality in a social 
environment of constraint, the desire to approach the observer under the 
cloak of anonymity and the insistence on the need "to make people 
know [what is happening]" (sometimes an explicit request, but always 
an implicit one). Besides such signs, there were the open actions that 
will be discussed in the course of this chapter and the omnipresent 
attitude of resistance permeating life.
Having defined the field of inquiry and the way this is going to 
be approached, the mode in which the dialectics of cultural struggle 
takes place in Jharkhand will now be examined. The cultural formations 
of oppression and resistance are treated separately in the present chapter 
to facilitate the presentation of data. Both cultures, however, should be 
considered side by side, interacting, as two voices in counterpoint.
4.- Jharkhand's Culture of Oppression.
A great part of politics and law is always theatre....
E.P. Thompson, Patrician Society, Plebeian 
Culture.
Terror, counter-terror, violence, counter-violence: 
that is what observers bitterly record when they 
describe the circle of hate, which is so tenacious and 
so evident in Algeria....
F.Fanon, The Wretched o f the Earth.
A culture o f oppression can be defined as the aggregate of 
dominant meanings and values, accompanied by practices in which 
violence and coercion enter as significant constitutive elements in the
reproduction of the hegemonic order, by which the powerholders aim at 
maintaining and strengthening their superordinate position. (For a 
different view on violence, cf, Riches 1986: 1-27). As mentioned 
above, this culture evolves in dialectical interplay with forces of 
resistance.
The expressions of this culture in the public domain are usually 
abundant given that its force resides in making these expressions widely 
known to the subordinates (10). This extensive appropriation of the 
public domain by the powerful stems also from the necessity to limit the 
use of this field by the powerless. It is in this realm that the theater of 
power takes place, pushing the subordinate classes' "text" of protest 
underground. In situations of domination-subordination, where a 
structured culture o f oppression prevails, the theater o f power - so aptly 
analyzed by E.P.Thompson (1974:382-405) - may develop into a theater 
of terror. The theater of terror has several characteristics, mostly defined 
by their extreme nature: to cause terror, not just fear of authority; to be 
repetitive, not finite; pervasive, not localized; inculcating self­
derogation, not just compliance. Terror as a mechanism to enforce 
subordination does not stop at being only part of a "theatrical style of 
dominance" but usually gives way to an actual practice o f terror, 
experienced by those who are its targets as reality (See Leach's 
comments on Geertz. Leach 1981: 30-33). The theater and the practice 
of terror attempt to pervade the whole area of lived experience in order to 
make it lived dominance and lived subordination.
The case of the Gua killings on September 8, 1980 illustrates 
the dynamics of a "theatrical style of dominance" and its transformation 
into a practice o f terror,
A procession of adivasis, wishing to submit a memoranda to 
the Forest officials, was allowed to march into Gua and hold a public 
meeting organized by the JMM. Gua had already been sealed off by the 
BMP. When the police arrested two of the leaders and attacked the 
multitude, the adivasis answered by shooting arrows, killing two 
policemen. The police fired, killing some and injuring others. The 
injured were taken by their companions to the hospital where police 
forces were already waiting. The wounded and those who had carried
(10) This is observable in the frequency of atrocities against labouring 
harijans and adivasis reported in the last decade, presented to the crowd 
as instances of "exemplary punishment".
them stopped near the entrance to the hospital. The police lined them up 
and shot them (11). The Gua story concludes with instances of the 
practice of terror, the killing of the innocents at the doors of the hospital 
performed as exemplary punishment (assumedly in retaliation for the 
death of policemen during the confrontation). The symbolic meaning of 
the punishment inflicted on the innocents should be noted. This 
punishment stresses before the weak the unlimited reach of the violence 
inspired by the powerful's wrath. Terror comes to be seen as a force that 
nobody can contain. It is perceived by its "objects" as unending and 
beyond human control:
Death, raids, attacks on women...and death, raids 
and attacks on women again. Nobody sees [takes 
notice] and it will never stop....
We are killed and robbed. It happened yesterday, [it 
happens] today, [it will happen] tomorrow....
(C om m ents reco rd ed  in the C hota 
Nagpur/Singhbhum area).
In Bihar, the dominant order appears to rest on physical power 
(coercion, punishment and terror), and on cultural hegemony (enforcing 
a socialization into subordination). Of the unedited discourses that back 
the culture o f oppression as it operates in Jharkhand, I concentrate on 
the following: the conceptions of (1) superiority/inferiority; (2) 
dominance/subordination; (3) violence as a "right" of the powerful and 
the "object" of violence, and (4) a perception of the subordinates as 
dangerous.
(a) The adivasis, particularly the majority in the lower economic 
range, are conceived as inferior: biologically, in intelligence and 
achievements (people seen as "naive", as "children", as the stereotype of 
the gullible "savage"), and culturally (people seen as beyond the pale of 
"high culture", in other words, not conforming to the dominant cultural 
values).
(11) The incident took place shortly before my field-work commenced. 
Therefore, it was possible to collect enough material to reconstruct the 
events on the basis of comments and information collected in the course 
of interviews, supplemented by data collected by journalists. See also 
PUCL Report 1979; EPW  1979: 940-943; Devi 1981b: 1595-97; 
Pardesi 1980). The Gua case was discussed in detail in a paper 
presented at the World Congress for Rural Sociology (Bologna, 1988) 
and is the subject of a forthcoming article.
The adivasis are called junglee , "people of the jungle" or 
"wild", a term close to the pejorative "savage". They are referred to by 
the racist name kaliparaja (from the Sanskrit M=black, andparaja=bom 
of another, a member of another community, alien, different).
The colour question is present although not always made 
directly explicit. Self-de valuation in racist terms has been internalized as, 
for instance, in the following remarks:
What can I do? I am just a black Santal....(A 
peasant).
Would you marry a Munda youth,..even if he is a bit 
dark? (A Munda woman).
Non-adivasis talked of the adivasis as "simple" and "naive", 
adjectives that in the present context are not eulogistic. Such terms go 
well with the pseudo-scientific "primitive", still in vogue among the 
anthropologists working in the area (but not exclusive to them since this 
is an all-India phenomenon among anthropologists and administrators). 
Another accompanying adjective is the well-known and officially 
sanctioned "backward". For instance:
Primitive tribes are more backward than the tribes 
themselves....(An educated adivasi).
There are tribes in an extremely underdeveloped 
stage....(Government officer).
We are dealing with one of the most intractable 
problems of India,...(An administrator on the 
"tribal problem").
They are simple because they do not understand 
the economy. They do not understand what is 
suiplus capital...They start to want things and have 
to enter the money economy. But they do no t 
become aware of what this economy is all about,... 
(Development Agent).
The main problem  of the tribal people is their 
traditional background....(Development Agent).
India is an anthropological m useum l (A local 
anthropologist).
(Emphasis added)
Simple, not able to understand, in a "lower" stage of 
development, backward, they are seen by the State and its Agents as a 
most difficult problem for the administration, a problem that is 
considered to be the adivasis' own creation, the result of "their 
traditional background". If there were not adivasis, there would be no 
problem. In this context of discrimination and condescension, the 
anthropologists' image of India as a museum sums up the perception of 
its indigenous peoples: constructed and catalogued as specimens 
belonging to a remote era in society's evolutionary process.
As an example of undervaluation, a portrait of adivasi women 
is instructive:
Adivasi women are free and naive! They are ignorant 
and so they are abused....
They [the adivasis] are exploited by other people 
because their women are free and the men are 
weak....
(Opinions of non-adivasi women)
On the marriage of a European ex-priest with an Oraon girl 
there was the following comment:
She used to work in the fields of the mission. He is 
very rich... She does not know English and likes 
status symbols given that she lacks any education.
She is a mercenary. She is very confused....(the 
wife of a development Agent).
Economic exploitation and sexual abuse are directly ascribed to 
the "innate" features of the adivasis. "Ignorance", "weakness" and 
"freedom" make an awkward combination to express something like 
"these are not our values", therefore "these are the consequences" or "it 
is their fault". When the adivasis change and move into forbidden 
grounds, the image is not any more flattering: ignorance again, 
confusion and deceit, as in the case of the Oraon girl who from field- 
hand tried to become "a lady".
As already pointed out in Chapter III, the adivasi women's 
"naivet6" and "freedom" was given as an argument to justify their 
prostitution around the industrial complexes. Prostitution, a 
phenomenon with deep socioeconomic roots is understood as an 
"accident" resulting from the irresponsible nature of the adivasis.
Instances where the concealed texts of superiority-inferiority 
were made explicit could be observed at the "Workshop on Strategy for 
the Development of Primitive Tribes", organized by the Bihar Tribal 
Research Institute (Ranchi, December 1980). This was an opportunity to 
witness a mini-social drama (cf. Turner 1974: 37 ff.; 1982: 61-89).
The Government, the scientific establishment, i.e. the total local 
body of applied anthropologists, and the Church with missionaries 
representing every denomination operating in the area, are 
conspicuously present. Around the table there are adivasis and non- 
adivasis, a fact not obvious at first sight. Most of those present wear 
Western clothes; few wear Indian garments. Those adivasis who are 
part of the round table - part as well of the elite of "the educated" - all 
wear Western clothes; their identity is disclosed only if by chance they 
say their names. This way of dressing does show, on the other hand, 
the class position of those who wear them and a "style" that broadly 
identifies them with executive positions (as in Government).
I chat with the leading anthropologist before the proceedings 
start. He asks me about the Lacandons in Mexico: "Are they primitive?". 
I do not understand what he means (My notes say : "What does he 
mean? Is he only using an old term or does he mean something else?"). 
Another participant informs me that Bihar is an amazing treasury of 
"tribal relics".
The proceedings start with talks about the "need to attain the 
psychological integration of the tribals into the mainstream" - a "sacred" 
mainstream that anthropologists apparently believe should "not.,.be 
violated by research" (Sengupta 1986:5). Some of the applauded 
conclusions are: "Some of the groups called 'backward' are really 
backward"; "As the name 'primitive' sounds harsh for people [who are] 
more or less like us, I suggest the term 'primary group1" (Prof. X), and 
"Development must be imposed without waiting for them [the adivasis] 
to decide", as this is "a sacred national task".
The only adivasi speaker, an old priest high in the Christian 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, speaks with deference and only refers to the 
need to preserve cultural traits and languages. The response of the 
Government representative is quick and reassuring: "We are careful to
preserve traditions, customs and culture. We have the rich traditions of 
the tribal people...Culture has to be dealt with. From a nationalist point 
of view we need to see that this happens".
Then, after much serious talk, the "light show" starts. A mini­
drama on the themes of superiority-inferiority and dominance- 
subordination is staged:
Four adivasi boys, very young, from the Bir Hor, Savara and 
Asur groups, have to perform as "samples", literally, before the 
audience. The boys are poorly dressed, with bits and pieces of cheap 
and worn clothes. Standing huddled together at one side of the table on 
the dais, they look shy and uncomfortable. They are made to say their 
names and ethnic group, and made to give a pre-arranged and monitored 
speech in Hindi - a Hindi teacher sitting at the table constantly 
correcting them in whispers. The short and forced speech finished, the 
audience relaxes and smiles, as if these boys were three year olds 
reciting a poem in front of visiting relatives. For the observer, the scene, 
the look on the faces, are disgusting (My notes read: "We are back in 
Columbus' times").
The boys are not allowed to participate in the discussions being 
held about them . Moreover, to close their brief appearance, one of 
them, the Bir Hor boy, sings a song. Some of its lines say:
Everything is changing except the Adivasis.
The Americans have gone to the moon, 
and the Adivasis are only crawling about....
The boys dismissed, the audience is asked to rest and have 
some tea.
What are the texts that can be read in this brief social drama?
First, what about the actors? On the one side, the carriers of 
the dominant ideology, the "intellectuals of the superstructure" in 
Gramsciam terms, were all present, physically as well as symbolically: 
Government, Science, and the Church, accompanied by the 
"intermediaries": members of the educated adivasi elite. They
differentiated themselves from the rest of the actors by their dress, 
position in the room, attitudes, form of speech and the language they 
used (English). Regarding clothing, it is to be noted that in only two 
cases it revealed a different identity: the Ramakrishna Mission 
representative in yellow robes, and an administrator cum anthropologist 
considered to be "more progressive", in a Nehru jacket. In this context, 
one may see these clothes as expressions of tradition and nationalism.
At the other end of the stage were the adivasis. They were 
represented first through the constant translation into speech of the tribal 
construct (the symbolic), and second, in the brief performance of the 
four adivasi boys, which served to reinforce the construct. Their 
appearance and behaviour contrasted sharply with the audience's. They 
conformed to the stereotyped image of "the tribal" as "primitive": poor, 
foolish, childish, clumsy, ignorant, subservient, with an "inferiority 
complex", and in constant need of guidance (monitored speech, repeated 
unasked for help, relief of the audience when they "could make it").
The verbal discourses during the meeting showed the strength 
of scientistic constructs in legitimizing the superiority-inferiority 
hierarchy, as reflected in the adjectives being used ("primitive", 
"backward", "tribal", etc.), the ideas that the indigenous people are 
"relics of the past", and that some are "people like us" (while others 
implicitly are not). The defence of the hegemonic order (dominance- 
subordination), sometimes euphemistically phrased as "the national 
task", permeated the discussions and revealed itself, for instance, in the 
conception of the indigenous people as "objects" of development and 
policies in general, with no right to give an opinion or to decide about 
their own lives. The intention to "deal with culture" (like a process to be 
externally controlled) and the emphasis on "psychological integration" 
fall within the same parameters.
The presentation of the four boys before the audience is a 
whole text in itself, that of dominance-subordination in its explicit mode. 
The boys were brought in, "used" for the show and dismissed, after 
being treated with condescension and not with equality (exclusion from 
the proceedings to the extent that they were not allowed to stay) (12).
(12) The way I recorded my impressions at that moment (the association 
with Columbus' times) seems to provide an appropriate parallel: some 
"specimens" were brought to "Court" to prove their existence and the 
success of "conquest".
Regarding the boys, the text reads somewhat differently: their shame of 
themselves and their acceptance of their discriminated condition and 
subordinate status.
(b) From this general assignment of innate inferiority to the 
adivasis stems the view that these are people who should occupy a 
subordinate position, a subordination in which they should and will 
inevitably remain (a view that shows in the comments made about the 
Oraon girl quoted above). This belief in the marginality of the adivasis is 
in turn translated into social practice. First, in its "benevolent" form 
characterized by paternalism, charity and unasked for guidance 
(background in Devalle 1980b). Secondly, in its authoritarian form, in 
the practice of psychological and physical violence.
"Tribal" is immediately equated with low social status. This is 
the perception that supports the perpetuation of the image of the adivasi 
as the ideal coolie, that is, fit to serve or to perform tasks that are related 
more to strength and endurance than to the use of skills. Thus, for 
instance, it is common to see teams of adivasis dragging long two­
wheeled carts with heavy loads, pulling rickshaws, or doing menial jobs 
in houses and offices. There were opportunities to observe them in their 
assigned subordinate roles in situations where authoritarianism and 
servility interplayed. For instance: Prof. Y rings a bell for his adivasi 
servant to pick up the phone, the pen that is exactly in front of him on 
the desk, or just to make him come in for nothing. Somehow the scene 
evokes the "crawling" in the Bir Hor boy’s song quoted above.
Adivasis are, besides, thought only to be suited to till the land 
and work in precarious mines, How prejudiced stereotypes and assumed 
"traits" ascribed to the adivasis are used to maintain them in the unskilled 
positions in the industrial sector, and how these constructs have helped 
create "labour-supplying areas", was discussed in Chapter m .2,a and b.
(c) Violence has acquired for the dominant classes in Bihar the 
weight of a "value" - the normal condition of life necessary to maintain 
the existing order - legitimized as the "right" of the powerful (13).
(13) See Home Commissioner Arun Pathak's statement:
Why are you [Government officials] wasting time on improving the lot 
of the tribals?...Crush them...Frame their leaders and put them behind 
bars.... ~ ''(Pardesi 1980:7).
Meanings, even those with an already disturbing implication, 
are further twisted and charged with an additional load. In this way, the 
gun, from being a symbol of potential violence, becomes a symbol of 
the violence of the powerful. In Bihar, the gun "has a caste" (not just as 
applied to Uttar Pradesh: castes with arms, but in the general sense of 
the 'caste of the armed ones') (14).
Violence has meaning only if it has an object. Values of 
inferiority-superiority easily provide this object. In the evaluation of 
inferiority first comes the idea of servility and naivete. Then the process 
of de-humanization begins: they are ignorant and primitive ("like 
children", a common remark made by non-adivasis), but able to stand 
hardship. When violence enters the picture, the process of construction 
of the object is completed: poor adivasis become objectified, a de­
humanized target, a mass without identity.
The results of this process of objectification of the victim is 
reflected in all its crudity in a theater and a practice o f terror. When 
alluding to some of these violent incidents, like the Gua killings, the 
view was expressed that the lives of the adivasis are worthless. For 
instance:
Well, yes, some tribals were killed....
After all, it's inevitable. How does one maintain order 
otherwise!....
Arun Pathak, known for his "aversion to tribal people", was formerly 
Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division. He was blamed for the 1978 
police mass rapes in Beldiah, Pakadia, Kerawa and Bakhadda (ibid.).
(14) See the data on licensed and unlicensed arms and the social sectors 
that have access to them in Link 1981: 16-17. The existence of private 
militia in the rural areas at the service of landowners has been widely 
reported (F 1979: 7-8; Link 1983: 9-10; EPW 1986: 15-18). The group 
that has access to firearms and can arm a body of men with the purpose 
of controlling other social sectors, is part of the 'caste of the armed 
ones' (in other contexts, the 'military castes').
What could the police do with that mob ! As
usual, a bullet is fired, there is anger, somebody
always dies..,,
(Various comments recorded in the Chota 
Nagpur/Singhbhum area. Emphases added).
The victims are not clearly identified; they are just a vague 
"somebody". Violence is seen as a normal part of life (it is "usual"), as 
an autonomous force (it is "inevitable"), and its Agents remain usually 
concealed in speech by the use of the impersonal ("there is..."; "...is 
fired"). The legitimacy of this "upper" violence is also clearly reflected 
in the "hows" and "what elses".
(d) Observing the practice of violence by the powerful in Bihar 
and its stimulus, and considering the systematic nature of dominance- 
subordination, one recalls J. Scott's suggestive idea of the development 
among the powerful of a "structural paranoia" (1986:5), in circumstances 
when the subordinates' thoughts and intentions are perceived as difficult 
or even impossible to grasp with certainty and, one may add, when 
coercion is widely used in the organization of consensus. We observe 
the existence of a behaviour and feelings of omnipotence in conjunction 
with a fear of retaliation (see Klein 1960: Ch. VI and VII passim).
For the powerful, the mass without faces becomes an eerie 
blank page, pregnant with concealed threats. Thus, it was said to me 
about the "nature of the tribals":
They do not have an outlet to release tension, and 
when they can not bear it any more, they turn to 
violence and to the bow and arrow.,.This is a 
problem in the control of people....
Subordinate sectors are perceived through "paranoid" optics as 
deceitful and dangerous. This perception is reflected also in the language 
used in the press, i.e., "a frenzied mob of Adivasis", or just "the mob" 
(77 1981: 5; NR 1980: f.p.), that anonymous, feared "monster" that the 
assertive presence of the weak, everywhere and in all times, has become 
for the powerful (15).
(15) At the same time, the weak can use to their advantage the menacing 
presence of the crowd and the anonymity it provides, as part of a 
strategy of popular action, a ,point already noted by E. P. Thompson 
(1974: 401 ff.).
Violence begins to appear in the minds of the powerful as 
legitimate tactics of self-defence. In the case under study, this "structural 
paranoia" reveals itself in the awe evoked by the arrow, mainly 
because it kills silently. The "hidden hate" of the adivasis is feared 
because it can strike unexpectedly, much like the arrow does. Thus:
They [the adivasis] are dangerous, violent...Oh, yes!, 
we have guns, but they have arrows and, you see, 
arrows come silently and then...[a gesture of slashing 
down and a sibilant sound]....
(Interview),
For the rural powerful arrows have become, and may have 
always been, something to fear and, at the same time, a justification for 
arming themselves, allegedly against the unpredictable insubordination 
of the subaltern classes. More directly said on one occasion:
One needs to watch them quite closely. Who knows 
what is in their minds, what will they do ....
It does not seem incorrect to consider the ban on the 
possession and carrying of bows and arrows and the requirement of 
licenses to carry them imposed in Bihar by the State Government, as a 
result of this "structural paranoia" (NR 1980c; Link 1982c: 12; a ban still 
in force at the time of field-work). Other, more powerful weapons - 
guns particularly - were not banned at the same time. On the contrary, in 
moments when confrontations became acute, the Government found it 
natural that "landlords and rich peas ants...formed [armed] groups to 
protect themselves and their interests" (F 1979b: 4). The ban against 
bows and arrows was clearly not intended to curb the incidence of 
violence in the Jharkhand area. Violence continued coming from other 
quarters altogether: firing incidents by the police became commonplace 
as was the general exercise of physical violence against adivasi 
labourers.
The way in which this "structural paranoia" is aroused, the 
mode in which tenuous hints of the subalterns' texts are read, was well 
registered by a reporter:
Tribal drums in Mayurbhanj, Purulia, Palamau or 
Raigharh no longer weave dance patterns in the air. 
Their sound is one ofdefiance..,.
. (TS 1980a: 5).
In Beldiha village (Santal Parganas), the dum-duggias were 
beaten to warn the villagers that the troops of the Central Reserve Police 
and the Bihar Military Police were surrounding the area. The sound of 
the drums was reason enough for the police to open fire.
5,- Jharkhand's Culture of Resistance.
We had attacked, we the slaves; we, the dung 
underfoot; we, the animals with patient hooves..,.
A. Cesaire, Les Armees Miraculeuses.
If one were to search for a common heritage among the 
indigenous peoples everywhere - those who have come to occupy 
subaltern positions in the course of conquest and of the process of 
State formation - we will find as a commonality long histories of 
resistance guided, primarily, by the will to survive physically as well as 
socially. This is not by any means a monopoly of the indigenous 
peoples but part of the life of all subaltern sectors. There is, 
nevertheless, a difference: in the case of the indigenous peoples the 
dimension of historico-cultural (ethnic) identity, tends to give extra 
meanings to resistance. With this consideration in mind, the modes in 
which a tradition of protest began building up in Jharkhand were 
explored in Chapter IV.
The dominant populations have usually depicted indigenous 
peoples as not having a history previous to the moment of 
conquest/domination. This conception has inspired the official versions 
of "national" history (history as told by the "winners", elite history). 
Despite the smothering blanket thrown over it by official histories, the 
history of the indigenous peoples is kept alive in a collective memory 
expressed in oral history, in aesthetic forms, and in the shared activities 
of daily economic and social life. Culture becomes the privileged means 
to interpret social reality and to communicate this interpretation despite 
the situation of confrontation, violence and repression (16).
As domination is not only exerted economically and politically 
but also culturally, the struggle against it is also launched at multiple 
levels, employing every possible mode of willed action. Thus, cultural 
notations and activities may become impregnated with political 
meanings. Therefore, we see the formation of a culture o f resistance 
which is not only active in open revolt but continuously operative in
(16) Carlos Guzm&n Btickler, for instance, shows the ways in which the 
Guatemalan indigenous peoples have elaborated their strategy for 
resistance (1975:102).
consciousness and in actions of opposition developed by the subordinate 
sectors in everyday life.
The message of resistance becomes clandestine by the force of 
circumstances, is grounded in a collective memory and expressed in 
codes specific to the subordinate social sector. These codes effectively 
protect the contents of the message of resistance as well as the intention 
of purposely defensive and offensive actions. When the channels for the 
open expression of social protest, popular grievances, aspirations and 
opinions are absent or blocked by force or law, the communication, the 
exchange of ideas and the preservation of a collective memory may 
develop, for instance, in the aesthetic realm, one of the various fields 
that can substantially remain under the control of the subordinate classes 
(17).
The forms in which a culture o f resistance is manifested are 
many. The message in each form reflects the particular ways in which 
domination has taken place and is continuing in the society that produces 
such a rebellious culture. What needs to be analyzed further is this 
potential for rebellion. There is no inherently or perpetually rebellious 
culture. Culture becomes rebellious. Explanations should be sought by 
looking at the ways in which social consciousness develops given 
existing socioeconomic contradictions and oppositions (18).
What realities can be "read" in the language of resistance being 
spoken in Jharkhand? The following discourses of resistance could be 
detected in Jharkhand: (1) the urgency to assure physical and social 
survival; (2) the value of justice, and (3) the careful preservation of 
"coded" social spaces. These discourses in turn do have explicit 
expressions which, despite their often apparent "failure" at the practical 
level, are effective: the expressions of an oppositional culture provide 
substance to the challenges to the existing hegemonic order (19). A
(17) Cases from Africa and Latin America were discussed in Devalle 
1985a.
(18) As Thompson remarks:
It is not sufficient merely to describe popular symbolic protest...it is 
necessary also to recover the significance of these symbols with 
reference to a wider symbolic universe, and hence to locate their force, 
both as affronts to the rulers' hegemony and as expressions of the 
expectations of the crowd....(1978: 155,fn.43. Italics in the original).
(19) I agree with C. Pelzer White on the importance of considering the 
question of the effectiveness of popular everyday resistance, underlined 
in her critique of J. Scott (Pelzer 1986:50-51). The issue of the
Santal peasant described such moments of resistance while talking of 
forcible harvesting as "tiny, tiny steps on the land", and its effects as "an 
arrow that flies high and far".
At this point, one has to ask, what do these concealed and 
explicit modes of the culture o f resistance in Jharkhand oppose in the 
concrete? They oppose and question the dominance-subordination 
paradigm and its expressions in social practice. The existing social 
order, which is maintained by force and therefore has minimal 
legitimacy, is considered to be expressed by its Agents. These Agents 
are resisted and, often indirectly, fought: men as well as institutions. 
Comments recorded in the field refer to "those who rob", "the ones 
who do not work" (landlords; often dikus in general), those who "when 
they come, they kill" (police; landlords' armed men), those of "double­
speak" (usually those in position of authority exercising it through 
imposition and authoritarianism), the "bloodsuckers" (exploiters in 
general, seen by Sibu Soren as "the enemy") and, as discussed in 
Chapter V, the bearers of Hindu culture.
a.- The urgent need to assure physical and social survival is a 
common denominator in all modes of resistance.
In different ways and from different political and class angles, 
the adivasis acknowledge that their survival is at risk. In interviews with 
some of their leaders (mentioned in Chapter V) this perception was made 
explicit:
If we, the tribals, do not stand with all our strength, 
politically and socially, we will not be able to save 
ourselves..,.
If you become Hinduized you lose your status and 
you become a slave in a society that has already made 
millions and millions of slaves....
(Emphases added)
Among the adivasi peasantry, the menace to survival is 
perceived in a much more direct way:
"success/failure" of popular movements was discussed in Devalle and 
Oberoi 1983.
When they [the police, the Forest officials] come, we 
leave, we go to the forest and wait....
To see [know] is no good....
(Com m ents recorded , in the Chota 
Nagpur/Singhbhum area).
They [the landlords] take our paddy and leave us 
hungry. Then we die...[That is why] we have to take 
our paddy back [reference to forcible 
harvesting]....(A Santal peasant).
In a situation of perceived and experienced threats to survival, a 
great part of resistance is kept concealed or disguised from the eyes of 
the powerful by means of the age-old mechanism of dissimulation. One 
important expression of resistance is, paradoxically, the use of silence: 
expression through non-expression. Silence can be of enormous effect 
in the staging of the theater o f the weak. For instance, the impressions I 
recorded on peasant marches (as those of forcible harvests) and the 
accounts of the slow and silent procession proceeding to Gua, illustrate 
the text of silence. Drums were certainly sounded, but somehow this 
merely served to emphasize the absence of the human voice. We should 
als.o remember that the frightening quality of the arrow resides in its 
silence and in the silence of the person who shoots it.
Silence is a component in many of the attitudes and actions of 
resistance that aim to avoid frontal opposition. It is present in the attitude 
of feigned servility and acceptance of authority and in "behind the back" 
gestures. For instance:
M. (a middle-class Bengali) shouts at his servant (a young 
adivasi boy) for him to bring water to wash his hands. He snatches the 
towel from the boy's hands. Something is not to M's pleasing. He 
throws back the towel, slapping the boy's face with it. The boy has not 
uttered a word. Other people present do not pay any attention either to 
the incident or to the boy as he leaves. One can follow him with the 
corner of the eye as he goes beyond a small partition open on two sides. 
He leaves the jug, stands still with the towel in his hands, throws it on 
the ground, starts wiping his feet on it, and finally stamps on it. The 
gesture would have angered his master had he seen it, especially 
considering the association, common in India, between feet or shoes and 
insult (Direct observation, Ranchi Town).
This incident can be easily explained as the reaction of a 
servant who dislikes his master. Although the unequal relation of master 
and servant is enough to account for the "behind the back" behaviour of 
the boy, more meanings are in fact implicit in it. We refer mainly to the 
aggregate of inferiority/subordination traits ascribed to the adivasis 
discussed in the former section. The attitude of servility is maintained in 
front of the master, but it does not last behind the curtain.
In the same way, other gestures made "behind the back" take 
the form of concealed insults (for instance, rickshaw pullers spitting - 
not because of betel-chewing - after certain passengers get down from 
the vehicles). Also, explicit comments such as the following are made 
"behind the back":
They [the dikus ] are dirty. They do not take off 
their clothes to take a bath .... They do not clean their 
tongues ....
This may be taken as an expression of adivasi ethnocentrism, but it 
certainly returns the insulting adjective "dirty" with which adivasis are 
very commonly qualified.
Then also, there is an interesting addition to silence: laughter 
(20). Concealed laughing and satire lie beneath some of the expressions 
of contempt with which the authorities' attitudes and ideas are judged. 
For instance, the case of the two Ho teachers mentioned in Chapter V 
laughing (instead of seriously complaining) after witnessing the 
humiliating treatment given to one of their people at an official meeting. 
Their dismissal of the incident as "just a show", precisely took away 
strength from the demonstration of superiority that "show" was intended 
to be.
The spitting behind the back of some people (usually 
Bengalis or Biharis, who are considered as part of the diku alien 
superordinate world) in urban areas of Jharkhand, may be related more
(20) E. Genovese already noted its value in his study on slavery in the 
North American South:
[The slaves] by laughing at themselves...freed themselves to laugh at 
their masters...Oppressed people who can laugh at their oppressors 
contain within themselves a politically dangerous potential..,.(1976: 
584)
to satire than simple insult. Spitting (accompanying betel-chewing) is 
associated with urban Hindu employees and seen as one of the markers 
denoting petty-power,
On one occasion, the depiction by some adivasi sweepers of a 
fat, lazy, betel-chewing petty-bureaucrat, sitting at a desk and passing 
his time trying to hit with precision the spittoon, was the cause of much 
laughter. In the satirical description, gestures ended up assimilating the 
figure of the lazy, fat bureaucrat to the object of his attention: he came to 
closely resemble the "round, dirty [vessel], sitting still in a comer". The 
caricature was, as anybody could see, a quite effective way of 
demystifying images of authority (Direct observation).
In the rural areas, different metaphors are used to draw 
caricatures of the powerful. The image of ineffective, lazy but 
prosperous authorities ("those who do not work", usually described as 
"fat", with "big round bellies", as often indicated by gestures) popular in 
urban areas, is replaced in rural areas by one of "those who rob" and, at 
the same time, are dangerous. Often, these objects of satire are identified 
by the name diku, used in its dual meaning: alien/exploiter.
A common simile, recorded also by other observers, is that of 
the diku as a greedy cat, always coveting the food of others and 
sometimes becoming aggressive - "showing the nails" - to get it.
I recorded a most interesting story in Chota Nagpur's "deep 
country" which had to do with elephants. There was plenty of laughter 
among the listeners when it was told. The script included the healthy 
element of "laughing at themselves" that Genovese has pointed out. The 
story was told after I inquired about the low and precarious huts that 
could be seen in the fields:
These are for us to watch for incoming [wild] 
elephants. They are dangerous; they come in big 
herds; they are big and step on everything: people, 
fields. They can kill.
The worst of them are the mad elephants. They are 
like the dikus: they come from beyond the village and 
like to steal. They make people run away.
They come and start looking for the liquor that is 
stored in the houses, smelling with their trunks. They
may break the roof in order to put the tusk inside and 
. thus get the liquor. They always get what they want.
A lot of damage is done. If they are mad, it is better to 
get out of their path.
Once X [one of the villagers] was dead 
drunk, walking unaware in the fields [gestures in the 
audience acknowledging X's fondness for drinking].
An elephant smelled the liquor inside him and 
followed him. The elephant was upset because this 
jug [the drunken man] did not seem to have an 
opening [to take the liquor out]. The elephant got 
mad, picked up X and started shaking him to see if the 
liquor could come out [gestures of surprise and joy].
Not a drop was spilled and so the elephant, being so 
upset and liquor-less, decided to leave X on top of a 
bamboo tree. There we found X, still dead drunk 
[laughs].
This is the story of our diku elephant who thought 
himself more cunning than drunken X, but left 
without a drop of liquor and could steal nothing [more 
laughs].
(Recorded in the Hasada'a area, at a village near 
Marang Hada'a).
In the course of the story - abundantly accompanied by mimicry 
and onomatopoeic sounds - the metaphorical elephant, the diku , 
gradually takes precedence over the real elephant. This superimposition 
of the two texts occurs in the description of the herd of wild elephants 
coming into the village, the need to watch their approach, and how they 
do not stop before fields or people (the exercise of power), the 
destruction they cause and the fear they arise, thus making people flee 
(the impunity of the powerful), their greed to take away food (liquor, 
although in this case it may also mean joy and rest). Moreover, the 
elephant acted precisely like a diku does in the eyes of the adivasi 
peasants: trying to squeeze the poor peasant to get at least a drop of 
what he may have and may be hiding.
The audience laughed at the poor drunken fellow, a co-villager 
known for his weakness, at the ridiculous sight of him walking 
innocently or stupidly when menaced by the elephant/diku that followed 
him, at his maltreatment and at the elephant finally leaving him on top of 
a tree in a most dishonourable situation. The villager had to be rescued 
from the tree, still drunk, but he still remained in possession of what 
was his (the liquor inside him = his self, his belongings). Drunken X. 
becomes the hero of the story, he is the one who cheats the mighty 
. elephant. Thus, by laughing at themselves, at the image of weak, drunk,
gullible men they are thought by the powerful to be, the adivasis can 
laugh at the foibles of the powerful.
There may be another hint in the story that would point to the 
need to preserve "coded spaces": the acting foolishly on the drunk man's 
part stands for dissimulation. The story of the elephant is in itself an 
example of the use of concealed, coded texts, hidden beneath the 
"pages" of a different and open text.
The story was not obviously new. It had been told before, but 
the laughter still occurred. The story was a fable with a message which 
was reinforced through repetition. Given the adivasi’s creativity in oral 
literature, one has grounds to believe that while traditional metaphors 
like those of the cat and the elephant continue to be used over and over 
again, new ones also come into being.
Concealment and dissimulation through silence tend to stress 
the negative, these being defensive methods that, while effective in 
maintaining the subalterns’ spirits high and their pride protected, do not 
pose a real threat to power. On the contrary, at least on the surface, these 
methods seem to imply the acceptance of the established power (silence 
and satire are "within the rules"). This acceptance promotes the 
continuation of a "theatrical style" of power and not its disassembly. 
However, when protest becomes explicit and politically phrased, the 
silence and laughter of the powerless may prove to be reservoirs of 
strength which can be channeled into positive political action.
In this light, silence can be an effective addition to the theater of 
the weak While embedded in action, silence itself makes protest explicit 
and the presence of the weak visible. The huge procession at Dumka on 
the occasion of the Jharkhand Diwas in February 1980 gives a good 
example of disciplined silence. According to reports, while the Santal 
marchers were being insulted by shopkeepers and some passers-by 
(idikus, according to the Santals), the marchers did not utter a single 
word nor did they return the insults. Boycotts are another, somewhat 
similar addition to the theater of the weak, a sort of silence by means of 
absence. Such silence by absence has often been used as a means of 
exerting some political pressure as, for instance, in the 1980 boycott of 
the officially organized annual Santal Hijta fair (F 1980:8).
Silence and satire can certainly make the powerful 
uncomfortable. In a situation of social violence like the one that prevails 
in Bihar, however, this uneasiness of the powerful, is caused mainly by 
the subordinates' silence, since satire tends' to remain more of an 
underground text. This uneasiness may ironically bring more wood to 
the fire of the powerful's "structural paranoia".
b.- Justice/injustice
A strong sense of justice and the realization that legal avenues 
to find redress are of difficult access, are themes frequently expressed 
by adivasis when they refer to their situation. Some of these comments 
have been quoted in previous chapters (Chapters HI, V and VI) while 
discussing the unequal socio-economic order in which adivasis are 
placed and their political views.
In Jharkhand, the combination of a sense of justice, the 
experience of injustice and blocked legal paths inspired the big rebellions 
of the past (see Chapter IV). On those occasions, the extreme nature of 
the situation led to instances of counter-terror, as in the case of the 
Santals in the middle of the nineteenth century (ibid.).
Counter-terror is not only a show of force and of direct 
insubordination. It also contains the element of "making justice by 
one's own hands", together with the search for satisfaction through 
vengeance. This is not the usual way in which adivasis make their 
conception of justice/injustice explicit. Instead, there are reports of 
cases of what are called "trials Jharkhandi style" (conducted at the 
outskirts of the village where the wrong occurred and, in the cases 
reported, punished by beatings). These reports indicate that the saying 
"The wicked must be punished and the good protected", became cuirent 
in early 1981 among sections of the JMM (F 1981:6). The saying as 
well as the setting up of these trials contain elements of the subalterns' 
counter-terror tactics, the aim being not only to make justice but to 
inspire fear of popular wrath.
More than the practice of a new legality, what could be 
generally observed were verbal, symbolic and practical manifestations of 
the justice/injustice discourse. Verbal manifestations ranged from the 
blunt words of an adivasi intellectual: "We are all equal", which implied 
"but we are not treated as such", to the statements in which some
referred to themselves as "victims of progress", "the underprivileged", 
"the uprooted" (see interviews quoted in former chapters).
People from the rural areas understood injustice not in the 
abstract but through the experience of it in daily life:
Sand, stone, soil, land, trees, the Government takes it 
all, and we even have to pay for it...The Government 
denies our rights....
After working all day at the mercy of somebody else, 
we find our stomachs empty....
At present, the adivasis do not seem to engage in counter­
terror. However, a play of veiled menaces does take place using a 
symbolic language. Once again, the mighty arrow possibly provides the 
best symbolic instrument of justice in a world turned blind and deaf to 
suffering. That the arrow, besides being a useful menacing symbol, is 
an effective weapon, is clear to the Santal peasant:
The arrow knows where it goes. It is never wrong....
They [the landlords] are deaf, they do not understand 
words. They seem to see [to have eyes] and still do 
not understand. They only know to talk the tongue of 
guns [a roar]. We know the tongue of arrows....
(Interviews).
Few are the sounds uttered in "the tongue of arrows". In fact, 
in the areas where the JMM had a following, the provoking of violent 
incidents was consciously avoided. This has also been the position of 
the Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union led by A.K. Roy which allowed the 
carrying of bows and arrows but avoided the use of violent means in the 
course of political action (A. Sinha 1982: 126). The presence of bows 
and arrows in events connected with issues of justice/injustice 
(processions, protest marches and carried by working teams during 
forcible harvests), suffices for the message of the arrows to be "heard".
The symbolic and practical meanings of the drums are clearer 
still: they convoke people, they always "say" something to somebody. 
To the powerful, the message has always been disquieting: at harvest 
time, the landlords initially used to flee at the sound of the drums that 
heralded the approach of peasants, eager to get a just share of the crops.
Soon the landlords learnt to answer the warning sound of the drums in 
"the tongue of guns".
c.- Coded social spaces for resistance and protest
The totality of the social field is a potential terrain to formulate 
resistance and protest. However, the nature and extent (pervasiveness) 
of a given hegemonic order set limits to the uses the subaltern sectors 
may want to give to this vast field. Therefore, the need arises among 
these sectors to find and protect (to codify) the most suitable spaces 
available in the social field as zones o f resistance. These zones are 
normally marginal to the spaces the explicit play of power relations 
occupy.
In Jharkhand, the resistance and protest concealed in these 
spaces are sometimes translated into explicit actions. This is the case of 
forcible harvesting. In other instances, when resistance becomes 
clandestine, the spaces used are to be found underground rather than on 
the surface (i.e.: in oral history and literature, in the meanings woven in 
aesthetic manifestations and in collective activities, and in the symbolic 
realm). What is not directly "said" communicates in another "language" 
much more than what the obvious message conveys. The strength of 
clandestine protest resides in the way this "double language" is used.
At least four coded spaces can be noted in the culture o f 
resistance as it operates in Jharkhand: (1) the production of symbols and 
meanings; (2) work; (3) oral history and literature, and (4) leisure (21).
c.l.- The production of symbols and meanings in the cases of 
the arrow and the drums has been already discussed in the course of this 
chapter, and the changing messages conveyed by the use of flags were 
mentioned in Chapter VI. Let us briefly refer to one of the possible 
combinations of symbol-meaning-action: purposive collective presence 
translated into the public political domain and how it comes to occupy a 
social space. The Jharkhand Diwas is a case in point (22).
(21) Each one of these coded spaces deserves close examination and 
analysis. This task will be hopefully attempted in the future, in a 
separate research project. At the present moment, some indications will 
be given about how these spaces are used.
(22) The data on the Jharkhand Diwas comes from interviews with 
people that have participated in it.
Since 1973, on the fourth day of February, Jharkhandis 
supporting the grass-roots Jharkhand Movement, have been holding 
annual massive meetings to express their demands. These are always 
peaceful events. The first Jharkhand Diwas, jointly organized by the 
JMM and the Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union, took place at the Dhanbad 
pologround. The participants were workers and peasants, adivasis and 
non-adivasis. They demanded a separate state and the return of alienated 
lands to the peasants, and expressed their opposition to the 
retrenchement of local coal-miners (see Chapter III). On the occasion of 
the 1974 celebration, 20,000 workers joined a multitude of 40,000 
peasants. The main demand at that time was for Jharkhand as Lalkhand. 
The green and red flags used to fly together on those occasions. They 
symbolized the worker-peasant alliance as well as the combination of 
regional (Jharkhand) and class (Lalkhand) demands (data collected in 
interviews; also Sengupta 1982c: 37-38, Iyer andMaharaj, 1977: 75, 
79). Subsequent years saw a decline in the workers' participation and, 
of late, a change in the politicial contents of the meetings (see Chapter 
VI). Although the number of participants varies, it appears to have 
remained high (30,000 in 1980), and lately to have gone up (70,000 for 
1986) {India Today 1986a: 3).
The Jharkhand Diwas has maintained a number of 
characteristics through the years: the event is repeated at regular intervals 
(annual), always on the same day (February the 4th), at the same places 
(Dhanbad and Dumka); it enjoys a wide participation on class grounds 
(workers and peasants) and across ethnic divides (adivasis and non- 
adivasis); it always has the same features (peaceful, bows and arrows, 
large numbers of participants, speeches), and at least one constant 
demand (a separate state). This regularity has helped to install a pattern, 
resulting in the subaltern sectors conquering certain time and 
geographical spaces. This circumstance has enabled them to take over 
momentarily the public scenario.
During the peak years of the worker-peasant alliance, the very 
presence of workers and peasants together was in itself an explicit 
message: that of their solidarity and the decision to join their struggles. 
This message was certainly uttered in a loud voice and was well-heard 
by the authorities. As A.K. Roy put it:
The authorities are not worried about the workers' 
movement or the tribal movement, but they are greatly 
alarmed about the worker-tribal alliance. That is why 
there has been such a persecution....
(Interview)
The collective presence that keeps materializing every February 
the 4th is not perceived as an abstract (faceless) and feared "mob" but as 
a political presence. The contents of these two "presences" ("mob" and 
purposive collective presence) are different. In the second instance, we 
find explicit political meanings focused with precise aims on the terrain 
of practice. In this sense, the Jharkhand Diwas of the mid-seventies 
were not expressions of the theater of the weak but of the real 
conquering of political spaces by social actors, obtained by means of an 
"invasion" of symbols and meanings through actual practice (23).
c.2.- The domain of work, especially when performed 
collectively, provides ample scope for the development of techniques of 
resistance and protest. In fact, this has always been one of the classical 
grounds where oppositional attitudes and activities have been put 
successfully into practice.
The conflict between the conceptions of time-work in the 
industrial setting and the attitudes of the adivasi workers in relation to it 
was previously pointed out in Chapter III. It was suggested that the 
assumed "inability" of the adivasis to comply with the time-work- 
discipline ethos of industrial capitalism, could precisely be a skill: to 
resist total subordination at least in some minimal space, contesting the 
control of time and behaviour at the working place.
The phenomenon of forcible harvesting, already referred to in 
Chapter VI, illustrates the potentialities the ambit of work has as a 
suitable field for the development of a culture of resistance.
To an extent, forcible harvesting is a predictable phenomenon, 
taking place each harvest season. What is not predictable is the field in 
which it is going to take place. The combination of both factors: exact 
timing and unknown targets, assures the effectiveness of this form of
(23) There is not enough information available at this moment to make a 
comparison of the meetings that took place in the mid-70's with those 
that have been held in recent years, to see how meanings and action have 
changed.
resistance since it makes peasants and their demands "visible" on the 
social stage. Forcible harvesting is organized on the same basis as any 
other harvest is in normal circumstances, only that in this case the 
modality of work is adapted to the needs posed by it being work and a 
mode of protest.
Forcible harvesting has been labelled a criminal offense by the 
State and part of the media. Peasants, instead, see it as their right: to 
collect what they have planted and worked for, the product of their toil. 
In the background of this attitude is the concealed discourse on 
justice/injustice: only those plots that a landlord has illegally obtained 
(contravening old or amended laws) are harvested. The attainment of 
justice seems to be the main motivation behind forcible harvesting. In 
the words of a peasant:
We do not want to harm anybody, we just want our 
share [of paddy]. We have asked and asked, but we 
were not listened to. We could not wait any longer.
We had to harvest our fields and take our paddy....
In the end, the effect is one of open but measured defiance, 
its righteousness stressed by the peaceful behaviour of the peasants 
during harvest operations and the open performance of the task during 
daytime. As said by a Santal peasant:
Why should we hide? Why should we be afraid? Is it 
a crime to retrieve what has been robbed from 
you?....
At the same time, there is a sense of urgency which arises from very 
concrete needs that have to be fulfilled:
They took our land. We work and work. They take 
our paddy and leave us hungry....
The public message of resistance that harvest marches and 
forcible harvesting convey is that of pea'sant solidarity and discipline, 
and of the continuity of their demands. This peasant tactics demonstrated 
that peasants can be the masters of a space: the modality of their work, 
the actual field on which this work is done, the time during which it is
performed, and that they could even momentarily change the conditions 
under which this work is usually done.
c.3.- Oral history and literature are the subaltern sectors' 
redoubts of resistance par excellence. They are spaces with "a past", 
with continuity, based not just on the effects of repetition. Oral history 
and literature are in themselves links between the past and the present. 
They record past and present experiences that often have been forced to 
remain guarded with zeal under concealement.
Previously, the answer a Munda gave to the question: "When 
and why do Mundas sing?" was quoted (Chapter V). He said:
When people have something important to say, they 
sing. Mundas sing to remember who they are....
(Interview).
For the adivasis of Jharkhand, a life-song-community-history 
complex is practically synonymous with life, in personal as well as in 
social collective terms. There is a saying in Mundari that explains: 
"Walking is dancing. Saying is singing" {Senge susun, kajige duran). 
The community is implicit in all references made to music, song and 
dance, since all these three develop on the basis of collective 
participation.
The life-song-community-history complex is equivalent to the 
community in its historical depth. This complex is in itself a code, a 
most complicated one. The fact that literature and history among the 
adivasis of Jharkhand has remained mostly oral (the writing of literature 
being recent and partial), helps to maintain the inviolability of the code. 
The characteristics of Mundari poetry, for instance, are functional in this 
respect. Mundari makes ample use of parallelism (synonym and 
antonym), onomatopoeia (24), metaphors, repetition of words or 
syllables to obtain rhyme, emphasis (25), and of the omission of 
relatives and prepositions. At the same time, to each poem/song
(24) E.g.: satob satob, the noise that people with shoes make when they 
walk. See the poem "Hatia village..." later in the text, where the 
onomatopoeia describes the engineer and technicians at the industrial 
complexes.
(25) For example, do , a particle that marks contrasts 
(see J. Hoffman e ta l  1936-1950: 1073).
corresponds a certain melodic and rhythmic pattern, and both are related 
to the rhythms of the life of the community.
With oral history and literature one enters the linguistic domain
(26). Language can be considered to be not only an indicator of identity 
(in the sense of “a people that speak the same language"), but also as a 
wider field in which identity is defined and redefined, reality is ordered, 
and ways of acting upon reality are communicated. Language does not 
only refer to the spoken word but to any form of communication. 
Communication, in turn, is purposive and not simply voluntary, since it 
takes place in concrete social situations.
On earlier occasions I discussed the possibility of discerning 
several texts in oral tradition (27). Of them, the following are relevant 
for the present purposes: (a) an oral tradition on history; (b) an oral 
tradition on ethnic definition, and (c) an oral tradition of opinion.
In the first of these texts, key events in the history of the 
community are recorded. This is the case of the "songs of rebellion" 
composed about the peasant movements that swept Jharkhand in the 
nineteenth century (see K.S. Singh 1966). Other songs are new and 
closely follow the pattern of the old ones. The history of the Birsaite 
Movement of 1895 is a theme that is taken up often in modern 
poem/songs. The following song, written at the end of the sixties, 
evokes the figure of Birsa:
Looking for you again
Muchia Chalkad is asking for you.
Dombari Hill is searching for you.
Is looking for you
with arrows and axes ringing [as they touch].
The rumbling of guns searches for you.
Bows and arrows touch [making a sound]
for our mother country (28).
(26) In this respect, what S. Varese has to say is suggestive:
For an ethnic group, the structure of a language plays the role of a 
referential matrix. As an ethnic referent, this matrix is what possibly 
permits an ethnic group to have continuity....(Varese 1988. My 
translation from Spanish).
(27) Papers presented at the staff seminar of the Centre for Asian and 
African Studies, El Colegio de Mexico (Mexico, 1979), at the South 
Asia Seminar, ANU (Canberra, 1983) and at the International Congress 
of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (Vancouver, 1983).
(28) R.D. Munda, Muchia Chalkad Do, Seled 1967: 53. My translation 
from Mundari.
These types of song that record history are repeated, 
remembered and reinvented. They are easy to memorize, are usually 
short (no more than four stanzas), and their lines are connected by 
words that give continuity to the text. Often, the same idea is repeated 
more than once to strengthen the message of the song.
History is kept in the collective memory of a people. Among 
the adivasis of Jharkhand, poem/songs are only one of the vehicles 
through which the contents of collective memory are communicated. 
Another vehicle is "telling" history. I had the opportunity to listen to 
history-telling while at a Munda village at the foot of Dombari Hill, a 
place where the old millennial dream was buried at the start of this 
century. Aside from the preservation of history, other elements were 
revealed on that occasion like the definition of identity and resistance to 
deculturation.
S., the village headman, was an old man, small in stature, but 
of great vitality and of difficult temper. He was proud to have worked at 
Gandhi's side. He was also proud of his family which, having 
converted to Christianity in 1858, later abandoned it. Unashamedly and 
laughing, he defined his family as being one of "petty zamindars". 
"More like rajas" - he added.
He understood and spoke English well (29), but insisted on 
speaking Mundari. As a consequence, the talk became confused and S. 
increasingly irritated. When his fury subsided, he burst out in perfect 
English:
One should speak one's own language! Why don't 
you speak in your own language?....
I agreed with him. He should have spoken in Mundari and I in 
Spanish, a most unpractical proposition. His scolding did not stop there:
In Mexico they are brown like us. Your colour is 
wrong. Why?,...[I found Mexico rung a bell when I 
mentioned it. I still do not know exactly why].
(29) A few of the old people in the area speak English well, probably 
because the British used this area as their summer quarters in the past.
I could not give a reason for this "mistake". Displaced from my 
role as observer, I understood how uncomfortable one can feel when 
observed and asked questions, especially when there are no possible 
answers. After making his point, S. amicably took me up Dombari Hill 
and told me his version of the Birsa rising. He must have been a child 
when the events were still fresh in the minds of the people around him. 
The story most probably was commented on and told many times in his 
village, close to the place where the movement was crushed.
Going up Dombari Hill, S. unfolded the details of the last 
chapter of the Birsa Movement. He pointed at spots on the way, showed 
me where the Birsaites placed themselves for the siege and from where 
the troops came, and recounted what happened afterwards. On top of 
that hill and with the bit of lived history that S. provided, Dombari 
looked exactly as the deadly trap it had been eighty years back: a small 
plain with a precipice on one side and no possible escape for the rebels 
and their families who took refuge there. S.'s version did not deviate 
from the known facts, only some small details were added: that children 
were killed [there is an old song that recalls the incident], what the 
people did on the hill, what happened to them and how they felt.
There are in oral tradition texts that aim to assert the historical 
identity of a people. In Jharkhand, through the medium of songs, the- 
themes of self-assertion often refer to land and territory and the rights 
the adivasis have over them. Old songs tend to stress these aspects (see 
Culshaw and Archer 1945; K.S. Singh 1966; Archer 1974). More 
recently, a song related to the Jharkhand Party, claims identity in the 
following way:
We are the natives of this country 
Yet they are driving us from our 
birthplace,
(Orans 1965: 109-110)
A wider conception of identity is put forward in a recent 
poem/song:
In this country we are born brothers, 
let us be united in love.
Nobody is in front and nobody is behind,
We are all brothers and relatives.
Do exchange garlands of flowers (30).
Sometimes, a concern for the problems suffered in Jharkhand 
is expressed in "songs of opinion". I translated one such song from 
Mundari. It refers to the effects of industrialization in the area, 
specifically to the industrial complex of the Heavy Engineering 
Corporation on the lands of what used to be Hatia village. Some of its 
lines read:
Ranchi road shines!
The steps of the white men sound 
as torrential rain [satob satob].
Hatia village trembles [in the distance 
while]
The metallic sound {jirib jirib] of the
workers' tools can be heard...
Ah! from the slopes they did uproot rocks and 
stones.
They made the god of the mountain [Marang 
Burn] flee.
When they brutally threw away the guardian
god,
Hatia collapsed in the dust like 
stones falling on green leaves.... (31)
In this poem, dispossession and destruction is described as 
being not only material (loss of land, destruction of the village), but also 
in terms of social and cultural disposession.
(30) Composed by Kande Munda (Hisir 1967). Original in Mundari and 
Hindi. My translation.
(31) Poem/song by R.D.Munda (Hisir 1967. My translation and 
comments in Devalle 1977b).
c.4.- One last space to be mentioned in connection with the 
formulation of resistance is that of leisure. This is an extremely fertile 
and flexible space (32). An important point to remark in the present 
context is that leisure entails collective activities: dancing with the 
participation of everybody present (in one way or another); listening to 
the music and words of old and new songs; sharing food and rice beer. 
All these elements form part of a specific semantic field. Leisure is for 
the adivasis a social and not an individual event. The immediate result of 
such social enjoyment of leisure is an enhancement of solidarity in the 
community, based on a basic attitude of sharing. It is possibly not a 
coincidence that the most visible aspects of leisure (mixed dancing, 
drinking, sexuality) have been precisely those which have been more 
often questioned by missionaries (on moral grounds) and by the 
dominant society (through derogatory stereotypes). In the end, such 
critical attitudes to leisure seem to attempt to undermine the social role of 
leisure.
(32) M. Orans (1965) has already referred to the "pleasure complex" 
among the Santals.
Conclusion.
The development of processes of dominance/subordination and 
of forces to resist and contest these processes has given rise in 
Jharkhand to two cultural formations: a culture o f oppression and a 
culture o f resistance. These two cultures are found to be operating in 
interaction and evolving dialectically.
In Jharkhand, the dominant values and meanings around which 
a culture of oppression is organized are condensed in discourses on 
dominance/subordination and on the legitimacy of the powerful's 
violence, and translated into social practices. The weak legitimacy of the 
existing hegemonic order and the presence of a complex of resistance 
have conditioned the nature, use and extent of coercion in Jharkhand. In 
such a situation, one observes that a measured "theatrical style of 
dominance" can be easily replaced by the practice of terror, directly 
experienced by the subaltern sectors as lived dominance.
It is especially in situations where domination attempts, using 
coercion, to pervade all the levels of life of the subordinate classes, that 
resistance becomes entrenched, expressed and guarded in the labyrinth 
of a cultural language. This is a dynamic language, adapted to the 
circumstances being lived, and may express itself through indigenous 
symbols or newly generated tropes.
In a situation such as the one prevailing in Jharkhand, the 
culture of the subordinate sectors has become rebellious accompanying 
the development of a social consciousness. The universe of thought and 
attitudes that rejects the hegemony of the powerful has become 
structured into a culture o f resistance that supports a social strategy for 
survival, self-assertion and, ultimately, social reproduction.
CONCLUSIONS.
Caminante no hay camino, 
se hace camino al andar.
Golpe a golpe, verso a verso....
Antonio Machado, Cantares (*)
For social scientists ethnicity has been synonymous with 
Otherness, the unsolved enigma. In an effort to decipher it, many 
researchers have reduced ethnicity either to a troublesome element in old 
and new "melting pots" or to an instrument used in the competitive game 
fostered by "social engineering". There is also primordialist ethnicity, 
one even closer to a conception of The Other as the essentially different.
The understanding of ethnicity will not come through attempts 
at deciphering or simplification. It is necessary to rephrase the problem 
and look at it from angles that have often been underplayed. This thesis 
is an attempt in that direction. From the study of a concrete case, the 
varieties of ethnic discourses in Jharkhand, I have derived a series of 
considerations regarding the general study of ethnicity.
1.- History's Open Hand.
Ethnicity should be viewed as a process whose meanings can 
only be understood in context, evolving within the flow of history and 
according to the particular social circumstances of a given people at 
different points in time. Moreover, the presence of ethnicity and class 
together in one and the same social formation adds to the complexities of 
the processual nature of ethnicity. The articulation and contradictions of 
these two processes - ethnicity and class - arising in the course of their 
evolution, can only be aprehended by looking at the historical dimension 
of the society in which these processes take place.
(*) Pilgrim, there is no ready made path.
You make your own path as you go along,
Blow by blow, verse by verse....
(My translation from Spanish).
Classical anthropology has studied people as if their past was 
not worth exploring. The concern with the "ethnographic present" has 
helped foster the myth of peoples with no history. Seen as social atoms 
with an irrelevant or elusive past, ethnography has given the people it 
studied the status of objects, of passive elements that left no imprint on 
history. One of the central aims in the treatment of ethnicity in this thesis 
has been to endow ethnic phenomena with historicity and to relate them 
to the social whole.
Under the influence of the older European schools of 
anthropology, anthropological training used to be preceeded by an 
acquaintance with history and philosophy, conceived as anthropology's 
primeval sources. Anthropological research often looked for support in 
history. Recently, a third source has been acknowledged: literature (in 
its travelogue or fiction genres [Clifford 1986a. Also Marcus and 
Cushman 1982]). In this light, ethnographical accounts have come to be 
considered as "a story among other stories" (Clifford 1986b: 109), 
Despite the indications of its origins, and the ideas and aims that 
informed it, anthropology disavowed somewhere in its development its 
close links with history and philosophy.
Anthropologists have remarked on the potentialities of a cross- 
disciplinary exchange between anthropology and history but, for the 
most part, they have rarely translated this appreciation into their research 
practices, At the most, a perfunctory bow to history is made by reducing 
historical dynamics to a sober and evanescent background landscape. 
Despite Evans-Pritchard's urgings in his 1950 Marett Lecture (1961), 
anthropological studies in the British and American traditions have 
remained, if not totally anti-historical, generally ahistorical. The various 
dialogues that can be established between anthropology and history 
depend on the theoretical position of the researcher in his/her discipline. 
Philosophy helps to set limits on the terms in which the dialogue is 
posed.
With the exception of the political economy school, 
ethnohistory and the recent Marxist studies that Ortner (1984) 
inadequately places under a quite mixed "practice approach", most of 
anthropology has resisted a rapprochement with history. At the same 
time, something has been happening on the other side of the disciplinary
divide. Historians have begun to apply to their research new 
perspectives resulting from a cross-disciplinary exchange with the 
social sciences (see discussion in Thomas 1963 and Thompson 1972, 
1977), not without encountering resistance from the ranks of the 
historians themselves (1).
What does history, as a potential partner in a joint endeavour, 
have to offer? Among other things, one can mention a reciprocal critique 
of the practice of research, putting the "ethnographic present" into 
perspective, providing social phenomena with contextual meanings, and 
restoring to the societies under study the (social) time depth that 
ahistorical variants of anthropological analyses have denied them.
In the study of ethnic phenomena in Jharkhand, a historical 
perspective has helped to detect the course that the process of ethnic 
conciousness-building has taken in the long duration, and to trace the 
origins of dominant discourses which use the ethnic theme as a 
subordinating agency. I refer, of course, to the colonial situation in 
India, to identities scientists and administrators constructed and 
translated into a category of inequality, namely the "tribe", and to the 
way ethnic differences were phrased during the process of Nation- 
building. The historical dimension thus provided contextual meanings to 
the analysis of the adivasis' political manifestations in Jharkhand.
By emphasizing the time depth of social processes, the 
"ethnographic present" is displaced from centre stage to become "a 
moment" in a processual flow. This shift, instead of diminishing the 
importance of the "ethnographic present", in fact enhances its contents. 
Social phenomena appear not to be "accidents" in the life of a society. 
The two Jharkhand movements here analysed acquired new meanings 
precisely when they were related to an adivasi tradition o f protest. What 
we can recover from this past of protest represents only the tip of the 
iceberg. To avoid risky speculations, the study has taken as a vantage 
point for observation the times of "high density" in the history of
(1) As E.P. Thompson puts it:
In some eyes, the "systematic indoctrination" of historians "in the social 
sciences" conjures up a scene of insemination, in which Clio lies inert 
and passionless...while anthropology or sociology thrust their seed into 
her womb. But the encounter between partners is going to be a good 
deal more active than that; and it is difficult to believe that the 
complacency of some anthropological...typologies will not be as much 
shattered by historical examination as the reverse.,.. (1972:46).
Jharkhand's adivasi societies. In those moments, under an increased 
dialectical tension between socioeconomic and political transformation 
and historico-cultural maintenance, overt collective confrontations with 
the colonial State come sharply into view. Much else still does not figure 
in this picture: the silent quotidian resistance as well as the absence of 
resistance at certain moments, since people cannot live in a constant state 
of protest. As I have stressed with reference to a culture of resistance, 
culture becomes rebellious at particular junctures and in specific modes.
There is yet another outcome of the application of a historical 
perspective to anthropological research. Much of anthropology has 
conceived of these societies as being without a past, while at the same 
time it has constructed their present in the image of what they are 
supposed to have been in the past (usually in the pre-colonial past). 
Both the past and present of "object-societies" have been situated at the 
margins of history. As a result, these societies have emerged as passive 
"objects" that are defined only in essentialist terms. Among these 
anthropological "objects" are the "tribes". It is not surprising that 
societies so de-contextualized often continue to be studied through their 
languages, material cultural manifestations, religions and customs, 
without these aspects being related to the social evolution of the societies 
in which they are present. By restoring historicity to the societies that 
anthropology studies, their social qualities, their dynamism and their 
presence in the current of social events - all denied by fixed categories 
and typologies - are acknowledged.
E. P. Thompson has said that "the mind of the historian has 
been enhanced, his perspectives extended, his awareness of significance 
aroused, by a reading of anthropology...One hopes that some 
anthropologists will return the compliment...." (1972: 48). My analysis 
of ethnicity hopes to return to history a few of the compliments 
Thompson has paid to anthropology.
2.- Not Objects but Social Agents.
For some time a number of social scientists have been trying to 
develop a dialogue between disciplines, but also to evolve an 
interdisciplinary strategy that "consists in creating a new object that 
belongs to no one" (Barthes 1984: 97-103). This shift in perspective 
and aims in the social sciences brings us to another of the key analytical 
issues posed by the study of ethnicity in Jharkhand: the construction of 
Otherness in anthropological practice and the ways in which social 
categories have been reproduced by the hegemonic sectors in order to 
validate structures of inequality.
The conceptualization of societies as "objects" has been one of 
the standing issues on the anthropological agenda since the late sixties. 
In J. Copans' words, it is necessary:
To change...the illusory object that anthropology has 
constructed up to the present....(1974: 142) To 
change the origin of the questions we should 
answer...To talk of other things in other terms....
(Ibid.: 33, Italics in the original).
The Other must be seen as a social agent and not as an (alien, 
passive) "object". This social agent speaks a language that is "active, 
transitive (political)...aiming at transformation" (Barthes 1984: 149. 
Also Abdel-Malek 1963). Despite J.P. Dumont's assertion that "the 
imputed transformation of objects into subjects...has by now almost 
degenerated into cliche..." (1986: 356), the problem still stands at the 
core of the discipline. The efforts at solving this problem through 
reflexivity and dialogical anthropology, although too easily dismissed by 
J.P. Dumont as "trite" (ibid.:357), have still to make a dent in the 
general position of anthropology vis-a-vis the societies it studies.
Can the use of subordinating categories like "indio", "racial 
group", "tribe", now "ethnic", still be considered acceptable? Why are 
certain societies and not others viewed solely in ethnic terms? Given that 
systems of ethnic group relations are essentially systems of inequality, is 
this terminology an instance of the "inequality of languages" (Asad 
1986: 141-164) with which different societies are addressed?
In my study of the adivasis of Jharkhand the category "tribe", 
of firm standing in Indian studies, was subjected to critical examination. 
Historical and ethnographic evidence were brought forward to 
demonstrate, on the one hand, the methodological weakness of this 
sociological category. On the other hand, the reasons for the ideological 
force that this sociological category has acquired are sought in the 
colonial redefinition of precolonial structures of social relationships and, 
once redefined, in the transformation of indigenous systems into parts of 
the colonial context. This new ordering of social relationships occurred 
at the ideological level through the objectification of the indigenous 
peoples as tribes and through the instauration of a "natural order of 
things" in which social relations became ruled by the "principle" of 
difference (ethnicity). The adivasis were not only asymmetrically 
incorporated into a new political economy but also, as representations of 
Otherness, into a new system of unequal relationships. Through the 
Census and later, through the Indian Constitution, the objectification of 
difference (ethnicity) succeeded in becoming an officially recognized 
paradigm for social classification. This process has also been helped by 
the acceptance of this objectification as a legitimate parameter to order 
social relationships by those in a position of subordination. This 
situation is reflected in the language sometimes used by subordinated 
ethnic groups, for instance, in the words employed by educated adivasis 
in Jharkhand to qualify themselves and others with reference to the tribal 
paradigm. Therefore, ethnicity can be made to play the role o f an 
autonomous force , and thus actually help in the reproduction of 
structures of inequality.
By placing Jharkhand's adivasi societies in historical context 
and in Jharkhand's present social formation, it becomes evident that 
ethnicity cannot be understood unless issues o f social differentiation, 
processes o f class formation and the development o f class conflicts are 
considered in the context o f their articulation with processes of ethnic 
differentiation. Adivasis live in a class society and in an economic 
formation where the capitalist mode is dominant. "Tribe", therefore, is 
an ill-suited sociological category to analyse the structural position of the 
adivasis in Jharkhand, either in the past or at present. "Tribe" as a fixed 
and timeless category, is an inadequate concept to understand the 
adivasis as agents in social processes. Situated in a social formation with 
specific characteristics, the adivasis not only exist in it but also act upon 
it, as their past and present straggles demonstrate.
Our contention is that there were and are no tribes in 
Jharkhand. What does exist, however, is the ideology of tribe which, in 
Wolpe's words, "sustains and reproduces capitalist relations of 
production" (1972: 454).
To deny the existence of "tribes" in Jharkhand on 
socioeconomic grounds, and to categorize the indigenous communities 
basically as agrarian in view of their historical evolution, does not imply 
that ethnic formations do not exist in Jharkhand or should be ignored. 
The tribal paradigm constructed unchanging societies on the basis of a 
limited conception of culture. The positivistic tradition, which still 
sustains this paradigm, restricted culture solely to its material 
expressions and to external symbols of collective identification. It thus 
denied the social nature of culture as a synthesis of a people's social 
consciousness, operative in social practice. Paradoxically, given their 
concern with culture, the defenders of the "tribe" in fact engaged in 
negating the living cultures of the populations called "tribal". The 
resulting picture has been one of people with a "museum culture", 
uprooted from the deep historical field , devoid of dynamism and 
meaning.
The solidity that the myth of the tribe demonstrated during the 
colonial era is not surprising. This myth justified the colonizer's mission 
civ ilisa trice . The myth has not died and nowadays nurtures 
developmentalism and the recommendations made by applied 
anthropologists and administrators. Why has it preserved its vitality? In 
my view, this myth has been and remains an element which fosters the 
expansion of State hegemony over civil society through the distortion 
and/or nullification of the history and culture of the subordinated 
sectors, thus eroding the basis of their social consciousness (2).
In Jharkhand there exist, on the one hand, the ideology of tribe, 
and on the other, ethnic formations grounded in specific socio-cultural
(2) Similarly, S. Varese states, regarding the situation of Peru's 
indigenous peoples:
To abolish the history of a people, to suppress their collective memory, 
implies to veto the future, to disaggregate the consciousness of 
unity...to cut the roots of collective imagination..,.(1980: 10. My 
translation from Spanish).
styles expanding in the long time duration. This "depth of the historical 
field" (see Abdel-Malek 1975), expressed in a consciousness of 
historical permanence, gives these ethnic formations continuity and 
elements for the formulation of endogenous social projects through 
which to interpret and face concrete social realities.
3.- The Voices of Culture.
Culture is ethnicity's privileged field in two senses. First, 
culture expresses the collective identity and consciousness of a people, 
synthetized in a particular "style" rooted in specific social and historical 
grounds. Second, through culture a first level of social awareness 
develops, the one that sustains the political expressions of ethnicity: 
social contradictions and conflicts are "handled in cultural terms" (On 
culture, refer to Chapter VII).
Among subordinate ethnic groups, it is the cultural domain that 
provides the elements for a strategy of survival, for social reproduction 
and for strength to check and question the advance of an attempted 
hegemonic order. The cultural "language" in which a particular ethnic 
identity is lived and expressed has codes and meanings that are 
significant only to those who create and share them. There lies the force 
of culture in situations of dominance-subordination: the preservation of 
coded spaces that can become zones o f resistance.
In my treatment of the political manifestations of ethnicity in 
Jharkhand, I have attempted to bring together culture and politics, often 
divorced from each other in anthropological research. This issue has a 
place in structural Marxism (where culture is reduced to ideology), 
among the critics of Western-centric socio-anthropological perspectives 
(especially in the seminal works of Abdel-Malek [1963] and Said 
[1979]) and in political anthropology. Most of the anthropological 
project, however, has come full swing to view culture in 
idealist/symbolic terms, separating culture and politics as if they were 
two mutually exclusive domains. This treatment of culture has ended up 
ignoring material and power issues. Geertzian cultural theory, very 
influential nowadays, is perhaps the clearest instance of the change 
operated in the conception of culture in anthropology. Geertz found 
inspiration in P. Ricoeur, but there was in Ricoeur a slight but 
significant difference in emphasis when he said "like a text, human
action is an open work..." (1971: 201. Italics added). Geertz translated 
this as "culture is a text" (1973: 452. Italics added), written without 
considering questions of power and domination and separated from the 
material and historical processes that mark the creation of culture (see 
Roseberry 1982; Crapanzano 1986). The stimulus for a necessary volte 
face in this state of affairs has come from the field of literary/cultural 
history through the works of Raymond Williams and through the 
writings of social historians like E.P. Thompson.
A Western-centric perspective, particularly in the political 
sciences, has tended to view the political manifestations of the subaltern 
sectors "from above", when not ignoring them altogether. Several issues 
should be considered in this light with reference to culture and politics. 
The dynamics of ethnicity in Jharkhand invalidates the generalized 
dichotomy resistance/acquiescence. Reality is more subtle. Everyday 
life suiprises us with actions, gestures, words that may have more than 
one meaning and purpose. The voices of resistance are often uttered in 
modes that may look non-political or with meanings that may appear 
only as marginal to explicit political discourses. The best examples of 
this are the different readings that can be made of peasant "passivity" 
and "endurance".
A mechanicist interpretation has also vitiated the understanding 
of power relationships giving rise to the dichotomies dominance- 
subordination and consensus-coercion. The complexities of the 
Jharkhand situation show that in reality there is a dialectical tension 
between forces of oppression and forces of resistance, between potential 
and achieved consensus and coercion. The perception of political 
phenomena radically changes when the locus of power is not sought in 
the apparatus of power but in the operation of forces that have to do with 
power. With this are related the value judgements through which 
"failure" and "success" in politics have been perceived. The dialectical 
tension in which dominance and subordination operate is more complex 
than what is reflected in electoral politics. As the tradition o f protest 
among the adivasis of Jharkhand up to the present shows, the relations 
between processes of domination and subordination have given rise to 
cultural formations o f oppression and resistance. These two formations 
develop far beyond the formal scenario of politics. The "success" of
resistance is better understood in terms of the gradual acquisition of 
experiences that can eventually translate into political actions. 
(Devalle and Oberoi 1983).
4.- Ethnicity: the Hidden Tropes.
There is no absolute practice o f ethnicity. The role played by 
the ethnic factor in politics will closely depend on the class situation and 
the interests of those sectors that resort to it to reinforce their ideological 
discourses and practical actions. The political formulation of ethnicity is 
not developed by the entire ethnic community/group as a bloc, since this 
is not an homogeneous entity in class terms. The actions of the different 
sectors of the community are guided by different interests, based on the 
existence of structural class links that are present in the society as a 
whole.
It is only at certain points in the history of a society that 
ethnicity is asserted explicitly, although in practice it has been "lived" 
and "used" all the time. What are the conditions under which ethnicity 
emerges as a major element for political mobilization? In contemporary 
India and certainly in Jharkhand, ethnic-based political movements 
appear closely related to class interests and often to overt class conflicts. 
In Jharkhand, ethnicity and class are embedded in the same social 
formation and found in interaction.
Broadly, I am arguing that when class conflicts are diverted to 
confrontations at other levels (for instance, "locals" vs, "outsiders"), or 
where the development of class-based movements encounters great 
obstacles, ethnicity may act as a factor of unity at a certain moment of 
political action. The issue remains as to when and under what 
circumstances class consciousness takes precedence over ethnic 
consciousness and becomes the leading force in popular movements. 
The JMM of the seventies did show this evolution but, at the same time, 
the eighties brought ethnicity once more back into the foreground in 
Jharkhand. This evolution is not complete and we will surely see more 
of it as changes continue to occur in the socio-political context of the 
region.
It is necessary to underline that to sharply separate the existence 
of an ethnic conciousness from the development of a class
consciousness may be highly unproductive. When ethnic ascription and 
class situation correlate, as is the case of indigenous peasantries (and the 
majority of the adivasis in Jharkhand fall broadly into this category), 
both ethnic and class consciousness may develop in unison. This 
combined awareness is condensed in the expression "Jharkhandi 
producer" that animated the grass-roots movement in Jharkhand.
Ethnicity as a process presents both continuities (what makes a 
particular ethnic/ ethno-national style) and discontinuities (the different 
forms in which ethnicity is lived by different social sectors). The 
discontinuities in the process stem from the direct intervention of social 
and historical circumstances: the experience of conquest and 
colonialism, the advance of cultural hegemony, the process of class 
formation and the development of class conflicts. From the intersecting 
of the two constituent tendencies of ethnicity, permanence and 
dynamics, emerge different formulations of ethnicity. The two 
formulations of Jharkhandi identity discussed in this thesis show that 
while some key indicators remain constant in the definition of identity 
and of political aims, these are differently formulated in each of the 
movements according to their class bases.
Class consciousness develops out of the collectively 
experienced everyday reality. For those involved, class, more often than 
not, is not translated into abstract discourses. Class is lived as a process 
and "handled in cultural terms" in many different ways (see Thompson 
1968: 10-12; 1978: 149-150). Ethnicity can be seen as one of these 
ways, particularly in systems of inequality in which ethnic ascription 
and class situation tend to correspond. In other words, ethnicity is a 
mode of social consciousness as well as a form of ordering social 
relationships. Oppression is not perceived in the abstract either. What 
flesh and bone people experience are concrete realities: land alienation, 
rural indebtness, inadequate wages, oppressive time-work-discipline for 
the sake of increased production, discrimination, the negation or 
distortion of their collective identity. Their demands globally express a 
defence of basic human needs and rights.
For oppositional grass-roots politics, ethnicity can provide a 
strategic axis for mobilization against inequality and domination, 
engineered towards aims that are not limited to the economic alone. They
will instead attempt to embrace realms of the social reality which have 
been subordinated by the mechanisms of formal politics to economic 
imperatives and to the "higher" goals of a sectorial "national interest". 
When appealing to their collective historico-cultural identity, the 
subaltern sectors are expressing their concerns and views on issues of 
culture and deculturation, self-respect, self-determination, the right to 
linguistic specificity, their views on the unequal nature of existing 
socioeconomic relationships, and especially their right to participate 
actively in politics. This participation is often sought outside the existing 
structures (like established parties) through a process of redefinition of 
the contents of politics. The people take a stand against the inequalities 
present in the society, against the authoritarianism of the State, and 
against the hegemonic claims of the ruling sectors.
In this context, the coalescence of class and ethnic/national 
subordination has usually resulted in an explosive combination. In the 
era of national liberation movements and decolonization, non-class 
identities - ethnicity amongst them - have played an important role in 
popular political mobilization, given the added meanings they provide to 
mass solidarity. In the course of these struggles, existing contradictions 
expressed in ethnic, regional and class antagonisms are acknowledged 
from a holistic perspective that embraces the social, economic and 
cultural domains. Those extra non-class elements may help the 
subaltern sectors to more successfully resist the social and moral 
hegemony of the dominant classes and to develop alternative views 
about the society at large and their future. These alternative views can 
come together into a potentially radical culture o f resistance.
To sum up, ethnic discourses are many and varied in nature. In 
the hands of the State and the dominant classes ethnicity serves as an 
element to reproduce systems of social relationships, to validate 
structures of inequality and to support policies of social control. In this 
context, sectors of those groups in a situation of ethno-national 
subordination may act, on account of their class situation, as mediators 
betweeen the structure of power and the subaltern sectors, performing a 
role similar to that of Mafeje's "converts" (1971). This mediation, 
translated in reformist efforts, moves always within the parameters 
established by the structure of power, ultimately helping in its 
reproduction.
In specific situations of subordination, on the other hand, 
ethnic consciousness may provide the foundations for the emergence of 
an oppositional consciousness, expressed in counter-hegemonic 
practices. This consciousness entails an acknowledgement of the nature 
of inter-ethnic relationships, often accompanied by an acute perception 
of class differences and antagonisms. At the practical level, ethnicity 
may provide the subaltern sectors with a strategy to combat inequality 
and to cancel forms of domination.
I have attempted to show in this thesis that the examination of 
social processes such as ethnicity calls for a change in the methodology, 
the modes of inquiry and analysis in anthropological practice. The 
subject needs to be approached in terms different from those that 
originate in ethnocentric perceptions. A methodology that combines 
historical, sociological and anthropological analyses of social 
phenomena can transform the terms in which issues of dominance and 
subordination have been posed. Former "objects" will be viewed as the 
social agents they are. The presence of Jharkhand adivasi societies as 
active social and historical agents challenges the existence of the 
"illusory object" that anthropology has constructed (in the guise of 
"tribes", in this case) to conceptualize certain non-Western societies.
GLOSSARY
Abwabs Miscellaneous cesses, imposts and charges levied by landlords 
and public officers.
Adhi dharma "A person whose dharma is the original one". An adivasi 
who follows his/her own religion.
Adivasi From Sanskr.: adi = original, vasi = inhabitant; the Indian 
native ethnic minorities.
Akkra, akhara Village dancing ground.
Anna One sixteenth of a rupee.
A'sar Bow and arrow,
Barkandaz Armed watchman.
Begar Forced labour.
Beth begari Bonded labour system.
Bhuinhar Original clearers of land among the Oraons and the Mundas, 
with remnants of khuntkatti lands as privileged tenures (bhuinhari 
lands).
Bitlaha Temporal or permanent excommunication for breaching the 
social code of conduct (Santal).
Bonga Deity; god.
Brahmotta Land granted rent free to Brahmins.
Chuar "Bandit".
Dacoity Brigandage.
Daroga Head of a police, custom or excise station.
Deswali lands Lands under the control of the religious chief (Munda). 
Diku A non-adivasi person alien to the area; "alien-exploiter".
Disum Territory.
Diwan A minister, a chief officer of a state.
Duk dukia (dum -duggia) Drum.
Eta-haturenko "Men of other villages",
Ghatwal Village headman with a service tenure (Bhumij); constable in 
Jungle Mahals. Guardians of passes and wardens of marches.
Gola Depot.
Hatu Village (Mundari).
Hor, horo "Us, the people"; self-definitory term among adivasis of the 
Munda group.
Hul Uprising. The Santal Movement of 1855.
Jagarthan Sacred grove (Santal).
Jagir A service tenure,
Jagirdar Holder of a jagir.
Johar Expression used by adivasis as a greeting; a salutation between 
equals.
Junglee "People of the jungle","primitive".
Kali paraja From the Sanskrit foz/j=black, andparaja = bom of another, 
alien, different. "Black people".
Kamioti Bonded labour system.
Khas Own cultivation.
Khorposh Maintenance grants.
Khorposhdar Maintenance grantee.
Khunt Lineage.
Khuntkatti lands Lands communally owned by the khuntkattidars.
Khuntkattidar Descendant of the village's founding lineage 
(Chotanagpur).
Kili Clan.
Lalkhand Red Land.
Laya Village priest ( Bhumij, Santal).
Lo BirSendra Hunt council (Santal).
Mahajan Moneylender.
Lathait Muscle-man trained in the use of 
batons.
Mahato Village headman.
Mahua Bassia latifolia. Fermented drink made out of its flowers.
Manjhi Village headman.
Manjiha land A landlord's privilege private lands (Chotanagpur). 
Manki Leader of a confederancy of villages (Munda).
Marang Burn Bonga The sacred Great Mountain.
More hor “Group of five" similar to the panchayat; Santal village 
council.
Munda Village headman (Munda).
Naia, nay aka, naeke Village religious chief (Santal).
Naib Deputy
Ojha or sokha “Witch finder". Traditional doctor.
Pahan Village religious chief (Munda).
Paik Village watchman.
Panchayat A village "council of five". Consultative body.
Paramanik Person in charge of matters regarding land and cultivation 
(Santal).
Pargana Confederancy of twelve villages (Santal). A revenue 
subdivision of a tahsil ( subdivision of a district).
/
Parganait Santal territorial chief.
Parha Inter-village council.
Parja-horoko "Men of other villages".
Patti Confederancy of villages (Munda).
Pradhani system A system in which the landlord does not deals directly 
with the tenants but through the mediation of the village headman 
(Chotanagpur and Santal Parganas).
Raiyat, ryot A cultivator, as distinct from labourer.
Raj Kingdom/ruler.
Raja Ruler.
R a j ha "The share of the raja", the raja's rent-paying lands 
(Chotanagpur).
Sadan Non-adivasi speaking Sadani.
Sal A tree of the species Shorea robusta.
Sannyasi A "houseless devotee", wandering mendicant.
Sardar Chieftain, village headman (Paharia).
Sardar ghatwal Chief of several twelve village-units (Bhumij).
Sarkar Government.
Sarna Village sacred grove (Munda).
Sasan Burial ground.
Sing Bonga The solar deity in the Munda pantheon.
Suzawal A native collector of revenue.
Tanbedar Watchman, a subordinate to the ghatwal 
Tarai Belt of plains between Bihar and Nepal.
Thakur God.
Thana A police station or area under the jurisdiction of a local police 
station.
Thika Permanent or temporary land lease.
Thikadar Holder of a permanent or temporary lease.
Tumduka Santal drum.
Ulgulan Uprising. The Birsaite Movement of 1895.
Zamindar Landlord or landholder. Under British law: a person 
recognized as possessing proprietory rights over land.
Zamindari Estate of a zamindar.
304
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Abdel-Malek, A.
1963 L'Orientalisme en Crise. Diog&ne, 44:109-142.
1975 La Dialictica Social LaReestructuracidndela 
Teoria Social y de Filosofla PolfticaM6xico 
-Madrid-B. Aires: Siglo XXI.
1981 Social Dialectics (vol.I and II). London:
Macmillan Press.
Adas, M.
1979 Prophets o f Rebellion. Millenarian Protest
Movements against the European Colonial Order. 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press.
Aguero, C., S. Devalle andM. Tanaka (eds.)
1981 Peasantry and National Integration. Mexico: El 
Colegio de M6xico.
Agiiero, C,, S. Devalle and M. Tanaka
1981 Perspectives for the Study of the Peasantry 
and National Integration. In C. Aguero, S. 
Devalle and M. Tanaka (eds.), Peasantry and 
National Integration. Mexico: El Colegio de 
Mexico: 45-49.
Ahmed, F.
1983 Ground into the Dust. India Today, August 31: 50 
-53.
1986 Jharkhand: Renewed Call. India Today, February 
28: 3.
Alvarez, C. A.
1979 Homo Faber: Technology and Culture in India,
China and the West, 1500-1972. Bombay: Allied
Publ..
Amin, S.
1974 El Capitalismo Perifirico. Mexico: Nuestro
Tiempo.
Anderson, B.
1983 Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin
and Spread o f Nationalism. London: Verso.
Antrobus, H. A.
1957 History o f the Assam Company 1839-1953. 
Edinburgh:Constable.
Apte, M. L.
1978 Region, Religion, and Language: Parameters of 
Identity in the Process of Acculturation. In R.
Holloman and S., A. Arutionov (eds.),
Perspectives on Ethnicity. The Hague-Paris: 
Mouton:223-231.
Archer, W. G.
1945 Comment. A Rebellion Number. Man in India, XXV 
(4): 205-207.
Argyle, W. J.
1969 European Nationalism and African Tribalism. In 
P.H. Gulliver (ed.), Tradition and Transition 
in East Africa, London: Routledge andKegan 
Paul: 41-57.
Asad, T.
1975a Anthropological Texts and Ideological Problems:
An Analysis of Cohen on Arab Villages in Israel. 
Review of Middle East Studies, 1:1-40.
(ed.)
1975b Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter. 
Ithaca:Ithaca Press.
1986 The Concept of Cultural Translation in British 
Social Anthropology. In J. Clifford and G.E. 
Marcus (eds.), Writing Culture. The Poetics and 
Politics o f Ethnography. Berkeley: University of 
California Press: 141-164.
Aspelin, P. y L. and S. Coelho dos Santos
1981 Indian Areas Threatened by Hydro-electric 
Projects in Brasil. Copenhagen: IWGIA.
Bailey, F. G.
1960 Tribe, Caste and Nation. A Study o f Political 
Activity and Political Change in Highland 
Orissa. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
1961 ’’Tribe" and "Caste" in India. Contributions to 
Indian Sociology, V: 7-19.
Balandier, G.
1955 Sociologie Actuelle de VAfrique Noire, Paris: 
PUF.
Banton, M.
1981 The Direction and Speed of Ethnic Change. In 
C.F. Keyes (ed.), Ethnic Change, Seattle:
University of Washington Press: 32-52.
Bara, D.
1980 Vikas Maitri. Annual Report, 1979. Ranchi: Vikas 
Maitri.
Barbados Symposium
1971 Declaration o f Barbados. Copenhagen: IWGIA.
Barrera, M.
1979 Colonial Labor Theories of Inequality: The Case 
of the International Harvester. In R. Cohen,
P.C.W. Gutkind and P.Brazier (eds.), Peasants 
and Proletarians, The Struggle of Third World 
Workers. London: Hutchinson: 331-352.
Barth, F. (ed.)
1970 Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social
Organization of Culture Difference. London:
George Allen and Unwin,
Barthes, R.
1984 Mythologies. London: Paladin.
Basu, K. K.
1934 The Sontal Outbreak in Bhagalpur. The Journal o f 
the Bihar and Orissa Reseach Society, XX: 186 
-224.
Bennett, J. W. (ed.)
1975 The New Ethnicity. Perspectives from Ethnology.
New York: West Publ..
Bernstein, H.
1976 Underdevelopment and the Law of Value: a
Critique of Kay. Review of African Political 
Economy, 6: 51-64.
Beteille, A.
1974 Studies in Agrarian Social Structure. Delhi:
Oxford University Press. .
Bettelheim, C.
1972 Theoretical Comments. In A. Emmanuel, Unequal
Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism o f Trade. 
London-New York: Monthly Review Press: 271-322.
Bhaduri, A.
1973 Agricultural Backwardness under Semi-feudalism. 
Economic Journal, 83, (329).
Bhattacharya, S.
1982 Modern Indian History. Presidential Address,
Indian History Congress. New Delhi: Jawaharlal 
Nehru University.
Bhowmick, P. K.
1963 The Lodhas o f West Bengal. A Socio-Economic 
Study. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak.
Bogaert, M. V. d.
1980 To Sit Together and to Stand Together 
(unpublished manuscript).
Bogaert, M. V. d., A. K. Sinha, M. Bhowmik and D. Bara
1980 Training Village Guidelines for Development 
Workers. Ranchi: Xavier Institute of Social 
Service.
Bogaert, M. V. d., D. Bara and A, K. Sinha
n.d. Development of Village Entrepreneurs in a 
Tribal Area. A Case Description. Ranchi: Bagla 
Press.
Bompas, C. H.
1909 Folklore of the Santal Parganas. London: David 
Nutt.
Bonacich, E.
1980 Class Approaches to Ethnicity and Race. The
Insurgent Sociologist, X (2): 9-23.
Bonfil Batalla, G.
1972 El Concepto de Indio en America: Una Categorfa 
de la Situation Colonial. Andies de Antropo- 
logia, IX: 105-124.
1979 Las Nuevas Organizaciones Indigenas. In
Documentos de la Segunda Reunidn de Barbados, 
Indianidad y Descolonizacion en America Latina. 
Mexico: Nueva Imagen: 23-40.
1981 Utopia y Revolucion: El Pensamiento Politico
Contempordneo de los Indios America Latina. 
Mexico: Nueva Imagen.
308
Bose, N. K.
1964 Change in Tribal Cultures before and after 
Independence. Man in India, 44 (1): 1-10.
Bose, S.
1971 Economy o f Bihar, Calcutta: Mukhopadhyay.
Bradby, B.
1980 The Destruction of Natural Economy. In H. Wolpe
(ed.), The Articulation o f Modes o f Production. 
London; Routledge & Kegan Paul: 93-127.
Bradley-Birt, F. B.
1903 ChotaNagpore. A Little-Known Province o f the 
Empire. London: Smith, Elder & Co..
Brass, P. R.
1976 Ethnicity and Nationality Formation. Ethnicity,
3: 225-241.
Bridges, L.
1973 Race Relations Research: from Colonialsm to Neo­
colonialism? Some Random Thoughts. Race, XVI
(3): 331-341.
Buci-Glucksmann, C.
1982 Hegemony and Consent. In A. Showstack Sassoon 
(ed.), Approaches to Gramsci. London: Writers 
and Readers Publ. Coop.: 116-126.
Byres, T. J. and H. Mukhia (eds.)
1985 Feudalism and Non-European Societies. Special 
Issue of The Journal o f Peasant Studies, 12: (2 
-3).
Cabral, A.
1973 Return to the Sources. Selected Speeches by
Amilcar Cabral. New York and London: Monthly 
Review Press.
Caplan, L.
1970 Land and Social Change in East Nepal, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Casimir, J.
1981 La Cultura Oprimida. M6xico: Nueva Imagen.
Castells, M.
1979 Immigrant Workers and Class Struggles in
Advanced Capitalism: The Western European 
Experience. In R. Cohen, P.C.W. Gutkind and P. 
Brazier (eds.), Peasants and Proletarians. The 
Struggle o f Third World Workers. London: 
Hutchinson: 353-379,
Cesaire, A.
1946 Les Armees Miraculeuses (EtLes Chiens se 
taisaint). Paris: Gallimard.
Chakraborty, S.
1982 Jharkhand Movement and the Working Class. 
Frontier. July 17: 3-5.
Chaudhuri, M. R.
1978 The Tea Industry in India. A Diagnostic Analysis
o f its Geo-economic Aspects. Calcutta-New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press.
Chaudhury, S. B.
1955 Civil Disturbances during the British Rule in 
India (1765-1857). Calcutta: Punthi Pustak,
Chandra, B.
1970 Colonialism and Modernization. New Delhi: New 
Age Printing Press.
Chesneaux, J.
1973 Peasant Revolts in China. 1840-1949. London: 
Thames and Hudson.
Cliffe, L.
1976 Rural Political Economy of Africa. In P.C.
Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (eds.), The Political 
Economy o f Contemporary Africa. London: Sage: 
112-130.
Clifford, J.
1986a Introduction: Partial Truths. In J, Clifford
and G. E. Marcus (eds.), Writing Culture. The 
Poetics and Politics o f Ethnography. Berkeley: 
University of California Press: 1-26.
1986b On Ethnographic Allegory. In J. Clifford and
G.E. Marcus (eds.), Writing Culture. The Poetics 
and Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley:
University of California Press: 98-121.
Clifford, J. and G. E. Marcus (eds.)
1986 Writing Culture. The Poetics and Politics of
Ethnography. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.
Cohen, A.
1969 Custom and Conflict in Urban Africa. A Study of
Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
1974a The Lesson of Ethnicity. In A. Cohen (ed,),
Urban Ethnicity, ASA Monograph 12. London: 
Tavistock: ix-xxiv.
1974b Two-Dimensional Man. London: Routledge and 
. Kegan Paul.
1981 Variables of Ethnicity. In C. F. Keyes (ed.),
Ethnic Change. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press: 307-331.
Cohen, R.
1978 Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology. 
Annual Review o f Anthropology, 1: 379-403.
Cohn, N.
1962 Medieval Millenarism: its Bearing in the
Comparative Study of Millenarian Movements. In 
S. Thrupp (ed.), Millenial Dreams in Action. 
(Comparative Studies in Society and History 
Supplement 2), The Hague: Mouton: 31-43.
1970 The Pursuit o f the Millennium, New York:
Paladin.
Comaroff, J.
1985 Body of Power, Spirit o f Resistance. The
Culture and History o f a South African People. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Connor, W.
1972 Nation-building or Nation-destroying?. World 
Politics, XXIV (3): 319-335.
Copans, J.
1974 Critiques etPolitiques de VAnthropologie.
Dossiers Africaines, Paris: Maspero.
(ed.)
1975 Anthropologie etlmperialisme. Paris: Maspero.
Corbridge, S.
1982 Industrial Development in Tribal India. The
Case of the Iron Ore Mining Industry in 
Singhbhum District, 1900-1960. InN. Sengupta, 
(ed.), Fourth World Dynamics: Jharkhand. Delhi: 
Authors Guild Publ.: 40-62.
1988 The Ideology of Tribal Economy and Society: 
Politics in the Jharkhand, 1950-1980. Modern 
Asian Studies 22 (I): 1-42.
Coupland, H.
1911 Bengal District Gazeteers. Manbhum. Calcutta: 
Bengal Secretariat Book Depot.
Cox, O. C.
1970 Caste, Class and Race. A Study in Social
Dynamics. London: Monthly Review Press.
Crapanzano, V.
1986 Hermes'Dilemma: The Masking of Subversion in 
Ethnographic Description. In J. Clifford and 
G.E. Marcus (eds.), Writing Culture. The Poetics 
and Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley:
University of California Press: 51-76.
Culshaw, W, J.
1949 Tribal Heritage. A Study o f the Santals.
London: Lutterworth Press.
Culshaw, W. J. and W. G. Archer
1945 The Santal Rebellion. Man in India, XXV (4): 
218-239.
Dalton, E. T.
1872 Descriptive Ethnology o f Bengal. Calcutta:
Office of the Superintendent of Government 
Printing (Reprint of 1960).
Das, A, N.
1975 Bihar: The Struggle of Workers and Tribal
Peasant in Chotanagpur. Economic and Political 
Weekly, X(9), March 1: 384-386.
1983 Agrarian Unrest and Socioeconomic Change in
Bihar, 1900-1980. New Delhi: Manohar.
1984 Class in Itself, Caste for Itself: Social
Articulation in Bihar. Economic and Political 
Weekly, XIX (37): 1616-1619.
Deere, C. D.
1979 Rural Women's Subsistence Production in the
Capitalist Periphery. In R. Cohen, P.C.W. 
Gutkind and P. Brazier (eds.), Peasants and 
Proletarians. The Struggle of World Workers. 
London: Hutchinson: 133-148.
de Lepervanche, M.
1980 From Race to Ethnicity. The Australia and New
Zealand Journal o f Sociology, 16 (1): 24-37.
Denoon, D.
1985 Capitalism in Papua New Guinea. The Journal of 
Pacific History, XX (3): 119-134.
Desai, A. R.
1961 Rural India in Transition. Bombay: Popular Book 
Depot.
Despres, L, A. (ed.)
1975 Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural 
Societies. TheHague-Paris: Mouton.
Devalle, S. B. C.
1977a La Palabra de la Tierra. Protesta Campesina en
India, Siglo XIX. Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico.
1977b Un Poema. Una Industria, Estudios de Asiay 
Africa. XII (1): 67-70.
1980a Nineteenth Century Peasant Protest in
Chotanagpur: A Retrospection. In P. Dash Sharma 
(ed.), The Passing Scene in Chotanagpur. Ranchi: 
Maitryee Publ.: 8-24,
1980b Multiethnicity in India. Copenhagen: IWGIA.
1981a La "Fiebre de la tala" y la Masacre de Gua.
Estudios de Asia y Africa, XVI (1):200- 206.
1981b. Language and Culture: A Defining Axis of Ethnic 
Identity. Comunicacion e Informdtica, 2 (1): 26 
-33.
1983 Antropologfa, Ideologfa, Colonialismo. Estudios
de Asia y Africa, XVIII (3): 337-368.
1984 Ethnic Relations and the Situation of the
Indigenous Peoples in the Pacific Area. U.N.U. 
Report.
1985a Clandestine Culture of Protest in Colonial
Situations. Canberra Anthropology, 8 (1 & 2):
32-57. -
1985b India en 1984: el Colapso del Estado y el
Comunalismo en Polftica. Estudios de Asia y 
Afric.a, XX (4): 646-678.
(ed.)
1988 La Diversidad Prohibida. Resistencia Etnica y
Poder de Estado. Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico 
(in press).
Devalle, S. B. C., and H. S. Oberoi
1983 Sacred Shrines, Secular Protest and Peasant
Participation: the Babbar Akalis Reconsidered, 
Punjab Journal o f Politics, VII (2): 27-62.
Devi, M.
198 la  Contract Labour or Bonded Labour?. Economic and 
Political Weekly, XVI (23), June 6:1010-1013.
1981b Witch-Sabbath at Singhbhum, Economic and 
Political Weekly, XVI (40), October 3:1595 
-1597.
1983 Singhbhum. A Countryside Slowly Dying. Economic 
and Political Weekly, XVIII (10), March 5:329 
-330.
Dhan, R. O.
1977 Tribal Movements in Chotanagpur. In S.C. Malik 
(ed.), Dissent, Protest and Reform in Indian 
Civilization, Simla: Indian Institute of 
Advanced Study: 199-209.
Dhar, H.
1980a Bihar: A Strange Alliance, Frontier, June 14:
7-8.
1980b Split in Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. Economic and 
Political Weekly, XV (31), August 2:1299-1300.
Dhoquois, G.
1976 La Formation Econdmico-social como Combinacidn 
de Modos de Production. In Luporini, Sereni 
et.al, El Concepto de "Formacidn Economico 
-social". Mexico: SigloXXI: 185-189.
Documentos de la Segunda Reunidn de Barbados
1979 Indianidad y DescolonizaciSn en Amirica Latina. 
Mexico: Nueva Imagen.
Dube, S. C.
1960 Approaches to the Tribal Problem in India. In 
L.P. Vidyarthi (ed.), Indian Anthropology in 
Action. Ranchi:Ranchi University: 11-15,
1977 Tribal Heritage of India. I: Ethnicity, Identity 
and Interaction. New Delhi: Vikas.
Dumont, J. P.
1986 Prologue to Ethnography or Prolegomena to 
Anthropography. Ethos 14 (4): 334-367.
Eliade, M.
1954 Traiti dHistoire desReligions. Paris: Payot.
Elwin, V.
1943 The Aboriginals. London: Oxford University 
Press.
1945 The Kol Insurrection. Man in India, XXV (4): 
258-260.
1960 Do We Really Want to Keep them in a Zoo?. In
Govt, of India, Adivasis. Delhi: Publications 
Division.
Enloe, C. H.
1973 Ethnic Conflict and Political Development.
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Epstein, A. L.
1969 The Network and Urban Social Organization. In 
J.C. Mitchell (ed.), Social Networks in Urban 
Situations. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press: 77-T16.
1973 Politics in an Urban African Community.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Essien-Udom, E. U.
1975 Tribalism and Racism. In L. Kuper (ed.), Race,
Science and Society. Paris-New York: UNESCO 
-Columbia University Press: 234-261.
Evans-Pritchard, E. E.
1961 Anthropology and History. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Fanon, F.
1973 Black Skin, White Masks. St. Albans: Paladin.
1983 The Wretched of the Earth. Bungay, Suffolk: 
Pelican.
Fitzpatrick, P.
1980 Law and State in Papua New Guinea. London: 
Academic Press.
Forrest, G. W. (ed.)
1910 Selection from the State Papers of the Governors 
General o f India, II (Warren Hastings.
Documents), Oxford-London: Blackwell-Constable.
Frank, A. G.
1966 Development o f Underdevelopment. New York: 
Monthly Review Press.
1969 Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of 
Sociology. In A.G. Frank, Latin America: 
Underdevelopment or Revolution. New York: 
Monthly Review Press.
Frankel, F. R.
1971 India's Green Revolution. Economic Gains and 
Political Costs. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
Fried, M. H.
1975 The Notion o f Tribe. Menlo Park, Cal.: Cummings 
Publ. and Co.
Fuchs, S.
1965 Rebellious Prophets, A Study of Messianic
Movements in Indian Religion. Bombay: Asia 
Publishing House.
Galeano M, J.
1984 El Animal y el Cazador. Casa del Tiempo, TV 
(40), May: 32-33.
Ganguly, D. C.(ed.)
1958 Select Documents o f the British Period o f Indian 
History. Calcutta: Secretariat Press.
Ganguli T.
1987 A Non-Violent Struggle. The Week, 5 (50), 
November 29: 38-39.
Ganguly, T. and U. Sinha
1987 TheJharkhand Reawakening, The Week, 5 (50), 
(November 29): 38-39.
Gait, E. A., C. G. H. Allen and H. F. Howard
1909 Imperial Gazetteer o f India. Provincial 
Series, Bengal, I and X. Calcutta:
Superintendent of Govenment Printing.
Gautam, M. K.
1977 In Search o f an Identity. A Case of the Santal 
in Northern India. Leiden: Gautam.
1978a Are we doing Justice to the Tribal Studies in 
India? A Critical View about the Trends and 
Prospects. In R.R. Moser and M.K. Gautam (eds.), 
Aspects o f Tribal Life in South Asia I: Strategy 
and Survival. Beme: University of Berne: 9-24.
1978b Tradition, Modernization and the Problem of 
Identity among the Santal. In R.R. Moser and 
M.K. Gautam (eds.), Aspects o f Tribal Life in 
South Asia I: Strategy and Survival. Beme: 
University of Beme: 105-121.
Geertz, C.
1963 The Integrative Revolution: Primordial
Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States.
In C. Geertz, Old Societies and New States. New 
York: The Free Press: 105-157.
1973 Interpretation o f Cultures. New York: Basic 
Books.
Genovese, E. D,
1976 Roll, Jordan, Roll. The World the Slaves Made.
New York: Vintage Books.
Ghosh, H. N.
1916 The Bhumij of Chota Nagpur. Journal o f Bihar and 
Orissa Research Society, 2: 265-282.
Ghurye, G. S.
1963 The Scheduled Tribes. Bombay: Popular Book 
Depot.
Gismondi, M. A.
1985 "The Gift of Theory": A Critique of the Histoire 
des Mentalitds. Social History. 10 (2): 211-230.
Glazer, N. and D. P. Moynihan
1963 Beyond the Melting Pot: the Negroes, Puerto 
Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York. 
Cambridge: MIT Press (Revised ed. 1970).
318
(eds.)
1976 Ethnicity, Theory and Experience. Cambridge, 
Mass., and London: Harvard University Press.
Gluckman, M.
1961 Anthropological Problems Arising from the
African Industrial Revolution. In A. Southall 
(ed.), Social Change in Modern Africa. London: 
Oxford University Press: 67-82.
Godelier, M.
1974 El Concepto de Tribu: Crisis de un Concepto o 
Crisis de los Fundamentos Empfricos de la 
Antropologia?. In M. Godelier, Economia, 
Fetichismo y Religidn en las Sociedades 
Pritnitivas. Mdxico, Siglo XXI: 198-222.
Gonz&lez Casanova, P.
1965 Internal Colonialism and National Development. 
Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 1 (4): 15-30.
Gopal, S.
1949 The Permanente Settlement in Bengal and its 
Results. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Gough, K.
1968 New Proposals for Anthropologists. Current 
Anthropology. 9: 403-407.
1974 Indian Peasant Uprisings. Economic and
Political Weekly, IX (32-33 8c 34): 1391-1412.
Gramsci, A.
1973 Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio 
Gramsci. Hoare and G.N. Smith (eds.). London: 
Lawrence and Wishart,
1975 Los Intelectuales y la Organizacion de la
Cultura. Mexico: Juan Pablos Editor.
Grierson, G. A.
1885 Bihar Peasant Life. Calcutta: The Bengal 
Secretariat Press.
1967 Linguistic Survey o f India. I: part I and IV.
New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
Grigson, W. V.
1946 The Aboriginal in the Future of India. Man in 
India, XXVI (2): 81-96.
Guerrero, F. J.
1983 El Anticapitalismo Reaccionario en Antropologia. 
Nueva Antropologfa, V (20): 31-51.
Guha, R,
1981 A Rule of Property for Bengal. An Essay on the
Idea ofPermanente Settlement. New Delhi: Orient 
Longman.
1983 Elementary Aspects o f Peasant Insurgency in
Colonial India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Guha, Ramachandra
1983 Foresty in British and Post-Britrish India. A 
Historical Analysis. Economic and Political 
Weekly, XVIII (44), October 29: 1882-1896.
Gulliver, P. H. (ed.)
1969 Tradition and Transition in East Africa.
Studies of the Tribal Element in the Modern Era. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Gutkind, P. C. W. and I. Wallerstein (eds.)
1976 The Political Economy o f Contemporary Africa. 
London- Berkeley: Sage.
Guzm&n-Bo'ckler, C.
1975 Colonialismo y Revolucion. Mexico: Siglo XXI.
Habib, I.
1963 The Agrarian System of Mughal India. Bombay: 
Asia Publishing House.
1985 Classifying Pre-Colonial India. The Journal o f
Peasant Studies 12 (2 & 3): 44-53.
Hall, S.
1981 Notes on Deconstructing "the Popular". In R. 
Samuel (ed.), People's History and Socialist 
Theory. London: Routledge and Kegal Paul: 227 
-240.
Hallet, M. G. and T. S. Macpherson
1917 Bihar District Gazetteers. Ranchi. Patna: 
Secretariat Press.
Hall, S., B. Lumley and G. Me Lennan
1978 Politics and Ideology: Gramsci. In Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, On Ideology. 
London: Hutchinson: 45-76.
Hall, S. and P. Whannel
1965 The Popular Arts. New York: Pantheon Books.
Heber, R.
1861 Narrative o f a Journey Through the Upper 
Provinces o f India from Calcutta to Bombay, 
1824-25. An Account of a Journey to Madras and 
the Southern Provinces, 1826, and Letters 
Written in India. I & n  (1856). London: John 
Murray.
Hill, C.
1972 The World Turned Upside Down. London: Penguin.
Hinton, P.
1981 Where Have the New Ethnicists Gone Wrong?. 
Australia and New Zealand Journal o f Sociology,
17 (3): 14-19.
Hobsbawm, E. J.
1963 Primitive Rebels. Studies in Archaic Forms of
Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries. 
New York: Norton.
1965 Introduction. In K. Marx, Pre-Capitalist
Economic Formations. New York: International 
Publications: 9-65.
1971 Class Consciousness in History. In I. Meszaros 
(ed.), Aspects o f History and Class 
Consciousness. London Routledge and Kegan Paul: 
5-21.
1976 Bandidos, Barcelona-Caracas-Mexico: Ariel.
1983 Introduction: Inventing Traditions. In E. J.
Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger (eds.). The Invention 
of Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 1-14.
Hobsbawm, E. J. and T. O. Ranger (eds.)
1983 The Invention o f Traditions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hoffmann, J. et.al.
1936-50 Encyclopaedia Mundarica. Patna:
Superintendent of Government Printing.
Hoffmann, J.
1961 Principles of Succession and Inheritance among 
the Mundas. Man in India, 41 (4): 324-338.
Hrach, H. G.
1978 From "Regulated Anarchy" to "Proto-nationalism": 
The Case of the Santals. In R.R. Moser and M. K. 
Gautam (eds), Aspects o f Tribal Life in South 
Asia I: Strategy and Survival Beme: University 
of Beme: 93-104.
Huizer, G,
1974 El Potencial Revolucionario del Campesino en 
America Latina. Mexico, Siglo XXI.
Hunter, G. and A. F. Bottrall
1974 Serving the Small Farmer: Policy Choices
in Indian Agriculture. London: CroomHelm and 
O.D.I..
Hunter, W. W.
1868 The Annals o f Rural Bengal. New York: Leypoldt 
and Holt.
1877 A Statistical Account of Bengal, XIV. London: 
Trubner & Co..
Iyer, K. G. and R. N. Maharaj
1977 Agrarian Movement in Dhanbad. New Delhi: 
National Labour Institute (mimeo).
1961 Revitalization Movements in Tribal India. In L.
P. Vidyarthi (ed.), Aspects of Religion in 
Indian Society. Meerut: Kedar Ram Nath: 282-315.
Jaulin, R.
1973 La Paz Blanca. Introduccidn al Etnocidio. Buenos 
Aires: Tiempo Contemporaneo.
(ed.)
1976 El Etnocidio a trav&s de las Americas. Mexico 
-Madrid-Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
(ed.)
1979a La Des-civilizacion (Politicay Prdctica del 
Etnocidio). Mexico: Nueva Imagen.
1979b Del Folklore, In R. Jaulin (ed,) La Des 
-civilizacion (Politicay Prdctica del 
Etnocidio). Mexico: Nueva Imagen: 85-90.
Jha, C. and N, Jha
1964 Some Aspects of Bihar Politicts. Indian 
Quarterly, XX (3): 312-329.
322
Jha, J, C.
1963 Restoration of Indigenous Police in a Tribal
Area of Bihar and Bengal, 1800, The Journal o f 
the Bihar Research Society, XLIX, (I-IV): 265 
-275.
1967 The Bhumij Revolt (1832-1833). Ganga Narain's
Hangama or Turmoil. Delhi; Munshiram Manoharlal.
1971 History of Land Revenue in Chotanagpur (c. 1770 
-1830 AD), In R. S. Sharma (ed.), Land Revenue 
in India. Historical Studies. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidas: 71-79.
Jha, S.
1972 Political Elite in Bihar. Bombay: Vora and Co.
Publ..
Jimenez Turon, S.
1979 Historia de la Dominacidn Europea en America, 
Escrita por un Dominado. In Documentos de la 
Segunda Reunidn de Barbados, Indianidad y 
Descolonizacion en America Latina. Mexico, Nueva 
Imagen; 201-206.
Jojoga, O. W,
1978 Some Suggestions for Promoting Equilibrium in 
South Pacific Research. In A. Mamak and G. Me 
Call (eds.), Paradise Postponed. Rushcutters 
Bay: Pergamon Press: 90-94.
Jones, S.
1978 Tribal Underdevelopment in India. Development 
and Change, 9: 41-70,
Kahn, J. S.
1981 Explaining Ethnicity: A Review Article. Critique 
o f Anthropology. 4, (16): 43-52.
Kamath, M. V.
1981 Operation Gangajal. The Illustrated Weekly o f 
India, CII (2), January 11-17: 6-23.
Kannan, K. P.
1982 Forestry. Forest for Industry's Profit. Economic 
and Political Weekly, XVII (23) June 5: 936-937.
Keshari, B. P.
1980 Jhakhand Movement. Frontier, April 26: 3-5.
1982 Problem and Prospects of Jharkhandi Languages. 
In N. Sengupta (ed.), Fourth World Dynamics: 
Jharkhand, Delhi: Authors Guild Publ.: 137-164.
Keyes, C. F. (ed.)
1981 Ethnic Change. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press,
Klein, M.
1960 Envidia y Gratitud. In M. Klein and J. Rivi&re,
Las Emociones Bdsicas del Hombre. Buenos Aires: 
Nova.
Kluckhohn, C.
1951 The Study of Culture. In D. Lerner and H.
Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press: 86-101.
Koppar, D. H.
1976 Tribal Art and its Place in the Ethnological
Museum. The Eastern Anthropologist, 29 (1): 91 
-99.
Kroeber, A. L. and C. Kluckhohn
1950 The Concept of Culture: A Critical Review of
Definitions. Papers of the Peabody Museum. XLI, 
Boston: Harvard University Press.
Kulkarni, S.
1982 Encroachment on Forests. Government versus 
People. Economic and Political Weekly, XVII (3), 
January 16: 55-59,
1983 Towards a Social Forest Policy. Economic and 
Political Weekly, February 5: 191-196.
Kumar, Radha
1982 Will Feminist Standards Survive in Jharkhand?.
In N. Sengupta (ed.), Fourth World Dynamics: 
Jharkhand. Delhi: Authors Guild Publ.: 203-209.
Kumar, Rajiv
1981a and b Nationalisation by Default: The Case of 
Coal in India. Economic and Political Weekly.
Part I: XVI (17), April 25: 757-768; Part H:
XVI (18), May 2: 824-830.
Kumar, S.
197 8 Report o f the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes 1977-1978. Delhi: Govt, of 
India Press.
Kuper, L. and M. G. Smith (eds.)
1969 Pluralism in Africa. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press.
Kuper, L.
1971 Theories of Revolution and Race Relations.
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 13: 
87-107.
1974 Race, Class and Power. Ideology and
Revolutionary Change in Plural Societies.
London: Duckworth.
Laird, M. A. (ed.)
1971 Bishop Heber in Northern India. Selections from
Heber's Journal. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Langton, M,
1981 Urbanizing Aborigines: the Social Scientists'
Great Deception. Social Alternatives, 2 (2): 16 
-22.
1984 "Medicin Square": for the Recognition of
Aboriginal Swearing and Fighting as Customary 
Law. B.A. Honours thesis: Australian National 
University.
Lantemari, V.
1965 The Religion of the Oppressed. A Study o f Modern 
Messianic Cults. New York: Mentor Books.
1977 Crisi e Ricerca d'ldentitd. Folklore e Dinamica 
Culturale. Naples: Liguori.
Leclerc, G.
1972 Anthropologie et Colonialisme. Paris: Artheme 
Fayard.
Leiris, M.
1976 Folklore y Cultura Viva. In R. Jaulin (ed.). El 
Etnocidio a travis de las Americas, Mexico 
-Madrid-Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI: 303-320.
Lewis, I. M,
1986 Religion in Context. Cults and Charisma.
London: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, O.
1980 Anthropological Essays. New York: Random House.
Lijphart, A.
1968 The Politics o f Accomodation: Pluralism and 
Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Luck£cs, G.
1971 History and Class Consciousness. Studies in 
Marxist Dialectics. London: Merlin Press.
Luporini, C., E. Sereni et.al
1976 El Concepto de "Formation Econdmico-social".
Mexico, Siglo XXI.
Mac Dougall, J.
1977 Agrarian Reform vs. Religious Revitalization:
Collective Resistance to Peasantization among 
the Mundas, Oraons and Santals, 1858-1895. 
Contribution to Indian Sociology N.S„ 11 (2): 
296-327.
Me Eachem, D.
1976 The Mode of Production in India. Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 6 (4): 444-457.
Mafeje, A.
1971 The Ideology of Tribalism. The Journal o f Modern 
African Studies, 9 (2): 253-261.
1976 The Problem of Anthropology in Historical
Perspective: An Inquiry into the Growth of the 
Social Sciences. Canadian Journal o f African 
Studies, X (2): 307-333.
1981 On the Articulation of Modes of Production: 
Review Article. Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 8 (1): 123-138.
Magubane, B. M.
1976 The Evolution of the Class Structure in Africa.
In P.C.W. Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (eds.), The 
Political Economy of Contemporary Africa. 
London-Berkeley: Sage: 169-197.
1979 The Political Economy of Race and Class in South 
Africa. New York and London: Monthly Review 
Press.
Maharaj, R. N. and K. G. Iyer
1982 Agrarian Movement in Dhanbad. In N. Sengupta 
(ed.), Fourth World Dynamics: Jharkhand. Delhi: 
Authors Guild Publ.: 165-200.
Mahto, S.
1971 Hundred Years of Christian Missions in 
Ckotanagpur since 1845. Ranchi: G.E.L. Church 
Press.
Mair, L.
1936 Native Policies in Africa. London: Routledge. 
Malinowski, B,
1967 A Diary in the Strict Sense o f the Term. New . 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Man, E. G.
n.d. Sonthalia and the Sonthals. Calcutta: Geo. Wyman 
& Co. (Preface dated 1867).
Mandal, B. B.
1975 Are Tribal Cultivators in Bihar to be called 
"Peasants’'. Man in India, 55 (4): 335-362.
Maquet, J. J.
1964 Objectivity in Anthropology.Current 
Anthropology, 5:47-55.
Marcus, G. E. and D. Cushman
1982 Ethnographies as Texts. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 11: 25-69.
Marx, K.
1976 Capital. A Critique o f Political Economy. I,
London: Penguin New Left Review.
1978 Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. New York: 
International Publications.
Marx, K. andF. Engels
1968 The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
In K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works. 
London: Lawrence and Wishart.
1965 The German Ideology. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart.
Mathur, K. S.
1972 Tribe in India: a Problem of Identification and 
Integration. In K.S. Singh (ed.), Tribal 
Situation in India. Simla: Indian Institute of 
Advanced Studies: 457-461.
Mathur, K. S. and B. C. Agrawal
1974 Tribe, Caste and Peasantry. Lucknow: 
Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society.
Mathur, V. K.
1967 The Traditional-Modern Continuum. An Assumption 
in Tribal Development, Journal o f Social 
Research, X (2): 11-25.
Medick, H.
1982 Plebeian Culture in the Transition to 
Capitalism. In R. Samuel and G. S. Jones (eds,), 
Culture, Ideology and Politics. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul: 84-113.
Medina, A.
1983 Los Grupos Etnicos y los Sistemas Tradicionales 
de Poder en M6xico. Nueva Antropologta, V (20): 
5-29.
Mehta, B, K.
1982 Historical and Cultural Basis of Jharkhandi
Nationality, In N, Sengupta (ed,), Fourth World 
Dynamics: Jharkhand. Delhi: Authors Guild Publ.: 
91-103.
Meillassoux, C.
1972 From Reproduction to Production. Economy and 
Society, I (1): 93-105.
197 8 "The Economy" in Agricultural Self-Sustaining 
Societies: A Preliminary Analysis. In D. Seddon 
(ed.), Relations of Production. Marxist 
Approaches to Economic Anthropology. London: 
Frank Cass: 127-157.
Mies, M.
1976 The Shahada Movement: A Peasant Movement in 
Maharashtra (India). Its Development and its 
Perspectives. The Journal o f Peasant Studies, 3 
(4): 472-482.
1982 Violence against Women. Paper presented at the 
"Women and Society" program, Goethe Institute. 
New Delhi (mimeo).
Miles, R,
1980 Class, Race and Ethnicity: A Critique of Cox's 
Theory. Ethnic and Racial Studies, (3) 2: 169 
-187.
Mintz, N.
1979 Tribals are the Victims of Progress. The New 
Republic (Ranchi), August 14.
Mishra, G.
1970 History of Bihar, 1740-1772. New Delhi:
Munshiram Manoharlal.
Mitchell, J. C.
1960 Tribalism and the Plural Societies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
1969 Theoretical Orientations in African Urban
Studies: Methodological Approaches. In M. Banton 
(ed.), The Social Anthropology of Complex 
Societies. London: Tavistock: 37-68.
1974 Perceptions of Ethnicity and Ethnic Behaviour.
An Empirical Exploration. In A. Cohen (ed.), 
Urban Ethnicity. London: Tavistock: 1-35.
Mitra, A. (ed.)
1954 West Bengal District Records. N.S. Birbhum,
1786-1797 and 1855. Calcutta: Secretariat Press.
Mohapatra, P. P.
1985 Coolies and Colliers: a Study of Labour
Migration from Chotanagpur. Studies in History. 
(N.S.), 1 (2): 247-303.
Monckton Jones, M. E.
1918 Warren Hastings in Bengal 1772-1774, Vol. 9 of 
Oxford Historical and Literary Studies. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Monsivais, C.
1985 Interview. Proceso (Mexico), September.
Moser, R. R.
•1978 Movements versus Rebellions. In R.R. Moser and 
M.K. Gautam (eds.), Aspects o f Tribal Life in 
Sotuh Asia I: Strategy and Survival Beme: 
University of Berne: 123-134.
Mukheijea, C, L.
1943 The Santals. Calcutta: Mukheijee and Co.,
Mukherjee, K. and M. Kala
1979 Bhojpur: the Long Struggle. In A. N. Das and V. 
Nilakant (eds.), Agrarian Relations in India.
New Delhi: Manohar: 213-230.
Mukherjee, P.C. et.al.
1974 Movimientos Agrarios y Cambio Social en Asia,
Africa y America Latina. Mexico: El Colegio de 
Mexico,
Mukheijee, R.
1933 Land Problems of India. London: Longmans, Green 
& Co..
Mukhia, H.
1981 Was there Feudalism in Indian History?. The 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 8 (3); 273-310.
1985 Peasant Production and Medieval Indian Society.
The Journal o f Peasant Studies, 12 (2 & 3): 228 
-251.
Munda, R. D.
1967 Seled (in Mundari, Hindi and Nagpuri). Ranchi: 
Sahkari Prakashan Samiti.
(ed.)
1967 Hisir. Anthology of Twelve Munda Poets. Ranchi: 
Sahkari Prakashan Samiti.
Nairn, T.
1975 The Modem Janus. New Left Review, 94: 3-29.
Narayan, H.
1978 Bihar. The Pupri killings. Economic and 
Political Weekly, X3H (37): 1580-1581.
Narayan, S.
1984 Plan and Planned Development. Mainstream, August 
4: 25-27.
Nikolinakos, M.
1973 Notes on an Economic Theory of Racism. Race, XIV
(4): 365-381.
Nun, J.
1969 Superpoblacion Relativa, Ejercito Industrial de
Reserva y Masa Marginal. Revista Latinoamericana 
de Sociologia, V (2): 178-236.
Oberoi, H, S.
1986 The "New" Old Trope: The Application of
Psychohistory in the Study of Socio-Religious 
Movements in Colonial India. Studies in 
History, N.S., 2 (2): 255-273.
O'Malley, L. S. S.
1910 Bengal Distric Gazetteers, Santal Parganas.
Calcutta: The Bengal Secretariat Book Depot.
1938 Bihar District Gazetteers. Santal Parganas.
Patna: Superintendent of Govt. Printing.
Omvedt, G.
1981 Steel Workers, Contract Laboures and Adivasis. 
Economic and Political Weekly, XVI (30): 1227 
-1229.
Onoge, O.
1977 Revolutionary Imperatives in African Sociology.
In P.C.W. Gutkind and P. Waterman (eds,),
African Social Studies. London: Heinemann: 32 
-43.
1979 The Counterrevolutionary Tradition in African
Studies: The Case of Applied Anthropology. In G. 
Huizer and B. Manheim (eds.), From Colonialism 
and Sexism Toward a View from Below. The Hague: 
Mouton: 45-66.
Orans, M.
1965 The Santal. A Tribe in Search of a Great 
Tradition. Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press.
Ortega Heeg, M., J. Velez and E. Boege
1983 El Conflicto Etnia-Naci6n en Nicaragua. Nueva 
Antropologia, V (20): 53-66
Ortner, S. B.
1984 Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 26
(1): 126-166,
Owusu, M.
1978 Ethnography of Africa: The Usefulness of the
Useless. American Anthropologist, 80: 310-334.
Oxford University
1982 Oxford Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Pande, B. M.
1968 Development Schemes as Factors of Change in 
Tribal Areas. Journal o f Social Research, XI
(2): 33-57.
Pandey, M. S.
1963 The Historical Geography and Topography of 
Bihar. Delhi-Patna-Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidas.
Pardesi, G.
1980 Gua Incident, Operation Annihilation?.
Mainstream, XIX (11): 6-7,
Pasolini, P. P.
1982 Gramsci's Language. In Showstack Sassoon (ed.), 
Approaches to Gramsci. London; Writers & Readers 
Publ, Coorp. Soc.: 180-187.
Patel, M. L.
1974 Changing Land Problems o f Tribal India. Bhopal: 
Progress Publications.
Patel, S. J.
1952 Agricultural Labourers in Modern India and 
Pakistan. Bombay: Current Book House.
Pathy, J., P. Suguna and M. Bhaskar
1976 Tribal Studies in India: and Appraisal. The 
Eastern Anthropologist, 29 (4): 399-417.
Pathy, J.
1982 An Outline of Modes of Production in "Tribal 
India". In B. Chandhuri (ed.), Tribal 
Development in India. Problems and Prospects. 
Delhi: Inter-India Publ.: 23-48.
People's Union for Civil Liberties and Democratic Rights
1979 Repression in Singhbhum. New Delhi: P.U.C.L.
Pelzer W. C.
1986 Everyday Resistance, Socialist Revolution and 
Rural Development: the Vietnamese Case. The 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 13 (2): 49-63.
Post, K. W. J.
1979 The Alliance of Peasants and Workers: Some
Problems Concerning the Articulation of Classes 
(Algeria and China). In R. Cohen, P.C.W. Gutkind 
and P. Brazier, (eds.), Peasants and 
Proletarians, The Struggle of Third World 
Workers. London: Hutchinson: 265-285.
Prasad, B. (ed.)
1960 Fort William-India House Correspondence and 
other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto, VI 
(1770-1772), Delhi: Manager of Publication,
Govt, of India.
Prasad, P.
1973 Production Relations: Achilles Heel of Indian 
Planning. Economic and Political Weekly, Vm  
(19), May.
1974 Reactionary Role of Usurers’ Capital in India. 
Economic and Political Weekly, IX (32-34), 
August.
1979 Semi-Feudalism: The Basic Constraints of Indian 
Agriculture. In A.N. Das and V. Nilakant (eds.), 
Agrarian Relations in India. New Delhi: Manohar:
33-49.
Pratt, M. L.
1986 Fieldwork in Common Places. In J. Clifford and 
G. E. Marcus (eds.), Writing Culture. The 
Poetics and Politics o f Ethnography. Berkeley: 
University of California Press: 27-50.
Raghavaiah, V.
1971 Tribal Revolts. Nellore: AndhraRashtra Adimajati 
Sevak Sangh.
Ramos, A. R. and K. I. Taylor
1979 The Yanoama in Brazil. Copenhagen: IWGIA.
Ranger, T. O.
1983 The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa.
In E. Hobsbawn and T.O. Ranger (eds.), The 
Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 211-262.
Ranjan, A.
1981 Illegal Coal Mining: Deadly but Paying. New 
Delhi, March 16-29: 19-21.
Redfield, R.
1960 The Little Community and Peasant Society and 
Culture, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ribeiro, D.
1968 The Civilizational Process. Washington: 
Smithsonian Institute Press.
1969 Las Americas y la Civilizacion. Buenos Aires:
Ceal.
1981 Ethnicity, Peasantry and National Integration.
In Agiiero, Devalle, Tanaka (eds.), Peasantry and 
National Integration. Mexico: El Colegio de 
Mexico: 83-94.
1984 La Civilizacidn Emergente. Nueva Sociedad, 73: 
26-37.
Riches, D. (ed.)
1986 The Anthropology of Violence. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.
Ricoeur, P.
1971 The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action
Considered as a Text. Social Research, 38:185 
-218.
Risley, H.
1891 The Tribes and Castes of Bengal. Calcutta:
Bengal Secretariat Press.
1908 The People of India. London: Thacker Spink & 
Co..
Robbins, E.
1975 Ethnicity or Class? Social Relations in a Small
Canadian Industrial Community. In J.W. Bennett 
(ed.), The New Ethnicity. Perspectives from  
Ethnology. Los Angeles-San Francisco: West: 285 
-304.
Roseberry, W.
1982 Balinese Cockfights and the Seduction of
Anthropology. Social Research, 49: 1013-1028.
Roy, A.
1981 Second Phase of Jharkhand Movement. Frontier,
May 9: 2-3.
1982 Tribal Protest in Ranchi, Frontier, June 26:2 
-3.
334
Roy, A. G. et.al
1964 The Bihar Local Acts. 1793-1963, Vol. Ill 
Allahahad: Bharat Law House.
Roy, A. K.
1982a Jharkhand: Internal Colonialism, I. Frontier,
April 17: 4-7.
1982b Jharkhand: Internal Colonialism, n, Frontier, 
August 24: 8-10.
1983 Caste, Class, Nationality.... Frontier, June 4:
5-8.
Roy Burman, B. K.
1960 Basic Concepts of Tribal Welfare and Tribal 
Integration. In L.P. Vidyarthi (ed.), Indian 
Anthropology in Action. Ranchi: Ranchi 
University: 16-24.
1968 Some Dimensions of Transformation of Tribal 
Societies in India. Journal o f Social Research,
XI (1): 88-94.
1983a State and Tribals in India. Mainstream, November 
26: 16-18.
1983b Transformation of Tribes and Analogous Social
Formations. Economic and Political Weekly, XVII 
(27), July 2: 1172-1174.
Roy Chaudhury, P. C.
1958 Bihar District Gazetteers. Singhbhum. Patna: 
Secretariat Press.
1959 1857 in Bihar. Patna: Revenue Department, Bihar.
1965a Bihar District Gazetters. Santal Parganas.
Patna: Superintendent, Secretariat Press.
1965b Temples and Legends of Bihar. Bombay: Bharatiya 
Vidya Bhavan.
Roy, S. C.
1912 The Mundas and their Country. Calcutta: The City 
Book Society (2nd. ed. of 1970 also used).
1915 The Oraons of Chota Nagpur. Their History, 
Economic Life, and Social Organization.
Calcutta: The Brahmo Mission Press.
1961 The Administrative History and Land Tenures of 
the Ranchi District under British Rule. Man in 
India, 41 (4): 276-323, (1st. edition of 1914).
335
Rude, G.
1980 Ideology and Popular Protest. New York: Pantheon 
Books.
Rudra, A.
1978 Class Relations in Indian Agriculture, I.
Economic and Politics Weekly, XU (22), June 3: 
916-923.
Russell, R. V.
1916 The Tribes and Castes o f the Central Provinces 
o f India, IV. London: Macmillan & Co..
Saberwal, S.
1979 Sociologists and Inequality in India. The 
Historical Context Economic and Political 
Weekly, XIV (7 Sc 8) February (Annual Number): 
243-254.
Sachchidananda
1955 Caste and Class in Tribal Bihar, Man in India,
35 (3): 195-202.
1959 Political Consciousness in Tribal Bihar. Man in 
India, 39 (4): 301-308,
1964 Culture Change in Tribal Bihar. Munda and 
Oraon. Calcutta: Bookland Private Ltd..
1974 Bitlaha. In K. S. Mathur and B.C. Agrawal 
(eds.), Tribe, Caste and Peasantry. Lucknow: 
Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society: 48-53.
1976 The Tribal Voter in Bihar. New Delhi: National 
Publ. House.
1979 The Changing Munda. New Delhi: Concept Publ. 
Col..
Said, E. W.
1979 Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.
Sahay, K. N.
1980 The Transformation Scene in Chotanagpur: Hindu 
Impact on the Tribals. In P. Dash Sharma (ed.), 
The Passing Scene in Chotanagpur. Ranchi: 
Maitryee Publ.: 25-71.
Sahlins, M.
1968 Tribesmen. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall.
Samuel, R. (ed.)
1981 People's History and Socialist Theory. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Saul, J.
1979 The Dialectics of Class and Tribe. Race and 
Class, XX (4): 347-372.
Saxton, A.
1979 Historical Explanations of Racial Inequality.
Marxist Perspectives, 2 (2): 146-168.
Schemerhom, R. A.
1978 Ethnic Plurality in India. Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press.
Scott, J.
1977 Hegemony and the Peasantry. Politics and 
Society, 7 (3): 267-296.
1985 Weapons o f the Weak. Everyday Forms o f 
Resistance. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press.
1986 Political Analysis and the Hidden Transcript of 
Subordinate Groups. Paper presented at the Dept, 
of Anthropology, RSSR, ANU, Canberra.
Seddon, D. (ed.)
1978 Relations o f Production. Marxist Approaches to 
Economic Anthropology, London: Frank Cass.
Selboume, D.
1979 State and Ideology in India. Monthly Review, 31 
(7): 25-37.
Sen, J.
1972 The Jharkhand Movement. In K. S. Singh (ed.), 
Tribal Situation in India. Simla: Indian 
Institute of Advanced Study: 432-437.
Sengupta, N.
1979 The Destitute and Development: A Study o f the 
Bauri Community in Bokaro Steel City Region. New 
Delhi: Concept Publ..
1980 Class and Tribe in Jharkhand. Economic and 
Political Weekly, XV (14), April 15: 664-671.
1981 Beyond Marx’s Capital: "Sons of the Soil" in 
Particular, Ethnic Upsurges in General. Patna:
ANS Institute of Social Studies (mimeo).
337
(ed.)
1982a Fourth World Dynamics: Jharkhand, Delhi: Authors 
Guild Publ..
1982b Native Situation in India and Appraisal of 
Policies. M6xico, CEESTEM (mimeo).
1982c Agrarian Movement in Bihar. The Journal o f 
Peasant Studies, 9 (3): 15-39.
1984 From Peasant to Tribe. Peasant Movements in 
Chotanagpur. Paper presented at the Seminar on 
Peasants and Peasant Resistance in Eastern 
India. Shillong: North Eastern Hill University 
(mimeo).
1985 Irrigation: Traditional and Modem. Working 
Paper 55. Madras: Madras Institute of 
Development Studies.
1986 The March of an Idea: Evolution and Impact of
the Dychotomy Tribe-Mainstream. Mids Offprint 9. 
Madras: Madras Institute of Development Studies.
Sengupta, U.
1984 Koel-Karo: A Proyecl Doomed. The Telegraph, June 
28:7.
Shanin, T.
1972 The Awkward Class. Political Sociology of
Peasantry in a Developing Society: Russia 1910 
-1925. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
Sharma, R. S.
1965 Indian Feudalism c, 300-1200, Calcutta: Calcutta 
University.
(ed.)
1971 Land Revenue in India. Historical Studies,
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
1985 How Feudal was Indian Feudalism?. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 12 (2-3):19-45.
Showstack Sassoon, A.
1982 Hegemony, War of Position and Political
Intervention, In A. Showstack S as son (ed.), 
Approaches to Gramsci, L,ondon: Writers and 
Readers Publ. Coop.: 94-115.
Silverman, S.
1976 Ethnicity as Adaptation: Strategies and Systems.
Reviews in Anthropology (Nov.-Dee.): 626-636.
Simeon, D.
1982 Jharkhand. Community or Proletariat?. In N. 
Sengupta (ed,), Fourth World Dynamics:
Jharkhand. Delhi: Authors Guild Publ.: 210-230.
Singh, J.
1981 Illegal Mining Only Livelihood. The Times of 
India, March 23:19.
Singh, K. S.
1963 The Haribaba Movement in Chotanagpur, 1931-1932. 
The Journal o f the Bihar Research Society, XLIX 
(I-IV): 284-296.
1966 The Dust-Storm and the Hanging Mist. A Study of 
Birsa Munda and his Movement in Chotanagpur 
(1874-1901). Calcutta: Mukhopadhyay.
1971a The Munda Land System and Revenue Reforms in 
Chotanagpur during 1869-1908. In R.S. Sharma 
(ed.), Land Revenue in India. Historical 
Studies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas: 80-107.
1971b State-formation in Tribal Society: Some
Preliminary Observations. Journal of the Indian 
Anthropological Society, 6 (2): 161-181.
1972a Agrarian Issues in Chotanagpur. In K. S. Singh 
(ed.), Tribal Situation in India. Simla:
Institute for Advanced Study: 374-387.
(ed.)
1972b Tribal Situation in India. Simla: Indian 
Institute of Advanced Study.
1977 From Ethnicity to Regionalism: A Study in Tribal 
Politics and Movements in Chotanagpur from 1900 
to 1975. In S.C. Malik (ed.), Dissent, Protest 
and Reform in Indian Civilization. Simla: Indian 
Institute of Advanced Study: 317-343.
1982 Transformation of Tribal Society. Integration
vs. Assimilation, Economic and Political Weekly, 
XVn (33), August 14:1318-1325.
1985 Tribal Society in India. New Delhi: Manohar.
Sinha, A.
1978a Class War in Bhojpur. Economic and Political 
Weekly, XIII (1), January 7: 10-11.
1978b Bihar. The Bishrampur Carnage. Economic and 
Political Weekly, XIII (13), April 1: 568-569.
1978c Development versus People. Economic and 
Political Weekly, XHI (18), May 6:750-751.
1978d Resurgent Adivasis, Economic and Political
Weekly, XIII (36), September 9: 1544-1546.
1980 Bihar: Who Destroys the Forests?. The New 
Republic, October 14: 2.
1982a Struggles against Bureaucratic Capitalism. In N. 
Sengupta (ed,), Fourth World Dynamics: 
Jharkhand. Delhi: Authors Guild Publ,: 111-134.
1982b Class War, not "Atrocities agains Harijans", The 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 9 (3): 148-152.
Sinha, B. B.
1979 Socio-Economic Life in Chota Nagpur, 1858-1935. 
Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation.
Sinha, D. P.
1972 Tribalism, Pluralism and Nationalism: Levels of 
Cultural Identity in Banari. In K.S. Singh 
(ed.), Tribal Situation In India. Simla: Indian 
Institute of Advanced Study: 494-501.
Sinha, N. K.
1962 The Economic History of Bengal, Vol. II.
Calcutta: Mukhopadhyay.
Sinha, R. N.
1968 Bihar Tenantry, 1783-1833, Bombay: People's 
Publishing House.
Sinha, S.
1953 Some Aspects of Change in Bhumij Religion in
South Manbhum. Bihar. Man in India, 33 (2): 148 
-164.
1962 State Formation and Rajput Myth in Tribal 
Central India. Man in India, 42 (1): 35-80.
1965 Tribe-Caste and Tribe-Peasant Continua in 
Central India. Man in India. 45 (1): 57-83.
1974 Levels of Economic Initiative and Ethnic Groups 
in Pargana Barabhum. In K.S. Mathur and B.C. 
Agrawal. Tribe, Caste and Peasantry. Lucknow: 
Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society: 54-63.
1982 Re-thinking about Tribes and Indian
Civilization. In B. Chaudhuri (ed.), Tribal 
Development in India. Delhi: Inter-India Publ.: 
3-13.
340
Sinha, S. P.
1959 The First Birsa Rising (1895). The Journal o f
the Bihar Research Society, XLV (I-IV): 391-403.
1964 Life and Times o f Birsa Bhagwan. Ranchi: Bihar 
Tribal Research Institute.
1972 Some Typical British Experiments in
Administration in Tribal Areas. Journal o f 
Administrative Training Institute, August,
Ranchi: Govt, of Bihar: 12-20.
Sinha, U.
1985 Bihar. Teaching the Santhals a Lesson. Economic 
and Political Weekly, XX (24): June 15:1028 
-1029.
1987a Thinning Patience. The Week, 5 (50), November 
29: 37.
1987b A Rite of Death. The Week, 5 (50), November 29: 
40.
Siverts, H.
1970 Ethnic Stability and Boundary Dynamics in 
Southern Mexico. In F. Barth (ed.), Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries. London: George Allen and 
Unwin: 101-116.
Sklar, R. L.
1967 Political Science and National Integration. A
Radical Approach. The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 5 (1): 1-11.
Sloan, W. N.
1979 Ethnicity or Imperalism?, A Review Article.
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 21: 
113-125.
Smith, M. G.
1965 The Plural Society in the British West Indies.
Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Somers, G. E.
1977 The Dynamics o f Santal Traditions in a Peasant 
Society. New Delhi: Abhinav.
Southall, A.
1961 Social Change, Demography and Extrinsinc
Factors. In A. Southall (ed.), Social Change in 
Modern Africa. London: Oxford University Press: 
1-13.
1970 The Illusion of Tribe. Journal of Asian and 
African Studies, V (1 & 2): 28-50.
Spear, P. (ed.)
1958 The Oxford History o f India. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Srinivas, M. N.
1966 Social Change in Modern India. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Srivastava, A.
1979a Bihar. New Trends in Rural Violence, Frontier,
March 5: 2-4.
1979b Bihar: "Trade Union" Murders in Dhanbad.
Economic and Political Weekly, XIV (10), March 
10: 550.
1980a RSS in Adivasi Belt, Frontier, January 19: 6-7.
1980b "Encounters" in Bhojpur. Frontier, December 13:
6-7.
1981a Formation of a Morcha. Frontier, January 24: 3 
-4.
1981b Christian Missionaries in Tribal Belt (I),
Frontier, February 21:4-6 and (II) March 7: 8 
- 11.
Srivastava, L. R. N. et.al.
1971 Education and Economic Condition and Employment 
Position of 18 Tribes. Delhi: National Council
of Educational Research and Training.
Stavenhagen, R.
1968 Seven Fallacies about Latin America. In J.
Petras andM. Zeitlin (eds,), Latin America:
Reform or Revolution. Greenwich: Fawcett: 14-31.
1973 The Future of Latin America: Between
Underdevelopment and Revolution. Latin American 
Perspectives'. 124-148.
1975 Las Closes Sociales en las Sociedades Agrarias.
Mexico: SigloXXI.
1981 Decolonizing the Applied Social Sciences. In R. 
Stavenhagen, Between Underdevelopment and 
Revolution: a Latin American Perspective. New 
Delhi: Abhinav
1982 Indian Ethnic Movements and State Policies in
Latin America. Paper presented at the Symposium 
on Ethnic Minorities and National States.
M6xico: CEESTEM.
1984a Las Minorias Culturales y los Derechos Humanos 
en America Latina. Mexico: El Colegio de M6xico 
and The United Nations University.
1984b Los Movimientos Etnicos Indfgenas y el Estado 
Nacional en America Latina. Civilizacidn, 2: 
181-204.
1985 The Indigenous Problematique. Ifda Dossier, 50: 
3-14.
Stein, B.
1985 Politics, Peasants and the Deconstruction of 
Feudalism in Medieval India. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 12 (2 & 3): 54-86.
Tatz, C.
1982 Aborigines and Uranium and Other Essays. 
Richmond: Heineman Educational Australia.
Texier, J.
1976 Desacuerdos sobre la Definicidn de los 
Conceptos. In Luporini, Sereni et.al, El 
Concepto de "Formacidn Economico-Social", 
M6xico: Siglo XXI: 190-195.
Thapar, R.
1966 A History of India. Vol. 1. Middlesex: Penguin.
Thapar, Romesh
1980 Blind, Blind, Blind.... Economic and Political 
Weekly, XV (52), December 27: 21-67.
Thapar, R. and M. H. Siddiqi
1979 Chota Nagpur: the Precolonial and Colonial
Situation. In Trends in Ethnic Groups Relations 
in Asia and Oceania. Paris: UNESCO - Series Race 
and Society: 19-64.
Thomas, K.
1963 History and Anthropology, Past and Present, 24,
April: 3-24,
Thomas, M. M. and R. W. Taylor (eds.)
1965 Tribal Awakening. A Group Study. Bangalore: 
Christian Institute for the Study of Religion 
and Society.
Thompson, E. P.
1967 Time, Work-discipline and Industrial Capitalism. 
Past and Present, (38): 56-97.
1968 The Making o f the English Working Class. 
Middlesex: Penguin.
1972 Anthropology and the Discipline of Historical 
Context. Midland History, I (3): 41-55.
1974 Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture. Journal of 
Social History, 1 (4): 382-405.
1977 Folklore, Anthropology and Social History.
Indian Historical Review, 3 (2): 247-266.
1978 Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class 
Struggle without Class?. Social History, 3 (3); 
133-165.
1980 The Poverty o f Theory and Other Essays. London: 
Merlin Press.
1981 The Politics of Theory. In R. Samuel (ed.),
People's History and Socialist Theory. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul: 396-408.
Thorner, A.
1982 Semi-Feudalism or Capitalism? Contemporary 
Debate on Classes and Modes of Production in 
India. Economic and Political Weeklyt XVII (49 
50 and 51),
Thorner, D. and A. Thorner
1965 Land and Labour in India. Lucknow and Bombay:
Asia Publishing House.
Tomasson Jannuzi, F.
1974 Agrarian Crisis in India. The Case o f Bihar.
Austin and London: University of Texas Press.
Turner, V.
1969 The Ritual Process. Structure and Anti 
-Structure. Middlesex: Penguin.
1974 Dramas, Fields and Metaphors. Symbolic Action in 
Human Society. Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press.
1982 From Ritual to Theatre. The Human Seriousness o f 
Play. New York: Performing Arts Journal 
Publications.
Turton, A.
1984 Limits of Ideological Domination and the
Formation of Social Consciousness. In A. Turton 
and Shigeharu Tanabe (eds.), History and Peasant 
Consciousness in South East India. Osaka: 
National Museum of Ethnography: 19-73.
UNESCO-CLACSO
1976 Diccionario de Ciencias So dales, Vol. n.
Madrid: UNESCO.
Upadhyaya, A.
1979 Peasant Movements in Western India. A Tentative 
Hypothesis. In A. N. Das and V. Nilakant. 
Agrarian Relations in India. Delhi: Manohar: 
169-187.
van der Berghe, P. L.
1976 Ethnic Pluralism in Industrial Societies. A 
Special Case?. Ethnicity, 3: 242-255.
van der Leeuw, G.
1964 Fenomenologfa de la Religion. Mexico: F.C.E,
van Exem, A.
1973 Basic Socio-Economic Attitudes of Chotanagpur 
Tribals. Ranchi: The Catholic Cooperative 
Society.
1975 Evangelization Today. A Local Church Reflects. 
Ranchi: Ranchi Jesuit Society.
Varese, S.
1975 Etnologia de Urgencia, Conciencia Etnica y 
Participacidn Social en el Peril. America 
Indigena, XXXV, (2):251-263.
1978 El Falso Estado: Hipdtesis sobre la 
Multietnicidad en Peru y Mexico. Oaxaca, Mexico: 
Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia 
(mimeo).
1979 Estrategia Etnica o Estrategia de Clase?. In 
Documentos de la Segunda Reunidn de Barbados, 
Indianidad y Descolonizacion en America Latina. 
Mexico: Nueva Imagen: 357-372.
1980 El Rey Despedazado: Resistencia Cultural y
Movimientos Etnopoliticos de Liberacidn India. 
Mexico: SEP (mimeo).
1981 The Difficult Pluralism: Multiethnicity and 
National Revolution in Peru. In Agiiero, Devalle, 
Tanaka (eds.), Peasantry and National 
Integration. Mexico: El Colegio de Mdxico: 99 
-111 .
1988 Movimientos Indios de Liberacidn Nacional. In S. 
Devalle (edA La Diversidad Prohibida. 
Resistencia Etnica y Poder de Estado. Mexico: El 
Colegio de Mdxico (in press).
Vidyarthi, L. P.
1960 Anthropology and Tribal Policy: A Case Study 
among the Maler Paharia: Some Preliminar 
Thoughts. In L.P. Vidyarthi (ed.), Indian 
Antropology in Action. Ranchi: Ranchi 
University.
1967a Some Preliminary Observations on Inter-Group 
Conflicts in India: Tribal, Rural and 
Industrial. Journal o f Social Research, X (2):
1- 10.
1967b Aspects of Tribal Leadership In Chota Nagpur. In 
L.P. Vidyarthi (ed.), Leadership in India. 
Bombay: Asia Publishing House: 127-144.
1969 Cultural Configuration of Ranchi. Survey o f an 
Emerging Industrial City o f Tribal India (I960 
-1962). Calcutta: Punthi Pustak.
1970 Socio-Cultural Implications of Industrialization 
in India. A Case Study of Tribal Bihar. Delhi: 
Research Programmes Committee, Planning 
Commission.
Vidyarthi, L. P. and K. N. Sahay
1976 The Dynamics of Tribal Leadership in Bihar. 
Allahabad: Kitab Mahal.
Vikas Maitri
1970 . The Silent Revolution. A Report o f the Second 
All-Chotanagpur Seminar. Ranchi: The Printer.
Volken, H.
1979 Vikas Maitri: A People's Organization in 
Chotanagpur. Ranchi: Sudarshan Press.
Vovelle, M.
1982 Ideologies and Mentalities. In R. Samuel and 
G.S. Jones (eds.), Culture, Ideology and 
Politics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul: 84 
-113.
Weiner, M., M, Fainsod Katzenstein and Narayama Rao
1981 India's Preferential Policies. Migrants, Middle 
Classes and Ethnic Equality. Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press.
Williams, R.
1976 Culture and Society, 1780-1950. Middlesex:
Penguin.
1978 Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
1982 The Sociology of Culture. New York: Schocken 
Books.
Wolf, E. R.
1975 On Peasant Rebellions. In T. Shanin (ed.), 
Peasants and Peasant Societies. Middlesex: 
Penguin: 264-274.
Wolpe, H.
1971 The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South
African Case. In I. Oxaal, T. Barnett and D.
Booth (eds.), Beyond the Sociology o f 
Development. London-Boston-Henley: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul: 229-252.
1972 Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South 
Africa: from Segregation to Apartheid. Economy 
and Society, 1: (4): 425-456.
(ed.)
1980 The Articulation of the Modes of Production. 
London: Routledge'and Kegan Paul.
Worsley, P.
1970 The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of "Cargo"
Cults in Melanesia. New York: Schocken Books.
Xavier Institute of Social Service (XISS) (Ranchi)
1980 Development from Below. Notes for Workers 
Engaged in Rural Development and Adult 
Education. Ranchi: Bagla Press.
Zide, N. H. and R. D, Munda
1969 Revolutionary Birsa and the Songs related to
him. Journal o f Social Research, XII (2): 37-60.
Zide, N. H.
1971 Some Munda Etymological Notes on Names in the 
Ramayana. The Journal o f Ganganath Jha Kendriya 
Vidyabeeth (Allahabad), XXVII: 747-763.
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
Government of Bihar and Orissa,
Legislative Department
1931 The Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908,
Patna: Superintendent of Govt. Printing.
Government of India
1952 Report o f the Scheduled Castes and
Tribes Commission. New Delhi: Govt, of 
India Press.
1961 Report o f the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes Commission, 1 (1960-
1961). New Delhi: Govt, of India Press.
1962 Report o f the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes Commission, U.N. Dhebar 
(Chairman). New Delhi: Govt, of India 
Press.
1962 Census o f India 1961. Bihar, Ranchi, 15.
Delhi: Manager of Publications.
1967 Report o f the Commissioner for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, (1946-
1965). Delhi: Manager of Publications.
1968 Census Altas o f Bihar. (Census of India,
1961), IV (Bihar), IX. Patna: Bihar
Secretariat Press.
1976 Report o f the National Commission on_
Agriculture, IX: Forestry. New Delhi:
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.
1980 Census o f India 1971. Bihar, series 4,
IV-A. Delhi: Manager of Publications.
1982 Statistical Abstract, India, 1980, New 
Series (25), New Delhi: Govt of India
Press.
1983 Census o f India 1981. Primary Census 
Abstract. Scheduled Tribes. Delhi:
Controller of Publications.
Department of Economic & Statistics, Min. of Food and Agriculture
1956 Agricultural Legislation in India, VI
("Land Reforms. Reforms in Tenancy").
Delhi: Manager of Publications.
Industrial Development Bank of India
1971 Industrial Potential Survey. Bihar._ 
Report o f a Study Team, Bombay:
Industrial Bank of India.
D O  C U M E N T S
Declaration of Barbados (1971). Copenhagen: IWGIA.
Diary of R. I. Richardson, Bhagalpur Collector. In A. Mitra (ed.), West 
Bengal District Records, N.S. Birbhum, 1786-1797 and 1855. Calcutta, 
1954.
Document of the Judicial Department, No. 42 of 1856, from W. H. 
Tykes and other directors to the Governor-General, dated London 
October l 2, 1856. In R. C. Roy Chaudhuri, 1857 in Bihar. Patna, 1959: 
Revenue Department, Bihar: 21:30.
Document N2 3254, Home (Judicial) Department Proceedings, dated 
July 11, 1871, from Sir. C. Bay ley, Secretary of the 
BengalGovemment, Judicial Department, to the Secretary of the Indian 
Govenment, Ministry of the Interior. In P. C. Roy Chaudhury, Bihar 
District Gazetteers. Santal ParganasPdXm: Superintendent, Secretariat 
Press.
Document relating to 22 convicts sentenced by the Birbhum Judge on 
December 3,1855. In A. Mitra (ed,), West Bengal District Records, N. 
S. Birbhum, 1786-1797 and 1855. Calcutta, 1954.
Letters from several Bhagalpur Planters to W. Theobald. Secretary of 
the Indigo Planters Association, dated 31-1-1856, received in Fort 
William on 28-1-1856, Bengal Judicial .Proceedings, 33,1856.
Letter from W. Theobald, Secretary, Indigo Planters Association to 
Grey, Secretary of the Bengal Government, dated 2-11-1856. 6, 
received in Fort William on 28-11-1856. Bengal Judicial Proceedings. 
33, 1856.
Letter from A. Cleveland to W. Hastings, dated November 1779. In 
L.S.S. O'Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers. Santal Parganas. Calcutta, 
1910: The Bengal Secretariat Book Depot.
Letter from A. Cleveland to the Honorable Board of Directors, dated 
February 1783. In L. S. S. O'Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers. Santal 
Parganas. Calcutta, 1910: The BengalSecretariat Book Dep6t.
Letter  from G. Loch, Collector at Bhagalpur, to G. F. Brown, 
Commissioner of Revenue at Bhagalpur, dated September 18,1850. In 
P. C. Roy Chandhury, 1857 in Bihar. Patna, 1959: Revenue 
Department, Bihar.
Letter from the Secretary of the Governor of Bengal to A.C. Bidwell, 
dated August 6,1855 (N2 1808). In A. Mitra (ed.), West Bengal District 
Records, N. S. Birbhum, 1786-1797 and 1855. Calcutta, 1954.
Letter from J. R. Ward, Special Commissioner, to the Suri Collector, 
dated September 9, 1855. In A. Mitra (ed.), West Bengal District 
Records, N. S. Birbhum, 1786-1797 and 1855. Calcutta, 1954.
Letter from R. I. Richardson, Bhagalpur Collector, to Brigadier Bird, 
dated September 13, 1855. In A. Mitra (ed.), West Bengal District 
Records, N. S. Birbhum, 1786-1797 and 1855. Calcutta, 1954.
Letter from R> I. Richardson, Bhagalpur Collector to Colonel Burney, 
dated September 21, 1855. In A. Mitra (ed.), West Bengal District 
Records, N. S. Birbhum, 1786-1797 and 1855. Calcutta, 1954.
Letter ffom Mr. Pontet to the Collector at Bhagalpur, dated January 1, 
1857. Bengal Judicial Records,
Letter from Mr. Pontet, Superintendent of the Damini-i-Koh to Mr, H. 
J. James, Acting Collector at Bhagalpur, dated July 17, 1823. In P. C. 
Roy Chaudhuri, 1857 in Bihar. Patna, 1959: Revenue Department, 
Bihar: 3.
Petition ffom Seedoo and Kanoo Manjhis to the inhabitants of Rajmahal, 
included in a letter form A. C. Bidwell to Mr. Grey, the Secretary of the 
Governor of Bengal, dated February 14,1856 (N -157). Bengal Judicial 
Records.
Petition ffom Nursingh Manjhi and Kudru Manjhi to the Commissioner 
at Bhagalpur dated August 29, 1854, included in a letter for A. C. 
Bidwell to Mr. Grey, the Secretary of the Governor of Bengal, dated 
February 14,1856 (N2 157). Bengal Judical Records.
Report from Mr. Pontet, Superintendent of the Damin-i-Koh, to the 
Commissioner at Bhagalpur, dated August 1848, quoted in a letter from 
A. C. Bidwell to Mr. Grey, the Secretary of the Governor of Bengal, 
dated February 1,1857 (N2 157). Bengal Judicial Records.
Report from Mr. Pontet to the Commissioner at Bhagalpur, dated May 
1851, quoted in a letter from A. C. Bidwell to Mr. Grey, the Secretary 
of the Governor of Bengal, dated February 17, 1856 (N2 157), Bengal 
Judicial Records.
Santal Communiques included in a letter from several Bhagalpur 
planters to W. Theobald, Secretary of the Indigo Planters Association, 
dated January 31,1856 and received at Fort William on February 28, 
1856.
NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
Calcutta Review
"The Sonthal Rebellion" (1855), "The Friends of India" (1856), XXVI, 
(LI), March: 233-264.
Economic and Political Weekly
1975 Bihar. Material B ase of S antal Movement,
X (11), March 15: 464-465.
1979a Containing the Jharkhand Movement, XIV 
(14), April 7: 648-650.
350
1979b Singhbhum. Exploitation, Protest and 
Repression, XIV (22), June 2: 940-943.
1979c Bihar. Dhanbad's Dispossessed Peasants, 
XIV, (33), August 18: 1411-1412.
1980a Class and Caste in Parasbigha Massacre, 
XV (8) February 23: 421.
1980b A Culture of Torture, XV (48), November 
29: 1993-94.
1980c Dhanbad: New Aspects of Coalfield 
Politics, XV (49), December 6: 2046.
1981 Bihar. Illegal Plunder of Mines and
Tribals of Kolhan, XVI (38), September 
19:1525.
1982a Coal Mines. Slaughter of Mines and
Miners, XVII (40), October 9:1641-1642.
1982b When the Forest Dissappear, We Will Also 
Dissappear, XVII (48), November 27: 
1901-1902.
Frontier
1979a Arms toHarijans, March 17:7-8.
1979b Bihar Incidents, November 10: 4.
1980a Another Santal Rebellion?, April 26:7-8.
1980b The Mineworkers of Singhbhum, 12 (51), 
August 16:2:7.
1980c More About Gua, 13 (5), September 27: 4- 
5.
1981a A Gua Report, 14, March 21: 7-8.
1981b Jharkhandi Justice, May 16: 5-6
1983 Forest Policy and Tribal Problem,
January 15: 9-10.
India Today
1986a Jharkhand. Renewed Call, February 28: 3.
1986b Bihar. Area of Darkness, December 31: 
40-43.
1983 Ground into the Dust, August 31: 50-53.
Link
1971 Issue. December 5:25-26.
1978 Children of the Forests. August 6: 21- 
23.
1981 Arms and the Man. The Gun has a Caste, 
December 6:16-17.
1982a Before Drought Turns Famine, 25 (12), 
October 31: 9,11-12;
1982b Santhals. Victims of Double Cheat, 25 
(13), November7: 10-11.
1982c Adivasis Feel Bitter, 25 (13), November 
7: 11-12.
1983 Forward Caste: Criminal Acts, January 
16: 9-10.
Newsweek
1987 A Grim Journey to the "Other India",
June 15: 20-21.
Patriot
1980 Steps to Prevent Harvesting Clashes, 
November 25: 4,
*
Pioneer
1984 Jharkhand Party no more a Challenge, 
December 14.
The Bengalee
1886 Slavery in British Dominion, XXVII (39), 
September 25; (40), October 2; (41), 
October 23; Child Life in Tea Gardens 
(42), October 30; (43), November 6;
(49), December 19; 1887 XVIH (4), 
January 22.
The Hindustan Times
1981 Coal Belt Land Acquisition Challenged, 
January 20.
1986 Who Will Save Belchchi?, September 7: 6- 
7.
The Illustrated Weekly o f India
1981 CII (2), January 11-17: 6-23.
The Indian Express
1980a Supreme Cart has a Look at Blinded 
Victims. Let this not Happen to Others, 
December 3: front page.
1980b Minister Was Aware of Blinding Campaign, 
December 12, front page,
1980c New Body Formed to Fight Oppression, 
December 17.
The New Republic (Ranchi)
1980a Unchain Birsa, February 23: Letters to 
the editor section.
1980b Confrontation in Tata and CCL
Collieries. Whom to Absorb "Sons" or 
“Sons of the Soil"?, July 19: 3.
1980c Indiscriminated Felling of Trees to
Stop, Assures Shibu Soren, November 1:
3.
1980d Justin Richards Castigates Processes of 
"Detribalization", November 1: front 
page,
1980e Police Open Fire Near Chakra Dharpur, 
November 29: front page.
1980f Paltry Compensation Irks Singhbhum 
Villages, December 6: 3.
1980g Ban on Bows and Arrows Withdrawn, 
December 6: front page.
The Stateman
1980a Harvesting Clash: One Killed, December
4.
1980b Santhal Group Teargassed, December 12.
1980c The Sound of Defiance in Tribal Areas, 
December 13:5,
1983 Tribals in Bihar Agitated, March 9:5,
1984a Singhbhum Courts Asked to Release 
Adivasi Prisoners, September 26:3.
1984b Minicement Plant in Orissa Tribal 
Village, November 17.
The Telegraph
1984 Bihar. Koel-Karo: A Project Doomed, June 
28:7.
The Times o f India
1978a Adivasis Stop Work on Hydel Projects, 
May 7.
1978b Tribal Agitators Destroy Trees, December 
13.
353
1981a Tribes Hopes of Jobs Belied, 15 
February.
198 lb  Bihar no Different After Bhagalpur, 
March 12; 3.
1981c 4 Killed by Adivasis in Purnea, March 
10: 5.
198 Id $32 m Saudi Loan for Bihar Project April 
15.
The Week
1987 5 (50), November 29: 34-40.
